Comprehensive Wishlist

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

One could also set out 'direction of supply markers.' This actually sounds interesting to contemplate.

So say if you anticipate advancing, you put your direction of supply marker somewhere out ahead in enemy territory. This costs you some of the supply benefits you get merely from being near the original point of supply -- but improves your supply over what it would be otherwise so long as you are actually advancing in the anticipated direction.

If, on the other hand, you figure on fighting it out right where you stand, you plonk that marker right where you are -- and improve your supply so long as you stay there.

You could even plan on a fighting retreat -- and put the marker where you plan to withdraw to.

Something along those lines might be incorporated into the supply unit. I'm not sure just how, though. Some sort of hysteresis perhaps. You can move the supply unit elsewhere, but it's effects remain in the location it was in a turn behind.

[damezzi]

TOAW is an operational level game. It will only suffer if we start trying to inject tactical-level considerations into it.

Take the defensive advantages conferred by 'hills.' I'd tend to take those to mean that the terrain is such that the defender can find a line across that hex that will offer him superior lines of sight, cover for his own troops, etc. I do not think the

I don’t think it’s a tactical consideration at all. It’s just the addition of one element to intelligence. How far one can see is also an operational issue. Instead of being able to detect enemy one hex further, one would be able to detect two or three hexes further (in smaller scale scenarios). No single line of sight is determined, but a probability based on the multiple lines of sight one has.
The modifiers for defenders in hilly regions are much more tactical in nature, in fact. Mine proposal wouldn’t affect combat at all and not even establish any kind of small scale details.

You’re right when you say that line of sight from hilly terrain will help defense, that could and should help seeing further too. After all, in a hilly terrain, I most probably will have some 50 m + hills at my disposal. Being unable to see a moving column in adjacent (not the hex) arid, open, sand, dunes, at least 7 kms (for example) away, being surprised by them…
Elevation isn’t modeled in Toaw. For sure any of those terrain I quoted could be in a higher level than the hills, but then, part of the defensive modifiers should be annulled too. If it isn’t, it means that it isn’t wasn’t a concern for the game designer. And for elevation, we have a work around at least.

Don’t get me wrong Collin, but I just don’t want to discuss this matter further. It was just a suggestion to be kept among hundreds of others here and which would hardly be used in the future(like most of the suggestions in the wish list) and if used, would be partially be used or changed, like those things happen most of the time.

It isn’t as important a matter for me. Curtis made me argue because of his stubbornness in stating that the solution would be arbitrary when it isn’t more arbitrary than any other probability based criteria in this game. I would have accepted other arguments, like I did from the beginning, the one based on the amount of work needed for implementing it. This is a reasonable argument and it may really not be worth the effort.

I’ll really discuss this matter no further, even if I respect arguments such as the one you presented.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Thinking about it further, and more generally, TOAW could do with some attention to the need for planning and organization. Aside from what I've just mentioned, there are absurdities such as tactical parachute drops to close pockets that only emerged earlier that morning, artillery barrages that don't involve stockpiling shells, and no doubt other places where the system fails because it doesn't allow for the fact that a good deal of this stuff needs to be arranged ahead of time. Event mechanisms and house rules can jerry-rig solutions to some of this -- but the game would be better if the effectiveness and abilities of one's units were tied to how closely developments were conforming to one's expectations. The Allies are able to drop a parachute division at Arnhem because they've been planning to do so for two weeks -- they can't just land the division across the Rhine at Strasbourg instead on the spur of the moment without a sizable drop in effectiveness.

Indeed, as it is, it's hard to understand how the Allies could have so willfully overlooked the evidence that the remnants of two panzer divisions had decided to stop and catch their breath right outside Arnhem. Perhaps if it was not just a matter of switching to some other attractive locale but of having the dropping units much more likely to break up and go into re-org the obstinacy would be more understandable.

