Lawrence of Arabia Gambit for the Rising Sun

[Hirohito]

Exactly why are they crazy? How are you going to base any real air threat in Singapore with daily devestating air raids from Indochina? Why do I have to sail past Singapore, why can't I go on the west of the DEI? I invade Alaska on the small chance that I can get a foothold on the US west coast just north of Seattle.

I want those bases in the HI so that I can harrass PH into starvation, I didn't say I wouldn't take it if I could, I said the ORIGINAL invasion is to take one of the undefended bases.

I see a common thread to these posts. Lets look at my plan on Jan 7 if all goes according to plan. Japan controls the following:
1. Kona and Hilo
2. Midway
3. Wake
4. Johnson Island
5. Palmyra Island
6. Christmas Island
7. Guadalcanal
8. Rennel Island
9. Santa Cruz Island
10. Espirito Santo
11. Efate
12. New Calendonia
13. New Zealand
14. Morotai
15. Ambon Island
16. Waigen Island
17. Tenimbar Island
18. Timor
19. Flores
20. Soembawa
21. Bali
22. Java Island
23. Sumatra Island
24. Andaman Island
25. Ceylon
26. Something in Alaskan panhandle.

The allies are in a pickle. Moving anything to PH is very risky what with TEN carriers, dozens of planes, and dozens of warships based in Hilo and Kona.

Moving anything out of the west coast is subject to attack from Alaska. Lots of subs, MLs, DDs, PGs, and PCs in Alaska. Here I do not mean the Aleutians, I mean the panhandle.

Moving anything to the PI means passing through TWO gauntlets, the first running n/s from alaska to NZ, the second running in a loop from Palau to Andaman Island.

Malaya, Singapore, and Burma are under constant air attack from two directions, Indochina and Sumatra/Java/Andaman Island.

The PI islands are under constant air attack from Palau, Formosa, Okinawa, Morotai.

The question is what does the Empire do next?

I would invade India by sea from Andaman Island and Ceylon, starting with the west coast of India.

If hit as soon as possible, India will fall.

After that I would hit Australia with everything I can put afloat, it might not fall, but I would bet I'll get 70% of it. McArthur said he could only defend 30% of Australia from a determined Empire attack.

Oh, and I would definitely be attacking PH in everyway possibe, as often as possible from the bases in Hilo/Kona. I might capture it, I might not. Probably a 50/50 chance.

Remember viewers I have 100s of thousands of troops that are NOT garrisoning useless islands, or wading through the jungles in PI, Malaya, Burma, Papua New Guinea for the invasion of India. Yes, it will take pretty much every transport I have to take India. But the payback is well worth it.

Hirohito

Hirohito

[Hirohito]

I did work out the details. To every last ship, squad, plane, gallon of fuel, box of ammo, and bowl of rice. It ain't easy, and you have to plan carefully. But the allies are in for some nasty surprises as they try to resupply everyone that is screaming for supplies. And, just when they think they are getting the upper hand, I invade those places anyway.

As Guderian put it during the campaign in France, the best way to suppress air power is to capture the bases they fly out of.

Hirohito

[Hirohito]

I dont' play the AI, a waste of time.

Hirohito

[Hirohito]

I didnt' say I wasn't going to invade Australia. I said I would starve them first. India can be starved, you carve it up and starve individual bases. The plan calls for the invasion of India as soon as the gauntlet is in place which will happen by Jan 7.

I'm not after Alaksa, I'm after a foothold on the west coast highway.

Troops fighting in the west coast of US cannot also be invading Empire territory elsewhere.

Hirohito

[Hirohito]

You didnt' read my plan. I'm going to take something in the Hawaiin Islands as part of the original raid. The ships stationed off the HI will transfer to that base, along with planes and engineers and supplies and fuel. What do you mean I can't load ships on turn 1? That's stupid. The way I see it, any ships that are part of Nagumos raiding force are okay. What dfference does it make if he has 15 ships or 150 ships?

It won't matter anyway, whether I move on turn 2 or turn 3.

I won't give up, you will be the one giving up.

Okay, I'll give you this. I won't move anything except from one Japanese controlled port to another Japanese controlled port outside of the original PH raiding force, except I want to change the list of ships that make up this force and the ports they sail from, these ships will rendezvous at a spot of my choosing but follow the same basic course as Nagumo on their way to PH. This way no one can claim, "But then you would not have had surprise because we would have seen you coming", becase I'll be doing basically what Nagumo did except with more ships.

You won't even hold the Hawaiin Islands.

Hirohito

[Oleg Mastruko]

ORIGINAL: Hirohito

I dont' play the AI, a waste of time.

Hirohito

Who do you play then? Have you tried your plans vs. human?

