Tell that to Me-109 pilots in the BOB that escorting bombers was to their advantage. The fighter is at its best as a hunter of planes, not a defender of them. Fighter pilots by nature are offensive minded. The last thing they want is to be tied down by a bomber formation.
"Tied to the bomber formation" is a matter of doctrine. Zeroes attacking Guadalcanal were not closely tied to the bomber formations. There weren't, for example, orders limiting the altitude or distance that they had to maintain with bombers outside of the initial approach. They weren't for example operating under altitude restirctions that affected Allied fighters escorting hvy bombers in the PTO. And in any case, the job of the fighter on the offensive is still limited to attacking enemy fighters. This is in contrast to the fighter on the defensive, that has to attack enemy bombers while avoiding enemy fighters... a far more complex task than mere escort.
Actually you have that turned around, it was the presence of Japanese fighters that made the allied pilots job more complicated. The allied job was to shoot down the bombers not go after fighters.
I did not "turn around" anything. I noted that the job of the defending interceptor is complicated because it of necessity has to avoid fighters (if they can, often not doable) while attacking bombers. No matter which side of the coin you call, it is a more complicated job than attacking a single-type enemy formation.
Your conclusion is correct but for the wrong reason. The Zeros had a...
My conclusion is absolutely correct for exactly the reason that I stated and that you copied in your reply.
When they conducted a sweep, they were the primary and only target.
Precisely. You have argued that the defense had an easy time of it which is flawed analysis. The job of the defense was more challenging when multiple types were engaged. In multitype formations, the escorting Zeros had an easier time of it because Allied defenders had a more complicated mission that often made them easier to get at. In more pure engagements where Zeros were just pitted against F4Fs, the Zeroes suffered greater losses. Therefore your claim that the presence of bombers made the Zeroes' job more difficult is contradicted empirically by the data.
And with the US advantage in early warning, the Wildcats were often up there waiting for them.
That is an overstatement. According to contemporary sources the early warning advantage gave the F4Fs enough time to meet the zero on equal terms. The effect was that the Zeroes did not routinely have positional advantage (except of course when the early warning system failed, which in the early days it frequently did). That does not constitute a special advantage for the Allies, it just means that in judging the general situation, were one to simulate it, there would be no special propensity for either side to achieve tactical susprise.
They conducted effective fighter sweeps throughout the Philippines and the SRA. Remember Darwin? The Japanese conducted a fighter sweep before the bombers came in.
That is correct. And in the overwhelming majority of successful sweeps, as at Darwin, the advantage of tactical surprise allowed Japanese to nail aircraft on the runway, while landing, or while taking off. That result does not suggest that Zeroes were better aircraft or Zero pilots better pilots, it suggests that local tactical surprise works to the advantage of the one with the initiative. Had the Japanese conducted the Darwin raid with, for example, F2A3s (were such a thing possible) and relatively novice aircrews the results would have been substantially the same.
There is one other point you mentioned in an earlier post concerning the quality of training of US pilots early in the war. try reading a history of the 49th FG upon its arrival in Australia and decide what their level of experience was.
I've read most of the relevant histories. I'm not sure which of my arguments you imagine yourself to be refuting. I have stipulated that the Allied pilots in general did not have as much air time as the Japanese ones and that for the most part the difference strikes me as irrelevent. Since my particular recommendation all along has been that the Zero bonus not apply when engaging USN pilots, I do not see how the history of the 49FG is relevant to my observations in this thread.
Another point. You claim that the Zero bonus doesn't capture the "feel and flavor" of the early war. Let's not forget that we should also model allied airgroups that arrived without either aircraft, mechanics or support equipment. Shouldn't we also model the problems created when Australian longshoremen refused to unload the American ships?
The game presumes to give the players control over logistical functions. If the Allied player chooses to send his aircraft without "aviation support" that is the Allied player's choice to make. Your observation about poor initial logistics has no obvious connection to the argument--- except perhaps to reinforce my observation that many of the Japanese early successes in the Phillippines and Indonesia are substantially attributable to the fact that allied aircraft were at the end of a virtually nonexistent logistical rope. I fully agree (if it is your suggestion) that the Allied logistical position in the PI, Indonesia, Burma, northern Australia, and SoPac should be weak at the start of the game. How the Allied player remedies that weakness is (in the game's current formulation) one of the problems that the Allied player gets to decide how to resolve.
Shouldn't we also model the huge operational loss rates that the P-40 and other aircraft experienced.
Again this has nothing directly to do with the results of the air to air model. At present operational loss rates are in fact modeled in the game. If it is your contention that they are not high enough perhaps that is some other aspect that needs to be examined. Certainly operational losses will be tied to logistics, and players that fail to provide sufficient aviation support and supplies do seem to suffer higher operational losses. Naturally, these should affect both players to the degree that they keep track of their logistical situations.
I'd be more than willing to lose the Zero bonus if you were willing to accurately model these ops loss rates. Seems only fair doesn't it? The point here is that the early American effort was basically a shoestring operation, beleagured by massive supply, equipment, aircraft and crew shortages.
Seems right to me. The Japanese logistical position at Rabaul was also quite weak in the early going, and in Indonesia and northern New Guinea. These are naturally problems that both players should have to resolve (keeping bases in supply, providing sufficient aviation support, and maintaining decent facilities that in the game are abstracted as runway/airfield development).
I'm all for historical accuracy but let's make sure that BOTH sides are modeled accurately. Of course, it really doesn't matter, does it. You don't own the game so what do you care?
I could ask why you care since you already own the game. It is the same logical position... that owners of the game should want to see it improved and that those looking for a better game would want to purchase one if it repairs glaring weaknesses extant in the current version. I'd buy it were it not (a) deeply flawed, (b) pretty much the same product as Gary Grigsby's Pacific War (which I already own).
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
