If history had been different...

[Raverdave]

Yeah I enjoyed that book..........was a good read.

[mdiehl]

You do have a point, that nobody would have believed it if it hadn't happened.

You mean apart from the fact that it had already been predicted ten years before it happened, right? Wasn't a PH air-strike scenario the subject of a fiction written in the early 1930s?

[TIMJOT]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl


You mean apart from the fact that it had already been predicted ten years before it happened, right? Wasn't a PH air-strike scenario the subject of a fiction written in the early 1930s?
]

If you are refering to "The Great Pacific War" (Bywater) I don't believe he predicted an PH air-strike. Although I think he did predict some sort of surface or sub/mine raid. He did however accurately predict the surprise attack and invasion of the Philipines, right down to the actual landing sites and line of advance.

Adm. King did demonstrate it was possible in a Fleet Problem in the early 30s.

[Nikademus]

The USN conducted a mock attack on PH during one of their Fleet Problems in the early 1930's. Believe the attacking team involved the Saratoga. Their airgroups were ruled to have achieved suprise.

I doubt they ever considered the Japanese capable of such a feat, + the harbor was considered proof against torpedo attack. At the time of the attack too, the weapons involved were too light to be able to seriously damage battleships which only reinforced the "gun club"'s prejidice against airpower

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Well...

i did not say "things would have been much better for the japanese"... just that the answer of your (rethorical) question isn´t so sure...

i mean, if the americans know everything about the plan, this could went wrong anyway.. because of xxxx (fill in something we haven´t thought about)... also i (attention, my personal opinion) see the "old" american battlesips as not stable (BEFORE Refitting and repair), so, comaparing the huge but repairable damages at PH with deadly damages in the deep water, i belive the losses would be higher...

If the americans could surprise the japanese carrier fleet with guns, well here i can´t see this happen because of the speed advantage of the japanese... some salvos, maybe, but that´s it.. 20-21 knots maximum speed compared with 30-31... nah, and if they do not hit critically the carriers (and american gunners were not battle hardened, the radar of 1941 wasn´t so good or built in (i could check it but i am too lazy in the moment) they will be sunk (again, just my opinion).

If the fighters could catch the japanese planes with surprise, this would be the "best" chance in my opinion, but i bet the american bombers would hit nothing in the try to bomb the japanese carrier fleet.
Also, if the battlewagons escape, this could lead to the wrong decision, to ignore the carriers and bet on the battleships...

but, sure, nobody could know it - only if this had happened... [:D]

ORIGINAL: CynicAl

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi

Nah... it isn´t so easy...

the americans thought about the japanese as inferior yellow guys... no match for americans....

if the ships had been in open sea, the losses of japanese planes would have been larger, but the american ship losses... no, i think they had been higher... the old ships recived large improvements after their repairs... in open water, you can´t recover the ships... so sitting in the harbour was bad, but in open sea, with first shoot experience against the jap carrier fleet...

also, how detailed are the informations and how should the usn react ? if i would be kimmel, i had but the ships in more shallow waters, partly flooded (esp. the ammo bunkers), extra flak cannons ready and any flying plane ready to start to counterstrike the japanese strike... also the carriers nearing the spot to launch the own bombers to kill the japanese carriers... maybe i loose the same amount of ships, but less damaged, less personell losses and a great chance to kill most of the best pilots in this area... and with some more luck, i get some carriers...

but in the deep ocean, you loose just more men and equippment... these battlewagons could absorb a lot damage, but flak fire wasn´t as good as later and just knowing that the japs come, do not help against a lot torpedos (in open water, the difficulty aproach for the japanese pilots is much easier, so the flak fire troubles will be lessen by easy aproach...)

just my opinion...[;)]

ORIGINAL: CynicAl



Correct me if I'm wrong, but it appears that what you're asking is: "Was the battle fleet better off stationary, with nobody manning the guns and generally in an unready condition, than they would have been maneuvering in the open ocean, shooting back (with additional AA fire from escorting cruisers and destroyers), and in an alert posture (watertight doors closed, DC crews on standby, etc)?" There's only one possible answer to that.

Yes, it really is that easy. Remember that the original question asked what posters would do as the US with better intel about the impending IJN raid on Pearl Harbor. This implies a point of departure after Nagumo is told to "Climb Mt. Niitaka," when the Japanese plan was already set, so they are going to proceed as IRL until they see the US doing something ahistorical.

I was going to type up a long, detailed post here, but I'll save myself considerable time and trouble by just pointing you to a series of posts made by "Electric Joe" in this thread from the Warships1 forums (see particularly "B-17s and IJN contingencies" and "Not Likely," also "The reasons Nagumo didn't launch a..."), as he's already said it rather better than I could.

[mdiehl]

, but i bet the american bombers would hit nothing in the try to bomb the japanese carrier fleet.

Whatever. [8|]

[CynicAl]

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi

Well...

i did not say "things would have been much better for the japanese"... just that the answer of your (rethorical) question isn´t so sure...

i mean, if the americans know everything about the plan, this could went wrong anyway.. because of xxxx (fill in something we haven´t thought about)...

It's always possible that some Mystery Factor XXXX that nobody's thought of can arise and change everything around. But if your plans depend on such an unknown - even to yourself! - factor, then I humbly submit that your plans need more work. [8D]

also i (attention, my personal opinion) see the "old" american battlesips as not stable (BEFORE Refitting and repair),

In fact, I believe that all the Standards had received bulges (which would tend to increase stability) in prewar refits. I'm sure none of them were carrying the greatly increased - and correspondingly heavier, increasing topweight and decreasing stability - AAA suites they were fitted with later in the war. So I'm not sure exactly where you got that "unstable" idea from.

so, comaparing the huge but repairable damages at PH with deadly damages in the deep water, i belive the losses would be higher...

