RHS Level I Updates Suspended

[el cid again]

Level I Update Link 2.51
https://1drv.ms/u/s!Ap7XOIkiBuUwg-8ZqLaG9QbsVHAolg


Having been under the weather for a while, I have only just returned to reworking
files. However, one issue came up today which I wish to correct for the sake
of any new game starts in Scenario 105 (only). Location slot 183 is the British Far
East Command, which renames into the more familiar ABDA Command soon after the
war begins. Correctly dated with respect to renaming and disbanding, this command in 105 (only) has the wrong command HQ - and cannot be moved. This update will fix this issue for new games (only).

There is a single device change in scenarios 99 and 105 (only): 1794. Correctly named the Type 5 five inch/50 DP gun in strictly historical scenarios, and available for late 1945 use, it is now given its (real, historical) original name: the Type 1 five inch/50 DP gun! This is essentially a scaled up version of the Type 38 (1938) 3 inch and 4 inch DP guns, using the very same fire control computer (loosely translated - the Japanese system has no direct equal - but is in fact an analog computer) with cams cut for the different trajectory. Intended for acceptance in 1941 and production in 1942, several classes of AA cruisers would have used it (similar to the Akizuki, and like that class, with an AA fire direction control room behind the bridge). In this variation, RHS assumes the historical decision to delay development (on mobilization in July 1941) is taken in "strictly historical" scenarios 101-104 and 106, but NOT taken in the "Japan enhanced" scenarios 99 and 105. This permits two threads of class (sub class) development - depending on the year in which the weapon becomes available.

Most of the changes here are to class files - all of them related to Japanese cruisers - and almost all of those to AA (CLAA) variants of them. A few eratta were found in CL and CA files, so these were corrected at the same time - affecting the ship files. The biggest of these was a failure to issue universally the experimental RHS device "night glasses ship" - reflecting the peculiar Japanese optics of the period - for pre-radar ship sub-classes. But a few had the wrong light AA suite in some way, or the wrong facings, etc. So they were fixed. The most interesting addition is a strictly historical AA variant of the Mogami class, designed in late 1942-early 1943 (See Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War, the definitive work in English). Because the Type 5 gun was not available, in this class (in strictly historical scenarios) the centerline main turrets are replaced with 5 inch/40 DP guns - although the after most turret is replaced with a pair on each side (as was done eventually on Suzuya). This results in a class somewhat similar to the final configuration of the French de Grasse post war - more or less 5 inch guns everywhere. [6 forward, 6 on a side, 4 aft, all in twins.] The Japan enhanced scenarios instead get a slightly later version using the 5 inch/50 Type 1 on the centerline (4 forward, 4 aft) - but with the side mountings using the 3 inch/60 "new guns" instead (similar to the Agano class and the Ibuki as carrier). The range and ceiling are identical, but the ROF is much better, and the number of shots is also better. Most of the work was done on the later war vessels - in general offering pure gun and SAM CLAA variants - IJN having the most developed SAM systems in the world by 1945. The best of these used a German radar concept - tracking both target and missile - which worked - but didn't permit engagement of many targets. The other was similar to the US Lark - slower (so a human could track the missile) - radio command via joystick - like a model airplane. [Lark already appears in RHS, in a historically considered version of the Alaska class, which also fits Loon SSMs in two "firing pits" aft. Loon is an unlicensed almost copy of the V-1 - but the wings are 4 inches longer! It was massed produced in 1945, 100,000 were ordered, and also can be fired from conversions of LSTs and CVEs.]

[el cid again]

Hello,
I just wanted to congratulate you and your team on the impressive work you have done on RHS.

Being an old modder, I was curious to see what you did with China so I installed your mod to see your take on China.
China looks impressive and a decided improvement over stock.

My curiosity whetted, I poked around at a few other areas - like aircraft, ships, and some land combat units and devices -
I see we are all working on the same things - just coming at it from different angles (for example, it appears you decided to measure aircraft speeds in knots).

Like the Babe's Team, you have done a vast rework of OOB and environment, while I have chosen not to stray too far from stock where OOB was concerned.

I have chosen to try to concentrate on naval warfare, and also abandon the direction the AE Team went with air combat (their new formulas are demonstrably flawed in my opinion).

Anyway, in a decided break from our old past bickering - I wanted to give you a Thumbs-Up and a Well Done.


Cheers,
Brian

[Big B]

Yep - those are my exact words.

I feel I should explain one thing - Air Team Direction.
Being on the Air Team early on in AE development, I have access to the information used to determine aircraft performance. While I believe they are valid in some ways - I also believe that they are not comprehensive enough...

The person headed that section, is a Real Fighter Pilot - so he carries A Lot of weight. Yet, I felt, after talking to many fighter pilots who actually fought the war in the Pacific, and flew those machines, - his modern (and valid) theories, based on today's jet-combat fell a bit short. I ran the numbers with WW1 Fighters (looking for consistency)and my disagreement grew.

So, I want to say that Stock Air Model is Valid under a certain view, but I don't see it as perfect - drawing from my own experience.
AS for OOB - yeah ...RHS has done it's homework.


B

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Hello,
I just wanted to congratulate you and your team on the impressive work you have done on RHS.

Being an old modder, I was curious to see what you did with China so I installed your mod to see your take on China.
China looks impressive and a decided improvement over stock.

My curiosity whetted, I poked around at a few other areas - like aircraft, ships, and some land combat units and devices -
I see we are all working on the same things - just coming at it from different angles (for example, it appears you decided to measure aircraft speeds in knots).

Like the Babe's Team, you have done a vast rework of OOB and environment, while I have chosen not to stray too far from stock where OOB was concerned.

I have chosen to try to concentrate on naval warfare, and also abandon the direction the AE Team went with air combat (their new formulas are demonstrably flawed in my opinion).

Anyway, in a decided break from our old past bickering - I wanted to give you a Thumbs-Up and a Well Done.


Cheers,
Brian

[el cid again]

Both stock and RHS (and probably many other mods which use a stock
foundation) have incorrect armament data for the start of war Tenryu class
cruisers.

These are the oldest and smallest of CLs in IJN service. An unsuccessful
design intended as destroyer leaders, they were always too slow for that
role, and 6 of the 8 planned were canceled in favor of a larger design based
on it. There also was serious design work in 1935-6 to turn them into CLAAs,
for which they were well suited. For that reason, both the 1939 armament
(still mounted in 1941) and this alternate are described here.

Ships as they should start the game:

The main armament is correct - 4 single 5.5 inch SP guns.

The major omission is a 3 inch/40 caliber AA gun right aft of the after
5.5 inch mounting.

The minor omission is a pair of 13.2 mm AAMG mounted on the quarterdeck,
behind the 3 inch AA gun. [Originally these were not present. A single
6.5 mm AAMG was mounted port and starboard. These might still have
been on board in 1941, but are not listed. The 13.2s were added in the 1939
refit.]

AA Conversion - never implemented.

