Yamamoto's Plan; The Execution

[bradfordkay]

I agree that had we had nearly any other commander on the ground than MacArthur, the PI situation might have been different. I say "might have" because of the fact that the fighters had been on patrol and were in the process of refueling when the attacks came. I have the same prejudice against MacArthur myself, but it seems to me that the mishandling of the fighters is to be placed on someone much lower on the command chart, as this was the territory of the FG ops officer. The planes should have been cycled in in smaller groups, starting much earlier, so that fewer would be on the ground at any one time.

As far as the bombers are concerned, I agree that Mac's staff is entirely to blame for that cockup...


Cid, no one is suggesting that we had anywhere near the same amount of intel on Dec 7 that we had for Midway. However, it was obvious that the balloon was going up soon, and there was significant intel indicating that it was real soon. Unfortunately, the "it can't happen here" crowd seemed to hold sway, when the people making note of the evidence were considered to be alarmists.

If you're creating a scenario with simultaneous landings at Johnson, Wake and Midway Islands in conjunction with the Pearl Harbor raid - well, that I can accept. Earlier in either this or the other thread, it appeared that you were arguing for a surprise invasion of the Hawaiian Islands. That is what I cannot believe would occur.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

I agree that had we had nearly any other commander on the ground than MacArthur, the PI situation might have been different. I say "might have" because of the fact that the fighters had been on patrol and were in the process of refueling when the attacks came. I have the same prejudice against MacArthur myself, but it seems to me that the mishandling of the fighters is to be placed on someone much lower on the command chart, as this was the territory of the FG ops officer. The planes should have been cycled in in smaller groups, starting much earlier, so that fewer would be on the ground at any one time.

As far as the bombers are concerned, I agree that Mac's staff is entirely to blame for that cockup...


Cid, no one is suggesting that we had anywhere near the same amount of intel on Dec 7 that we had for Midway. However, it was obvious that the balloon was going up soon, and there was significant intel indicating that it was real soon. Unfortunately, the "it can't happen here" crowd seemed to hold sway, when the people making note of the evidence were considered to be alarmists.

If you're creating a scenario with simultaneous landings at Johnson, Wake and Midway Islands in conjunction with the Pearl Harbor raid - well, that I can accept. Earlier in either this or the other thread, it appeared that you were arguing for a surprise invasion of the Hawaiian Islands. That is what I cannot believe would occur.

Johnston and Midway were pushing it. The initial Wake Island invasion was on the 11th because it took that long for the transports to trundle up there from Kwaj (450 nm). The distances to Midway and Johnston are about three times as far--resulting in invasions about the 19th. The KB didn't have the fuel to loiter in the vicinity of PH for two weeks.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: herwin
Johnston and Midway were pushing it. The initial Wake Island invasion was on the 11th because it took that long for the transports to trundle up there from Kwaj (450 nm). The distances to Midway and Johnston are about three times as far--resulting in invasions about the 19th. The KB didn't have the fuel to loiter in the vicinity of PH for two weeks.

Wouldn't that be more like two months if they wanted to keep the US from reinforcing to the point that any invasion would be futile? Johnston and Midway certainly couldn't support the kind of airpower needed to isolate the Eastern Hawaiian Islands..., and if the US can bring in additional air strength the Japs are on the losing end of a battle of attrition.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I don't know what to say about the attacks on Clark? I fear my prejudice against MacArthur may cause my judgement to be clouded. Nevertheless, I see indications his HQ went into shock, and I tend to believe Gen Brereton's account that he didn't have permission to act. I do think your term "mismanagement" applies quite well - regardless of which HQ - or both - is to blame?

Gonna shock the world and back Cid on this on. McArthur, Sutherland, and Brereton pulled off as fine an imitation of "The Three Stooges" as any Japanese planner could have wished and dreamed of. What these clowns did in the Philippines should have had them preceeding Short and Kimmel to Courts Martial. Fortunately for them, they were too far away to reach, and the "Battling Bastards of Bataan" earned them a reprieve by giving America a large scale "Alamo" to feel good about while everything else in SE Asia was falling around them.

Mac and Sutherland went on to totally screw up the Papaua Campaign in New Guinea before finally coming to grips with the realities of modern warfare..., and Brereton "Peter Principaled" his way up the ladder until he could play a key role in turning Market-Garden into a disaster by refusing to let his transport pilots fly two lifts on September 17th (In spite of the fact that many of them had done just that during Anvil a month before). He didn't want to "exhaust" his aircrews (who would be sleeping in beds that night while the Para's they dropped would get little or no sleep on the ground in Holland).

