Slowing down or stopping a Japanese Central Pacific strategy

[ny59giants]

It seems to me that a skilled Japanese player is able to invade and take control of Hawaii, "if they want." It will slow down the conquest of PI and maybe the SRA. If they had done so IRL, what kind of triggers would it have produced priority wise in the USA?? I would think that porduction would be excellerated to some degree. This may be something that needs to be addressed, "IF" a WitP II actually happens.
Looking through many of the AAR's, I have yet to find one that has had this happen and how the Allied player has been able to overcome it. There are so few AAR's into late '43 or into '44 to start to draw conclusions about a Central Pacific strategy having drawbacks.
I am thankful to get some feedback and insight into how others have combated this strategy. It may be Spring '07 before some games get to the point that answers are forthcoming. [&:]

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

It seems to me that a skilled Japanese player is able to invade and take control of Hawaii, "if they want." It will slow down the conquest of PI and maybe the SRA. If they had done so IRL, what kind of triggers would it have produced priority wise in the USA?? I would think that porduction would be excellerated to some degree. This may be something that needs to be addressed, "IF" a WitP II actually happens.
Looking through many of the AAR's, I have yet to find one that has had this happen and how the Allied player has been able to overcome it. There are so few AAR's into late '43 or into '44 to start to draw conclusions about a Central Pacific strategy having drawbacks.
I am thankful to get some feedback and insight into how others have combated this strategy. It may be Spring '07 before some games get to the point that answers are forthcoming. [&:]

To take Oahu, the Japanese player would have to make an opposed landing against a force of two divisions and then defeat them on their own ground. Granted, the American divisions were understrength, but they would have been able to hold off a force of 4+ Japanese divisions on December 8th, and a full army (9 divisions) by the end of December 1941. A landing force operation of that size would not have had the operational security that the KB had and probably would have forced the Japanese to suspend all other offensive operations. That suggests that the larger the force sent to Hawaii before the war, the less likely the US Fleet and US Army in Hawaii would be caught by surprise. An attack against a fully alerted Hawaiian force would have found the US Fleet at sea and hard to find, probably off Lahaina Roads, the US carriers doing scouting and sniping, and the army forces deployed to defend the shore and air. At that point, it might have been politic to recall the KB, given the fuel situation and that even with surprise Yamamoto expected to lose two carriers.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

An attack against a fully alerted Hawaiian force would have found the US Fleet at sea and hard to find, probably off Lahaina Roads, the US carriers doing scouting and sniping, and the army forces deployed to defend the shore and air. At that point, it might have been politic to recall the KB, given the fuel situation and that even with surprise Yamamoto expected to lose two carriers.

I watched a what if documentary recently about this. Most of the "experts" seemed to agree that if the US Navy had been alerted and was at sea it would have tried to directly take on the KB with its BBs. We know what the outcome of that would have been. Probably the loss of the entire pacific fleet, including the CVs that likely would have accompanied the attack. Most of the "experts" seem to agree having the fleet attacked at port where many of the ships could be saved may have been the better outcome. Also, following the attack the US was able to analyze the effectiveness and come to the conclusion that WW II was going to be a carrier war, which conflicted with the naval doctrine of the time.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

watch out when using this 'stealth' tactic.

Putting no planes or very few planes on naval search combined with extended range combats (range 4 for example) can result in your CV's not launching strikes.

Risky yes, but not necessarily unwise. I would never recommend putting planes of on 0%naval search and running with a complete "blackout". That would be bad and actually somewhat pointless. However, with the IJN having CS and CVL. The KB can put a number of carriers in passive mode and let its seaplanes do the spotting, thus effectively hiding the overall number of CV in the TF. It could be 2 CV, it could be 6 and you would never know until you were engaged in a full scale battle.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

It seems to me that a skilled Japanese player is able to invade and take control of Hawaii, "if they want." It will slow down the conquest of PI and maybe the SRA. If they had done so IRL, what kind of triggers would it have produced priority wise in the USA?? I would think that porduction would be excellerated to some degree. This may be something that needs to be addressed, "IF" a WitP II actually happens.
Looking through many of the AAR's, I have yet to find one that has had this happen and how the Allied player has been able to overcome it. There are so few AAR's into late '43 or into '44 to start to draw conclusions about a Central Pacific strategy having drawbacks.
I am thankful to get some feedback and insight into how others have combated this strategy. It may be Spring '07 before some games get to the point that answers are forthcoming. [&:]

