As to "superior Japanese doctrine." At some time you have to ask yourself this: "If the Zero was better than the Allied aircraft, and the Japanese pilots were substantially more experienced in ways that matter, and if the Japanese pilots had as you allege superior doctrine or tactics, why did inferior USN pilots in inferior USN planes flying inferior USN doctrine and tactics consistently beat the Zero or at least fight it to a draw?"
We've debated the relative merits of the Zero vs Wildcat ad nauseum. When compared to the Wildcat, the Zero was the better fighter for air combat maneuvering. The majority of US Wildcat pilots who engaged the Zero at Coral Sea and Midway all stated that the Zero was by far the better perfoming aircraft. The only advantage the Wildcat had over the Zero in this regard was a faster dive speed. One on one, the Zero was able to best any early war opponent. That is because they Japanese were dictating the terms of the fight. It doesn't matter how much firepower your aircraft has if it's unable to put those weapons on the target. It's a poor weapons system when its best advantage is to dive away from combat. Put it this way, one on one, which fighter will achieve a kill position more often?
But obviously there is more to air-air combat than just the attributes of any one aircraft.
The Japanese did not have an effective tactical fighter doctrine. It was quite inferior to that of the US, especially in the latter half of 1942. Japanese pilots tended to operate by the "lone wolf" principle. Their fighter formations were often described as a "gaggle" with no apparent organization. Once combat was joined, Japanese pilots tended to operate individually. This wasn't done as a result of any comprehensive tactics but was more inline with the Bushido or Samurai spirit. It is ironic that the Japanese emphasized one on one combat tactics also deemphasized individual successes. It was the early superiority of their Zero, the lack of knowledge of US pilots in combatting it and the inpreparedness of the US that allowed for its successes.
But it wasn't the attributes of the Wildcat itself that spelled the demise of the Zero. It was the refinement of US group tactics. US pilots had it drummed into them that if they wanted to survive, they had to use mutually supporting tactics. But in early 1942, US forces were still operating under their flawed peacetime fighter doctrine that emphasized classic dogfight tactics. That doctrine failed to take into account the relative advantages and disadvantages of the Wildcat against a particular opponent. But they learned rather quickly that fighting to Zero on its terms would result in higher losses regardless of the tactics used. Coral Sea and Midway showed that the Zero's could be neutralized through mutually supporting tatics. And those tactics were still evolving. As it was they barely held their own. And if it hadn't been for the robustness of the Wildcat and the fragility of the Zero, the loss rate would have been considerably higher.
The US tactical doctrine as evolved following the Battle of Midway was simple. The first and foremost item was the dictum "Do not engage in a turning fight with a Zero." The second, and probably most effective, was to always fight in mutually supporting pairs. The third, less effective (but very important to survival), was to know when to dive away and run. People like Thatch developed defensive tactics for survival, not for any increase in mission effectiveness. That his tactic, and others, also provided a means for gaining a very transient advantage enabling a snapshot at the attacker was a bonus. One that they used to great effect. And it helped that the Wildcat had a sloped cowling, allowing for longer visual contact in the deflection shot.
When all was said and done, it was the dedication of the pilots and the evolution of their tactical doctrine that allowed US pilots to survive the early battles and begin dealing crippling losses to the enemy as the year wore on.
It's not "statistically trivial" IMO. IN face to face encounters between the F4F and the A6M the F4F consistently won or achieved a draw. These include Coral Sea, Midway VMF, Midway USN, and 4 months of consistent air combat over Guadalcanal. The only clear cut victory was at Wake in Dec 1941. In light of the VMF F4Fs victory at Midway, I'd say that Wake and Midway VMF come out as a wash.
I've covered in some detail reasons why the USN did quite well. Better training at deflection shooting and better tactical doctrine being a big part of that. My suggestion all along has been that the flaws in the A2A model affects the game strategically because it makes risking Allied CVs against comparable numbers of Japanese CVs a very inadvisable idea. That is why I have suggested that part of the deal is to eliminate the Zero bonus.
From a result oriented POV you might strike a balance between the mystic cult of japanese superiority and the historical data by (a) leaving the ZB in, and (b) increasing the F4F EXP levels by 20 points across the board, (b2) put in a "Wildcat bonus" that has the net effect of reducing Wildcat vs A6M losses to about 1:1.
Now, if you want to impose the "ZB" because of results of RAF, USAAF pilots vs Japanese ones, I'd want to know what the historical kill ratios were of these aircraft. I'd also want to know why any early Japanese success are presumed a consequence of the mystic invincibility of the Zero rather than, say, the fact that most Allied a/c in Malaya, the PI, Indonesia, and for the first couple months at Port Moresby, were operating on a logistical shoestring from crummy airbases against a numerically superior foe that had the strategic initiative.