Didn't know that (about Market Garden - which I love to study and game). It is a heartbreaker - if your sympathies lie with the ground pounders. Trained by US Marines (at the Landing Party School) to be ultra light naval infantry, and used to being sent places to do things without a lot of help on the ground (usually without any help on the ground), my mind naturally imagines it is with the paras (to use a British term). We were unlucky - dropping right on top of Panzer Lehr -
but one might say that our vaunted SIGINT failed us here - although there was a little photographic evidence of vehicles that should not be present if it was the quiet place we thought it was (albiet only two of them). This was not an early war SIGINT failure either. I think it is possible to say that HQ can always screw you up - that in spite of the fact I mainly served in what amounts to HQ - and I know it is a lot harder to get it right before the fact than it is to Monday Morning Quarterback it afterward with 20-20 hindsight. Perhaps Brererton was not that great as an air staff leader?

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

I agree that had we had nearly any other commander on the ground than MacArthur, the PI situation might have been different. I say "might have" because of the fact that the fighters had been on patrol and were in the process of refueling when the attacks came. I have the same prejudice against MacArthur myself, but it seems to me that the mishandling of the fighters is to be placed on someone much lower on the command chart, as this was the territory of the FG ops officer. The planes should have been cycled in in smaller groups, starting much earlier, so that fewer would be on the ground at any one time.

As far as the bombers are concerned, I agree that Mac's staff is entirely to blame for that cockup...


Cid, no one is suggesting that we had anywhere near the same amount of intel on Dec 7 that we had for Midway. However, it was obvious that the balloon was going up soon, and there was significant intel indicating that it was real soon. Unfortunately, the "it can't happen here" crowd seemed to hold sway, when the people making note of the evidence were considered to be alarmists.

If you're creating a scenario with simultaneous landings at Johnson, Wake and Midway Islands in conjunction with the Pearl Harbor raid - well, that I can accept. Earlier in either this or the other thread, it appeared that you were arguing for a surprise invasion of the Hawaiian Islands. That is what I cannot believe would occur.

Well - the operational objective is to invade the Hawaiian islands - at least ostensably. [The actual operational objective is to insure the US has its full attention on the Central Pacific and gives no thought to fighting where Japan wants a rapid offensive to occur - the SRA. This objective should succeed wether or not Oahu is actually taken.] So I guess that the objective "invade Hawaii" is assumed to mean its invasion is a surprise. While I think the starting of the war on Dec 7 (or 8 if you prefer Japanese time as I do) may well be a surprise - and I have posted players may set the first turn surprise switch either way - I don't think that, when and if a game gets around to invading Oahu itself - sometime like February 1942 or later - it will be a surprise to anyone. I don't think the idea of an air raid on Pearl Harbor is misplaced: look at the Aleutians op: an air raid at Kodiak was the first move - to insure no interference with the landings at Attu and Kiska.
But I also don't think a player would be wrong to assign the carriers to cover one or two of the landing forces - and forego the raid. What I have been trying to say is that PLAYERS (or in the case of AIO AI) should decide the exact last day moves - and that the way these interact should decide how much surprise/warning exists. In no case is it an option to invade the lower Hawaiian Islands in force on the first day - since all three heavy (land) units are not yet in a position to do that.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

I agree that had we had nearly any other commander on the ground than MacArthur, the PI situation might have been different. I say "might have" because of the fact that the fighters had been on patrol and were in the process of refueling when the attacks came. I have the same prejudice against MacArthur myself, but it seems to me that the mishandling of the fighters is to be placed on someone much lower on the command chart, as this was the territory of the FG ops officer. The planes should have been cycled in in smaller groups, starting much earlier, so that fewer would be on the ground at any one time.

As far as the bombers are concerned, I agree that Mac's staff is entirely to blame for that cockup...


Cid, no one is suggesting that we had anywhere near the same amount of intel on Dec 7 that we had for Midway. However, it was obvious that the balloon was going up soon, and there was significant intel indicating that it was real soon. Unfortunately, the "it can't happen here" crowd seemed to hold sway, when the people making note of the evidence were considered to be alarmists.