It's unclear the degree to which the US would have been able to accelerate production, but they certainly would have shifted Home defence forces to the WC. I think the major effect it would have had was to shift resources away from the European theater toward the Pacific. It seems fairly clear that within 6 months, the US felt very secure in its position in the pacific and thus focused more on the war in Europe.

[Nikademus]

If your using a smaller number of dedicated carriers, be sure to bump up their naval search even more. I'm not sure it would make a difference against other CV TF's but against surface TF's, the more planes on naval search, the better your chances of getting off a strike at longer ranges.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

An attack against a fully alerted Hawaiian force would have found the US Fleet at sea and hard to find, probably off Lahaina Roads, the US carriers doing scouting and sniping, and the army forces deployed to defend the shore and air. At that point, it might have been politic to recall the KB, given the fuel situation and that even with surprise Yamamoto expected to lose two carriers.

I watched a what if documentary recently about this. Most of the "experts" seemed to agree that if the US Navy had been alerted and was at sea it would have tried to directly take on the KB with its BBs. We know what the outcome of that would have been. Probably the loss of the entire pacific fleet, including the CVs that likely would have accompanied the attack. Most of the "experts" seem to agree having the fleet attacked at port where many of the ships could be saved may have been the better outcome. Also, following the attack the US was able to analyze the effectiveness and come to the conclusion that WW II was going to be a carrier war, which conflicted with the naval doctrine of the time.

Perhaps, but the USN was much more concerned with tracking IJN carriers than battleships in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor (Hughes, 1986, 88), suggesting that the Battle Fleet would have been careful as long as it had not gained air superiority. Also, I'm not sure the KB would have dealt with the USN carriers adequately given the attractive presence of the Battle Fleet. The KB's only weapon that could deal with USN battleships were the Kate squadrons, which I seem to recall were vulnerable to AA during their attacks and limited in quantity. The Battle Line would have lost more ships than at Pearl Harbor, but the KB would probably have lost four carriers.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

ORIGINAL: herwin



I watched a what if documentary recently about this. Most of the "experts" seemed to agree that if the US Navy had been alerted and was at sea it would have tried to directly take on the KB with its BBs. We know what the outcome of that would have been. Probably the loss of the entire pacific fleet, including the CVs that likely would have accompanied the attack. Most of the "experts" seem to agree having the fleet attacked at port where many of the ships could be saved may have been the better outcome. Also, following the attack the US was able to analyze the effectiveness and come to the conclusion that WW II was going to be a carrier war, which conflicted with the naval doctrine of the time.

Perhaps, but the USN was much more concerned with tracking IJN carriers than battleships in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor (Hughes, 1986, 88), suggesting that the Battle Fleet would have been careful as long as it had not gained air superiority. Also, I'm not sure the KB would have dealt with the USN carriers adequately given the attractive presence of the Battle Fleet. The KB's only weapon that could deal with USN battleships were the Kate squadrons, which I seem to recall were vulnerable to AA during their attacks and limited in quantity. The Battle Line would have lost more ships than at Pearl Harbor, but the KB would probably have lost four carriers.

Its very possible that the IJN may have lost some carriers, though I doubt it would have been from surface action. In my mind the most likely scenario would have been the battle fleet sails out to meet the KB and is promptly sunk by torpedo bombers, remember that the USN commanders weren't sure what to make of the threat of TB and DB at this time. No one had really seen these weapons at war, though the mediteranian was beginning to shed some light on how effective they could be. Following this action though, the US CV may have gotten in a counter strike damaging the IJN carriers. IF the US had enough intelligence to know what was going on and had managed to mass the three carriers in the Pacific along with PH air support it would have been a force to be reckoned with on its own.