All four 5.5 inch mountings were replaced with twin 5 inch/40 caliber AA guns.
This was somewhat modified, however, such that instead of 1 forward, 2 centerline
and 1 aft it became 1 forward, 1 centerline and 2 aft (superimposed). The 3 inch
AA gun was removed. So were the AAMG. In their place were 4 twin 25 mm.
Also, the design contemplated 36 DC in patterns of 4 = 9 shots.

[el cid again]

update 7.23
https://onedrive.live.com/redir?resid=3 ... file%2cmsi



I have completed the task of updating IJN cruisers with respect to night optics
and a comprehensive review of armament and radar sensors. This affects
mainly ship and class files, but also two records in the device files. [It seems
the "night glasses, ship" and "night glasses, aircraft" were not properly defined
and were not working.] This review involved a careful review of line drawings,
dated photographs, and in particular more than a thousand pages of Japanese
Cruisers of the Pacific War - an extensive collection created by two amazing
amateur scholars over half a century of working on archival records.

There are a few location file eratta corrections.

I think there may be aircraft file eratta corrections.

Having completed these, I have returned to "pwhexing" (a tedious task working
in an unstable beta editor) - and updated slightly the Akyab Road. I will now
do that road upgrade for all later (not start of game) Winter files - and add it
as well as the Tea and Horse Caravan Road and the South Silk road - to
out year Fall files. Once completed, I will do Spring files and then Monsoon files
in respect to the same additions - and fold in detected eratta as well. The Fall
1942 file - nominally completed - had the Akyab Road (stage one) upgraded
and is added here. That project - building a primary road to Akyab from Chittagong -
was an exceptionally difficult project. There is no gravel in the area. For that reason,
mud was baked into bricks - and it is a literal "red brick road." A kiln was built about every 25 miles along its route, and coal was hauled in from India to fire them.

[el cid again]

Due to improvements (and reductions) in medication, Mifune has been
able to work again - and to communicate without being confused. I have
bribed him into giving some priority to RHS air art. I never found the time
to learn how to do filmstrips.

While he has lost almost all his machines - apparently to heat in Florida -
I unexpectedly am able to supply a machine with high end graphics that
was modified for extensive cooling and temperature monitoring for reasons
unrelated to Florida. That was my "bribe." This was possible because of
an error on the part of a manufacturer which permitted me to get an
even better system at little cost. I caught the error - pointed it out - and
they decided to honor the obvious error anyway - as a reward. [Most
things in the system had $0 cost - things like disk drives, memory, etc]

He also taught me today how to do overlays. A single vital point was not mentioned
in the documentation (such as it is) - that the feature is triggered by the presence
of at least one monthly sub folder under an annual folder under the side folder for air art. This means I can improve the existing filmstrips quickly - and also any later ones he makes - at will - like changing ship art.

Assuming this all works, there will be upgrades that must include art - so the use of the installer will become important. People who can't get it will have to be handled on a special case basis. It will be vital to keep up - about 15 CAF bitmaps - and a few others - will change pointers. RHS will then be fully consistent with stock and all other major mods - a principle of how we organize. We have more than they do, but we try to leave things in the same places they do - so players may easily change games without separate installations.

[el cid again]

I have been distributing - in the RHS (documentation) folder - a document called RHS Atomic Research Theory. I didn't realize it was unfinished. I completed it today and it is attached here. This is based on more than half a century of research. I collect materials in several languages on the matter, and consult with authors and analysts. This is a grossly simplified summary. If anyone has detail interest, I have much of the supporting materials. Some of this is archival: in particular US materials on radiological weapons - from the first proposal in writing to the complete test results - and a declassified list of the tests so we know the results are in fact complete.
Just ask whatever.

There will be an art update and a pwhex update - probably today. Some of this art is from other mods and is simply more colorful than the stock art we use. More interesting is a set of late 2014 art which Mifune made for RHS but I never got to work. If it works - I will issue it with revised air-art cross reference data.

Since I cannot attach the document, the text follows:

RHS Atomic R&D Theory
All the “great powers” were engaged in, or in the case of France previously had been engaged in, atomic research by the time the Pacific War erupted. France, indeed, had been the most advanced in 1940. Long alleged to have been interested “only” in atomic power, in fact eventually it emerged that there was a bomb research program in Algeria until the Fall of France ended it.

The first US service to invest in “uranium research” was the Navy, and that indeed was because of interest in atomic propulsion. The Navy program was absorbed by the Manhattan Project, and re-directed with the immediate objective of producing atomic weapons. Early programs are somewhat confused, because of general ignorance of what was technically feasible: early advocates of bombs believed they probably would have to be ‘reactor-bombs.’ Ridicule of German ideas along these lines comes from those not familiar with US concepts in 1941. Similarly, Axis research into radiological weapons is sometimes ridiculed by those not familiar with ideas in the US Manhattan Project: I have a letter to the oversight committee in which Oppenheimer describes a proposal for such a weapon made by Enrico Fermi. The US designed and tested a range of such weapons over a period of many years. Another widely misunderstood matter is the extent to which US atomic research was compromised by foreign powers: At a minimum, the USSR, Germany, Japan and Spain -–and likely the UK – obtained substantial useful material by espionage. Note that Japanese intelligence regularly and accurately reported to the Japanese Prime Minister the state of US research.

Perhaps least understood of all atomic research programs is that of Japan. One reason is that most records were destroyed – either incidentally to bombing raids or deliberately. Another is the general reluctance to admit Japan had serious atomic research, by both Japanese and by apologists for them in the USA. In fact, the first Japanese programs began because of serious interest in atomic power. The official document describing the first meeting for the Navy program (published, among many other places, in The Making of the Atomic Bomb), clearly describes the purpose as “to power industrial machinery or battleships.” The first Army program, by contrast, was conceived to support aircraft propulsion. [This was not entirely nonsense. The US was so impressed by Axis investigations they began research which lasted more than a decade. It ended up funding billion (or in one case two billion) dollar programs for a bomber, for a cruise missile, a ballistic missile and a ‘space cruiser.’ It even ended up fielding one practical product: a reactor to power space satellites. But the research required much more time than was available to the antagonists in World War Two.] Fuel starved Japan had gone to war over the supply of oil (for energy). As well, East and SE Asia is unusually poor in uranium minerals. For this reason, the idea of blowing up a huge amount of atomic fuel was far less attractive than of having it serve generating power for 2-3 years (the practical time of a first generation reactor core) – after which the fuel might be recycled to a different purpose. When the Japanese services became interested in atomic weapons, the research programs to develop them were separate from, and generally not integrated with existing research into “special steam boilers” (what were originally called “atomic piles” and later called “atomic reactors” in the USA). Given the late start, the tiny amount of funding, and the small number of scientists assigned, it is not surprising they failed to deploy operational weapons during the war. Even so, at least one of their programs was astonishingly efficient, producing a design described as “just like ours” by three Manhattan Project scientists who examined it. In fact, the gun type uranium bomb design was more practical (in this age we would say “weaponized”) than the Little Boy design used at Hiroshima was. As well, while the US considered fielding radiological bombs, the Japanese appear to have actually done so on a small scale. The Russians in particular were interested, and insisted in operating the one productive reactor at Konan (modern Hungnam). This they did until at least 1948. [Some kind of research continued until 1950, when it became a target for USAF bombing raids.] Korean scientists, technicians and machinists (who were legally Japanese in the Imperial era) became the core of the post war DPRK nuclear program in the 1950s. This was only possible because there was a significant wartime Japanese program during WW2.