I really can't figure out why you assume the Japanese would inflict as much damage vs. maneuvering, screened, shooting targets as they did IRL against stationary, open, largely defenseless targets. At Pearl Harbor, they achieved ~50% hits with torpedos (~20 of 40 according to one fairly generous count), and quite a bit less with level bombing (<15 of 50, and they didn't have to worry about obstructed approaches). It is profoundly unlikely that they would do that well against maneuvering, defended targets - IRL the Kates hit with 7 torps in 70 drops (10%) over the course of 1942, and the level bombers would need a miracle to hit anything at all. Worse for Japan, the ships would have all watertight hatches secure, and damage control parties standing by to deal with the hits that do get through - so individual hits will be much less likely to be immediately fatal (i.e., no repeat of California going down to just two hits).

If the americans could surprise the japanese carrier fleet with guns, well here i can´t see this happen because of the speed advantage of the japanese... some salvos, maybe, but that´s it.. 20-21 knots maximum speed compared with 30-31...

Who said anything about engaging Kido Butai with the battle line? I'm pretty sure it wasn't me. All I want is six hours' warning to get the fleet out of the harbor and safely over the horizon, in pretty much any direction. Given the RL IJN scouting plan from 7 December, not only will they never find my fleet, they won't even realize I'm not there and they have to search for it until a few minutes before the first wave of bombers arrives over the harbor! However, since you bring it up...

Given really good intelligence, like supernaturally good, and at least one days' warning, it just might, maybe, be possible to get the fleet into position for an ambush. The Japanese do have a speed advantage of about 7 knots (Kaga was not a 30 knot ship!), but if they try to run they have a serious problem: Fuel. Even tanking up on both the outbound and return trips, the Japanese were operating at the ragged end of their rope off Oahu. If they have to make a long high-speed run (which burns off fuel much faster than cruising) in order to avoid a gunnery action with the US fleet, it's very likely that the DDs won't make it back to the tanker. For that matter, CVs Soryu and Hiryu could very well be in trouble too. So yes, they can run, but for how long? (Given sufficient warning - like a week or two - I'll try to put a submarine wolfpack in the general vicinity of the tankers, too. [:D])

There's another possibility, as well. If (admittedly that's one very big "if") the US fleet could spring the trap on Kido Butai while the air groups were busy over Oahu, Nagumo would be put in a very ugly position. His air groups would be looking for their CVs to be in a particular place when they return - if he runs, he misses the rendezvous. Of course he also misses the rendezvous if he doesn't run, but for a completely different reason... [:'(] So if(!) the timing's very good, they can run - but at the cost of their entire striking arm.

And of course, USN cruisers and destroyers most certainly could keep pace with Kido Butai, even if the Japanese did try to run. If the Japanese turn to fight the more numerous American light forces, they risk being caught up and overwhelmed by the battle line; if they don't, they risk being nickeled-and-dimed to death as they run.

nah, and if they do not hit critically the carriers (and american gunners were not battle hardened, the radar of 1941 wasn´t so good or built in (i could check it but i am too lazy in the moment) they will be sunk (again, just my opinion).

Sunk by what? After the morning raids, Kido Butai couldn't possibly have launched another strike until well after noon - too much flying time required traveling to and from PH, then more time to recover, repair, rearm, and refuel the aircraft. An ambush that hasn't sprung by then isn't going to happen anyway.

If the fighters could catch the japanese planes with surprise, this would be the "best" chance in my opinion, but i bet the american bombers would hit nothing in the try to bomb the japanese carrier fleet.

I more or less agree with this. There were ~150 fighters of various types based at various airfields around Oahu. Mostly P-40s, with a fair number of P-36s and some odds and sods in F4Fs and F2As detached from various Navy and Marine squadrons. The first Japanese strike was escorted by 45 A6Ms, the second by 33. The escorts would draw off a lot of the interceptors, but not all, and those that got through to the bombers would have themselves a really good day. Flak would take its toll, as well.

But most of the bombers on Oahu were Army level bombers. They're not likely to hit much, certainly not at this point in the war. However, there were a couple of squadrons of Marine dive bombers at Ewa - VMSB-231 with SB2Us, and VMSB-232 with SBDs. If they got through the Japanese CAP (say, because the fighters were all busy chasing off the Army planes) they could do some damage. Also, Halsey wasn't that far away with Enterprise and her air group; you'd better believe I'd invite him to the party too.

Also, if the battlewagons escape, this could lead to the wrong decision, to ignore the carriers and bet on the battleships...

but, sure, nobody could know it - only if this had happened... [:D]

The USN wasn't really likely to "ignore the carriers" anyway. The naval rearmament programs started before the war planned to bring the number of fleet CVs in the USN up to about the same as the number of BBs. The fate of Force Z a couple of days later (nothing could have prevented that short of Phillips turning around and heading for Ceylon) would still serve as a glaring notice that armored ships could be overwhelmed and brought down by airpower.

We have a huge advantage, looking back, in that we know pretty much what both sides had, and didn't have, and what they did with it, and how well it worked. Realistically, just sortieing the fleet and sending them on a goodwill tour to Johnston I. or wherever would probably be the way to go.