IIRC instances of BBs attacking CVs were few in WWII and the only one I can think of ended very badly for the BBs. I am referring to the battle near PI where the US CVE tried to screen the oncoming Japanese surface TF from the US transports. As I recall, between the CVE and US surface ships the Japanese BB never made it within range of the transports.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005




Perhaps, but the USN was much more concerned with tracking IJN carriers than battleships in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor (Hughes, 1986, 88), suggesting that the Battle Fleet would have been careful as long as it had not gained air superiority. Also, I'm not sure the KB would have dealt with the USN carriers adequately given the attractive presence of the Battle Fleet. The KB's only weapon that could deal with USN battleships were the Kate squadrons, which I seem to recall were vulnerable to AA during their attacks and limited in quantity. The Battle Line would have lost more ships than at Pearl Harbor, but the KB would probably have lost four carriers.

Its very possible that the IJN may have lost some carriers, though I doubt it would have been from surface action. In my mind the most likely scenario would have been the battle fleet sails out to meet the KB and is promptly sunk by torpedo bombers, remember that the USN commanders weren't sure what to make of the threat of TB and DB at this time. No one had really seen these weapons at war, though the mediteranian was beginning to shed some light on how effective they could be. Following this action though, the US CV may have gotten in a counter strike damaging the IJN carriers. IF the US had enough intelligence to know what was going on and had managed to mass the three carriers in the Pacific along with PH air support it would have been a force to be reckoned with on its own.

IIRC instances of BBs attacking CVs were few in WWII and the only one I can think of ended very badly for the BBs. I am referring to the battle near PI where the US CVE tried to screen the oncoming Japanese surface TF from the US transports. As I recall, between the CVE and US surface ships the Japanese BB never made it within range of the transports.

Glorious

Hughes (1986, 91f) states that carriers dominated the daylight hours but were sitting ducks for gunfire at night. A formation of CAs could travel 200 nautical miles at night. Since airstrikes were mounted at the same range, a carrier force could not be closed unless it had casualties to protect or was pursuing. Remember the KB had a minimal screen (2 BB, 2 CA, 1 CL, 9 DD), so it had to sail away from the Battle Fleet no later than the evening of December 7 or risk a surface action in the morning of December 8. I would have been inclined to pull the Battle Fleet back to encourage the KB to advance and send the CAs in for a daylight strike on December 7th. Sinking the Battle Fleet was the purpose of the attack, with smaller ships of less importance. US CAs had about 5 knots speed advantage on the Kaga and 2-3 knots advantage on the Kongo class BBs, so once in contact, especially at night, the US CAs would have been able keep it. The Tone and Chikuma were not super CAs as they were designed as fast seaplane carriers with guns.

For air operations, carriers had to turn into the wind. This meant that might not be able to launch aircraft in the presence of fast enemy surface forces. I'm not sure what the prevailing winds are in the Hawaiian Islands.

[niceguy2005]

Herwin, you make a very good point and in all honest, who knows what could have happened. CV fleets were vulnerable during daylight hours and a surface fleet might close with it at night and engage. I actually tried this tactic in Grigsbys earlier game Carrier Force (a recreation of the Midway battle) back in the 80s. The result was almost always the same. The CV TF moved just far enough to stay out of range and come daylight my surface TF got blasted out of the water.

When doing the what if scenarios though it is very important to keep in mind the frame of mind of the day. I don't think one can overstate the reliance the USN put on battleships before December 7th and how radically that had changed by December 8th.

I think your strategy of setting a trap at PH by keeping the battle fleet at one of the other isalnds is a good one, in the game. I RL I find it hard to believe that US commanders, given the way they thought on December 7th about carriers and battleships, would have been able to stand by and wait through the day while the KB pounded PH, an american territory and then closed with the enemy at night. It might have been the smart course of action, but politically it would be hard to explain back home.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

Herwin, you make a very good point and in all honest, who knows what could have happened. CV fleets were vulnerable during daylight hours and a surface fleet might close with it at night and engage. I actually tried this tactic in Grigsbys earlier game Carrier Force (a recreation of the Midway battle) back in the 80s. The result was almost always the same. The CV TF moved just far enough to stay out of range and come daylight my surface TF got blasted out of the water.