The oldest Japanese program (N Research, where N probably means “Navy”) did result in a sub-critical reactor experiment. Just as in Germany, the focus was on using natural uranium (needing no enrichment) and heavy water. The object was to build a “boiler” and both German and Japanese reactors were so described. [The US program instead used natural uranium and very pure carbon blocks, resulting in a “pile” of blocks.] Both methods permitted the use of un-enriched uranium, but required very expensive to make heavy water or very pure graphite. A third method, using dry ice, was proposed in Germany, but not attempted until after the war ended (in Canada). It would produce a “cold” reactor – suitable to make isotopes but not power. Reactors were important to understanding atomic physics, and to make plutonium (which the Germans called “eka-uranium” = “like uranium” - an alternative nuclear fuel which was cheaper than massive enrichment of U-235. Another possibility was to combine natural uranium and thorium in a reactor, which then could produce both plutonium (from the U-238 that makes up most natural uranium) as well as U-233 (from the thorium). The Japanese were interested in this possibility, in particular to produce reactors that would last longer. [As the U-235 was consumed, the plutonium and U-233 made would then replace it as active fuels, without any need for processing, prolonging the useful life of the core.] As well, it was hoped that U-233 might make good bomb fuel. [The US Army attempted to use it as such as late as 1952, when it was finally determined it does not make “suitable bomb fuel” – it is too “hot” – although it is superior reactor fuel (finally established by the last core of the experimental Shippingport reactor a generation after the war). Early reactors were generally too large, or too small in heat energy, to be very useful for propulsion – so they were either used to make plutonium (as at Hanford) or for research (most others). But both Axis and Allied programs also considered using reactors to make material for use in radiological weapons. Only the US program made plutonium on an industrial scale for bombs (although the Germans intended to eventually). Most bomb programs focused on separating enough U-235 to make a pure uranium bomb.

Axis programs suffered from a lack of supply: there were no good sources of uranium available to them. The Germans captured 1000 metric tons of the richest ore ever mined (26% U-235) – while the US lucked out and bought 1000 tons – in both cases because Union Mines (Union Minere du Hout Katanga) wanted an atomic arms race – and shipped the ore to Belgium and New York in 1938! The source was Shinklobwe in Katanga, the Belgian Congo. This represented decades of global demand in 1938, so the mine was closed (and flooded). 30,000 tons of “lower grade tailings” – 19% U-235 - were left on site. Japan considered going to get it. The US actually did go get it in 1942. This matters because NO OTHER mine in history ever produced ores much over 2% U-235 – and most mines available to Japan produced ores on the order of only 2/10 of 1% U-235! The US hired Union Mines engineers to develop mines in Canada. The Germans never got fuel production off the ground. The Japanese inherited the traditional uranium industry of China – where it had long been demand to make a black pigment for ceramics. So much so there was a refinery in Shanghai. They also built a refinery at Konan, and before the war began also the largest heavy water plant in the world – unknown to the Allies. Japan moved ores with minor uranium and thorium contents - never more than 4/10 of 1% - from all over the empire – including 6,000 tons from Malaya – the only time it was a source of atomic fuels. But most Japanese fuel came from China, where ancient, traditional, primitive surface mining was the main source. By 1945 Japan was paying astronomical prices for this ore - indicating a real demand for it. Only as the war ended did a significant pitch blend mine come on line in Korea – too late for Japan but it became the principle DPRK fuel source. The few low grade mines in Japan were also exploited. As a result, Japan eventually had enough natural uranium for at least two reactor cores – and learned enough from the first one to design an atom bomb (for which it hoped eventually to produce enough fuel to make). That in turn led to designs for aircraft to deliver it – modified G8N and Ki-91 bombers. The Japanese bomb design was based on a cut down 3 inch AA gun – just as the Hiroshima bomb was. It used two radio altimeters to determine altitude, where as the US used four former tail warning radars for the same purpose (requiring three to “agree” to detonate). The Japanese also designed a 250 kg radiological bomb and built a facility to charge them in Korea, not far from the experimental reactor site. These could not be built in numbers, however, unless more and larger reactors were built. Apparently the original sub-critical reactor experiment (reported on in the second meeting of the N program and documented, among other places, by Rhodes in The Making of the Atomic Bomb) was rebuilt using the same fuel and heavy water, only in larger quantities – to get a super-critical prototype reactor. That in turn became the basis of a design for a submarine propulsion plant.
Heisenberg himself said that a sub reactor was the only possible practical wartime application of atomic research – but never designed one in detail. The Manhattan Project decided not to attempt such a wartime application, but did a paper study of one late in the war. Japan, however, went the other way. They began seeking a power plant, built a prototype that was suitable to make steam, and based a design on it. Plans for using that plant were discovered in 1968, and unsealed in 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. No less than four classes were considered, but the first of these is perhaps the most interesting, while the second was selected to build. More on these later. Only one other country designed an SSN during WW2 – the UK. Its design dates to 1942 and it is impossible to know more about it until 2042, when they will be declassified. The RN didn’t attempt to build an SSN, and probably the plant was too heavy for it. [Only France attempted to build an SSN using natural uranium post war – the Gymnote as designed. That plant turned out to be to big and heavy – so the boat was completed as a diesel sub instead.]

The original Japanese SSN design was a variant of the I-400 submarine aircraft carrier. This may explain the formal name of the class – which literally means “extraordinary diving can” where “diving can” is the Japanese term for “submarine.” The original I-400 was smaller than the few eventually built after re-design. It carried only two bombers (assembled) (and spares enough to build a third) instead of the three in the as-built version (also with spares for one more). Both the original design and the one actually built had an SSN style snorkel – not sufficient to run the diesel engines – just enough to run an auxiliary engine. The original program contemplate no less than 18 hulls, of which six were to be atomic powered. The atomic powered variants were to be steamships (as all SSNs are). The diesel plant was designed for this class as well – and simply retained when the later program substituted larger vessels. At the same time, an A type HQ sub was also modified to replace one of the original I-400s – also able to carry 2 bombers. The I-400s themselves were expanded – because it was realized not many could be built – and it would take several carriers to deliver enough planes to matter. There is also some speculation that the 250 kg radiological bomb was to be one of the armament options for these ships. The original I-400s were also to double as attack submarines, and their smaller size on the same power plants gave them rather better performance both on the surface and underwater. The time it took to redesign the I-400 meant that none were available until summer 1945, and that none were built with atomic plants.
Instead of the I-400, the first SSN design was for the I-500. [Do not confuse this with a 1945 rename of a captured German supply submarine. That was probably deliberate to confuse history.] The I-500 is documented in many places – as the Type C-4 design (oddly it was C-3 in Japan where where what we call C-1 was just C). It used the very same power plant designed for the I-400 but on a shorter hull – resulting in better performance. There is evidence this vessel went to Germany in 1945 (where US Army intelligence found passengers who had made a trip from Japan by submarine in two months) and also that it stopped in the Gulf of Panama en route to or from Germany. In Panama, in July 1945, a “recon type kaiten” was found on a beach – abandoned – with 600 kg of raw silk in a cargo compartment that replaced the warhead. Not documented (except in Advance Force Pearl Harbor), this sub still exists. Long at the US Army Aviation Museum on Oahu, it was eventually returned to Japan where it is on display today (never mind reference books do not admit a recon kaiten existed). No other vessel could have delivered this to Panama in July 1945.

