Tokyo Rose was a Hussy! Chez (J) vs. Canoe (A)

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witpqs
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by witpqs »

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

That's the analysis I've been tailoring my play to, witpqs. But I think Fortress Palembang is important for at least three reasons:

1) It represents a better place to defend than either Soerabaja or Batavia due to terrain and supply, so you might as well (given time) transfer the Java/DEI troops to Palembang.

2) There is a risk Japan could bypass Sumatra and head right for a weakened India. That's a real risk the Aliled player has to consider and try to address. But if Japan doesn't do that, and instead follows a more traditional coure of action, Fortress Palembang should really slow them down and damage their units. It's a good way for the Aliled player to exact a toll.

3) If Japan really messes up and doesn't attend to a Fortress Palembang in a timely manner, the Allies could start their "phase" of the game with an advanced, powerful platform with multiple interlocking bases and airfields supported by a supply-generating base. I would give my right arm to be able to kick off the Allied offensive-phase of the game from such an advanced position. I'd gladly sacrifice less vital places (New Zealand, Line Islands, etc.) if it gave me that advantage.

I was not criticizing your decision in any way. In fact, I think it is the right decision regardless of the economic situation in the scenario. I was just adding to the discussion about the delay and the observations about oil/fuel versus time. And of course, there is no guarantee that EHQ knows about those economic analyses, is there? [;)]

I should add that, of course the more he does and the more he increases production, the shorter that "time leash" gets.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Bullwinkle58 »

ORIGINAL: witpqs

True, but those places only mitigate the time involved. Even ignoring them the time frame is way longer than I had assumed.

Agree. When I was shown figures by a well-known "AE analyst" I was surprised how fueled the Japanese economy was/is. They can't go joy-riding with the KB all over the hemisphere, but for normal ops they're not in bad shape for awhile.
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Jeremy Mac Donald
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Jeremy Mac Donald »

Been lurking this AAR, including reading your opponents version as well hence I won't comment on the game.  On that note I'm slightly concerned by a few comments a few people have made where there is some danger that they have seen both sides of the story.  I've come to the conclusion that those of us following along really need to make a choice - either watch both sides of the story and then commit to never commenting in any way that could influence the players or, alternatively, we pick a side and then you can be an adviser. 

In fact I believe that a poster should probably state clearly his intentions one way or another in his first post.  This is because the temptation to comment can be very seductive.  I don't believe anyone on these forums would go out of their way to ruin the experience for the actual players but, in particular, if you out yourself as watching both sides then that acts as a deterrent to falling for that seductive sirens call of commenting on the game being played when it will almost certianly be coloured by your insider knowledge.  In effect outing yourself in an AAR helps to keep you away from temptation.
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obvert
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by obvert »

Maybe this is all intentional. It's three months in, which seem like a lot, but if Japan really is much better off on fuel, could this be a trap to lure a bunch of units into an (ultimately) undefendable spot where they will be wiped out?

No basis for this, just looking for any understanding of the seemingly lackadaisical conquests by Japan in this game.

If it's not intentional, could it be used that way to a Japan player's benefit later in another game?
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Canoerebel »

2/4/42 and 2/5/42

witpqs: I knew you weren't critizing; my reply was simply to clarify why I think Palembang makes a good choice, at least under these circumstances, even though fuel isn't as big a constraint under Scenario Two.

Jeremy: That's a good reminder and worth stating. Ironically, though, you unintentinally and with the best of motives may have just given me a clue. The main comment I've seen from a reader came from Nemo: that the enemy is probably "focusing on 12 to 6." That was made weeks ago, and everybody knows that Nemo is an unusually astute at evaluating the intentions of other players (he's a pyschologist [psychiatrist?]) and an experienced and capable player. I ascribed his comment totally to his knack for piecing together things, so had no thought that he had been reading my opponent's AAR or had any particular inside info. I am as certain as I can be that it wasn't, in fact, a breach. But my interpretation of your comment, which was admirably vague and certainly not any way improper, is that you think that the comment was a breach because it proved to be right on target. So, now, I might attatch additional signficance to the comment - not because he knew or revealed anything, but simply because you think he did. Of course, I may be completely wrong about any or all of this. So, you're right - reading between the lines can make it possible for a player to deduce things...maybe. How's that for convoluted thinking? P.S. Whether I'm right about the "12 to 6" comment or not, it didn't change my plans because I had already committed to the idea that I would leave the Pacific "open" and send all Allied reinforcements to India and Sumatra. In effect, I'm weaking myself right where the enemy is going, but it suits me to do so and I decided to do so long ago.