When doing the what if scenarios though it is very important to keep in mind the frame of mind of the day. I don't think one can overstate the reliance the USN put on battleships before December 7th and how radically that had changed by December 8th.

I think your strategy of setting a trap at PH by keeping the battle fleet at one of the other isalnds is a good one, in the game. I RL I find it hard to believe that US commanders, given the way they thought on December 7th about carriers and battleships, would have been able to stand by and wait through the day while the KB pounded PH, an american territory and then closed with the enemy at night. It might have been the smart course of action, but politically it would be hard to explain back home.

I didn't invent this strategy--the Japanese planners considered it their nightmare scenario. The American naval commanders at Pearl were very professional, had a reasonable estimate of the odds, and were unlikely to let their emotions overwhelm their considered judgment.

[ny59giants]

IRL the Americans were very worried about the vulnerability of the tank farm. If that had been destroyed, the remains of the Pacific Fleet would have headed to the West Coast or risk running out of fuel. I made a suggestion on the "wish list" about being able to target fuel supplies at a base along with targeting the stored Oil at places like Palembang (Oil producing capabilities can be damaged, but the 200,000 stored Oil is left undamaged [X(]).
If the Japanese had stayed to invade Hawaii, the fuel tank farm would have been targeted and no naval defense would have been practical.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

IRL the Americans were very worried about the vulnerability of the tank farm. If that had been destroyed, the remains of the Pacific Fleet would have headed to the West Coast or risk running out of fuel. I made a suggestion on the "wish list" about being able to target fuel supplies at a base along with targeting the stored Oil at places like Palembang (Oil producing capabilities can be damaged, but the 200,000 stored Oil is left undamaged [X(]).
If the Japanese had stayed to invade Hawaii, the fuel tank farm would have been targeted and no naval defense would have been practical.

The two fuel tank farms held 4.5 million barrels or about 750,000 tons, with each individual tank protected by a berm--I think they would have been very difficult to take out completely. The Neosho also had some oil. The Navy was building 4.5 million barrels of underground storage, which wasn't finished until 1942. I suspect the USN would have had enough oil even after an attack on the tank farms to sustain local operations for quite a while. If the KB did not take out the Battle Fleet and maintain complete air superiority, any invasion is at serious risk, even with Combined Fleet support.

By the second strike, the defenses were active--about 2/3rds of the Japanese losses occurred then. A third strike would have taken several hours to prepare and would have been pushing dusk.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

IRL the Americans were very worried about the vulnerability of the tank farm. If that had been destroyed, the remains of the Pacific Fleet would have headed to the West Coast or risk running out of fuel. I made a suggestion on the "wish list" about being able to target fuel supplies at a base along with targeting the stored Oil at places like Palembang (Oil producing capabilities can be damaged, but the 200,000 stored Oil is left undamaged [X(]).
If the Japanese had stayed to invade Hawaii, the fuel tank farm would have been targeted and no naval defense would have been practical.

i have heard about this also. The commanders, were not just worried about the tank farms, but the repair yards also. However, the Japanese had to go first for the capital ships as their strategy was predicated on not just hurting, but destroying the Pacific fleet. They needed it to be months to years before the Pacific fleet could threaten them.

Still, one would think it would only take a squadron to take out a bunch of stationary oil tanks. Even just some zeros loaded out with bombs might have done the trick.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

Herwin, you make a very good point and in all honest, who knows what could have happened. CV fleets were vulnerable during daylight hours and a surface fleet might close with it at night and engage. I actually tried this tactic in Grigsbys earlier game Carrier Force (a recreation of the Midway battle) back in the 80s. The result was almost always the same. The CV TF moved just far enough to stay out of range and come daylight my surface TF got blasted out of the water.

When doing the what if scenarios though it is very important to keep in mind the frame of mind of the day. I don't think one can overstate the reliance the USN put on battleships before December 7th and how radically that had changed by December 8th.

I think your strategy of setting a trap at PH by keeping the battle fleet at one of the other isalnds is a good one, in the game. I RL I find it hard to believe that US commanders, given the way they thought on December 7th about carriers and battleships, would have been able to stand by and wait through the day while the KB pounded PH, an american territory and then closed with the enemy at night. It might have been the smart course of action, but politically it would be hard to explain back home.