RHS does not use the stock atomic bomb at all. This weapon is not destructive enough and has political effects which are unrealistic (more related to post war views about atomic weapons use). In fact, Gen Marshall planned to use at least 9 atom bombs as part of Operations Olympic and Coronet. In its place RHS has created two atomic bombs - a "Uranium Bomb" and an "Implosion Bomb." These bombs will destroy at least 20 different targets when dropped, which is at least more than the stock bomb does. The USAAF gets 1 Uranium Bomb per month starting in July, 1945. It also gets two Implosion bombs per month starting in August 1945. These are delivered by special units which use dedicated "Silverplate" (unarmed) B-29s. These bombers are restricted to special detachments of the 393rd Bomb Squadron with the suffex UB (for uranium bomb) or IB (for implosion bomb). These units may always operate the B-29 Silverplate P (= Pumkin Bomb) bomber. [This aircraft carries large conventional bombs and is used to give the air units experience flying missions over enemy territory with the same aircraft - stripped of defensive weapons to increase its range.] Later, when Silverplate IB or UB aircraft appear, the detachments may operate aircraft with the same suffix. The USAAF always gets atomic bombers at a statistically average rate of 1 UB per month (from July 1945) and 2 IB per month (from August 1945). In some circumstances, IF industry in Japan is functional, Japan may get 1 G8N1 UB every four months (from August 1945) and 1 Ki-91 UB every four months (from October 1945).
 
RHS assumes that, had the war lasted longer, and if the Allies to not destroy Japanese industry – or deprive it of resources to produce HI points if undamaged – it might be possible for Japan to produce a few atom bombs. IF there are HI points sufficient, AND IF there is a specific engine plant actually producing engines, AND IF there is a specific aircraft factory dedicated to a sub type of aircraft, THEN Japan may produce one G8N atomic bomber at a time - and if it dedicates a second aircraft factory and has appropriate engines for it – later still one Ki-91 at a time. These may only be operated by tiny one plane air units, and these must disband after use – so they will reappear only once every 120 days. The idea is to simulate the limited atomic fuel supply on top of draconian production restrictions making plane production hard to achieve so late in the war. Japan could eventually have one atomic bomber every two months if it puts both types into production. Note that unlike the B-29 Silverplate bombers which can carry atomic bombs to extended range, both Japanese atomic bombers only carry atomic bombs to normal range and only carry cameras to extended range. However, Japanese atomic bombers do have defensive armament, unlike the Silverplate B-29s. These features model the actual design philosophy of both nations.

RHS has a speculative RN SSN in class slot 2479 named Conqueror in honor of a later SSN which sank the Belgrano in the Falklands war. The class is not used in any scenario. It also presents the virtually unknown but historical I-500 in class slot 1958. The one vessel actually built (I-500) is present in ship slot 1801 in all scenarios. The planned second and third units (I-501 & I-5-2) are present in Japan Enhanced Scenario 105 only in ship slots 1086 & 1087. Although Scenario 99 is also JES, it has its own ship logic.

[el cid again]

expanded text at the end of the above post

[US87891]

Each of your multi year researched paragraphs were either copied wholesale or condensed from Robert Wilcox’s book or the Nazi A Bomb website. Nothing new, nothing to see. A typical conspiracy theory set of nonsense that was debunked by legitimate historians and scientists long ago.

The effects of a nuclear device (critical or non-critical) last a loooong time. The 1st ROC Capital Division took Hungnam. There was no American component as one might rightly expect if it was a suspected A-bomb test site. There were two companies of 88th? Engineers, but no-one from Corps, or Army, or higher, or anywhere else.

They found no secret hill top surrounded by barbed wire; they found no secret underground bases; they found no secret tunnel complexes; they found no residual radioactive elements in the area; they did find an ammonia processing plant.

BTW, I'm the fellow who was an instructor at JOTC, Ft Sherman, at the time you said you were there. Remember?

Matt

[cdnice]

[X(]Wow......I am blown away by the detail of all this work. Thank you very much for the effort, I look forward to checking it out soon.

[el cid again]

The art Mifune did last year - now slightly improved - looks wonderful
in the editor. But I still have not made it work - the game crashes on loading.
I hope Mifune will be able to make minor adjustments so it does work soon.
But until it does work I won't issue it.

To this add it appears I can replace air panels at will - using Cathartes work as a template. This will permit a number of immediate improvements even before we get a major rework. But I won't implement this until the revised set is working.

[el cid again]

At least you are partially correct: a lot of this material is in Wilcox's book! However
a good deal of what I have isn't. Enough, in fact, that he says he needs to do another rewrite
to include it. In fact, I covered a good deal more than he does: you won't find anything about
RN, USN or IJN atomic submarines designs in his book. You won't find mention of US programs post
war inspired by Axis atomic research - and I mentioned all four of them. I write with precision,
and if you read carefully you will find a good deal in these few paragraphs NOT in his book, either
first or second editions.

ORIGINAL: US87891

Each of your multi year researched paragraphs were either copied wholesale or condensed from Robert Wilcox’s book or the Nazi A Bomb website. Nothing new, nothing to see. A typical conspiracy theory set of nonsense that was debunked by legitimate historians and scientists long ago.

The effects of a nuclear device (critical or non-critical) last a loooong time. The 1st ROC Capital Division took Hungnam. There was no American component as one might rightly expect if it was a suspected A-bomb test site. There were two companies of 88th? Engineers, but no-one from Corps, or Army, or higher, or anywhere else.

They found no secret hill top surrounded by barbed wire; they found no secret underground bases; they found no secret tunnel complexes; they found no residual radioactive elements in the area; they did find an ammonia processing plant.

BTW, I'm the fellow who was an instructor at JOTC, Ft Sherman, at the time you said you were there. Remember?

