Conservative Japanese Strategy

[mogami]

Hi, well have at it and mod away. Myself I will never agree that are is too much supply in stock because that is game I play and I've done a number of games into 1943 and I've always had severe supply problems.
 
I don't run out from expanding aircraft or other factories since I do very little of that. I run out because it costs 1,000,000 supply or more to repair SRA so I have imports in 1943.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005

I have been reading (via the Internet) about the Allied campaign in New Guinea. What strikes me as I read this is how the Japanese tried to shift resources from one theater to anohter to try and counter the Allied onslaught. Often this resulted in Japanese forces being out of position and/or isolated. For example much of the air and naval power available to the Mariana's defense was moved to New Guinea to counter the allied offensive against Biak, to no avail. One possible conclusion to draw from this is that the Japanese tried to control too much territory with to little force - a conclusion that is probably not uncommon among historians.

This leads me to wonder if any Japanese players thus far have tried a more conservative approach to the war. Possibly trying to conquer much less territory than historically was the case. This would be quite different given that most Japanese players I have seen actually try to conquer more territory.

What would have happened had the Japanese never included New Guinea or the Solomons in their defensive perimiter, but instead started with Kendari and Morotai? What would have happened had the Marianas really been the first line of defense, instead of Tarawa?

The key issue was tempo of command. The Japanese could not react quickly enough to take advantage of their central position. It also happened in Burma once the maneuver war got going in mid-1944.

[herwin]

A couple of points I've made before:

1. IRL, the prewar Japanese strategy was smash and grab the SRA, ship resources and oil home for as long as possible, then resist the USN close blockade passively until the US grew war weary.

2. IRL, the late advance into the South Seas was due to logistical constraints. There were large enough Allied garrisons at key points that a quick grab wasn't powerful enough.

[Sardonic]

I would argue that if the Japanese create big bases (both air and naval) and allow the USN to capture
them, they are making things EASIER on the USN.

The thing to do is make damn sure that you wont lose one of these bases easy.

It doesnt hurt to capture stuff, simply to PREVENT them from being increased in size.

You cant win a war of attrition with the USAAF. He will grind you into dust.

Once the USN can mass eight SeaBees on one spot AND supply them, its over, and you are in TROUBLE.

The only real hope is to sink so many merchants that you win an automatic victory.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Sardonic

I would argue that if the Japanese create big bases (both air and naval) and allow the USN to capture
them, they are making things EASIER on the USN.

The thing to do is make damn sure that you wont lose one of these bases easy.

It doesnt hurt to capture stuff, simply to PREVENT them from being increased in size.

You cant win a war of attrition with the USAAF. He will grind you into dust.

Once the USN can mass eight SeaBees on one spot AND supply them, its over, and you are in TROUBLE.

The only real hope is to sink so many merchants that you win an automatic victory.

Truk was an enormous base--the central islands were out of range of gunfire, so the Japanese fleet could shelter there. It was basically a cat 10 base fully developed with air strips and fortified to level 9. We didn't try to take it, we merely hit it really hard with naval air. So building it was not handing something to the Allies. Originally, Plan Orange was to take Truk, but the Admiralties near Rabaul were substituted.

[niceguy2005]

It seems to me that one of the problems with the big base strategy for Japan is that the base becomes crucial to hold. The Allies can't be allowed to have it because they have a ready made airfield and forwad port for shipping, so the Japanese must consolidate their resources to defend it. There are two problems with this.

1. The allies can just bypass it making it irrelevant
2. The allies can come at you head on and destroy a lot of your military and airpower in a decisive fight on their terms.

Such a strategy is sort of a hub and spoke design for defense. This however is too easy too defeat. You either go at selected bases forming the spokes, thus breaking the wheel, or you smash the hub and the spokes become useless.