I will repeat - I will be more than ready to let you test your plans vs me as USN as soon as the next patch is out. I think your plans are completely untenable (if you really stick by them when playing).

O.

[mogami]

Hi, You can't reach Ambiona Island on Dec 7 unless you use the turn 1 exploit.

You have 12 Div and 6 Bde to do all this with. While there are many SNLF/NG units they cannot be relied on to hold any base and can only capture weakly held bases.

(You do not base your plan on knowledge gained from peeking at Allied prewar deployments do you?)

[Hirohito]

I didn't say that Ambon would be taken on Dec 7. I said it would be held by Jan 7. I developed the plan based on wanting to emulate the lawrence of arabia strategy that was used successfully in the vast ocean of sand that is the arabian peninsula. Lawrence didn't have "enough" forces either. I have heard enough complaining about actions taken on Dec 7 by the Imperial forces that I have modified the plan so that all movements done outside of forces bound for the bombardment of PH are between Japenese held bases only. The actual kick off vs non PH targets is Dec 8. Dec 7 is spent loading ships and moving things around a bit.

I know how many Imperial forces there are.

The Japanese had immense intelligence on the Allied deployments just prior to Dec 7. Are you saying that I should pretend they didn't have this information? Why do you think those sushi bars and oriental spas/massage parlors are all over the place? What do you think those girls all named Rosie are talking to the Allied soldiers and saiilors about while they give them their "Massage/bath"?

The Japanese military was confident that they could outfight the Allied forces at the beginning of the war at even less than 1-1 odds, and they were right.

Hirohito

[mogami]

beginning at Ambon Island

Hi, I would like to be your Huckleberry for the first try. (I like seeing new ideas executed)

[dtravel]

One of the goals of this strategy is to set up "gauntlets" of LBA that the Allies would have to run supply convoys thru. One thought that occurs to me is that if the Japanese attempt or succeed in capturing one of the HI bases, aren't they just setting themselves up to run the same gauntlet of LBA to keep it functioning?

[mogami]

Hi to supply one base that is flying 1 daitai of bombers and 1 daitai of fighters will require
54 supply per day fighters 108supply per day for bombers (1 mission not counting bomb loads) or 216 supply per day (not counting bomb loads) or 270 supply per day for AC not counting bomb loads. 40 supply per day for 1 div not in combat supply for support troops (AV/AA/CD/HQ) Call it 400 supply per day not counting bomb loads or 2800 supply per week or 11,200 supply per month (before any combat is added.) Ships protecting the base will require AA/Gun reloads and fuel.

1 hit on supply destroys .1 percent of supply onhand so if Japanese unload 3 months worth of supply 33,600 points and Allied night attack scores 1 hit total next day will be

Day 1
33,600 minus .1=33264
33,264 minus daily supply (400)=32,864 (daily supply required DSR)

Day 2
32,864 minus .1=32,535
32535 minus DSR=32135

Day 3
32135-.1=31814
31814-400=31414

Day 4
31414-.1=31100
31100-400=30700

Day 5
30700-.1=30393
30393-400=29993

Day 6
29993-.1=29693
29693-400=29293

Day 7
29293-.1=29000
29000-400=28600

First week supply consumed=4600 + bomb load +spoilage (spoilage is produced when port+airfield size less then 10) projected supply use 2800. Actual +1800 (plus bombload =spoilage)

Change starting supply required for 3 months to +1800x4x3+36200=57,800

(this is one base for 3 months minus bombloads and spoilage and rearming ships)

xnumber of bases.

At the coast of 57,800 supply (or more) Japan gets base that is weakly held and operating weak air force.
Double the size of force and you double the supply cost.


Allied response against unsupplied forward Japanese bases will begin around first week of Mar 1942. (They can accelerate Japanese supply use by scoring more then 1 supply hit per night)

No matter how far Japan has advanced by mid Jan 42 they will have exhausted supply reserves. (Japan at full production produces a total of 25,000 supply per day. )
Enough to run 1 base for 62 days but it is not produced in a single location and has yet to be collected and transported. The loss of each 7k AK load of supply = 3weeks of base supply.

[Central Blue]

Hirohito,

glad to see you don't feel picked on. Genius, on the other hand, is seldom appreciated[;)]

I would certainly like to take a crack at you. No experience with PBEM, but lots of time with PacWar and the history of the conflict. But there are a lot of folks here with way bigger reps than mine. I look forward to the AARs.

In the meantime, the argument is fun too. Thanks for bringing it to us.

[mogami]

Hi, Hey he at least has a plan. I've always felt that a bad plan executed well was much better then a great plan poorly executed or no plan at all. (running around like a chicken with it's head cutoff is not a good way to conduct a war)
If you have a plan to begin with you can modify it to reflect changes in situation existing when plan was made. Without a plan as a starting point your lost before you begin.