Matt

[el cid again]

A good deal of the detail isn't described anywhere. The extensive map development involves more than
merely adding about 100% more locations - it includes detail research into every location - existing or new.
More than a few stock locations did not use the names they had during WW2 - or if Japanese at start - did
not use the Japanese name. Many locations have notes in brackets behind the name describing what the place
is famous for in an economic sense? The values for industry are not seat of the pants guesses, but are
based on analysis of what was there, what was built there, or what could be built there? A surprising number
of very important air and/or naval bases in history are not even present in stock. But they are present in RHS.
Similar detail is present in land unit, aircraft and ship data. Many LCU in stock have only a tiny number of
records and omit significant elements actually present. The basic game system permits modeling of ship conversions
to other forms: a large number of these are now included in RHS. The very heart of RHS is aircraft - the mod
began by accident out of developing aircraft for a different mod. The process, overseen by a professional programmer,
and aided by years of input from the Forums, resulted in a superior system that well shows off the air combat and
other code related to aircraft inherent in the game system. It takes a lot of time to work out the formulas for
every aircraft sub-type - and we have vastly more of them to work out too. Only taking the time to look at the mod
will lead to understanding how much work has been invested in it.

[el cid again]

update 7.23
https://onedrive.live.com/redir?resid=3 ... file%2cmsi


This comprehensive update includes art, data, RHS (documentation), and scenario (data) files.

The art is focused on updated Allied aircraft filmstrips. These caused a total review of all Allied aircraft records to insure proper pointers. These filmstrips return RHS to the bitmap order used by stock for China Air Force - we only left it out of necessity to get the last filmstrips to work. There is also other general art - mainly Allied and Japanese Mission filmstrips and the ground units filmstrip. These art files mean you must copy the RHS folder over the top of your working AE install in which you want AE to run.

There are substantial changes to aircraft data files. This mainly is changed art pointers. But there are other changes. P-38F and P-38G picked up drop tanks - which in spite of nominally being forbidden were in general use in PTO during their production period. And a carrier variant (FO-2) of the P-38 was added to scenarios 99 and 105. Unwanted by the Navy, it is not put in strictly historical scenarios. But facing a bigger threat, these planes, plus carrier capable B-25s, and also float Wild Catfish and TBDs - are added to the Japan Enhanced scenarios where it is assumed the stronger Japanese threat creates more demand for assets.

A number of submarines were reworked - mainly to insure the variations between scenarios are consistent. This means that the I-400 class in 101-104 & 106 is the later, larger class - with one converted to a tanker - and only five being completed. 99 & 105 stick with the original plan - an earlier, smaller, better performing vessel - built in larger numbers (still not the 18 planned, but something like a dozen). Certain other similar distinctions were also implemented.

All out year Winter pwhexe.dat files have had the Akyab Road added to them. A couple had one eratta hex in India corrected. The Fall 1942 pwhexe.dat file is also reissued to the newest standard.

[el cid again]

7.24 update
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This update simply better exploits the already issued revised Allied Aircraft Filmstrips.
It mainly changes pointers in the aircraft files. It does represent a very detailed review and integration of the data files with the art files. As usual, there were things found that were possible to do better, including both eratta and actual additions of one kind or another.

For example, there is one new air group. This is 112 Squadron RAF. Never a PTO unit, it was unusual in terms of its people: many aircrew and ground crew were from Australia and New Zealand, and also from Poland. Late in 1945 it was in Italy. Had the war continued, outfitted with RAF Mustang IV aircraft. Had the war continued for a long time, I believe it would have been transferred to PTO. Because most RHS scenarios do not end until the end of Monsoon, 1945, we have to estimate what units might have transferred to PTO from ETO.

A surprise is the discovery that the new filmstrips had side, top and alpha art for the B-42. This aircraft is only present in Japan Enhanced Scenarios 99 & 105 - but these have it because, if the campaign in fact does not end in auto-victory, presumably the more difficult situation might extend the war long enough for the early form to have achieved operational status. Apart from its long range and respectable bomb load, this is a very fast aircraft.

Rather more air art pointers were revised than expected - in the 20-30 range. Many of those because I found the correct art in the new strips (even if it is very old art, some of it wasn't in the previous ones). Other cases involve a better "nearest art" selection - partly as we have more types to choose from. Many of these cases involve the correct aircraft in the "wrong" colors. There were minimal changes to the location files related to aircraft production. There were also a handful of updates to location files related to Allied command assignments - to give players more options.

Also thoroughly revised was RHS Air Art Cross Reference documentation, and new "Plane Lists" 4 and 5 have been added documenting the planned changes/additions for aircraft. This probably represents the final form of RHS aircraft options. The "missing types" which had been defined (B-36 and B-42) have been added back in (to Scenarios 99 & 105). This because we have B-42 art and I expect to have B-36 art - so any game that starts after today will be able to get the "right" B-36 art if I simply revise the pointer in the aircraft data file. It is a very late aircraft - so it won't be needed any time soon! A related type with "wrong" art is the C-99 - almost pure chrome as few would have been built: but we already had it with 4 engine art. It too will pick up 6 engine art in due course.

I now have two update plans:

1) Continue to update pwhexe files (other than Winter which are finalized)

2) See if I can overlay missing air art and/or integrate revised filmstrips as/when they are completed by Mifune.

[el cid again]

Rewritten in next item

[el cid again]

AE Japanese Logistical Limits

A serious student of WW2 history, and play-tester, has objected that AE permits IJA far too much capability in logistical terms. Specifically, he is upset that it is possible to conduct an offensive in China at the same time that is possible to launch operations in the SRA, and sometimes, far into the Indian Ocean. His position is somewhat supported by historians who argue that the “limit of practical reach” for Imperial forces was approximately Rabaul – and that any effort beyond that point was doomed to failure.

These objections are well intended, but surely incorrect. Further, within its limits, both the WITP and the WITP/AE engine is remarkably good at logistical calculations. Players CAN over-extend themselves, or not, and the engine makes it apparent when and if that occurs? While stock scenarios have numbers of problems in detail – this was because the time it would take to do microscopic development was cost prohibitive. If you do take the time to research all historically and economically important locations, it is possible to make a reasonable model of the logistical potential of the campaign area. If you also model the actual cost to lift of ground units (so that pack units are harder to lift than draft units, and draft units are harder to lift than motorized units), and add most of the missing ships, it is possible to turn AE into a remarkably good logistical computer. You will constantly find yourself forced to make realistic trade off decisions: yes, we can lift those units and supply them over that distance, but ONLY IF we FAIL to import the resources required to maintain production. We can STILL do it IF the stocks are high enough, but we SHOULD be increasing stocks rather than depleting them – so there WILL BE a down side medium term if we do not.

It would, in theory, have been better to have made “supplies” more complicated. In particular, ammunition and a re-defined “fuel” should be separate from general supplies. Pack and draft units, and many static units, need no fuel at all. Motorized units need it. Ammunition is not consumed at all except in combat – but then it rises to as much as 90% of consumption. General supplies are needed all the time by all units, but are relatively constant. Fuel should really be what logisticians call POL, and should include vehicle, aircraft and ship fuels, and some industrial fuels. Ammo, on the other hand, does not come from LI or even HI Centers – it comes from Munitions Plants. Just as weapons do. This would permit even better logistical modeling. Never mind, the as designed system still works surprisingly well. The main problem is that a “supply point” is too flexible – you always have what you need until you run completely out – and combat does not run you out of ammunition even though you still have large stocks of other things – as it should.