At the least, I'd like to see airdrops moved from the movement phase to the combat phase (see item 6.13). But it could be even more delayed to the start of the next turn. That would require some actual planning.

[el cid]

I know is on the wish list but I wanted to throw in an idea.

A lot has been talked about the rounds and how one unit in far away can spoil the turn, even for units 1000 km away. and I know in the wish list there is the idea that only units that did not finish their attacks will be in a state of continuing the attack.

Here is the idea: all the formation 8units tied to the same HQ) of a unit involved in an attack that has not finished will be set in the same state (could not receive new orders). This would represent the formation HQ involvement on the attack, being busy and not able to issue new orders to other units under its command.

What you would achieve with this is:
- bringing benefits to keeping formation together, and fighting together
- being able to design armies based on small formations vs large formations. The small formations will be much more flexible, and few units will be affected by attacks lasting too long.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: el cid

I know is on the wish list but I wanted to throw in an idea.

A lot has been talked about the rounds and how one unit in far away can spoil the turn, even for units 1000 km away. and I know in the wish list there is the idea that only units that did not finish their attacks will be in a state of continuing the attack.

Here is the idea: all the formation 8units tied to the same HQ) of a unit involved in an attack that has not finished will be set in the same state (could not receive new orders). This would represent the formation HQ involvement on the attack, being busy and not able to issue new orders to other units under its command.

What you would achieve with this is:
- bringing benefits to keeping formation together, and fighting together
- being able to design armies based on small formations vs large formations. The small formations will be much more flexible, and few units will be affected by attacks lasting too long.

Yeah. Generally speaking, the global turn-ending has got to go. The effect has been weakened, but that's not really the problem. The problem is the global nature of the effect.

[rhinobones]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
TOAW is an operational level game.

Seen this written quite a few times and I do not believe that it is true. TOAW is an “Operational” game only in the sense that the word “Operational” is used in the game name. Fact is that TOAW is expansive enough to build scenarios from the tactical scale (squads, platoons, companies) to the strategic (Armies and Army Groups). Europe Aflame and the Grand War WW I scenarios are hardly to be considered as “operational” . . . neither are the numerous scenarios which model individual battles.

This is not to say that TOAW models all levels with perfect fidelity, we know it doesn’t, but within reasonable limits both the tactical and strategic levels can be modeled. Its time to drop this notion that TOAW is an “Operational” game and that no other level of combat can be modeled using the TOAW engine.

Regards, RhinoBones

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
TOAW is an operational level game.

Seen this written quite a few times and I do not believe that it is true. TOAW is an “Operational” game only in the sense that the word “Operational” is used in the game name. Fact is that TOAW is expansive enough to build scenarios from the tactical scale (squads, platoons, companies) to the strategic (Armies and Army Groups). Europe Aflame and the Grand War WW I scenarios are hardly to be considered as “operational” . . . neither are the numerous scenarios which model individual battles.

This is not to say that TOAW models all levels with perfect fidelity, we know it doesn’t, but within reasonable limits both the tactical and strategic levels can be modeled. Its time to drop this notion that TOAW is an “Operational” game and that no other level of combat can be modeled using the TOAW engine.

Regards, RhinoBones

TOAW does nothing at all to simulate many factors that are critical on a tactical level. Line of sight, small arms weapon range, the importance of a 'we-go' system at that level, and some of the qualifications on unit control that exist at the tactical level all come to mind.

Nor does it offer many of the tools one would need for an adequate simulation on the strategic level. Production, the subtleties of national effort and expectations (the Second Front, Viet Nam), the need to engage in certain militarily inefficient but morale-raising activites (strategic bombing)...

You mistake the range. Within 'reasonable limits' part of the operational range can be modeled -- as it is, many situations contain critical elements TOAW can't handle -- even if they are approached at the operational level. By the time you reach anything that could be described as either 'tactical' or 'strategic' the deficiencies will be overwhelming. You can have a go -- but you can also have a go at using TOAW to model class control in an inner-city school.