I didn't invent this strategy--the Japanese planners considered it their nightmare scenario. The American naval commanders at Pearl were very professional, had a reasonable estimate of the odds, and were unlikely to let their emotions overwhelm their considered judgment.

I wouldn't consider commanders bowing to political pressure to respond to be an emotional reaction on their part. As we all well know, PH is not just a military base, it's an American territory with American civilians. Letting the enemy attack a base would be one thing, but explaining to Americans back home why the fleet waited to attack while bombs were falling on civilians heads might be really hard to explain. I think the commanders could have made rational arguments all day long, but it would be hard to sell at home.

Also, I still think locating a CV TF at night and closing with it for a decisive engagement is dicey at best. The Japanese may have feared this worse case scenario, but it would be difficult to say the least to actually execute. The US Navy was well trained and well led, but then again, so was the British light cavalry brigade that made its famous charge into history.

Probably most importantly is that these are the reasons Japan planned its attack the way it did. I am sure that some Japanese commanders were wanting to wait in the area and try and locate the US CVs, but they were well aware how badly thing could go for them if they had any bad luck what so ever.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

IRL the Americans were very worried about the vulnerability of the tank farm. If that had been destroyed, the remains of the Pacific Fleet would have headed to the West Coast or risk running out of fuel. I made a suggestion on the "wish list" about being able to target fuel supplies at a base along with targeting the stored Oil at places like Palembang (Oil producing capabilities can be damaged, but the 200,000 stored Oil is left undamaged [X(]).
If the Japanese had stayed to invade Hawaii, the fuel tank farm would have been targeted and no naval defense would have been practical.

i have heard about this also. The commanders, were not just worried about the tank farms, but the repair yards also. However, the Japanese had to go first for the capital ships as their strategy was predicated on not just hurting, but destroying the Pacific fleet. They needed it to be months to years before the Pacific fleet could threaten them.

Still, one would think it would only take a squadron to take out a bunch of stationary oil tanks. Even just some zeros loaded out with bombs might have done the trick.

A significant number of tanks, and each had to be taken out individually. To really hurt the US Fleet, the KB needed >90% damage to the farms. Meanwhile the fleet, being undisturbed, would be conducting a Boxing Day shoot at the activity over the tank farms and naval repair facilities.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

Herwin, you make a very good point and in all honest, who knows what could have happened. CV fleets were vulnerable during daylight hours and a surface fleet might close with it at night and engage. I actually tried this tactic in Grigsbys earlier game Carrier Force (a recreation of the Midway battle) back in the 80s. The result was almost always the same. The CV TF moved just far enough to stay out of range and come daylight my surface TF got blasted out of the water.

When doing the what if scenarios though it is very important to keep in mind the frame of mind of the day. I don't think one can overstate the reliance the USN put on battleships before December 7th and how radically that had changed by December 8th.

I think your strategy of setting a trap at PH by keeping the battle fleet at one of the other isalnds is a good one, in the game. I RL I find it hard to believe that US commanders, given the way they thought on December 7th about carriers and battleships, would have been able to stand by and wait through the day while the KB pounded PH, an american territory and then closed with the enemy at night. It might have been the smart course of action, but politically it would be hard to explain back home.

I didn't invent this strategy--the Japanese planners considered it their nightmare scenario. The American naval commanders at Pearl were very professional, had a reasonable estimate of the odds, and were unlikely to let their emotions overwhelm their considered judgment.

I wouldn't consider commanders bowing to political pressure to respond to be an emotional reaction on their part. As we all well know, PH is not just a military base, it's an American territory with American civilians. Letting the enemy attack a base would be one thing, but explaining to Americans back home why the fleet waited to attack while bombs were falling on civilians heads might be really hard to explain. I think the commanders could have made rational arguments all day long, but it would be hard to sell at home.

Also, I still think locating a CV TF at night and closing with it for a decisive engagement is dicey at best. The Japanese may have feared this worse case scenario, but it would be difficult to say the least to actually execute. The US Navy was well trained and well led, but then again, so was the British light cavalry brigade that made its famous charge into history.