Eastern DEI: The enemy has landed at Makassar and will take the base tomorrow. However, he didn't bring any base forces with him, which will give me a bit of a breather from enhance enemy air threat over eastern Java. This will shut down the flow of Allied xAKL traffic to and from Balikpan.

Western DEI: The Allies currently have 2200 AV in eastern Sumatra distributed as follows: Djambi (24 AV); Palembang (1179 AV and 3.31 forts); Prabaemolith (164 AV and 2.06); Oosthaven (632 and 2.82); Benkolen (106 and 1.50), and Padang (136 and 2.12). A UK brigade is two days away; 6th Aussie cav is on the way; two engineer units and a big base force will arrive within days.

Port Blair: Allied AV is up to 88 and I think I can get it up to about 100 drawing off troops from Rangoon. An Aussie brigade is aboard ship and on the way from Aden. Put 225 or so AV on Port Blair behind three or four forts...and Japan will have a tough time once the invasion bonus expires at the end of March.

Coral Sea: The enemy is landing at Koumac and I'm getting more SigInt of troops bound for Noumea. The American carriers are just east of New Zealand's south island and will pass over the next two or three days. I am hoping that the enemy moves this way indicate this is Japan's main vector of attack. I don't want to go up against the Japanese spearhead and it would suit me if it were aimed at this area, which I consider of far less strategic importance than many others. I will continue to concentrate in the DEI, which I consider more important and having more enemy vulnerability....at least until the enemy commits the KB in the DEI.

China: I was getting a little nervous about the force approaching Changsha, but I know more now and my fears are at least temporarily abated. The Japanese stack did manage to catch one of three infantry units retired from the forested hex to the east of Changsha (bombing raids slowed it down), but the enemy force is only a bit more than 2000 AV (34, 39, 35, 41 divisions plus a bunch of brigades). I already have 2200 AV behind four forts, with another 1,000 AV to arrive in a few days, so I believe Steve will have to reinforce strongly to have a chance.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Canoerebel »

ORIGINAL: obvert
Maybe this is all intentional. It's three months in, which seem like a lot, but if Japan really is much better off on fuel, could this be a trap to lure a bunch of units into an (ultimately) undefendable spot where they will be wiped out?

No basis for this, just looking for any understanding of the seemingly lackadaisical conquests by Japan in this game.

If it's not intentional, could it be used that way to a Japan player's benefit later in another game?

Yes, that is possible. I've had to weigh the very risks you mention against the benefits. I've been monitoring Japanese moves and force disposition - including use of SigInt - to see if I can figure out whether my opponent is trying to lure me into a trap. My strategy has unfolded slowly, but picked up the pace considerably in mid January when I got several indications that my opponent was not putting together a master-stroke plan, but rather seemed somewhat disorganized and allowing events to shape his strategy rather than taking control to shape the game. (The events included the mess in Luzon and his committing reinforcements there). Now I've committed to my strategy fully, so if I've been wrong in my evaluations, I"m in for a world of hurt.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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paullus99
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by paullus99 »

Very dangerous to leave a potent enemy stronghold in your rear or on your flank - Canoerebel is maximizing his use of forces that would have otherwise been "chaff in the fire" should the Japanese player go full bore into the DEI at game-on. At this point, conquest is going to be very expensive in terms of firepower necessary (and resources), along with time. Even in Scneario #2 - the Allies will only continue to get stronger and better prepared - and if the Japanese player doesn't push his perimeter out far enough (and secure likely allied jumping off points), the game takes a different turn.

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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Canoerebel »

One of the things I've been mulling over the past two days is whether to commit Australian forces to Sumatra. I'm short on political points, so I can't strip much more from India, but Oz has quite a few unrestricted units (I think?) or at least units that can be bought relatively cheaply. They are also nearby and I have plenty of xAPs to handle them. But I had decided - at least temporarily - to not weaken Oz, while at the same time not strengthening it. In the event Steve were to commit wholey to a conquest of Oz, my "failsafe" would be the release of the "crossing the deadline" troops. I would use those to invade Burma or Malaya, thus fighting an offensive in the enemy heartland while the enemy was fighting way off on the perimeter.

