The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

[poodlebrain]

He did write present, and not presents. That could mean a single big action instead of multiple actions. If single, then Sabang is almost certainly the site given the inaction in recent days.

[Lecivius]

That sandwich maker is gonna make like a chef at a Benihana in his AAR [8|]

[:'(]

[Canoerebel]

7/2/43

Operation Roller Coaster: Another very good (but not perfect) day in the Marshalls. The day begins with more "TF X merges wtih TF Y" messages, just like ordered (embedding capital ships with amphibs heading to Wotje). Bombardments take place on schedule at Maloelap and Wotje. The latter, which I thought might prove pretty darned stiff, seemed relatively light, which served as a good omen. Then landings commenced at Wotje, even as additional troops and supply came ashore at the other islands (Mili, Maloelap, Ailinglaplap, and Jaluit).

Modest enemy air strikes, mainly from Tarawa, sink a patrolling YMS south of Jaluit.

No enemy combat ships or carriers showed up. PBYs from Jaluit showed a few small TFs out around Ponape (confirming SigInt yesterday that an AA unit is inbound to that base). Recon from Mili showed that Eniwetok airfields is empty and that the base is not strongly held.

The shock attacks at Ailing and Maleo failed to take either base, though the latter attack dropped forts to 3. My troops on both islands need to rest a bit. I can reinforce them with reserve troops, but I don't want to divert them from their primary missions yet, because those just might be open (more about that in a moment). The shock attack at Wotje succeeds, taking the base. The facilities are in good shape, so now the Allies have a level four airfield on the northern perimeter. A P38H squadron then moved here from Johnston Island, and one of the three PBY squadrons at Jaluit moved here.

John is in a bit of quandry. The Allies have the potential to move foward strongly if he doesn't contest what's going on. He and I have both learned that his atols are vulnerable, even when garrisoned by CD units. The Allies have the ability to rearm ships now (though I can't do that until I pull my carriers back to Jaluit to offer CAP since that island doesn't have a field yet). The amphibs with troops slated for Roi Namur and Ponape are present and those slated for Kusaie are just a day or two east. Meanswhile, the Allies will continue to land supply and builld facilities to bring in more land-based fighters. If John doesn't send a stout KB this way, there is a chance that the Allies could move on Roi Namur, Kusaie, and even Ponape before moving south to handle Tarawa and Baker (the latter two are definite targtets while the first three are more "target of opportunity" types, though I do intend to move on Roi Namur unless KB is sighted tomorrow).

In these particular circumstances, the Marshall are very imporant. A concentration of strong, interlocking Allied bases there and in the Gilberts creates a massive bulge along the Japanese perimeter. Suddenly John sees that his shore guns aren't performing well and that the Allies have open lines of attack towards Lunga, Rabaul, New Guinea, and even Truk. He'll know he has to move to counter. Does he pull Half KB North from Attu (where it is again today)? Does he move Half KB South here to face a strong Death Star? Does he do both?

Tomorrow, recon will focus on Ponape and Kusaie. I need this information, but it's also intended to push John towards the conclusion that his interior is threatened now.

And, if John reacts strongly to counter the threats in CenPac, the Allies shift back to NoPac.

Operation Circus: Allied fighters sweep Amchitka to good effect and bombers then strike hard, closing the airfield (100%, per mouseover). Half KB North remains at Attu.

Battle of Sumatra: I agree that John's message seems aimed at Sabang. Today five BBs bombed the tiny Allied garrison on the west road (the strongest unit is an Aussie engineer at 40 AV - total AV is about 100). Then bombers hit this hex hard. Then two IJA divisions shock attacked...and achieved 1:1 odds, failing to dislodge the defenders.

At Sabang it was quiet today except for modest bombing raids. Supply down to 4.5k. As I wrote once before, "Here at the end of all things...." I won't begrudge John the forthcoming "Banzai!"-Fest. He's earned this one.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

There's a natural tendency that many players have, to some degree. We tend to concentrate our forces where the action is. I think in the old days of wargaming, the phenomenon was known as the players rushing all their forces to the center of the map, engaging in a titanic clash, and the game ended. The developers have done a good job of making this harder to do in AE (PP plays a big role in this).

John seems to concentrate his forces to an extreme extent. For months, essentially every combat ship and sub was in Sumatra. Now a host of subs are in the Aleutians. But by concentrating his forces he tends to leave big gaps (I hope - I hope that I'm not about to get pounced on by a KB to show me a lesson). When he had all his subs in Sumatra, I didn't see one in the Aleuts or West Coast for six months. Then, when he moved so many to the Aleuts, he left the Marshalls without any. The same goes with patrols: he tends to concentrate them where he expects action. Thus, in autumn '42, he had them all in New Guinea and left Sumatra totally unprotected. Then he moved them to Sumatra and left the Aleuts unprotected. Same thing with troops - he moved them all to Sumatra and left Hokkaido and the Aleuts open. Etc. etc. etc.