Probably most importantly is that these are the reasons Japan planned its attack the way it did. I am sure that some Japanese commanders were wanting to wait in the area and try and locate the US CVs, but they were well aware how badly thing could go for them if they had any bad luck what so ever.

The US carriers were the highest priority targets for the attack. I doubt US naval commanders would be affected by political pressure to do things that violated their considered judgment. The US Navy had much more experience than the IJN in attacking Pearl. During the 20s and 30s, they conducted a number of exercises to help them understand what a Japanese aerial attack on Pearl would involve and what it would take to defeat it. A senior US admiral once indicated that the Navy had gamed out the entirety of the Pacific Campaign--the only surprise was the kamikazes.

[niceguy2005]

ORIGINAL: herwin

The US carriers were the highest priority targets for the attack. I doubt US naval commanders would be affected by political pressure to do things that violated their considered judgment. The US Navy had much more experience than the IJN in attacking Pearl. During the 20s and 30s, they conducted a number of exercises to help them understand what a Japanese aerial attack on Pearl would involve and what it would take to defeat it. A senior US admiral once indicated that the Navy had gamed out the entirety of the Pacific Campaign--the only surprise was the kamikazes.

When have US commanders NOT been under pressure to do things against their better judgement. That's part of BEING a commander is having to deal with the realities of politics. The US has a LONG, and I mean LONG history of making military decisions for its commanders and then leaving them to execute it the best way they can. Washington's defense of New York against the Brittish, McClellans pressure by Lincoln to attack the Confederacy. There are more recent examples I won't get into for political reasons. Its a natural consequence of having a commander and chief who is first and foremost a politician.

There is now way the slow old battlewagons at Pearl were going to chase down the IJN fleet, just not going to happen. Now, they might have some luck with a fast cruiser force, since the escort for the carriers were small, but there is no way the battleships would have stood a chance once located.

[ny59giants]

A significant number of tanks, and each had to be taken out individually. To really hurt the US Fleet, the KB needed >90% damage to the farms. Meanwhile the fleet, being undisturbed, would be conducting a Boxing Day shoot at the activity over the tank farms and naval repair facilities.

With what ships would the Americans be putting to sea to chase the IJN CV's?? What quality fighter planes would take on the Zero's and cause serious enough damage to get the Japanese to retire? The AA fire from the remaining ships was not much and the AA around PH was not sufficient, considering the size to be covered. Attacking the shipyards and fuel farm and the resulting damage would have been more detrimental to the US Navy than the loss of the old slow BB's.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

A significant number of tanks, and each had to be taken out individually. To really hurt the US Fleet, the KB needed >90% damage to the farms. Meanwhile the fleet, being undisturbed, would be conducting a Boxing Day shoot at the activity over the tank farms and naval repair facilities.

With what ships would the Americans be putting to sea to chase the IJN CV's?? What quality fighter planes would take on the Zero's and cause serious enough damage to get the Japanese to retire? The AA fire from the remaining ships was not much and the AA around PH was not sufficient, considering the size to be covered. Attacking the shipyards and fuel farm and the resulting damage would have been more detrimental to the US Navy than the loss of the old slow BB's.

Ships--with anything fast enough to overhaul the Kaga. Remember the KB had a very weak screen, and the Battle Fleet had a significant number of fast ships. The IJN tried sending in the fast gunships to catch the US carrier TFs a number of times during 1942.

Aircraft--"Of Japan's 441 planes (350 took part in the attack), 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave and 20 in the second wave) and another 74 were damaged by flak and machine gunfire from the ground. Over 20 of the aircraft that safely landed on their carriers were irreparable." (Wikipedia) The Navy had 221 aircraft on hand *after* the attacks (including 46 combatant types and 45 long-range patrol planes), plus about 150 undamaged naval aircraft with the carrier TFs. (http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/p ... CPac-A.htm). The Army had an additional 159 aircraft--mostly fighters--available after the attack, half combat-ready.

AA--the lack of AA during the attack was due to the surprise, not the unavailability of weapons.