logistic analysis

[Yamato hugger]

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[rtrapasso]

As for "Japans Rommel". He seemed to have a lot of people that dis-obeyed his orders doesnt he? Cant think of a time that Rommel was disobeyed to the point where he would have had to defend his actions to a war crime trial board.

Just as a point of clarification - the IJA was somewhat notorious for its officers disobeying commands of its generals, often to the point where the junior officers would KILL their superiors for being "insufficiently ruthless" or some such twaddle.

I have never been able to reconcile the ruthless obedience demanded by the Japanese military with this attitude. Perhaps the officers were (partially) exempt from the obedience otherwise expected???[&:]

[Yamato hugger]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

Just as a point of clarification - the IJA was somewhat notorious for its officers disobeying commands of its generals, often to the point where the junior officers would KILL their superiors for being "insufficiently ruthless" or some such twaddle.

I have never been able to reconcile the ruthless obedience demanded by the Japanese military with this attitude. Perhaps the officers were (partially) exempt from the obedience otherwise expected???[&:]

Well, my opinion, but to me a "genius" would find a way to remove the officers below him that would dis-obey orders. Like the commander of the Guard division for example. Or he would at least find a way to get him to follow his orders, or at the very least put him in a position where he only has the option of following orders.

I never said Yamashita wasnt a good general. But then, I wasnt the one that called him "a genius" either [:D]

[mdiehl]

Defending Bataan is a death sentence. 100% of the troops on Bataan got both dengue fever and malaria - and that dibilitated them and shortened their lives directly. Defending Bataan when there were not anything like enough food stocks also was a way to insure starvation over any significant time.

To be fair, had MaC properly devloped his logistical base in Bataan and removed the supplies to that base the dengue fever, malaria, and starvation would have been greatly reduced. The food and medical stocks were *supposed* to be there. Much of it was precipitously abandoned in Manila.

As to Logistics, Yamato hugger is correct. Water use alone for a combat infantryman in action would probably amount to a MINIMUM of several gallons (21+ pounds) per day (including drinking water, coffee, and water used to prepare rations). This would be true of either the Japanese or US forces. Of course, if water is locally supplied this does not need to be shipped....

[tsimmonds]

Japanese might actually need more water; they did after all consume rice with (or even as) every meal. Who remembers the "Italian Pasta Rule" from CNA?[;)]

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Japanese might actually need more water; they did after all consume rice with (or even as) every meal. Who remembers the "Italian Pasta Rule" from CNA?[;)]

O S%$^ I do [:D][:D][:D]

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Japanese might actually need more water; they did after all consume rice with (or even as) every meal. Who remembers the "Italian Pasta Rule" from CNA?[;)]

OK - i'll bite. What is CNA, and what is its "Italian Pasta Rule".

And now we know what all those locally produced supplies are: WATER!!!

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Japanese might actually need more water; they did after all consume rice with (or even as) every meal. Who remembers the "Italian Pasta Rule" from CNA?[;)]

OK - i'll bite. What is CNA, and what is its "Italian Pasta Rule".

And now we know what all those locally produced supplies are: WATER!!!

CNA = Campaign for North Africa ( old old old circa 1979 ? ) SPI monster board game covering 1940-1943 in the desert with 5 mile hexes and Bn units from Cairo to El Aghelia ....


Italian Pasta Rule ... something like ( remembering back many years here ) .. if Italians have insufficient water ... their disorganization level is immediately switched to 27 ( which meant that they could do nothing and would surrender if attacked by enemy units ) !! In other words, the Italians want their pasta ( with water ) !!!

[Yamato hugger]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

OK - i'll bite. What is CNA, and what is its "Italian Pasta Rule".

And now we know what all those locally produced supplies are: WATER!!!

Personally I have no idea. Sounds like an old SPI type rule to me.

Local supplies would be consumables. Water, maybe. Food certainly. Lumber. Concrete. Sand. ______________ <fill in the blank>. There are lots of "local" things that are needed in game terms to drive the supply function of the game. Would it be nice to have it broken down into "this is food" "this is bullets" "this is 16" shells"? Some people would say yes. Others would say no. Have to draw a line somewhere.

Takes lots of supplies to "repair" damaged items in the game. Holes in runways. Mineshafts. The items needed to repair these things doesnt need to come from a factory in Japan. Most of it doesnt need to come from a factory at all.

[mdiehl]

Who remembers the "Italian Pasta Rule" from CNA?

That was a memorably bad rule.

[Blackhorse]

CNA = Campaign for North Africa ( old old old circa 1979 ? ) SPI monster board game covering 1940-1943 in the desert with 5 mile hexes and Bn units from Cairo to El Aghelia ....


