Campaign For North Africa 40D-43

[warspite1]

Turn 38
19th April 1941

Oh dear.....

[DanNeely]

artillery attacks on airfields are IMO appropriately devastating. Your aircraft may very well have been simulated flying (for the sake of deciding how lethal shells are) during take off and landing the runway is a very compact target and easy to saturate with a devastating quantity of shells.

On the ground anything short of hardened shelters (of the sort not in the game) is a fragile non moving target that heavy shellfire can be walked onto until the hangers are reduced to burning pyres for whatever was trying to shelter inside.

More generally aerial bombardment gives you a lot more/better chances to spot the attackers in time to take off and not be caught on the ground, and unlike AAA defensive weapons capable of shooting down artillery shells in flight are only starting to cross the line from science fiction to high tech weaponry.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: DanNeely

artillery attacks on airfields are IMO appropriately devastating.

warspite1

Yes I don't have too much of a problem with it - I was just using a bit of dramatic effect [;)]

[warspite1]

Turn 38
19th April 1941

Now call me old fashioned, but I don't think the war has turned in a direction necessarily to our advantage.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Turn 38
19th April 1941

Now call me old fashioned, but I don't think the war has turned in a direction necessarily to our advantage.

Churchill would find the words for it. And he'd find another general or two (Auchinleck? Ritchie/Cunningham?).
And send an RAF Vice Marshall (Dowding or Park?)to command what's left.
The AI seems rather competent at attacking.

[warspite1]

Turn 38
19th April 1941

One glance at the map tells Neame all he needs to know. There is no more pretence at trying to fall back in good order. It's now become a rout.

All units capable of moving are ordered to do so to the limit of their movement - no regard to saving others. Some units on the coast make it as far as Tobruk, while others reach Gazala, but for others still - the twin dangers of ambush and air attack stop their retreat. The 74th HAA Regiment is caught near Bomba, the Guards Brigade HQ gets little further. The bulk of the remaining armour and Australian infantry are strung out trying to reach the comparative safety of Tobruk (although the plan will be for as many of them as possible to try and head east between the Germans at Tobruk and the advancing Italians to the south).

[warspite1]

Turn 38
19th April 1941

The turn will be quick. All artillery naval units that can fire are ordered to open up.

At Gazala the 107th Royal Horse Artillery inflict some loses on lead elements of the Trento Division.

A similar result is gained by the Trento Divisional HQ to the east.

Finally there Germans at the east end of the line assaulting Tobruk are bombarded with limited effect.

That ends the turn.


The first two 'combats' are those where the CW were engaged as they tried to retreat.

[warspite1]

Turn 38 - Axis Turn
19th April 1941

The main action this turn is as follows:

3. The Trento units, with air support, take part in a slug fest against the British and Australian units west of Gazala. Overall losses are even and the CW stay put.
4. 21st Panzer's artillery switch focus to the CW units between Tobruk and Gazala and inflict moderate damage upon them. Further losses are incurred from the Regia Aeronautica and then further German bombardment.
15. Finally the pressure is too much and three artillery units fall back on Tobruk. The Cheshire MG Battalion and a battalion of Scots Guards continue to hold.
18. Still the British infantry hold despite relentless pressure on their position.
19. The Bersaglieri just cannot find a way through and the British soldiers beat off another attack.
26. The Italians try another attack west of Gazala but again fail to dislodge the stubborn defenders

[warspite1]

Turn 39
23rd April 1941

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ WARNING - Tank Porn for the Axis Fan Boys +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Worryingly the British have noted the arrival of a new Panzer Division - the 15th....

[warspite1]

Turn 39
23rd April 1941

Neame's plan to try and get his troops and armour to sneek through the Axis lines is actual not as 'simple' as it sounds. Apologies for the appalling map below, but I am attempting to show why.

The red lines are the roads. The black 'blobs' are the impassable desert hexes. As can be seen, the way to Bardia is blocked. The British and Australian forces will have to try - albeit short on supplies - and force the Italians at Rotunda Segnali off the road, or try and skirt south (with all that means in terms of movement cost) and pick up the road southeast of 'Knightsbridge'.

[warspite1]

Turn 39
23rd April 1941

The CW position post initial movement. Note the arrival of much of the 4th Indian Division from Bardia to try and assist getting a supply route open to the east.

[warspite1]

Turn 39 - Round 1
23rd April 1941

The turn begins with three bombardments. Two at Tobruk, and one in support of an attack to come mounted by the 4th Indian Division.