As it is, OPART tends to start becoming a little implausible at both ends of its range -- that is to say, both at 2.5 km/hex and short turn lengths and at 50 km/hex and the longer turn lengths. It obviously functions best in the middle of the range it aspires to -- and is not really an adequate tool for simulation outside of that.

The game's name really is a giveaway. I think The Norm (blessed be His name, genuflect three times and accept all values in the program as revealed truth), was explicitly disavowing any attempt to provide a simulation of warfare at either the tactical or the strategic levels. 'The Operational Art of War' -- why do you think he called it that?

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Yeah. Generally speaking, the global turn-ending has got to go. The effect has been weakened, but that's not really the problem. The problem is the global nature of the effect.

It think the risk of early turn ending is an important check on low-quality forces otherwise being able to function like surgical-strike elites. The problem is really only when the scope of the scenario gets extreme. To deal with that correctly, we'd need to be able to split the front up into sections or such.

[damezzi]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Yeah. Generally speaking, the global turn-ending has got to go. The effect has been weakened, but that's not really the problem. The problem is the global nature of the effect.

It think the risk of early turn ending is an important check on low-quality forces otherwise being able to function like surgical-strike elites. The problem is really only when the scope of the scenario gets extreme. To deal with that correctly, we'd need to be able to split the front up into sections or such.

I agree with Curtis first sentence, but I think the solution proposed by El Cid, or something similar, may work. A check could be made for each formation individually based on force proficiency and it's MPs zeroed, if check failed. This would avoid surgical-strike like operations and represent lack of capability of individual HQs in terms of coordination. Others may be able to keep initiative by their own.

Well, that's the first time I think about it, so, maybe there is some undesirable collateral effect I didn't consider.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Yeah. Generally speaking, the global turn-ending has got to go. The effect has been weakened, but that's not really the problem. The problem is the global nature of the effect.

It think the risk of early turn ending is an important check on low-quality forces otherwise being able to function like surgical-strike elites. The problem is really only when the scope of the scenario gets extreme. To deal with that correctly, we'd need to be able to split the front up into sections or such.

Well, that's it. The device is perfectly valid for an Arracourt or something. Smallish scenarios pitting one division- or corps sized force against another in a limited area over a limited timespan.

However, for anything covering an extended area or with multiple commands -- which would be a good half of the scenarios TOAW reasonably should be expected to handle -- it rapidly becomes a liability.

[rhinobones]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
TOAW does nothing at all to simulate many factors that are critical on a tactical level. Line of sight, small arms weapon range, the importance of a 'we-go' system at that level, and some of the qualifications on unit control that exist at the tactical level all come to mind.

Nor does it offer many of the tools one would need for an adequate simulation on the strategic level. Production, the subtleties of national effort and expectations (the Second Front, Viet Nam), the need to engage in certain militarily inefficient but morale-raising activites (strategic bombing)...

You mistake the range. Within 'reasonable limits' part of the operational range can be modeled -- as it is, many situations contain critical elements TOAW can't handle -- even if they are approached at the operational level. By the time you reach anything that could be described as either 'tactical' or 'strategic' the deficiencies will be overwhelming. You can have a go -- but you can also have a go at using TOAW to model class control in an inner-city school.

As it is, OPART tends to start becoming a little implausible at both ends of its range -- that is to say, both at 2.5 km/hex and short turn lengths and at 50 km/hex and the longer turn lengths. It obviously functions best in the middle of the range it aspires to -- and is not really an adequate tool for simulation outside of that.

The game's name really is a giveaway. I think The Norm (blessed be His name, genuflect three times and accept all values in the program as revealed truth), was explicitly disavowing any attempt to provide a simulation of warfare at either the tactical or the strategic levels. 'The Operational Art of War' -- why do you think he called it that?

