Could Germany have defeated the USSR?

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: sveint

Invariably in these discussions Germany is allowed to correct mistakes... while the Soviets are not. If the Soviets are allowed to do things better, just like Germany, there is absolutely no way Germany could have won. Just imagine properly deployed Soviet forced during the first few months of the war.

That is a good point-the Soviets could have done much better operationally. Their strategy did seem to fit their abilities though.

On the other hand, regarding the most critical week point in Germany's planning-its economy-Russia did a stupendous job. There is not much more that Russia could have done to improve its actual performance economy wise. Whereas Germany could have performed much better very easily, it did not. This makes it easier to ask about what ifs regarding Germany-although most what ifs center around moving one unit this way and another that way. These are the things that would have been easily countered-and thus are rather academic in the big picture.

[ezzler]

[quote]ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro


[quote]ORIGINAL: ezz

Come on now. If Germany had shortages of strategic materials in 1939, the war would have been over much, much sooner than it was. Germany had in fact created huge stocks of strategic materials which they may fall short of if cut off by blockade. Critical materials did not run short until well into 1944. This resulted in weaker chargers being built into AA rounds and portions of a/c being made of substandard material.

{ why didn't Germany institute the 72 hour work week as did the UK.

This is very true. But partly it was the lack of resources in 1938/9 that had led German factories to shedding their skilled workers. They weren't ready because the Nazi boom was 36-38 then lack of foreign currency prevented imports and caused shortages.
Orders to the armies ammunition suppliers were cut in 1939, much to the consternation of the business who had to cut production and shed skilled staff. Mortar production ceased altogether in spring 1939. Artillery shells had to be produced without copper driving bands due to the horrendous copper shortage. Building steel was so restricted that by 1940, 300 infantry battalions were under canvas without garages or store rooms. In 1938 there was a plan to produce 61,000 mg34's. The steel reduction of 1939 reduced this order to 13,000.
In November 1938 the armies steel ration was cut from 530,000 to 300,000 tons. The army went into shock . They were planning for a war in 1941-42 and had big plans.The shock was absolubte when Hitler said it would be 1939. Hitler's speeches of 1939 simply illustrate the point. He argues for war now. War while Germany is ahead in arms and has better quality new equipment. In even one year their lead would be lost. They could not outproduce Britain and France.

It was Germany's foreign exchange reserves that was killing the plans. They didn't have any. They had to export. So they had to ship OUT the raw materials they needed for themselves. In April 1939 ammunition production was cut to its lowest level since before the existence of the new army was announced. The ordnance board reported enough ammunition for only 14 days hard fighting.{this was made up in oct'39 when it became clear war was coming soon.}But Germany could not expand any further its already staggering military production.
As others have pointed out they hadn't enough trucks. They hadn't the steel to spare to make more. If they had have had they wouldn't have had the rubber tyres to put on them or the fuel to operate them.
The Luftwaffe's share of copper in Jan 1939 was cut in half. This was not enough for plan 11, the building of 8,300 aircraft demanded by 1942. In summer '39 the copper ration was cut to just 20%.
German production was boom and bust. That is why it was like it was. 1939 was a big big bust. The stockpiles came from Russia through trade and France through conquest.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: ezz




This is very true. But partly it was the lack of resources in 1938/9 that had led German factories to shedding their skilled workers. They weren't ready because the Nazi boom was 36-38 then lack of foreign currency prevented imports and caused shortages.
Orders to the armies ammunition suppliers were cut in 1939, much to the consternation of the business who had to cut production and shed skilled staff. Mortar production ceased altogether in spring 1939. Artillery shells had to be produced without copper driving bands due to the horrendous copper shortage. Building steel was so restricted that by 1940, 300 infantry battalions were under canvas without garages or store rooms. In 1938 there was a plan to produce 61,000 mg34's. The steel reduction of 1939 reduced this order to 13,000.
In November 1938 the armies steel ration was cut from 530,000 to 300,000 tons. The army went into shock . They were planning for a war in 1941-42 and had big plans.The shock was absolubte when Hitler said it would be 1939. Hitler's speeches of 1939 simply illustrate the point. He argues for war now. War while Germany is ahead in arms and has better quality new equipment. In even one year their lead would be lost. They could not outproduce Britain and France.