I've made similar important decisions previously One of the first was to leave the two Aussie brigades in Malaya to defend Singapore. On the one hand, I wanted to evacuate them to Sumatra, but I began to sense that the Japanese advance on Singapore might not be strong enough to take the base within a reasonable time. This was a judgment call, but it proved to be right. The enemy attack on Janauary 10 mauled them rather than the Allies. They haven't attacked since then. As I think you can see, Singapore, if it can be held, forms an important road block - both to an enemy end-around on Port Blair, Ceylon and India, and possibly also for Sumatra (because many players, once committed to Singapore, will want to vanguish it before moving forward to what they perceive would be new targets). The decision to commit a decent amount of troops to Singapore was made in December, and turned out to be a good call.

The next big decision point came in mid January when I got confirmation that SigInt reports that IJA divisions were heading for Luzon was right. This told me that the enemy was committing to a protracted campaign in Luzon, which also meant he wouldn't have those troops to commit elsewhere. It was at this point that I decided to commit the British and Australian troops in India and at Aden to the defense of Sumatra. It's still too early to know if I made the right call here.

When the enemy force that congregated at Clark Field launched a distastrous (for them) attack in late January, I knew Steve would reinforce there and that Luzon would mire him down even longer. So I've committed a few more units from India to Sumatra, though I've currently pumped the well fairly dry until reinforcements arrive (an Indian brigade arrives at Madras in less than a week, so that's the next possibility).

There are other pieces to the puzzle: I decided some time ago - a month? - to commit the Allied carriers to the DEI. This decision was based on the enemy repeated use of Mini-KB forces in the southern DEI. I'm hoping I can jump all over that, though the opportunity may vanish before my ships make it to theater (they're nearly at New Zealand now).

I decided to reinforce Port Blair about ten days ago as I realized the more roadblocks I can create the less likely the enemy will have time to move on India when and if he should vanquish (or bypass) Sumatra. The Aussie unit bound there will take a good ten days to two weeks to arrive.

At the outset, I determined that I would try to bolster India's defenses by committing all American reinforcements that became available. This decision was made gradually beginning in December and fully implemented, I think, in early January. The first infantry unit, a raider battalion, will reach Capetown in three days. I probably have about 400 AV in total on the way to Capetown - not alot, but a start.

Vast numbers of American aircraft squadrons have been sent to India and Sumatra, with some already there. Included in this number is 30 P-39s at Tjilitjap. I haven't used them yet, as I don't want jolt Steve with just how great the Allied commitment is. I also have nearly all the DEI/British navy at or near Cocos Island, with reinforcmenes on the way (an American CA and CL Boise are nearing Perth; an American BB, CA, and two DDs departed San Francisco a couple of days ago).

I mention all this to give readers - especially newcomers - an idea of how large the Allied commitment is, how it evolved in stages, and how big a role reading enemy intentions and capabilities played. And the fun part is that there is a chance that I could have evaluated incorrectly.

"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by JohnDillworth »

Well you have the Boise near Australia, that should be enough to defend with! Seriously, I think you have a lot of troops in Sumatra and you might be falling in love with the concept that you will hold it throughout the war. You might, but I wouldn't be the house on it. Committing free troops in Australia would be betting the house. Most of those troops are of militia quantity, and would not add much real backbone to your defense in Sumatra. Same is true in Australia but Australia is big. IF they serve as speed bumps in Australia they buy time. That time might be the time you need to get your "He crossed the line" bonus troops to where you can really use them. Might be Australia, Sumatra or offensives in Malaya. Point is, if Australia is stripped bare, you might not have a Sumatra or Malay option
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by paullus99 »

Looking at the hypothetical map, here is my general evaluation:

1) To invade India, a Japanese player needs to secure his SLOCs through the DEI - which means a succesful campaign in the PI, Singapore, and perhaps even Northwest Australia to eliminate threats to his flanks. Canoerebel has created a very potent roadblock that will require a major committment of resources to clear (at this point, the forces committed to all of these campaigns is contraindicative of a push in the direction of India).

2) To invade Australia, a Japanese player has many more options as far as strategic directions go. He can go through the DEI & go down the west coast (though his lack of progress in the DEI puts this option in doubt) or proceed to secure the Solomons and New Guinea for a thrust against the North and East Coasts, with the potential to also include New Caledonia, Fiji & Auckland as a buffer against quick reinforcement from America. But, again we aren't seeing a major committment of ground & air forces in this region either for a quick conquest & follow up - though Australia is still a very viable target based on current operations.