If you're creating a scenario with simultaneous landings at Johnson, Wake and Midway Islands in conjunction with the Pearl Harbor raid - well, that I can accept. Earlier in either this or the other thread, it appeared that you were arguing for a surprise invasion of the Hawaiian Islands. That is what I cannot believe would occur.

Johnston and Midway were pushing it. The initial Wake Island invasion was on the 11th because it took that long for the transports to trundle up there from Kwaj (450 nm). The distances to Midway and Johnston are about three times as far--resulting in invasions about the 19th. The KB didn't have the fuel to loiter in the vicinity of PH for two weeks.

This is confused analysis - and not quite right. When you reach an objective is a matter of when you leave and what speed you move en route. In EOS and AIO (and presumably in OIO if there is one) we are NOT using the inadequate, tiny Naval Guard unit to assault Wake that really was used, nor the old ships that delivered it. You will see repeated references to fast ships in my posts above for Midway, Wake and Johnston - because these - and a fourth unit that is to size any airfield/port in the lower islands - are NOT on old, slow ships either. As for Kiddo Butai - it is not approaching from Japan - it does not have to refuel multiple times en route - and the tankers are not substantially depleted already (simulated by RHS by removing some of them from the game until 21 Dec in other scenarios - when they returned to Japan: since we cannot have tankers partly filled, we give you part of the tankers to simulate it). In EOS and AIO - you start with the tankers FULL - near Kwajalein - and the Carriers make their approach without refueling. Further - in RHS we reduced the ranges and increased the fuel requirements as appropriate - so you don't get the typical 250% greater than real fuel efficiency that was present when we began. The carriers and their escorts COULD be forward for two weeks - I bet they will not due to air casualties - and they also have the ability to refuel WITHOUT returning to Japan or Truk - not only at Kwajalein - but at Saipan - at Eneweitok - at Midway - at Johnston - or at sea from the replenishment group. Stocks exist at the friendly bases, and tankers are moving forward to the captured bases, so the players (commanders) have options. You will find that after 5 or 6 weeks - in a perfectly run game - some of the ships will be approaching operational damage levels that require withdrawal - or degraded operations. You will find that, after 3 weeks, you are seriously running out of fuel forward UNLESS you sent tankers forward with reserves from Japan about every day - and if you do that - you will find you are seriously depleting your fuel stocks there - just as you should be to do this sort of thing. But there is no reason to say the operation - much bigger than KB alone - cannot be sustained for longer than ship maintenance and battle damage will allow. These forces will be forward for at least twice two weeks (that is a month) before it is safe to withdraw (leaving the area under control of land based air) - and more likely twice that long (that is, two months). At that time an operational assessment should be done (that is, after the forward bases are secured and building up supplies and facilities) - and a timetable set for the major invasion operation - which will occur after most major units have repaired back up to full operational status. That will involve another operation of at least two weeks - and more likely a month - at sea. IJN is more able to do this (in terms of fuel stocks measured in time) than USN ever was - in any era: we always were willing to use a greater fraction of the fuel stocks than they need to for this op. [Being a major oil producer - the biggest in the world at the time - was one reason. But since Japan is siezing NEI - which has "more than enough oil for the needs of the empire" - the real problem is lasting the time it takes to get that working - not lasting the entire war on fuel stocks. Military operations are in some sense a function of finite resources - and nothing more than fuel is a limitation on distant naval operations. However, the fuel problem is not so severe it limits KB - or even KB and many other ships - to two weeks at sea. Fuel is not the limit - wear and tear will force suspension after 5-6 weeks - air casualties probably will force it well before that - and battle damage might at any time.]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: herwin
Johnston and Midway were pushing it. The initial Wake Island invasion was on the 11th because it took that long for the transports to trundle up there from Kwaj (450 nm). The distances to Midway and Johnston are about three times as far--resulting in invasions about the 19th. The KB didn't have the fuel to loiter in the vicinity of PH for two weeks.

Wouldn't that be more like two months if they wanted to keep the US from reinforcing to the point that any invasion would be futile? Johnston and Midway certainly couldn't support the kind of airpower needed to isolate the Eastern Hawaiian Islands..., and if the US can bring in additional air strength the Japs are on the losing end of a battle of attrition.