An alternative is to think of a spider web, the sort you find in the corner or your garage. Its a sticky mass of interconnected string. You can't even tell which one to cut first. Japans strategy should mirror this. Building numerous small interconnected bases (level 3 airfields and level 3 ports). When the mass of allied troops smashes into this interconnecting web it breaks some of the bases but can become easily bogged down by all the others. The entire time it fights you at that base it is under constant attack and harrasment.

Truth be told, in the end, Japans going to fall anyway because it is so badly outnumbered and over matched. The only thing that can possibly save Japan is luck and making the allies desperate or frustrated enough to do something stupid.

[mogami]

Hi, Japan has to use the bases on map. If she could build islands that would make the defense easy.
The Allied player has then means to advance on more then one axis.    They are going to move south from Burma. They may use amph operations to bypass or cut off Japanese along coast in Burma.
They are going to advance into Southern SRA either toward Kendari or Toward Ambonia THey will require amph assets in this but land based air can provide most of the cover.  The ultimate objective of this axis is Clark Field and Formosa.
They will come across from Pearl Harbor. First Wake and then one of Kwajaleans out layers.  This move might be in conjunction with advance north toward Kwajalean from Baker or Canton. 
 
The point is the Japanese will have to contend with multiple threats

[temagic]

know this is an old thread, just wanted to contribute one little thing to the discussion;

http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/hois ... etard.html

Cheers!

[Feinder]

The "active defense" for Japan, is much the same as the "active defense" for Allies, after amphib bonus expires for Japan.
 
You don't have to defend strongly, you just have to defend.  If you own the base, prepped or not, your opponenet MUST prep, or he's going to suffer massive casualties on the beach.  If you are prepped (defense), so much the better.  But the key is to force your opponent to actually spend the time to prep to say, at least 40 for an invasion, even if you're just holding with a Btn.  Going unprepped as the invader, can be disatrous.  So as the defender, you're trying to buy time.

Same token, you DON'T want to lose a bunch of guys defending.  LCU loss points, esp for Allies, will be your biggest bane.  As Allies, I hold a base as long as "reasonable", then attempt to evac (potentally by air if in range), at the last minute.  But staying there initially forces your opponent to land opposed (time to prep, losses to disruption and assaults).  Then when things are looking "unfavorable", airlift/fasttran the unit back, to defend the next line.  Your opponnet is compelled to prep-assault-recover, and you save as many of your guys as possible.
 
What I do as Japan and Allies is to keep a few bastions, with several weaker satalite bases that are basically there for the AFs.  If bad-guy goes for the satalite bases, he gets pummeled by LBA from everythign in range, and it saps strenght from an atttack on the bastion.   If he goes directly for the bastion, the satalite bases attrit him with LBA, and bastion is supposed to hold long enough for reinforcements to arrive (yes, I keep a "mobile force" on 18kt transports every so often, in order to zoom in and reinforce at first opportunity).  Most invasions means CVs and transports come in.  If your LBA can endure and put pressure on the CVs (force them to retreat, if anything out of sorties), that's when you zoom in your fast reaction force (reinforcements) to the bastion.
 
-F-

[Grotius]

For some insight on the etymology of "petard" and the phrase "hoist by his own petard," see

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petard

The Wikipedia entry suggests, among other things, that Shakespeare was one of the first to use the phrase, and that indeed "hoist" was initially a past tense of the old English word "hoise." Shakespeare didn't mean "hung by his own rope" but, instead, "blown into the air with his own bomb." (Hamlet, Act III, sc. iv, relating to Rosencrantz & Guildenstern and their plan to free Hamlet.)

To add my own insight to this: "petard" is related to the French "pet" (n.: fart) and "peter" (originally: "to fart," often now meaning "to fizzle" or to "peter out" -- which provokes linguistic debate about the etymology of our English phrase to "peter out"). A French-speaking friend of mine used to refer to my early-morning flatulence as the "pet de l'ourse", the "fart of the bear" waking up.

[VSWG]

TMI! TMI!