Now let us consider the case of IJA strategy and distant operations in logistical terms. By that I mean substantially the ability to perform operations in terms of stocks of weapons, supplies/munitions, and the ability to move and support units with sealift. The best historical indicator of the logistical potential of Japan is what it really was able to field, recognizing that it never controlled the entire area, and that it suffered a great deal of damage to places it did control. Japan starts with the largest army in the area (neglecting Soviet forces that never left ETO). It still has the largest army at the end of the war. And it fields millions of men in Axis allied forces as well. While production does increase during the war, much of the material and ordnance required is either very old (some of it pre-dating WWI), or of foreign origin (counting Chinese manufactured as foreign to Japan). Nor was Japan very efficient in production or organization: the actual limit of what Japan might have produced is larger than what it did produce.

AE Logistical Limits Page 2

The source of logistical material is industrial production. Japan controls several over-developed industrial centers in the Home Islands which require massive imports of resources and some petroleum to function. It also controls numbers of smaller industrial centers in Manchukuo, Korea, Northern China and the Home Islands, many (but not all) of which require imports to remain productive.

The foundation for industrial production is raw materials – resources and oil in game terms. This may either come from owned or captured resource centers or oilfields, or from stockpiles. The war essentially is fought because the USA, Britain and the NEI embargoed imports to Japan in an attempt to force Japan to end its war in China. Japan was not only unwilling to end the war in China, after five years and significant casualties – it also was unwilling to establish the precedent that the Western powers could dictate its policy (by embargo) any time they wanted, over any issue. It also had stockpiled significant amounts of what it would need if isolated. In terms of oil, Japan had what it believed was an 18 month supply at the time the embargo began, which was July, 1941. [It really consumed more than it expected to, so the clock had somewhat less time on it.] Stockpiles of resources were not as great, but the potential to import them was much greater. In fact, Japan did not work many of the mines it captured. According to Parillo, author of The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II, the amount of oil in the SRA was vastly greater than Japan needed. The situation was similar, if not quite identical, with respect to other materials. Most of the world’s tin was in NEI, and Japan could not use even 10% of production. Other materials had far lower proportions, so the % Japan needed to import was greater – but there was generally far more than required.

The critical link between industrial production and resources was shipping. Japan not only had to capture sources of resources and oil, it had to move them to the industrial centers that needed them. Most difficult were the centers in Japan which had to be fed by sea, vulnerable to submarine and mine warfare. More difficult still was allocation of shipping. Although it IS more efficient to import from East Asia and the SRA than from North America, Japan and Europe – Japan was renting a million tons of foreign shipping in peacetime it could not use during the war. [Partially mitigating that is 300,000 tons captured in the first few months – shipping generally not in AE because there is no mechanism permitting a ship to “change sides” during the game.] But management of shipping is the real strategic organizational challenge facing both the historical Japanese strategists and the game players. Japan in history did not do this very well (see Parillo). That means that what a better managed Japan in terms of shipping allocation would actually be able to produce more than historical Japan did. And the game does a very good job of modeling this. In RHS test 9A, Axis players managed to virtually shut down HI production in Japan in six months – due to over-allocation of ships to offensive operations in Australia and Ceylon (simultaneously!).
 

AE Logistical Limits Page 3

The key to success for Japan is moderation and using what it has well – as in most things. There is a reason for colonial exploitation of China as well as of all of the SRA except Thailand (the only country to maintain independence entirely). That reason is there is a lot of resources and/or oil to exploit, and even distant countries found it economic to exploit them. It is much more efficient (in terms of shipping efficiency) for Japan to exploit these same resources, because it is closer. And the resources available generally are vastly more than what Japan requires, even if it manages to achieve a near optimum war economy. [Above all that means that industry never shuts down for lack of the resources it needs to produce every day.] The problem is NOT “are there enough resources to meet Japan’s needs?” It is “can Japan move those resources from where they are to where they need them?” In absolute terms, the answer is “no” – Japan ALWAYS has some centers unable to produce for lack of something. Japanese players are constantly allocating shipping – or changing “stockpile settings” at locations – to bring places unable to produce back on line. Real production, as IRL, is always less than theoretical production. But the greatest extent of this problem is due to a failure to allocate enough shipping, in time, because either it was needed to move military units or supplies for them, or because it was too dangerous to use the ships in a given area at the present time. In this sense, AE is a gigantic logistical computer model, constantly calculating the impacts of player decisions.

One of the best ways to optimize Japanese power projection is approach WW2 in the same way Japan approached “The Short, Victorious War” (the Russo-Japanese War) which put Japan on the map as a major power. That means Japan needs a plan – not just to start the war – but also to end it when it reaches the limits of its offensive power. In the former war, Japan sued for peace just after it committed the last reserves (the 55 year olds) to win the Battle of Mukden. Going with “the facts on the ground” at that point was optimum for Japan. Broadly, Japanese militarists were aware of this in 1941: they knew they could not win a long war. But, apart from the idea of neutralizing the United States Fleet during the period of initial expansion, and capturing the SRA to create an autarky – there was no actual plan of what to do – even had that succeeded. The Battle of Midway might be said to be the ultimate expression of “naval war without a proper plan.” [Admiral Morison in the official US Naval history claims they violated “every one of the laws of war” in this battle!] As well, the IJA forces initially committed to the SRA were a tiny fraction of those available – and those eventually committed to the area. IJA eventually sent most of the experienced troops and most of the weapons of its strongest theater – the Kwangtung Army – into the fighting areas. It also had sufficient stock of rifles, mortars and other arms to form vast numbers of infantry formations later in the war – mainly to secure the Home Islands or other areas not near a battlefront. Players need not make these mistakes. Japan can commit the forces it has early and in numbers to areas where they matter to achieve strategic goals. And in AE, and especially in RHS, they can have a plan to end the war using the auto-victory rule. AE code nominally conducts a test on the first day of 1943 to see if the Victory Point ratio is 4:1. RHS says ANY day a 4:1 ratio is achieved is auto victory – doing so before 1943 is just as good as on January 1. This is a high bar, but probably not impossible.
 