The point of Midway and Johnston - and they are critical - is that they are RECON bases - and points at which ships may replenish, rearm and make emergency repairs. The USAF definition of air power says that the MOST important function of air power is to gain INFORMATION about the enemy. Hawaii is out of range of recon or naval air search from the Mandates - and it is not safe to move invasion forces forward blind. Midway, Johnston and (in my view) at least one airfield forward of them are vital to having the INFORMATION required to conduct operations successfully. The Kiddo Butai insures TEMPORARY air control wherever it goes. I use that to insure we can move forward ships with supplies and engineers and land based air units. Only a few of these will operate from Midway, Wake, Johnston and possibly Marcus Island (briefly). Most will move to operate from at least two significant (and probably several secondary) strips in the lower islands. Taken together THOSE can "support the kind of airpower needed to isolate" Oahu. That THAT is the real weak link in the chain: a sufficiently aggressive Allied player can and should contest the taking (or holding if taken) of those bases. Leaving major forces on Oahu as spectators while the Japanese build up air power on the almost undefended lower islands is only a path to insure Oahu is either isolated or occupied. The BATTLE ought to be over the basses that can "support the kind of airpower needed" to control the Central Pacific. Once they have it - the Japanese can even ignore Oahu - although I would not - and IRL neither would they. IF the US tries to return (should I say WHEN the US tries to return) the problem is much worse - because Japan has not put all its military eggs in one basket (Oahu). Knocking out the airfields on any single island cannot have the same impact it did on Dec 7 1941 - because one island need not have all the air units. Here again is a strategy for the US: spread your air units out - and start sending supplies to those other islands - along with ground troops. Defending multiple points - all of them with steep mountains - is much smarter than just defending one. [While Hawaii is "jungle" in WITP - it isn't in RHS]

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
The point of Midway and Johnston - and they are critical - is that they are RECON bases - and points at which ships may replenish, rearm and make emergency repairs. The USAF definition of air power says that the MOST important function of air power is to gain INFORMATION about the enemy. Hawaii is out of range of recon or naval air search from the Mandates - and it is not safe to move invasion forces forward blind. Midway, Johnston and (in my view) at least one airfield forward of them are vital to having the INFORMATION required to conduct operations successfully. The Kiddo Butai insures TEMPORARY air control wherever it goes. I use that to insure we can move forward ships with supplies and engineers and land based air units. Only a few of these will operate from Midway, Wake, Johnston and possibly Marcus Island (briefly). Most will move to operate from at least two significant (and probably several secondary) strips in the lower islands. Taken together THOSE can "support the kind of airpower needed to isolate" Oahu. That THAT is the real weak link in the chain: a sufficiently aggressive Allied player can and should contest the taking (or holding if taken) of those bases. Leaving major forces on Oahu as spectators while the Japanese build up air power on the almost undefended lower islands is only a path to insure Oahu is either isolated or occupied. The BATTLE ought to be over the basses that can "support the kind of airpower needed" to control the Central Pacific. Once they have it - the Japanese can even ignore Oahu - although I would not - and IRL neither would they. IF the US tries to return (should I say WHEN the US tries to return) the problem is much worse - because Japan has not put all its military eggs in one basket (Oahu). Knocking out the airfields on any single island cannot have the same impact it did on Dec 7 1941 - because one island need not have all the air units. Here again is a strategy for the US: spread your air units out - and start sending supplies to those other islands - along with ground troops. Defending multiple points - all of them with steep mountains - is much smarter than just defending one. [While Hawaii is "jungle" in WITP - it isn't in RHS]

I'd agree with this in general, but just how soon can those "two other islands in the lower chain" be captured and brought into use? 4 weeks, 6 weeks, 8 weeks after Pearl? The obvious threat to Hawaii posed by the opening moves suggested is going to have every reinforcement available in the Continental US headed there in short order. First as "deckloads of fighters" shuttled into range by CV's to reclaim air superiority, then as every unit and piece of equipment deemed ready and necessary for the defense of the lower islands. Not to mention every B-17 and -24 anywhere in the states to keep those "forward bases" pounded down.

Even giving yourself the oil to run such a campaign and the units to make the landings, it's still going to be an awfully "iffy" process in real world terms. Especially if, as you say, the US spreads some of those incoming forces over the other Southern Islands.

[witpqs]

This might be a game-only issue (meaning as opposed to IRL), but Pearl Harbor has only about 50,000 supplies to start with and will require big shipments very quickly under that sort of load.