3) To invade Hawaii, a Japanese player should be pushing the Line Islands & already prepping to secure Midway as well. The operations in the Aleutians could be a move to distract US resources from the Central Pacific, but we've yet to see any meaningful moves that might indicate a Central Thrust.

We are still very early in the game & the Japanese player may still be concentrating his critical mass just out of site of Canoerebel's "range of information" but I think we can start to dicern a general pattern of operations with leans towards a more Southeastern movement.

Just the $.10 tour of my thoughts on the subject.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Canoerebel »

That's sharp analysis, paullus99. I agree that all visible factors are pointing to a SoPac emphasis. I would welcome that.

Somebody (Bullwinkle?) pondered whether Chez is familiar with the current edge thinking on IJ fuel stocks in Scenario Two. I haven't gotten the impression that he is a deep reader of the forums. At the same time, I think he was getting some counsel from certain players (Chickenlad) that bowed out of this AAR. So he should be getting some good advice if he's keeping his AAR active and listening to input.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by John 3rd »

He would be insane (personal opinion) to attack India! After Dan's last match, reading other AARs, and my own current experience, I don't think India can be taken by the Japanese.

Australia is the logical next choice, however, with the lack of aggressive movement this option will begin to close.

Hawaii is a truly interesting choice to make. The major problem there is the long supply line and horrific cost in fuel the operation would consume without major benefit.

The key factor here is with the Allied commitment now in full swing there are definite vulnerabilities that, perhaps, wouldn't be there in a normal scenario. Australia is weaker--slightly--due to troops being moved into the Sumatra defense and I would imagine Hawaii isn't as built up as it normally would be at this point.

Perhaps your opponent is waiting to see your CVs Dan? If he sees them far from his target (read Hawaii) then he might move much more quickly.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Canoerebel »

I get the feeling that Chez is not a big risk taker. I think Hawaii is a pretty high risk gamble, so I rate the odds of an attack as fairly small.

As for India, I think an aggressive, experienced IJ player in Scenario Two definately has a good shot at taking it out. Were I playing Q-Ball or Nemo (two players with lots of experience who are quite aggressive, and I'm sure there are plenty of others), I'd be scared to death.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Alfred »

ORIGINAL: obvert

Maybe this is all intentional. It's three months in, which seem like a lot, but if Japan really is much better off on fuel, could this be a trap to lure a bunch of units into an (ultimately) undefendable spot where they will be wiped out?

No basis for this, just looking for any understanding of the seemingly lackadaisical conquests by Japan in this game.

If it's not intentional, could it be used that way to a Japan player's benefit later in another game?

Yes, I've posted at length elsewhere about this issue.

Whether Chez is intending this is another matter. Even if it isn't his current intention, he certainly would still retain that possibility into the medium term.

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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Alfred »

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

He would be insane (personal opinion) to attack India! After Dan's last match, reading other AARs, and my own current experience, I don't think India can be taken by the Japanese.

India most definitely can be taken. Don't be misled by the very sub optimal play displayed by other Japanese players to date. Whether it is the best utilisation of Japanese assets is another matter. Much depends on which of the five strategic approaches I have posted elsewhere Japan chooses to achieve victory.

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Nomad
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Nomad »

I agree with Alfred, India is certainly doable. If a player uses the 18th British and the three Indian Brigades to defend in the SRA and loses them, India will be quite weak. A good to excellent player should be able to take India. This does limit what else can be done.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Nemo121 »

Jeremy Mac Donald,

I fear your faith in the forum and its members is sadly misplaced. In my last game one forum member ( FatR) TWICE knowingly broke FOW to inform my opponent of my entire strategic assessment and plan ( my opponent didn't solicit this, but what can you do when you get a PM? ). So, some people here have no integrity whatsoever.

With that said, I think that some posters to the forum can see trends and conduct analysis at a reasonably high level and can, without reading both sides of an AAR, do quite a good strategic analysis of what the possibilities are and how things will probably turn out. I would suggest there are roughly 12 people on the forum who could, IMO, conduct such an analysis from reading a single-sided AAR and be right almost all of the time. I think that you might be misinterpreting something like that as coming from unfairly gotten knowledge.

Since my name has been mentioned as a possible originator for Jeremy's concern ( although not confirmed ) I will say that I amn't following Chez Da Jez's AAR. After the first few days and the AO action it was absolutely clear just how this game would go. That AO error was hugely telling - particularly in terms of WHY they would be there at that time, although, obviously, that wasn't something to highlight in the analysis at the time as it would simply have given Canoerebel far too much of a head's up on the 3 to 6pm strategic focus.