This makes for a fun game for the Allied player if he has enough experience to gather info and put it together accurately (and as I type this, I cross my fingers hoping I'm not conjuring bad luck in the form of KB arriving tomorrow). But John would be better served to not over-concentrate his forces. He should've had patrols in Sumatra in mid '42. He should've had decent defenses in Hokkaido and the Kuriles in early '43 (so that he didn't have to freak when the Allies showed up unexpectedly).

It's easy for me to point out things about John. And I could even be wrong about them, though I think it's pretty accurate. And John (and many of you) can spot the holes in my game. But it's a lot of fun trying to identify holes and take advantage of them. If the Allies manage to complete the Marshalls campaign without suffering a lopsided carrier battle defeat, they should be in great shape to build on these past two successes even while enduring the humiliation of Sumatra.

I concur. I much rather face a Japanese opponent who likes to keep all his carriers together in one big fist. In that case I split my carriers and look to operate where I know his are not. If a Japanese player splits his carriers then I tend to keep mine together and look for a chance to strike a blow. I think a lot of Japanese players discount the capability of Allied intelligence. Because Japanese intelligence is so weak they think it is easy to hide their carriers. However, I find that with some work and deduction, I have a pretty good idea where the Japanese carriers are most of the time.

[paullus99]

An inexperienced player sees what his opponent wants him to see....a good player makes his opponent see what he wants to see.

[Lowpe]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

I think a lot of Japanese players curse the capability of Allied intelligence.

Fixed.[;)]

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

He should've had decent defenses in Hokkaido and the Kuriles in early '43 (so that he didn't have to freak when the Allies showed up unexpectedly).

1. Any Japanese player should "freak out" about a large force of unknown destination in the mid-Pacific!! [;)]

2. It's actually impossible to garrison everywhere on the map as Japan (even in this mod) in early 43.

Evidence would suggest he determined (rightly) that Sumatra was the most important area on the map in early 43 and that once the situation there was not in doubt, his CVs could move. Luckily for him, you did not throw a big feint out there into the Pacific earlier or he would have had a tough choice. Once you did move, he did something to react well enough that you did not move to Hokkaido. Is that poor play?

3. The current move to the Central Pacific is fine, and a good use of your prepped troops, but it's basically just getting back on schedule. There is a long distance to go and a lot of bases yet to take before getting into range of the HI.

Do you have a long term plan to get there, or are you content to react to where you suspect the Japanese have not placed the KB?

[Canoerebel]

John's reactions to my moves in NoPac didn't stop me from going for Hokkaido. Once I decided to target the Aleutians instead, Hokkaido was off the menu.

I have detailed plans for the balance of '43 and general ideas thereafter.

The overall goal, though, is to chip away at Japanese capital ships. I think that's the surest (and shortest, if successful) route to victory. I've never heard of a Japanese player conceding because he ran out of aircraft or ground troops. I've only infrequently heard of Japanese players running out of fuel or supply. But there have been a multitude of concessions when the navy vanished. And John is a navy man above all else. (It's similar for the Allies - many concessions are made after an Allied player loses an early and lopsided carrier battle).

I think the Allies are ahead of schedule, even with the impending loss of Sumatra. I've said this before, but in most of the games I've seen of late involving experienced IJ players, the Japanese have made serious inroads way beyond the historical norm. John hasn't in this game. The main reason is that he's been reacting to a series of Allied offensives since early '42: Spring '42 counterinvasion in the Aleutians (recpatured by John); Assam and invasion of Ramree Island (June '42, still held by Allies); invasion of Gilberts (June '42, retaken by Japan); invasion of Sumatra (November '42, ongoing but about to end in John's favor).

John has successfully countered most of these Allied offensive operations, but at a cost. He lost the initiative early on (or surrendered it voluntarily to go after the Allies) and never made any serious pushes thereafter. So now it's mid '43, the Allies are on the move, and the Japanese outer defenses have been compromised in two theaters.

Perhaps it's not possible to point out flaws in the enemy's game without appearing unfairly critical. I have noted where I think John deserves credit while also going into detail when as to why I think he's been stymied. I've also pointed out where I made mistakes (especially in Sumatra). The nature of this mod and the house rules might be also be taken into account by some, but I agreed to them and thus have no right to complain about them. But the imbalance in the fighter pools above all else determined what happened in Sumatra, and I get the blame for not fully understanding that going in.