[JWE]

Yo Mikey, and Brother Brad,

OK, here’s what we are a gonna do:

Surprise off (tested it twice, doesn’t make much difference in the PI; you are on the money though, Mac & Brereton both bite dead bears, and shoulda been shot).

The Biggie clears from Japan; maybe a Div and a half (with supports). I’m going with Harry’s ancillary ops, to Midway & Johnson, clearing from the mandates.

7th USA and 1st & 2nd MarDiv are available as immediates. Sara up and clearing soundings on about 12/4 (or so). Open orders, and TF loading on turn 1.

Problem is JP transport hulls. My scenarios have way fewer capable APs and AKs than stock or CHS. I’ll have to scrape up an odd 2-300,000 tons or so, to make this work. Should be ok, since if it works, they go back to smiling & dialing, if it doesn’t, war ends in ’43 or ’44.

Anyhow, looks like a good game setup. Works very well in CHS. It will take a week or two to get to closure, but I’ll give a report.

[JWE]

Having a real hard time finding the large fast transports necessary for this kind of op. I'm gonna have to revamp some PI and Malaysian TFs to make this work. Poopie, JP had squat for backup hulls. Oh well, what ya gonna do?

[DuckofTindalos]

Looking forward to hearing how this goes, John.

[el cid again]

In RHS half the AKs (and a number of other transports) are not available - because we cannot consume more than about half the resources we should consume. So we run the model on 100% oil, 50% resources, and you get only half as much - and move only half as much - but produce 100% of the HI points. Anyway - getting shis is harder in RHS - due to the much reduced ship count. Also we don't have as high a cargo rating in many cases, and we increased fuel requirements in most cases. But it is actually not necessary to commit anything like all of Japan's shipping - there are many idle ships in the beginning - before there are resources and oil captured needing to be moved.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
The point of Midway and Johnston - and they are critical - is that they are RECON bases - and points at which ships may replenish, rearm and make emergency repairs. The USAF definition of air power says that the MOST important function of air power is to gain INFORMATION about the enemy. Hawaii is out of range of recon or naval air search from the Mandates - and it is not safe to move invasion forces forward blind. Midway, Johnston and (in my view) at least one airfield forward of them are vital to having the INFORMATION required to conduct operations successfully. The Kiddo Butai insures TEMPORARY air control wherever it goes. I use that to insure we can move forward ships with supplies and engineers and land based air units. Only a few of these will operate from Midway, Wake, Johnston and possibly Marcus Island (briefly). Most will move to operate from at least two significant (and probably several secondary) strips in the lower islands. Taken together THOSE can "support the kind of airpower needed to isolate" Oahu. That THAT is the real weak link in the chain: a sufficiently aggressive Allied player can and should contest the taking (or holding if taken) of those bases. Leaving major forces on Oahu as spectators while the Japanese build up air power on the almost undefended lower islands is only a path to insure Oahu is either isolated or occupied. The BATTLE ought to be over the basses that can "support the kind of airpower needed" to control the Central Pacific. Once they have it - the Japanese can even ignore Oahu - although I would not - and IRL neither would they. IF the US tries to return (should I say WHEN the US tries to return) the problem is much worse - because Japan has not put all its military eggs in one basket (Oahu). Knocking out the airfields on any single island cannot have the same impact it did on Dec 7 1941 - because one island need not have all the air units. Here again is a strategy for the US: spread your air units out - and start sending supplies to those other islands - along with ground troops. Defending multiple points - all of them with steep mountains - is much smarter than just defending one. [While Hawaii is "jungle" in WITP - it isn't in RHS]

I'd agree with this in general, but just how soon can those "two other islands in the lower chain" be captured and brought into use? 4 weeks, 6 weeks, 8 weeks after Pearl? The obvious threat to Hawaii posed by the opening moves suggested is going to have every reinforcement available in the Continental US headed there in short order. First as "deckloads of fighters" shuttled into range by CV's to reclaim air superiority, then as every unit and piece of equipment deemed ready and necessary for the defense of the lower islands. Not to mention every B-17 and -24 anywhere in the states to keep those "forward bases" pounded down.

Even giving yourself the oil to run such a campaign and the units to make the landings, it's still going to be an awfully "iffy" process in real world terms. Especially if, as you say, the US spreads some of those incoming forces over the other Southern Islands.