Italian Pasta Rule ... something like ( remembering back many years here ) .. if Italians have insufficient water ... their disorganization level is immediately switched to 27 ( which meant that they could do nothing and would surrender if attacked by enemy units ) !! In other words, the Italians want their pasta ( with water ) !!!

I remember that memorably unplayable game . . . but I thought the pasta rule simply doubled the water supply requirement for Italian units, to reflect the fact that they needed water for cooking as well as drinking. I don't remember the disorganization/surrender part.

I *do* remember that you had to keep track of where each individual vehicle broke down (because it could be repaired/recovered by either side). And a lot of vehicles broke down.

Come to think of it, it wasn't that much harder to play than WitP. [;)]

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

CNA = Campaign for North Africa ( old old old circa 1979 ? ) SPI monster board game covering 1940-1943 in the desert with 5 mile hexes and Bn units from Cairo to El Aghelia ....


Italian Pasta Rule ... something like ( remembering back many years here ) .. if Italians have insufficient water ... their disorganization level is immediately switched to 27 ( which meant that they could do nothing and would surrender if attacked by enemy units ) !! In other words, the Italians want their pasta ( with water ) !!!

I remember that memorably unplayable game . . . but I thought the pasta rule simply doubled the water supply requirement for Italian units, to reflect the fact that they needed water for cooking as well as drinking. I don't remember the disorganization/surrender part.

I *do* remember that you had to keep track of where each individual vehicle broke down (because it could be repaired/recovered by either side). And a lot of vehicles broke down.

Come to think of it, it wasn't that much harder to play than WitP. [;)]

Ok, ok - as an "offering" to the god of Masochistic Edification [&o][&o][&o] ... I went and hunted up a copy of the CNA rules ... and scanned in the relevant parts ... it was -26 cohesion ... not 27 disorganization ... but -26 cohension meant you surrendered even if an enemy drove by ! Yes, it took about a week to play a week - so for those WITP games that only play 1 turn per day - pretty much the same !

[mdiehl]

The Italian Pasta rule is germane in a way because it has much in common with the WitP "Zero Bonus." They're both overstated rules that produce bizarre results that are justified without much regard to historical outcomes on the basis of flimsy but plausible sounding theoretical justification.

[el cid again]

:

The ORIGINAL War In The Pacific (the SPI mechanical one) at least differentiated between "Northern" and "Southern" resource points. In this version, it is hard to see why Japan had to "strike south" at all? Why not just go into China, Manchuria, Korea and even Russia and live off the resource points from them?

Because if you do that you will all but run out of oil in about 6 months. Once that happens your production of HI will slow to a trickle, which means practically no more aircraft engines or airframes (no more airplanes), practically no more armaments or vehicle points (no more LCUs or replacements), practically no more naval or merchant shipbuilding points (no more warships or merchies). For IJ with no oil coming in from the SRA, the game would quickly slow to a crawl. Mercifully, it would not last nearly as long as it might otherwise.

Think of Oil and Resources as Southern and Northern resource points

This isn't quite right - IF the game economy is historically correct. Japan stockpiled enough oil to run the economy for much longer than six months. When the oil/rubber/tin embargo was imposed (in July 1941) the clock began to run (rather than on Dec 7 or 8 - depending on what side of the date line you live). Japan had enough oil in stocks to run the full economy for about 18 months. It also produced some oil - and purchased some oil (notably in Siam and China). You have more than a year after the game begins to get oil production/shipping in line with needs - or should - and that should be your biggest economic priority - IF the game economy is done correctly.

Heavy Industry points should be dominated by steel. Steel was the most critical strategic resource besides oil in BOTH the USA and Japan. Steel can be used for many things, but you cannot quickly change how much you are making. A Yamato class battleship uses the steel for 150 escort ships or 3000 tanks. Another use for steel is factories and machine tools. But any given bit of steel only is one of these things at a time - and so it is a big economic planning limitation - how much steel you put into what? STEEL is mainly from Iron Ore and Coal - and THOSE are "northern resource points" - mainly. It should not be that "resource points" from places with oil wells and rubber plantations can be turned into steel products, nor that places with "resource points" from iron mines and coal mines can become fuel. IF you don't address these issues, you end up with a model that is grossly misleading, and does not permit analysis of the historical situation Japan faced - which is just about the most difficult one of modern times. [Japan faced a similar crisis in the early 20th century, and it DID solve the problem that time. It had much better strategic planning, and even an exit strategy for the war.] In WWII Japan did BETTER than Germany did in economic terms - it produced more airplanes relative to its size of economy and industry - and otherwise organized somewhat better somewhat sooner. But it made critical errors - and a good sim of Japan's situation should recreate these problems - at least in broad outline.