AE Logistical Limits Page 4

Consider China. Eventually IJA conducts operation Ichi-Go – due to the threat of B-29 bases in country. That threat is real in game terms too – and need not wait for the B-29 to be a problem. China is thus a two edged sword – captured it generates supplies and resources for Japan – uncaptured it represents a potential significant enemy base for operations against Japan. Japan has a significant Army in country and even larger military forces in Manchukuo and Korea which need not move by sea to reach China. In 1942 the chances of a Soviet offensive are essentially nil. While a prudent garrison should be maintained, there is no reason not to transfer the forces (which actually were transferred in 1943 and 1944) in 1942. As well, there are significant forces in the Home Islands. Again, the chances of an Allied invasion in 1942 are essentially nil. Again, a prudent garrison should be maintained, but all experienced and high quality units (except where restricted to Japan by the scenario designer) are available to send to China or the SRA. The IJA is much larger than the US Army and US Marines. What good is that advantage it is isn’t exploited? And why wait to exploit it until later in the war, when the qualitative edge of veteran troops is less in addition to facing larger numbers of enemy soldiers as well as vastly larger and better air and naval forces? A Japanese offensive needs to strive for victory in 1942. And in logistic terms, this is much more feasible in China than in much of the Pacific. The Pacific is a logistical desert – producing very little. China is able to produce more than the troops require – it also is a source of exports useful (after a short over-water trip) to the Home Islands – much more efficient than long-distance sources are. On top of these considerations, remember that the Pacific War is ABOUT China to begin with. Except the US, UK and NEI wanted to force Japan to end its war in China (which began in 1937 – when such an effort might have succeeded – and when Japan had not yet suffered large losses making defeat “unthinkable”) – except for the Allied ultimatum and embargo, Japan would not have embarked on the conquest of the SRA at all in 1942. Except for the need to isolate China, Japan might not have invaded Burma at all – is only other utility is as a Western buffer from the “threat” posed by Allied armies in India. [Allied players know India is not a threat in 1942 – it has too few ground units and almost no air force or navy.] Thailand – particularly a neutral Thailand – might serve as a cheaper buffer. The occupation of Indochina – which led directly to the embargo – also was because Japan wanted to isolate China. What is the point of going to war, rather than getting out of China as the Western powers demanded, only to then put it on back burner and not go for a win there? Particularly if a win is possible quickly – releasing forces for other operations.

It is probably impractical to conquer China writ large. But China in 1941 is a divided nation. Manchuria and several other provinces in the North are Japanese controlled. Sinkiang and a neighboring province – a vast area – are Soviet allied (and so modeled in RHS). Sian is surprisingly well defended by nature and limited approach routes. Chunking is the same. And Yunnan – the “national redoubt” of ROC China – probably is not conquerable. Nevertheless, it is probably entirely practical to capture East and Southeast China, and with some skill, Central China. This creates a significant buffer area in which Allied air bases cannot be established in medium or heavy bomber range of the Home Islands, and from which significant exports may occur. The same rough terrain (forest and mountains) that defends Western China also means IJA can defend against attacks from that area with modest forces – mainly covering the few roads. As important, the remaining ROC controlled area does not produce enough supplies to feed the (constantly regenerating) NRA (ROC) Army well enough to permit offensive operations. If this can be achieved by the fall of 1942 – some troops and air units can then be transferred to other areas – precisely the time of year when a push for more Victory Points will be needed.

AE Logistical Limits Page 5

This document will not consider what “victory” means in game terms, and mechanisms to achieve it, as well as why that might also be meaningful in historical terms? The Victory Point system designed for WITP and WITP/AE values locations as well as enemy units lost on a point system. Locations are valued by what is present at the location multiplied by a constant which is related to where the location is on the map. A complex system is used to determine the VP value players ultimately see on the game display. There are apparently three values involved: what I call the “base value” which is a field that shows in the editor; what I call a “multiplier” which varies in zones by map location; and what I call “infrastructure value” which seems to be the sum of port and airfield values in the hex.

The “multiplier” has two different standards: for Japan, at the map edge, the value is ten while for the Home Islands it is one; for the Allies at the map edge, the value is one while in the Home Islands the value is ten. There are also intermediate zones with values of two, three and five, between these extreme zones with values of one or ten.

In RHS, the “base value” is standardized with a formal definition:

Case VP Base Garrison
10+ Population Centers (700+ Industry) 30 VP 60 Gar "Industry" = HI + LI + Shipyards + Refineries Note 1
10+ Population Centers (Normal Case) 20 VP 40 Gar
4-9 Population Centers 15 VP 30 Gar When a location is of unusual economic significance
4-9 Population Centers 10 VP 20 Gar
0-3 Population Centers 3 VP 10 Gar When a location is of unusual economic significance
0-3 Population Centers (Special Case) 3 VP 5 Gar When location is important for ANY reason
1-3 Population Centers (Normal Case) 2 VP 0 Gar
0 Population Centers (Normal Case) 1 VP 0 Gar

Note 1: VP base value also 30 if the location is defined as a Capital (and garrison also 60).

It is the product of the base value so defined (in the editor), the multiplier (for the map zone), and the infrastructure value (ports and airfields) which players see on the map and which they are credited with if they control the location.

From the above it will be seen that players are rewarded for the locations they control. While the more population and industry and base infrastructures all matter, there is also the effect of the area multiplier which skews the result such that there is minimal reward for areas “easy to control” near the vital home areas of each side, and maximum reward for controlling distant areas which are presumably “harder to gain control of.” Consider this in terms of Japanese economic necessity and strategy: areas near Japan either start under Japanese control or, if captured, are easier and more efficient to export resources and oil from (as well as easier to support occupation forces in). But the greatest rewards (in VP terms) come from capturing major locations distant from Japan – which is both harder to do and less efficient to export from or to support occupation forces in. This implies that Japan should attempt to secure nearby areas early on – both so the Allies cannot use them as bases from which to launch attacks on Japan – and to export from efficiently whatever resources or oil they may contain. Once this is achieved, it also implies that more distant operations might result in the high VP values needed for auto-victory.

AE Logistical Limits Page 6

Let us digress and consider the case of out year Japanese victory. Code runs a test on January 1, 1944 to see if the VP ratio is 3:1? It also runs a test on January 1, 1945 to see if the VP ratio is 2:1? [RHS considers a value of 3:1 any time in 1943, or of 2:1 any time in 1944, as auto victory.] Given the massive numbers of reinforcements the Allies get in 1943 and 1944, neither is realistically likely to happen. It remains, these are default secondary goals for Japan to try for if it fails to achieve 4:1 in 1942. All of them essentially have the same context: achieving such VP ratios requiring capturing high value Allied locations while not losing too many VPs because of unit losses.

How does this VP system (which I think is well conceived) relate to the real world? In Grave of a Dozen Schemes, British historian H. P. Willmott considers one such case which might have happened had the units in position been used with a different objective. At the time of the Indian Ocean raid of the Kiddo Butai, 15th Army was being committed to the invasion of Burma. Had it instead been committed to invading Ceylon, where prospects for success were high given the dismal state and number of defending forces, he thinks the British government might have been forced from the Pacific War altogether, and India might have been neutralized (with significant effects even on Allied forces in ETO). In 1942, US planners were very concerned about a Japanese investment of Alaska and Canada’s Northwest and Yukon Territories.