If I understand your post correctly, Europe Aflame and the McBride/Falotti renditions of The Great War are either Operational scenarios (which I kind of doubt), or they are strategic scenarios which are unplayable because TOAW does not “. . . offer many of the tools one would need for an adequate simulation on the strategic level. Production, the subtleties of national effort and expectations (the Second Front, Viet Nam), the need to engage in certain militarily inefficient but morale-raising activites (strategic bombing)... “ and that the “deficiencies will be overwhelming”.

Wow! Wonder if the people playing these scenarios realize that their enjoyment is completely misspent? They would be better off playing a scenario about class control at an inner-city school.

As for the tactical side of TOAW . . . one must wonder why a great number of calories were spent building a data base defining the characteristics of so many individual weapons and why the game engine counts the number of shots fired by these individual weapons, the number of individual hits and the probability that a single hit will kill the target. Come on . . . is this type of detail really needed for an Operational game? Of course not; basic attack, defense, armor and movement values would suffice. But, this level of detail is wonderful for the tactical scenario, it is good for the rivet counters and it is extremely good for the people that truly love to play/build war scenarios of any scale that contain the TOAW level of unit detail.

Writing that “The Norm . . . was explicitly disavowing any attempt to provide a simulation of warfare at either the tactical or the strategic levels” is smoke, mirrors and BS. You really have no knowledge of what The Norm was thinking and you prove this by making up words he never said publicly. “Explicitly disavowing” . . . did The Norm actually speak these words to you, or is this a fabrication purporting to be the truth?

As for the title, my guess is that he wanted to make a play off “The Art of War”, but since the title was already coined by Sun Tzu, he needed to make a slight alteration while retaining the flavor. The Strategic Art of War (TSAW), too hot. The Tactical Art of War (TTAW), too cold. The Operational Art of War! Ahhhhh, sounds and tastes just right. TOAW . . . it kind of rolls off the tongue. Good name for a war game. Sun Tzu is happy.

Of course if you have any first hand communication with The Norm about his intentions, feel free to share them with the forum. Otherwise, in spite of the game title, the evidence strongly points to TOAW being designed as a universal war game engine. Operational scale just happens to be the happy medium between tactical and strategic.

Regards, RhinoBones

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones




If I understand your post correctly, Europe Aflame and the McBride/Falotti renditions of The Great War are either Operational scenarios (which I kind of doubt), or they are strategic scenarios which are unplayable because TOAW does not “. . . offer many of the tools one would need for an adequate simulation on the strategic level. Production, the subtleties of national effort and expectations (the Second Front, Viet Nam), the need to engage in certain militarily inefficient but morale-raising activites (strategic bombing)... “ and that the “deficiencies will be overwhelming”.

All I am saying is that as you move out of its designed range, TOAW will become increasingly inefficient. La Familia Wright, at the moment, owns a Mazda MPV. This is ideal for the uses we put it to. As a sports car, it could indeed drive around the course, and as a moving van, we could indeed get our earthly goods from here to there on it...eventually. However, it's not really designed for these purposes, and so will tend to perform relatively poorly if put to these purposes. Another vehicle would be better.

Wow! Wonder if the people playing these scenarios realize that their enjoyment is completely misspent? They would be better off playing a scenario about class control at an inner-city school.

I wouldn't (and didn't) say their time is completely misspent. However, I am sure that Curt (the designer of Vietnam and Erik Nygaard (who has essayed several 1 km/hex scenarios) would both agree that their tasks would have been considerably easier -- and presumably better executed -- if they had had a purpose-designed vehicle at hand.

As for the tactical side of TOAW . . . one must wonder why a great number of calories were spent building a data base defining the characteristics of so many individual weapons and why the game engine counts the number of shots fired by these individual weapons, the number of individual hits and the probability that a single hit will kill the target. Come on . . . is this type of detail really needed for an Operational game? Of course not; basic attack, defense, armor and movement values would suffice. But, this level of detail is wonderful for the tactical scenario, it is good for the rivet counters and it is extremely good for the people that truly love to play/build war scenarios of any scale that contain the TOAW level of unit detail.