The existence of Oil as a separate resource from Resource Points probably means this model can be made to work.

[el cid again]

The trial of Yamashita certainly wasn't a fair trial. He was mainly tried because of the destruction of Manila by forces of the IJN who disobeyed his orders to withdraw to the mountains. But he was the commander in charge, thus be bears some responsibility for that what happened, even if it was not ordered by him and this was known to the court.

While it is perfectly true that Manila was the second most destroyed city of WWII (after Warsaw), and it is also true that Yamashita ordered the city not to be defended but the IJN disobeyed his order, he was NOT charged with its destruction per se. He was charged with a general sort of lack of control of many Japanese units distant from him in the entire campaign. His American lawyers established that the Allied command had deliberately disrupted his ability to control his units, often successfully. In the end, the conviction came down to a single bit of purgered testimony about something he was alleged to have said involving a Filipino who had played the game as a quisling during the war. Such hearsay evidence is never acceptable and, if it were, would not have been credible in this instance, according to the Supreme Court and most reviewers since. There is a book on this subject written by his defense team, and a number of references to this case in many histories. It is notable that, while the other post WWII war crimes tribunals have been used as models for later war crimes proceedings, this one has never been imitated - and we better hope it is not imitated by an enemy - because based on it there would be no possibilty of a successful defense. It is just one more dismal chapter in the story of MacArthur- the American Ceasar - and even the biographers who like him are less than kind about it.

[el cid again]

1st Imperial Guards Division was formed in 1943 from the Guards Brigade that had been left behind at Tokyo. There's no relationship (in this regard) to the (2nd) Imperial Guards Division in Malaya. The Guards Brigade at Tokyo had been left behind when the rest of the Imperial Guards Division left for China in first place. 3rd Imperial Guards Division was raised later with newly formed regiments.

There are so many errors in Western accounts of Imperial military institutions I am willing to accept your version might be true. But the US Army's wartime intelligence reported it differently. And post war the Chief of Operations of Yamashita's army also reports it differently. While many people detest Col Tsuji, so far as I am aware no one anywhere ever suggested he was a liar. He is a militant Japanese nationalist, and he served briefly as head of a nationalist party in the Diet in the 1950s - before disappearing forever (probably as an intelligence asset) in the area he knew so well - SE Asia. I also have been told orally that the Imperial Guards division was broken up deliberately because of discipline problems. I would love to read your sources, however. I suggest (for English readers) Soldiers of the Sun, Kaigun (the Japanese word for Army), and Warriers of the Rising Sun. These are scholarly histories, and balanced, willing to criticize and praise, as the data indicates, neither out to paint the IJA as demons nor as saints - and it was neither by and large. Having studied it in some detail, I believe it had great influence on two other national armies - the PLA and the US Army.

[el cid again]

What is this "per unit" thing? Where do you dream this up? Yes a B-29 group is going to consume more supplies than an infantry squad. So what? Doesnt diminish the amount of supplies that have to come to support them as a whole. So this means we have to take into effect all the food to feed the troops. All the bullets they shoot. The artillery shells and naval gun ammo they used. The daily amount of bombs dropped, not just in this battle here, but everywhere. How many tonnes of av gas does 1 plane use on 1 sortie average? How many sorties per day? How many depth charges used in a day? And not only in combat. You have to train units in this game also.

News flash: WITP DOES vary the supply requirements of a unit according to its size and composition and type. I am not sure why you are arguing with me about it? The system as it exists rates supply requirements in terms of supply points and (for naval units) fuel points. Note a PT boat does not use the same amount of fuel as a battleship. Not sure why you think otherwise? The problem is that fuel should probably the military concept of POL - and probably motorized land units and air units should consume it as well as naval units. This is probably fixable too. The more general problem is that of ammunition being lumped with everything else. This may not be fixable, but if it is NOT addressed, then rice and timber can become heavy artillery ammunition, etc. as required.

[el cid again]

My unit on active duty had a fuel allocation. A monthly total of how much fuel and oil we were allotted. Our "fuel ration" averaged out to 750 POUNDS per man in the unit alone!