I think John will go on the offensive after Sumatra and will create bulges in the Allied positions in several places (my guess is Assam and/or China, but I'll keep watching). And I think the Allies have created bulges in the Japanese perimeter and are in relatively good position to prosecute the war now.

Sooner or later there's going to be a big carrier battle. If the Allies come out on the short end, the pace will slow for a time. If the Allies come out ahead, the pace should quicken somewhat.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

John's reactions to my moves in NoPac didn't stop me from going for Hokkaido. Once I decided to target the Aleutians instead, Hokkaido was off the menu.

Not to quibble, but I think if you'd suspected he hadn't seen the move, and wasn't reacting, you could have continued. Why "decide" on your secondary unless the primary is potentially not going to turn out well due to an opponent's reaction? Lets be honest; with the placement of the KB at that time unknown, it was a bridge too far, and unlike now, he for some reason choose to keep it in the shadows then.

I have detailed plans for the balance of '43 and general ideas thereafter.

The overall goal, though, is to chip away at Japanese capital ships. I think that's the surest (and shortest, if successful) route to victory. I've never heard of a Japanese player conceding because he ran out of aircraft or ground troops. I've only infrequently heard of Japanese players running out of fuel or supply. But there have been a multitude of concessions when the navy vanished. And John is a navy man above all else. (It's similar for the Allies - many concessions are made after an Allied player loses an early and lopsided carrier battle).

The Decisive Battle? [:)]

I think the Allies are ahead of schedule, even with the impending loss of Sumatra. I've said this before, but in most of the games I've seen of late involving experienced IJ players, the Japanese have made serious inroads way beyond the historical norm. John hasn't in this game. The main reason is that he's been reacting to a series of Allied offensives since early '42: Spring '42 counterinvasion in the Aleutians (recpatured by John); Assam and invasion of Ramree Island (June '42, still held by Allies); invasion of Gilberts (June '42, retaken by Japan); invasion of Sumatra (November '42, ongoing but about to end in John's favor).

John has successfully countered most of these Allied offensive operations, but at a cost. He lost the initiative early on (or surrendered it voluntarily to go after the Allies) and never made any serious pushes thereafter. So now it's mid '43, the Allies are on the move, and the Japanese outer defenses have been compromised in two theaters.

Although you did a great job of making him fight early, in a way you also inhibited his tendency to overextend. This game is actually about the economy for Japan, regardless of those who think it's about the (SMASH! ... BANG!) IJN. That part is fun, and I was guilty of too many CV raids too, but I paid the price later.

Japan is better off in the long run with a smaller perimeter.

Perhaps it's not possible to point out flaws in the enemy's game without appearing unfairly critical. I have noted where I think John deserves credit while also going into detail when as to why I think he's been stymied. I've also pointed out where I made mistakes (especially in Sumatra). The nature of this mod and the house rules might be also be taken into account by some, but I agreed to them and thus have no right to complain about them. But the imbalance in the fighter pools above all else determined what happened in Sumatra, and I get the blame for not fully understanding that going in.

Absolutely agreed. This is weighted to the Japanese, and I agree that the Sumatra move could have played out differently in a different mod. It still seemed just slightly too early for me. I'd want Hellcats for that.

It's no problem to point out your perceptions of your opponent. It's also though good to get some perspective. I wouldn't want you to think you are ahead of schedule and that his side is not faring well, because from your end, there is no way to know. That is all I'm saying.

No one will know if he's got a good enough handle on the economy through all of this and can hold onto some semblance of the KB for long enough to push you back a few times until he proves it. All else is spin.

I think John will go on the offensive after Sumatra and will create bulges in the Allied positions in several places (my guess is Assam and/or China, but I'll keep watching). And I think the Allies have created bulges in the Japanese perimeter and are in relatively good position to prosecute the war now.

Sooner or later there's going to be a big carrier battle. If the Allies come out on the short end, the pace will slow for a time. If the Allies come out ahead, the pace should quicken somewhat.

Yep.

If he goes on an offensive (which would not be smart IMHO), then your critique of the war at this point may turn out to be right on! [;)]

[Canoerebel]

Eric, I don't think you have a good picture of what happened at Hokkaido. John's reaction had nothing to do with it. The move was predicated on having surprise until the fast transports (by that, I mean APAs and APs of 17 to 21 knots carrying 2nd Marine Div.) were within two to three days of the beaches. I almost made it, but patrols picked them up about four or five days out. I immediately defered to the secondary target as was the plan all along. John didn't react at all before I made that decision - only because he had no time to.