I would also state that after my intense annoyance at the FatR fiasco and my own non-AARing in the aftermath I'd be one of the more careful people around here re: commenting if I read both sides. With that said, one doesn't need to read both sides here to see what is going on.


Re: the Orwellian doublethink re: Chez Da Jez's current pace of advance and lack of clear strategic focus...
When you read Chez Da Jez's other postings on the forum ( of which I read a sample as SOP for performing the minor level of character assessment needed before offering input re: his likely thinking, level of insight and so on and so forth ) you'll see a focus on the tactical issues and not the strategic issues. I have read other of his AARs and there has always been that ( I believe ) mis-focus.

Throw into that the issue with divisions prepping for distant targets suddenly popping up in the Phillipines to lend their weight to initially understrength thrusts and I think we are seeing that lack of clear strategic focus resulting in Order, Counter-order and Disorder as a certain famous Prussian would have said.

I have no doubt that what we are seeing is not some deeply subtle, plan but, rather, the failure of an insufficiently focussed, honed, timetabled and weighted plan.

While Alfred is absolutely correct that the situation is still recoverable I believe that absent external advice on a grand strategic and strategic level Chez Da Jez won't rescue this situation.



Canoerebel,
Commit the Australians. I've been advocating an "all in" policy from Day 1. I think that you've held back till now but not you can see the benefits of such a policy in the future.

Sure, CDJ could bypass etc BUT if you have sufficient forces forward in supplied bases his bypass will not encircle you but merely result in his forward units advancing until they are, themselves, cut off. It would be damnably difficult to supply an Indian invasion from Singapore while Palembang is a functional bomber base for the Allies. Read my AAR and the amount of hell I created for Japanese shipping at Singapore with CL, DD and bomber raids in the waters around Singapore. I sank dozens of Japanese ships every month in that small region.

Southern Sumatra is the best roadblock to the invasion of India you can develop at this stage of the war. Don't rob it to put a few troops at Port Blair when those few troops will be easily pushed aside by any reasonably strong Japanese committment. The benefit of garrisoning Port Blair with 100 AV of troops is minimal. If Japan wants they can defeat 100 AV with an amphibiously landed regiment + 100 bombers. So, this garrisoning is illusory.



Re: India.
India can absolutely be taken. Based on forum posts I think there are, at present, only about 6 people on the forum who would be able to be the first to take India. Once they've devised the appropriate strategem there are probably a dozen others who could adopt it ( but couldn't come up with it themselves ) who would then be able to invade and capture India.

Your last game showed some good pointers on how to do it but also showcased a large number of very serious strategic errors, which point the way towards how to do it successfully.

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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by String »

About AAR security.

I think it's a fine balance between getting the readers interested with the strategic details and keeping OpSec. Reading the same old DEI invasion over and over again isn't very interesting to most AAR followers. Even if they read it, they don't feel the need to comment on it, and thus, the AAR will consist of mostly just the players posts. For me personally, that's a bad thing, as I write my AAR's for the comments mostly, and to stroke my ego [:'(].

I have a situation similar to Canoerebels in my game, the Japanese player has advanced very slowly, and I'm not sure what he's up to. I would like to be more clear about my plans, but after the Pzb/Nomad121 debacle I'm not sure I can, considering the OpSec. In the past I've used certain other forums for more open AAR's, but these days I'm afraid that that certain other developer has become too popular for my AAR's to be protected by obscurity.

Just my two cents.


edit: By the way, I read both AAR's so I won't comment on the game on neither, but I have noticed a few leading questions on the other one. Luckily, they're only clearly leading if you know both sides of the story.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by Canoerebel »

I'm going to post an update in a moment, but first a note about OpSec. I am aware of the occasional OpSec breaches, in particular the one in Nemo's game (though I wasn't aware who had committed it). Yet I still post in great detail in my AARs. This is because I derive as much pleasure from writing an AAR as I do playing the game. I'm not sure I could play without writing an AAR, so I'm willing to take the risk. In the unlikely event of an OpSec failure, I would simply try to revise my plans to somehow re-achieve some surprise.

So...thanks for reading because that makes the writing even more enjoyable.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!

Post by GreyJoy »

This AAR is really good. Thanks Canoerebel for taking the time to write it down
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