It was Germany's foreign exchange reserves that was killing the plans. They didn't have any. They had to export. So they had to ship OUT the raw materials they needed for themselves. In April 1939 ammunition production was cut to its lowest level since before the existence of the new army was announced. The ordnance board reported enough ammunition for only 14 days hard fighting.{this was made up in oct'39 when it became clear war was coming soon.}But Germany could not expand any further its already staggering military production.
As others have pointed out they hadn't enough trucks. They hadn't the steel to spare to make more. If they had have had they wouldn't have had the rubber tyres to put on them or the fuel to operate them.
The Luftwaffe's share of copper in Jan 1939 was cut in half. This was not enough for plan 11, the building of 8,300 aircraft demanded by 1942. In summer '39 the copper ration was cut to just 20%.
German production was boom and bust. That is why it was like it was. 1939 was a big big bust. The stockpiles came from Russia through trade and France through conquest.

Ezz

You have pointed out many important parts of the difficulties that Germany had in '39. I am aware of many of these problems. The General of the Artillery was pushing for solutions in '38-he pointed out that Germany's steel production was far less than it was during WW1. The stocks of shell were no where near adequate for a major war. The shortage of copper was one of those little things that rippled throughout production planning. That was the primary justification for the LW not receiving 100% of aluminum production. There were many and varied challenges to getting everything into high gear. The demands for steel were overwhelming. The plans for synthetic fuel production required huge amounts of steel. These plans had to be severely curtailed as soon as war broke out.

I did not mean to imply that Germany could have begun building 1500 tanks and 4000 planes a month in 1939. There are some areas of production that may have had to stagnate for a while until supplies improves-or alternatives were found. However, for many primary machines of war, there was more than enough on hand for some rather large increases in production. There was no reason for a/c production to languish the way it did for the first 3 years of the war-a 20% increase could have been effected with the longer work week.

The chronic problem was a shortage of labor. Labor equals man hours worked-a 72 hour work week would have addressed that problem to a large degree. As demand for aluminum increased, so would the supply-same for steel and many other basic requirements. I am also aware that adding workers in various segments was not as easy as putting out "help wanted" signs-there were issues with trade unions which had to be addressed also.

It seems likely that ,in spite of the various economic difficulties that Germany faced, production could have been expanded much more rapidly than what actually occurred. The first step in that direction should have been getting the most out of the labor force.

[sullafelix]

As has been stated Soviet production was as good as it could get. What happens if the uboats were more effective and lend-lease was cut down. Soviet production stays the same but Germany gears up at the same time as Great britain and her 1944 production figures come in 1942. Also I think we have leaned to far to the Soviets could do it alone and didn't need the Western allies help. What would have happened at Kursk if the invasion of Sicily did not take place then? What would have happened in 1944 if Normandy had to be postponed?
 
While I tend to agree an out an out victory for the Germans was unlikely. I do believe that a correctly done defensive war in the east could have bled the Soviets so bad that a negotiated peace comes into play. With the opening of the Soviet archives we now know how close to the bottom of the barrel the Soviets were in 1945.

[Helpless]

What happens if the uboats were more effective and lend-lease was cut down

Nothing special, most of lend lease went through Pacific.

[ezzler]

Germany's fastest increase in production came in feb - june 1940. The increases in arms productions doubled. That was on top of the increases already made, the U-Boat production, the battleships and the massive new docks to house them. Hitler was warned that if ammo production continued at that pace there would be no more metals left. It was go for broke in 1940. There wasn't anything left. So the arms increases have to be measured from mid 1940 and if an attack is planned for 1 year later in the USSR then there really is no chance of increasing the army. Germany performed spectacular increases in production from 1940 onwards when it received supplies of raw materials and finished product from Russia and the occupied territories.
The 72 hour week question is a good one. I'm not sure that every factory was not on triple time.

A good discussion on the demobilisation after the fall of France here http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum ... 00033.html

As for the comment elsewhere that the USSR alone could beat the Axis.. Without 2/3 of its trucks 90% of locomotives and rolling stock ,10,000 aircraft,enough food to feed a 12,000,000 man army for the duration of the war.
The USSR may well have won, but no means certain.

[06 Maestro]

Ezz-thanks for the link-I'll keep that one.