These concerns were pre-dated by local residents of Alaska ever since Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, and by Brig Gen “Billy” Mitchell in 1935, when he singled out Alaska as “the key point of the whole Pacific,” and he told the House Military Affairs Committee “He who holds Alaska holds the world…Alaska is the most strategic place in the world. It is the jumping off place to smash Japan. If we want to fight her in the Philippines, it will take five years to defeat Japan.” [This position looks more reasonable today than it did in 1935. Anchorage is, decade after decade, the air cargo hub of the entire world. Most flights from the US West Coast to Asia enter Alaskan waters and, weather permitting, pass in sight of the Aleutian Islands. Expeditionary Air Wings and airmobile Rangers and Stryker Brigades can reach Asia in less than half the time than from any part of CONUS.] Fairbanks is fifteen hours flying time of Tokyo -- or New York. Others echoed Mitchel’s position in 1937: Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Homer Lea and Bern Balchen. But in 1940 Territorial Governor Ernst Gruening could say “A handful of enemy parachutists could capture Alaska overnight.” The only military post was Chilkoot Barracks, built to protect a gold trail in the 19th century. It had no roads or airfield and its only “transportation asset” was a 51 year old harbor tug. The only “artillery piece” in Alaska – a Russian relic – served as a flower pot! Buckner found it ironic that Alaskans, the most air-conscious people on Earth, had no air force. [Alaska still has six times as many pilots per capita as any other state. In 1940, it had the highest number of pilots per capita in all history – one in three. Finally, the Soviet-Geman Pact resulted in significant defenses for Alaska. $350,000,000 were spent within 18 months, mainly to build airfields, many of which were useful in the Northwest Staging Route (by which most Russian aid aircraft were sent) and for the Aleutians campaign. [See The Thousand Mile War, pp 52-55]. One result of this is that, by the end of 1941, Alaska has significant airfield development, but virtually no ground or naval defense forces! For this reason, depending on how much players send to Alaska, it may be possible to invade at minimal risk or cost, and capture immediately useful airfields – able to bomb the largest aircraft factory in the world (at Renton, Washington) among other thingsCanada can be invaded via the Yukon River in Monsoon, 1942, and via the Mackenzie River as well in Fall 1942. It was concern over an invasion that led to the historical construction of the ALCAN highway and the CANOL (Canadian Oil) project.

AE Logistical Limits Page 7

Every near map edge location has a multiplier of ten for its VP value. If Alaska has fallen, and Whitehorse (Yukon Territory) is captured and supplied by river (any time in Monsoon or Fall seasons), operations with distant air support over the Pacific Northwest become feasible. The historically planned invasion route was to use the twin ports of Aberdeen and Hoquiam, Washington (which are on the RHS map) – because they lack the major coast defenses of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Columbia River. Both rail and road connections from there threaten Portland, and the Seattle/Tacoma area. Once secured it might be possible to march North to Vancouver, and capture many locations of significant VP value while depriving Canada of its primary logistic base.

Similar operations are possible relative to Siberia. In particular, the Lena River offers (Fall only) ocean access deep into the Continent – almost to Lake Baikal. If Japanese forces are willing to take on Soviet Forces – it was the primary historical objective of the IJA. [During the Russian Revolution the IJA, reinforced by a contingent of US Marines, actually occupied Siberia as far West as Chita!] It offers significant resources and some oil and heavy industry. Against a sufficiently inept Allied player or team, an invasion of the USSR in Fall, 1942 might be feasible as a way to generate significant VPs.

Finally, it may be possible to occupy the major cities of India or Australia – in 1942 before the major Allied build ups of mid war. It will not be practical in logistic terms to support all such operations – but one of them probably is completely feasible assuming relatively low Japanese shipping losses during the campaign. 

[el cid again]

7.24 update
https://onedrive.live.com/redir?resid=3 ... file%2cmsi




The trigger for this release, which is a collection of a number of minor things,
was that testing discovered three errors in the pwhexe.files:

1) The Tsugaru Straits (at the top of Honshu) were not modeled restrictively enough

2) A secondary road west from Canton was modeled as a trail instead

3) Movement between two islands in the Visayas was possible where it should not have been.

For this reason, I have defined a new pwhexe.dat standard, and begun to issue it with this update. The critical start of game and base file is attached here as well. The Fall 42 file is also updated in this respect. Many other pwhexe.dat seasonal files will be updated in this and other respects shortly. [I have completed working on a new primary workstation, and modified the old one so Mifune can work on art. Pwhexing and air art will dominate near term updates.]

There is at least one instance of changing a pointer to use better air art. I also managed to obtain a great deal of air art two days ago as well as two programs to manage art. There will be a good deal more air art soon.

There are numbers of new very junior naval officers. In the case of Full RHS Scenarios (101, 103 and 105), many of these are assigned to river booms, or other minor vessels. Those vessels are not present in Simplified RHS (102, 104 and the future 106) - but the officers remain - for use as players wish. This was done mainly because analysis of why river booms were not combat effective determined that the use of the "dreaded staff officer" (i.e. no assigned officer) forced horrible values (all zeros) on the task groups. River booms, especially combined with minefields and coastal forts, are a way to contest enemy movement - on the Yangtze in particular. These affected leader and ship files.

A handful of unit and location eratta were corrected in the location files.

A handful of air unit and aircraft eratta were corrected in air group and aircraft files.

[aleajactaest10044]

Long term follower of RHS. I wanted to take a moment to tell everyone that I think Sid and the team have done a great job with this mod. I encourage everyone to take a look!

[el cid again]

Although I have no product to issue, today is a watershed day: I "made" an
air art filmstrip that works (by adding one image from an older filmstrip). That
means I have mastered the tools required to select, cut or copy and paste.

In the process I discovered a good deal of air art already present not being
used which I was unaware of. That on top of the present art I knew we don't
use - because of a lack of tops. Some of this art was actual tops - but it is
apparently out of sync with sides - and we must have tops and sides in sync
to show up.

Before I got to this point, I was able to obtain a matching set of sides, tops
and alphas used by the common air art scheme. RHS nominally adopted
this some years ago - but somehow we never got most of the tops and
sides into our collection - and the only copies I had was just the Allied and
Japanese sides - so my impression was the tops and alphas were never made.
It is good news they were made and that I have them.

Also - this week Mifune has been able to bring online a desktop graphics station
I sent him - to replace both of his which died in 2014. He also was able to actually
generate product this week - in the form of individual images - which I no longer
need him to be able to put into filmstrips. That means he can focus on what he
likes to do - making art - and not worry about organizing and managing the at.

There will now be a long series of updates - during which I will be issuing both
air art filmstrips and scenario aircraft files in sync with them. There are six flimstrips
and in my view they should come in sets of three - all in sync with each other -
and integrated with the aircraft files so the revised art can be used by players.
When I tire of the gigantic task of organizing air art, I will return to the tedious process of updating the seasonal pwhexe files. At the end of this series of updates -
which may come every day or two - we will call it 7.30. The first one - 7.220 -
also has some location, ship and leader work done on eratta and integrating additional junior officers with ships.