All three bombardments provided decent results.

Round 3

This is followed up by an attack by the 4th Indian Division which forces the Italian units back. A further bombardment is mounted by the Royal Navy off Tobruk. 50% of the turn remains.

Round 6

The Indian bombardment of the Italian Ariete forces continues and the cavalry regiment and two infantry battalions prepare to attack.

Round 8

4th Indian Division force the Ariete into further retreats, although the elite Bersaglieri Regiment holds their ground.

To the west, a mixed British and Australian attack succeeds in wiping out a Bersaglieri Regiment from the Trento Division - and the British gain possession of the road east.

[warspite1]

Turn 39 - Axis Turn
23rd April 1941

The AI gives every indication it is not going to stand for the British armour escaping....

The surrounded Australian 15th Battalion is wiped out south of the Jebel.

1. But then the action truly starts with an Italian attack on the British infantry between Gazala and Tobruk. The attack is beaten back with no losses to speak of.
2. South of 'Knightsbridge' the British armour defending the southern approaches to the road is brought under artillery fire. There are few casualties.
3. To the west, the forces surrounding a Bersaglieri regiment are beaten back and the Italian unit breaks the encirclement.
5. As said, the Germans are not massively impressed with the events of the last turn. Elements from the German 15th and 21st Panzer Division and the Italian Trento Division, attack the British units that had just captured the road. The British retreat. Neame takes grim satisfaction that at least these units aren't bothering the Tobruk garrison.
6. The Italians fight back against the Indians and smash through their defense, splitting the force in two.
7. The British infantry west of Tobruk are on the receiving end yet again - but still they hold firm.
8. South of Knightsbridge a squadron of the 5th RTR and a battalion of the Essex Regiment hold off an attack by Italian infantry.
9. But to the northwest the Germans continue to push the British back, forcing them to concede more of the road.
11. The Germans from the north and the Italians from the south continue to put the British armour under intolerable pressure and the 5th RTR and Essex infantry are forced to retreat.
12. The Indians are in all sorts of bother thanks to Italian armour and artillery carving up the infantry.
16. The Australian 7th cavalry Regiment are pushed back by the German panzers. The CW forces are becoming more and more widely spread and disordered.
21. The Germans resume bombardment of the Tobruk defences....
24. The Indians are almost broken. This is serious...
28. The British are forced out of Gazala. These are worrying times everywhere for Neame and his staff. He needs his divisional generals to get a grip.
32. The Germans attack at Giarabub, causing the Czech battalion to retreat.

57 attacks in total!!! That was a spectacularly unpleasant turn.

[henri51]

I guess this game shows why the British abandoned most western positions when they saw Rommel's three-pronged attack across the desert, and ran for the hills...

Henri

[Zorch]

With hindsight, the move into Cyrenaica (sic) looks mistaken. But it's hard to stop pursuing a beaten foe.

[warspite1]

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece [;)]. Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic [:D]).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece [;)]. Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic [:D]).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

I was referring to your game, not to real life. [;)]
I agree the Greek adventure was a mistake, in real life.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece [;)]. Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic [:D]).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

I was referring to your game, not to real life. [;)]
I agree the Greek adventure was a mistake, in real life.

warspite1

Soz old fruit, you were replying to the previous poster, who as far as I could tell was talking about real life.

However, I still disagree with you [;)]

Although I don't know how this game plays out, I know that the Germans get a victory bonus for taking Tobruk. Moreover in real life Rommel couldn't move on Egypt without taking Tobruk. I assume the supply rules adequately reflect this (and I base my answer on that assumption).

[Olorin]

The British should have sent 20 divisions to Greece or none at all.

Since they lacked that force, the meager force that was sent was not an assistance at all, it simply hastened the deutsch decision to invade, because the reason for the invasion was the British presence in Greece.

Terrible decision for both nations.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece [;)]. Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic [:D]).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

I was referring to your game, not to real life. [;)]
I agree the Greek adventure was a mistake, in real life.

warspite1

Soz old fruit, you were replying to the previous poster, who as far as I could tell was talking about real life.

However, I still disagree with you [;)]

Although I don't know how this game plays out, I know that the Germans get a victory bonus for taking Tobruk. Moreover in real life Rommel couldn't move on Egypt without taking Tobruk. I assume the supply rules adequately reflect this (and I base my answer on that assumption).

I'm not saying abandon Tobruk - just don't go past Gazala with major forces.