I would not wait - and I never do. EITHER I risk an up front op - or I go in 48 to 96 hours later. Never very far. The build up takes about a month - but it is fast enough it isn't safe to try to reinforce. Every week I take another island.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Looking forward to hearing how this goes, John.

I am writing a scenario, based on CHS 2.08, that has an interesting opening day; a 3 way choice. Maj. Faustini is in the middle of it, and the guys at Pendleton are pretty excited.

The choice is 1) historical hit on PH, rest of the ops as irl 2) the JWE special; nothin touchin HI, major revamp on Malaysian ops, with KB running South flank and striking Singapore (Mersing hit day 1, Palembang in play, week 1), and 3) the HI invasion option, in conjunction with the PH hit; compels reduced ops in PI to get the transport capability.

Game begins Dec. 6. Japanese player chooses and makes ancillary moves. Allied player has an open turn, but no clue. Next turn is Dec. 7. !!!! If the Japanese player chooses option 3), the Allied player gets some nice intel. If he's smart, he'll figure it out and make proper dispositions.

Different reinforcement sets become available depending on who does what to whom. Almost done, we're waitin for Quintan to get back from %$@# because he must, simply must, play the Japs on this one: We talked Dr. Banner from Carlisle into being Ernie King, and Parillo signed up one of his H-net colleagues to be king of production. I will be the moderator and CPX exec.

This one is getting some real buz. It's almost old home week, for some of us. I'm breaking our rule and will open this one up to the outside, sorta. AARs with one week lag on ops. All initial ops orders, and subsequent warning and action orders (day 1, 2 and 3) shall be adhered to by all players. Afterwards, Japan will incur calculated delays in shifting operational imperitives. Allied delays will be substantially less.

Gonna be a good one. Should start shooting mid Sept (assuming Jeremy gets home on sched). Coming soon to an AAR forum near you. Ciao.

[bradfordkay]

It's going to be fun watching this one. Thanks for the info, John.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

It's going to be fun watching this one. Thanks for the info, John.

Check out the Day-1 Scenarios thread. Lots of info on who might have done what to whom, when and if ... Some stuff on why the HI assault was an opium dream; basis for the "A-Day, 3-Way".

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: JWE
The choice is 1) historical hit on PH, rest of the ops as irl 2) the JWE special; nothin touchin HI, major revamp on Malaysian ops, with KB running South flank and striking Singapore (Mersing hit day 1, Palembang in play, week 1), and 3) the HI invasion option, in conjunction with the PH hit; compels reduced ops in PI to get the transport capability.

Wouldn't Kido Butai have a lot of trouble staying un-spotted while trying to get into position to make an overnight speed run and hit Singapore? Not to mention getting the troop convoy in position to land at Mersing on the 7th? I assume the Allies are getting "full readiness and a couple of days of movement" as well...., do they have the option to "strike first"?

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE
The choice is 1) historical hit on PH, rest of the ops as irl 2) the JWE special; nothin touchin HI, major revamp on Malaysian ops, with KB running South flank and striking Singapore (Mersing hit day 1, Palembang in play, week 1), and 3) the HI invasion option, in conjunction with the PH hit; compels reduced ops in PI to get the transport capability.

Wouldn't Kido Butai have a lot of trouble staying un-spotted while trying to get into position to make an overnight speed run and hit Singapore? Not to mention getting the troop convoy in position to land at Mersing on the 7th? I assume the Allies are getting "full readiness and a couple of days of movement" as well...., do they have the option to "strike first"?

Oh my goodness, this is almost giving up the baguette. KB might not likely open the overcoat. I'm assuming, if the hard Maylay op is the choice, that the KB will clear from either the home islands or Taiwan; full sigsec. If this is the option, surprise is on.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: JWE
Oh my goodness, this is almost giving up the baguette. KB might not likely open the overcoat. I'm assuming, if the hard Maylay op is the choice, that the KB will clear from either the home islands or Taiwan; full sigsec. If this is the option, surprise is on.

Huh? Is this English? You lost me if it is. I was just trying to point out that Kido Butai was "lost" to Allied Intelligence before the PH Operation..., a situation that could hardly apply if it was operating off the China Coast. And any move towards the South would definately trip alarms all over the SRA.

Also, once any Invasion Convoy kept going South past Singora all chances of "masking it's purpose" are gone. Every Allied unit in the Far East would be on "full alert" and moving to man it's "invasion imminant" locations. It's hard to see how "suprise is on" could apply...