For ex many of the worst Allied army pilot defeats occurred because of "the Bounce" so to speak. At Darwin, for example, most of the P40s were shot down taking off from the airfield. I submit that Chinese pilots in Polikarpovs could have achieved the same result at Darwin had the Allied pilots been caught with their planes on the runway.
Your use of mid-late 1942 statistics to justify the removal of the ZB is flawed. There is no basis for comparison vis a vis the ZB. Now whether the ZB is removed or not, I really don't care so long as the total WitP OOB is also adjusted to reflect the true historical picture. And that would certainly have a far greater negative impact on the allied forces than the Japanese. For instance, VF-6 Wildcats should have their armor rating removed and durability dropped due to no self-sealing tanks. These weren't added until late January 42. VF-6 should also have their speed and alitiude ratings reduced due to the fact that their aircraft had P&W R-1830-96 engines with a single stage, dual speed supercharger instead of the P&W R-1830-86 dual stage, dual speed supercharger. VF-2 should also have the F2A's durability reduced due to the lack of self-sealing tanks. They didn't begin transition to the F4F-3 until late January. VF-3 on Saratoga was the first to receive F4F-3 with these changes. I can go on and on. How nit-picky do you want to get?
You state that the USN carriers should be able to go one on one against a Japanese fleet CV in 1941 and early 42 yet you have no data to justify your opinion. On the other hand, there is at least one instance where the relative performance of the USS Enterprise and its airwing can be compared against land based Claudes and Nells and it comes up sorely lacking. This is the Marshall Islands raid on 1 February 1942, specifically the attack on Taroa. Wildcats managed to surprise 2 Claudes who were not aware of the attack but succeeded in only shooting down only 1 and damaging the other. 6 other Claudes managed to get airborne while being strafed by the Wildcats and engaged the SBDs. The SBDs shot down 2 Claudes but the Claudes shot down one Wildcat. 5 SBDs were lost. So much for the the Wildcats stellar performance. It should be noted that many VF-6 Wildcats only had installed seat armor in the days prior to the raid.
An even more important and potentially catastrophic event occurred a little while later. 5 Nells attacked the Enterprise. They were not intercepted before or after releasing their bombs. No hits were obtained but one bomb fell close enough to kill one sailor, injure 7 others and start a gasoline fire. One Nell, after releasing its bombs, pulled up sharply and attempted to dive into the deck of the Enterprise. It just missed but its wing cut a SBD in half on the flight deck.
Shortly thereafter 2 other Nells attacked, again dropping their bombs before interception. AA gunners managed to damage one of the Nells and the other was shot done by the CAP as they retired.
In addition Japanese planes damaged the Chester with a bomb and convinced her to suspend her bombardment and retire.
Not only was the VF-6's performance in the attack and on CAP of VF-6 less than stellar, the AA gunnery was also ineffective. Halsey's After Action Report specifically states "The inability of the 5" AA battery to knock down the formation of enemy twin-engine bombers ... is a matter of grave concern. ... AA Gunnery Practices [should] be scheduled when opportunity offers, with ship steaming at not less than 25 knots. If adequate safeguards can be introduced, ship should be required to make radical changes of course."
And this is against much inferior Claudes and Nells. I can only imagine what the result would have been had the Akagi or Kaga been in the vicinity.
Even at Coral Sea, the effectiveness of Lexington's AA fire was labeled by her CO as only "partially effective." We did see on 5/7/42 what 1 US CV could do to a IJN CVL but that is hardly representative, is it? Especially considering that 1/3 of Shoho's fighters were A5M Claudes and the 8 Zeros onboard were only temporary and had not operated from a carrier before..
But let's look at the next day's action. Here you have 2 US CVs facing off against 2 IJN CVs. We know the result. Lexington sunk, Yorktown moderately damaged. Shokaku badly damaged but Zuikaku unscathed. Both airgroups were decimated, Yorktown having only 4 operational fighters left at the end of the battle.
Only at Midway, do we see a decisive result and it can be argued that the result was as much due to Japanese poor tactical use of her air forces and lack of coordination as to the skill of the US airmen. There was also a large measure of "luck" involved, as there is in any battle.
Again, what is the basis for your opinion that the US would, more often than not, win a CV vs CV battle early in the war? Lundstrom and Frank certainly won't help you here. The fact remains that the historical record doesn't support the outcome of such an action. If anything, it presents the opposite potentiality.
Chez