I would have prefered he kept alot of this quietbecause there is much more reaction in the Allied capabilty then he is supposing if the Allies know in advance what is happening.

There is no such thing as a long term plan that "you can't stop even if you know it's coming" I've already begun working up an Allied counter Mar 1942 is the time I see Japan coming to a halt from lack of supply. To be sure in Mar 1942 Japan will have in excess of 1,500,000 supply points on map. But it will not be where it is required to prevent Allied operations.

I think the India phase will be abandoned early on. The Japanese have 12 Div and 6 Bde. The CBI contains (not including Chinese formations that begin assigned to SEAC)
no fewer then 5 div and 5 Bde. Plus a very powerfull armored force.

The USA has for CenPac use at start and ready to go 4 Div and several RCT combined force outside the SRA then is 9 Div and 7 Bde/RCT

Inside the SRA are forces that require no less then 6 Japanese Div just to contain.

The Chinese are able if used correctly to distract several div and several Bde from Southern Area Army. (Indo China)

The real deployable force for Japan consits of SNLF and prehaps 3 Div worth of troops.
Outnumbered in any direction employed. The IJN will consume fuel at rates faster then it can be transported. (Oh they have that 45 day run wild period)

There are not enough baseforce units for SRA/India/CenPac all at once and the SRA enemy air power cannot be destroyed in 1 or 2 days. (The bulk of it remains out of range for quite a while.)

Before the Allied SRA naval forces are accounted for the IJN will have to remain in SRA.

And last and most fatal is the Japanese are commiting to a large supply requirment 3 months before they know what their supply total will be.

that 25000 per day requires a full production from Palembang and other SRA bases.
Japanese production of supply will not offset use prior to Mid Mar 1942 no matter how well SRA operations go and assuming they capture all bases 100 percent intact and begin imeditate shipments to heavy Industry. There will be a well defined decrease in Japanese operations produced by lack of supply commencing in mid Jan and lasting till mid Feb (while the scattered material is collected) this will allow a very moderate increase in operations for remaineder of Feb before it come completly and finally to a halt.
Allied operations will commence soon after.

Now all we have to do is run the turns and see who the bestter guesser is. [X(]

[Vaevictis_386]

Hats off to Hirohito for thinking up something very intriguing and innovative.

Just about any Japanese plan can be countered with the objection: You won't have enough forces/supplies to do it. Japan is always in that situation.

Perhaps the greatest strength of H.s plan is that Allied players could not rely on well worn historical paths of response. They'd have to think creatively too, and if they weren't good at this, would find themselves in hot water.

One reservation I have is that Japan gives up the advantage of interior lines of defense. Would this be worth the price? Maybe...

[mogami]

Hi, If my admititly conservative Japanese operations are restricted in scope because of supply I don't need a calculator to see that more expasive operations requiring a higher level of operational intensity will experiance supply problems.

It does no good to have moved 300 Japanese aircraft to a base where they have no supply and there is no supply to ship. Moving forces to advances bases and leaving them in an unsupplied condition does not hurt the Allies. It might look pretty on the map to see all the Japanese flags but you better save a screen shot because it cannot be maintained.

Logistics are not something that gets in the way of a great plan. Logistics before any movement can be considered define what can move where and fight and for how long.

To be honest I would permit the Japanese to move safely all the way to the US West Coast. Hell I'll give him a port in Canada with a nice airfield if he promises to really move there.

What is so innovative of saying you'll take India and Alaska? Innovative would be finding a way to supply it in the first place. If that can't be done the the rest is just talk.

No where in any of this do I see anything that destroys more Allied material then is lost. No where does it force the Allied player to give battle in any location he does not feel he has a chance of coming out at least equal. Equal is losing for Japan.

[dtravel]

ORIGINAL: Mogami
To be honest I would permit the Japanese to move safely all the way to the US West Coast. Hell I'll give him a port in Canada with a nice airfield if he promises to really move there.

What is so innovative of saying you'll take India and Alaska? Innovative would be finding a way to supply it in the first place. If that can't be done the the rest is just talk.

There's that note of cynicism again! Come on Mogami! You're supposed to be one of the giants of WiTP, think positively! [:'(][:D] <ducking and running away very very quickly now>

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: Hirohito
"I won't give up, you will be the one giving up."

Jesse Ventura

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: dereck
Sorry about flaming you Hirohito - it definitely wasn't my intention.

Edward Teller

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: Mogami
To be honest I would permit the Japanese to move safely all the way to the US West Coast.

Lee Iacocca

[Central Blue]

great schtick pasternakski!