All that is there to provide a non-arbitary framework for assigning values. It's a valid approach -- but does nothing to prove the game is suitable for tactical simulation. My annuity's value is calculated to the nearest cent -- that doesn't demonstrate it's the right vehicle to buy a six-pack of beer with.

Writing that “The Norm . . . was explicitly disavowing any attempt to provide a simulation of warfare at either the tactical or the strategic levels” is smoke, mirrors and BS. You really have no knowledge of what The Norm was thinking and you prove this by making up words he never said publicly. “Explicitly disavowing” . . . did The Norm actually speak these words to you, or is this a fabrication purporting to be the truth?

As for the title, my guess is that he wanted to make a play off “The Art of War”, but since the title was already coined by Sun Tzu, he needed to make a slight alteration while retaining the flavor. The Strategic Art of War (TSAW), too hot. The Tactical Art of War (TTAW), too cold. The Operational Art of War! Ahhhhh, sounds and tastes just right. TOAW . . . it kind of rolls off the tongue. Good name for a war game. Sun Tzu is happy.

Alternatively, by calling it the 'Operational Art of War', we might be led to believe that Norm intended the game to simulate warfare at the Operational level. Just a guess here, of course. You're free to suggest alternative hypotheses.

Of course if you have any first hand communication with The Norm about his intentions, feel free to share them with the forum. Otherwise, in spite of the game title, the evidence strongly points to TOAW being designed as a universal war game engine. Operational scale just happens to be the happy medium between tactical and strategic.

Regards, RhinoBones

Lol. Nevermind if it's explicitly called 'operational' -- and designed accordingly -- it's intended as a universal war game engine. That's obvious.

It explains the absence of any devices for simulating production, lines of fire, recruitment, larger/smaller scales, etc. Your logical acumen is stunning.

[ColinWright]

..

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones

If I understand your post correctly, Europe Aflame and the McBride/Falotti renditions of The Great War are either Operational scenarios (which I kind of doubt), or they are strategic scenarios which are unplayable because TOAW does not “. . . offer many of the tools one would need for an adequate simulation on the strategic level. Production, the subtleties of national effort and expectations (the Second Front, Viet Nam), the need to engage in certain militarily inefficient but morale-raising activites (strategic bombing)... “ and that the “deficiencies will be overwhelming”.

Wow! Wonder if the people playing these scenarios realize that their enjoyment is completely misspent? They would be better off playing a scenario about class control at an inner-city school.

I consider McBride's "Great War" to be virtually unplayable and riddled with problems (and for those who will ascribe personal motives to this remark, note that I don't feel the same about DNO)- I can't speak for Pierro's scenario. Europe Aflame is popular for excellent reasons, but it's not exactly simulation. Come join Rommel on his way to Armenia!

Point is that one can play these scenarios- but it's obvious the system is creaking. One has to constantly make compromises. Take for example the eighty page briefing for McBride's Great War- most of which consists of house rules.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Writing that “The Norm . . . was explicitly disavowing any attempt to provide a simulation of warfare at either the tactical or the strategic levels” is smoke, mirrors and BS. You really have no knowledge of what The Norm was thinking and you prove this by making up words he never said publicly. “Explicitly disavowing” . . . did The Norm actually speak these words to you, or is this a fabrication purporting to be the truth?

First paragraph on page 8 of the TOAW III manual;

"...The term is generally used to describe anything in the grey area between strategy [...] and tactics [...] Think of the operational level as a view of the battlefield on a scale just exceeding that at which differing ranges of various direct fire weapons are significant."

So, no, he didn't just pick the name because it sounded nice. He explicity stated in the manual that his intention was to exclude the strictly tactical and the purely strategic.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Writing that “The Norm . . . was explicitly disavowing any attempt to provide a simulation of warfare at either the tactical or the strategic levels” is smoke, mirrors and BS. You really have no knowledge of what The Norm was thinking and you prove this by making up words he never said publicly. “Explicitly disavowing” . . . did The Norm actually speak these words to you, or is this a fabrication purporting to be the truth?