Hokkaido was wide open, but the Allies had to have everything go just right for me to chance it this early and with only four complete divisions and the equivalent of two more. When that one important element didn't work out, I diverted. If it had been a month later when I would have had two or three more divisions, I wouldn't have diverted at that point.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Eric, I don't think you have a good picture of what happened at Hokkaido. John's reaction had nothing to do with it. The move was predicated on having surprise until the fast transports (by that, I mean APAs and APs of 17 to 21 knots carrying 2nd Marine Div.) were within two to three days of the beaches. I almost made it, but patrols picked them up about four or five days out. I immediately defered to the secondary target as was the plan all along. John didn't react at all before I made that decision - only because he had no time to.

Hokkaido was wide open, but the Allies had to have everything go just right for me to chance it this early and with only four complete divisions and the equivalent of two more. When that one important element didn't work out, I diverted. If it had been a month later when I would have had two or three more divisions, I wouldn't have diverted at that point.

Ok. Sure. I get that. You had a good plan, and made a stab the best possible target.

I didn't mean that there was definite information on the KBs position. In fact the opposite. I think you did the right thing. But as we know John's tendencies, if he spotted you, he most certainly was reacting!

[Lowpe]

I don't know about the rest of the JFBs, but I would trade losing the initiative, as CR describes it, for wiping out 7+ Divisions at Sabang even if it cost me Medan's oil while I still had Magwe and the core perimeter was intact.

I think you actually inadvertently helped John by limiting his perimeter by causing him to focus on Sumatra.

Just my thoughts.[:)] Time will tell.

[Alfred]

Japan has not lost the initiative and it should be able to destroy the Sabang pocket.  This would all be so obvious with a Japanese player who is sang froid.  Try telling Nemo that Japan no longer has the strategic initiative and he would be very dismissive.
 
Alfred

[Lowpe]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Japan has not lost the initiative and it should be able to destroy the Sabang pocket.  This would all be so obvious with a Japanese player who is sang froid.  Try telling Nemo that Japan no longer has the strategic initiative and he would be very dismissive.

Alfred

For clarity, I changed my description of initiative above.

[desicat]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

Japan has not lost the initiative and it should be able to destroy the Sabang pocket.  This would all be so obvious with a Japanese player who is sang froid.  Try telling Nemo that Japan no longer has the strategic initiative and he would be very dismissive.

Alfred

Sang-froid
noun
1.
coolness of mind; calmness; composure:
They committed the robbery with complete sang-froid.

I think in this game CR is correct that the Japanese have lost the initiative and are in reaction mode. Their main battle fleet has been in almost constant action and probably is due for some upgrades and maintenance (not all ships obviously), a large bulk of their ground forces are not prepped for their ultimate locations (either on the offensive or defensive), and it doesn't seem like he has settled on a defensive line as of yet.

I find it interesting that the Japanese are wasting their and CV's up in the Aleutians and have taken way too long to close out Sabang. Roller Coaster may get them to react for no purpose once again, although John may resist the impulse (although I doubt it).

[Canoerebel]

Alfred is talking about hypothetical opponents, but I'm playing John. He did lose the initiative for more than a year. Nemo (and others) wouldn't have lost the initiative, but one of the pleasures and challenges of playing PBEM is trying to get a handle on your opponent and then using that knowledge. While John did lose the initiative for a long time, that doesn't mean he can't regain it. I expect him to try. Since KB is untouched - same with Death Star - there's immense fighting to come.

[Canoerebel]

Roller Coaster as of July 2.

[Canoerebel]

The Allied lodgment in the Marshalls is obvious on the strategic map.

While the Marshalls are not decisive terrain, under the particular circumstances in this game I can use them to good effect. The Allies have viable attack vectors to the south, southwest, west, and northwest. John will need to react to protect his next line of defense. He's already doing so, per SigInt that 56th Div. is inbound to Ponape.

Like Operation Circus, this operation is a direct benefit of John's focus on Sumatra. He has to focus there, of course, but I'm fortunate that Sabang held long enough to tie down most of Japan's remaining BBs. And information about the likely position of IJN carriers also played a big part. I would not have proceeded with this op had I not known where John's BBs were and the location of Half KB North. In the absence of such knowledge, I would've waited for the next two Essex class carriers to arrive before venturing deep into the unknown.

One funny thing is that I had serious reservations about proceeding with this op due to the risks involved. If this op had failed miserably in tandem with the impending fall of Sabang, John would have (as the Four Yorkshiremen put it) danced about on my grave singing hallelujah. It would have been the ugliest tandem defeat imaginable.

But now we're two ops into the Allied counteroffensive. Both are remarkably well to this point. And that's due most to Sabang.

[witpqs]

What are those 3x IJN TF showing as being?

[Mike McCreery]

The battle for the Marshalls is over.

Once the Allies get a 4EB foothold in the area there is nothing that can stand against the organized bombing.