While I believe you - your figures are reasonable for a modern American unit - they are not related to WWII era Japanese army requirements - with rare exceptions. Typical IJA units had no motor vehicles at all. "Fuel" for many units was fodder for mules and horses! There were even units with no pack animals - and these units were LARGER than units with them - because men did the packing. The US solved this problem in a different way - we "attached" civilian pack bearers - I have pictures of long lines of Filipino's bearing our supplies in the march up the Naguilian road. IJN land units used, mainly, IJA weapons, but had no pack animals at all, and often no support vehicles. [A typical SNLF had two armored cars for example - and a Naval Security Detail had none at all most of the time.] In an army like that of Japan, the pounds of fuel per day per unit is zero, unless it has motor vehicles or airplanes or gasoline generators. Even those units that have motor vehicles are mixed - thus a typical "motorized" infantry division has TWICE as many companies of draft transport as it has of truck transport. And even the US Army had a much lower fuel allotment per man in WWII than it has today. Our vehicles are larger and we have hundreds of helicopters supporting a division - if you think trucks consume fuel try helicopters! On the average, today, MOST of the supply (by weight) a US unit consumes is fuel. That was not true in WWII. Another factor is ammunition - it is normal to consume almost none when not fighting - but a vast amount when in combat of various kinds. IF you lump ammunition with general supplies, the supplies per day figure becomes almost useless - because it is grossly understated for most combat situations and grossly overstated for non-combat days.

[el cid again]

As for Bataan, you need to learn a few things about defense. It does no good to defend something the enemy doesnt need. What is the purpose of taking the PI? Manila harbor, and Clark field. Doesnt matter where you defend really if you dont deny these to the enemy you may as well not even be there. A lot more casulties were caused (on both side) by disease than bullets and shells. That happened in the fields of France as well as the malaria ridden areas of the Pacific. If you dont think any of Yamashitas men died of disease in the mountains, you are nuts.

Oddly, it is my view that defending Bataan is defending what the enemy doesen't need! The Philippines has several roles in Japanese strategy - not just one or two. Most critically, it was a base of American land, air and naval power on the flank of their line of communitations to Malaya and Indonesia - it simply could not be tolerated to exist. Also, it offers a large numbers of harbors (not just one at Manila Bay) and airfields (not just one at Clark AAF). These are sufficiently numerous and close to each other to offer a good defensive position against future offensives designed to cut the sea line of communications in the South China Sea (from the Pacific offensive envisioned by War Plan Orange). Also, it is a significant source of resources in its own right - although not oil. These objectives - in every case - require occupation of key points in many places. Letting the enemy have Cebu and Celebes and Mindinao is not really good policy for protecting the Dutch East Indies, for example. On the other hand, holding Bataan does NOTHING to threaten Clark AAF as you seem to think - it is not in raiding distance and no such raid was ever contemplated. It does almost nothing to threaten Manila Bay - Corregedor and a nearby island do cover the northern approaches - but they are vulnerable being open and the entire bay can be closed by Fort Drum without them anyway.

As for disease, if you think living where dengue fever and malaria is endemic is not worse than where they are not, it is not I who am nuts. Whatever disease statistics Yamashita's men had, they were nothing like the 100% on Bataan for BOTH diseases. Some of those men held out for decades. No one on Bataan was going to do that. I think it is the reason Mac NEVER visited Bataan in person too - I think he had moral courage under fire but not in the face of disease. Yes - Japanese troops suffered from these diseases - ON BATAAN. At one point they had only 2000 effectives in the line. But it was enough. Because we probably had no effectives in the line - and may not have been able to attack even if we knew their strength. I am not sure WHY you like defending Bataan in 1942? But I don't think you would feel that way if you had to do it.

[el cid again]

As for "Japans Rommel". He seemed to have a lot of people that dis-obeyed his orders doesnt he?

Your cultural understanding of Japan is so low it approximates the typical American of c 1940. It is hard to escape the consequences of your assumptions - no matter how critical they are.

First of all, the Japanese military had a concept of discipline wholly alien from ours. One could honorably - and maybe even lawfully - disobey orders - IF your motive was patriotic. This concept does not translate into English at all - and it results in a military institution that is almost not a military institution in our sense of the term. Except there are very rare cases where we do the same sort of thing - they are nothing like as rare in Japanese institutions. Unless you spend some time coming to terms with such concepts, your comments cannot be germane. Rommel didn't have anything like Japanese troops or institutions to deal with.

Second, even the great division between the US Navy and US Army in the Pacific pales with that between the IJN and IJA. If you read Takishi Hara (Japanese Destroyer Captain) you will be struck that he does not even count Japanese Army ships as ships! His statistics are accurate - but only if you count Navy ships - the Army ones didn't even register in his mind. The admiral in charge of Manila did not regard ANY IJA officer as his superior - he was not in the IJA after all - and it was AGAINST JAPANESE LAW to surrender anything, ever. He also believed that Manila represented capital assets of value to the IJN, or to its enemy, the USN, and he had no intention of just handing them over - just as you might feel was honorable if defending against an invasion somewhere. Holding these attitudes against Yamashita as some sort of lessening of his greatness is basically silly. Not sure WHY you have a problem with a Japanese officer being respected even by his enemies - as Rommel was - but Yamashita is probably the clearest case of such a Japanese general officer - wether or not you like it.