First paragraph on page 8 of the TOAW III manual;

"...The term is generally used to describe anything in the grey area between strategy [...] and tactics [...] Think of the operational level as a view of the battlefield on a scale just exceeding that at which differing ranges of various direct fire weapons are significant."

So, no, he didn't just pick the name because it sounded nice. He explicity stated in the manual that his intention was to exclude the strictly tactical and the purely strategic.

Petty details such as this won't slow down the Rhino. Having adopted an essentially untenable position, he will now become increasingly angry and abusive as he attacks all criticisms of it.

[rhinobones]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
. . . he will now become increasingly angry and abusive as he attacks all criticisms of it.

Well, that’s not very civil. It appears that you are purposely attempting to provoke a response. Since you obviously prefer the low road . . . I instead prefer to take the high road and dismiss the provocation as grade school mentality.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
First paragraph on page 8 of the TOAW III manual;

"...The term is generally used to describe anything in the grey area between strategy [...] and tactics [...] Think of the operational level as a view of the battlefield on a scale just exceeding that at which differing ranges of various direct fire weapons are significant."

So, no, he didn't just pick the name because it sounded nice. He explicity stated in the manual that his intention was to exclude the strictly tactical and the purely strategic.

Thank you for pointing out the quote. Very interesting. However, there is nothing in the paragraph (and the following paragraphs which you neglected to quote) that precludes tactical/strategic level scenarios or “explicitly” disavows their development. In fact, the following paragraphs go on to describe the flexibility of TOAW . . . and since The Norm (genuflect three times) included the basic unit, map and time scales necessary for tactical/strategic scenarios development, my conclusion is that he had no problem with creativity at the upper and lower thresholds of warfare.

To conclude, I find it difficult to understand why the inclusion of the word “Operational” in the game title is so debilitating to understanding the functions that the game engine is designed to perform. To support my position I can point to the fact that TOAW contains both tactical and strategic game elements . . . the people opposed to this point of view have no facts. Instead they resort to interpretations of intent, read between the lines and adherer to The Norm (genuflect three times) mythology in order to build a case.

Regards, RhinoBones

[rhinobones]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I wouldn't (and didn't) say their time is completely misspent. However, I am sure that Curt (the designer of Vietnam and Erik Nygaard (who has essayed several 1 km/hex scenarios) would both agree that their tasks would have been considerably easier -- and presumably better executed -- if they had had a purpose-designed vehicle at hand.

So, you are saying that not only is the tactical possible, but that some designers have actually made respectable tactical scenarios. Is this what you meant?

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Loll. Nevermind if it's explicitly called 'operational' -- and designed accordingly -- it's intended as a universal war game engine. That's obvious.

By "obvious" do you mean that TOAW is truly universal, i.e. tactical, operational and strategic?

Also note that you wrote this before Apple Boy popped up with the manual quote . . . so do you still stand by your words or do you need to retract?

Regards, RhinoBones

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones
and since The Norm (genuflect three times) included the basic unit, map and time scales necessary for tactical/strategic scenarios development, my conclusion is that he had no problem with creativity at the upper and lower thresholds of warfare.

2.5km/hex is "on a scale just exceeding that at which differing ranges of various direct fire weapons are signficant". Therefore I would consider it operational.

50km/hex can (just about) be used for operational level scenarios. See Bob Cross' excellent Soviet Union 1941.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: rhinobones

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
. . . he will now become increasingly angry and abusive as he attacks all criticisms of it.

Well, that’s not very civil. It appears that you are purposely attempting to provoke a response. Since you obviously prefer the low road . . . I instead prefer to take the high road and dismiss the provocation as grade school mentality.

That'll be a first. If so, my comment will have had the desired effect.