I did not read that entire discussion, so this may have been touched on. Hitlers order for production priority to be switched to the LW requirements actually was made. However, from statements from LW generals and Goering, nothing was actually given to them. LW production continued to suffer from a lack of labor and also from manufacturing space.

A/c production increased only about 10% from 1940 to '41-not very impressive at all. Compared to what the British did, it is almost comical.

It may not be entirely fair to speak of low production increases for items which were just entering production; such as Mk4 tanks. However, there were a large number items which had been under production for a couple of years or more-these things could have been increased.

The truth to the effects of the 72 hour work week is evident in the production increases which occurred in army factories commencing in Jan of '43 and then again, even more strikingly, in April of '43 with the LW factories initiating the long work week. The numbers of actual production are not just statistics, but hard evidence of the success of the longer work week.

I fully realize that the massive outputs attained later in the war could not have been achieved until the importation of foreign labor was taken seriously.

In my original scenario I only pointed to the affects of having the 20% boost until Dec. '41. The effects of that order could have actually been extended to April of 1943. Not even considering the early opening of new factories this would have (theoretically) resulted in the production of approximatively 9,000 more a/c-that's a whole lot of a/c. Exactly how this would have affected front line strength would involve much speculation. None the less, I think it is safe to say that this would not have been a good thing for the Allies.

[06 Maestro]

Ezz-

That really is a good discussion you linked to. It touches on what we are talking about here. The low amount of resources alloted to the war effort, in the early years, is quite telling. Regardless of actual production increases, 20% more is 20% more.[;)]

[Randomizer]

I would submit that the issues of intense German labour usage (or lack thereof) also relates to Nazi party political dogma that was entirely inseperable from the war effort.  There was an excellent reason why the NSDAP was the National Socialist German Workers Party and why develpments like the subsidized Volkswagon automobile and prewar Strength through Joy marine cruises were so important to the Party's self image.  Advent of war had cancelled these benefits that were aimed specifically at the German worker so an early total war mobilization scheme that demanded more work for fewer perks could have been seen as tacit admission that the Nazi ideal worker's paradise had become unattainable, at least in the near term.  I suspect that this played a role in the late total war mobilization of the Nazi state.
 
The Nazis themselves sowed the seeds of their own destruction and while Hitler might have written the Party dogma, hundreds of thousands (millions?) of party hacks and functionaries perpetuated it long past the point where it might have actually served the state in the cause of victory.
 
On another note, before one goes off narrating the wartime production situation as related by the self-serving Albert Speer, have a read of The Good Nazi by Dan van der Vat.  It's food for thought.
 
Ezz has written some very excellent insights into this discussion.  Thanks.
 
Best Regards

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: Randomizer

On another note, before one goes off narrating the wartime production situation as related by the self-serving Albert Speer, have a read of The Good Nazi by Dan van der Vat.  It's food for thought.
Best Regards

Food for thougt? In what way? Does it relate to how Germany might have won the war? No it does not. It is more unfounded, unproven allegations by a man with a one track mind- on a subject which has nothing to do with this thread.

A. Speer could not be convicted (of genocide) in a very hostle tribunal so I see no reason to condem him brcause some flake is rying to make a name for himself (alng with the cash). Speer was a genius and a good man caught up in terrible times. Even if he was not a good man, I would still read his books-as I'm not into book burning to assuage my ego. I'm after information, what are you after?

[sullafelix]

Half of Lend Lease material came through Pacific ports in Soviet ships. So a drop in the Artic convoys could have made a large impact.
 
These figures are for armored vehicle and aircraft production in 1940 and 1944. Please remember the effect bombing had on the 1944 figures and also the loss of Soviet territory and therefore material during the same.
 
amored vehicle 1940
 
German - 1,788
 
Soviet - 2,625
 
1944
 
German - 18,956
 
Soviet - 28,159
 
 
Aircraft 1940
 
German - 7,829
 
Soviet - 10,565

 
Aircraft 1944
 
German - 35,076
 
Soviet - 40,300
 
 
 
 
 

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: sveint

Invariably in these discussions Germany is allowed to correct mistakes... while the Soviets are not. If the Soviets are allowed to do things better, just like Germany, there is absolutely no way Germany could have won. Just imagine properly deployed Soviet forced during the first few months of the war.

The player of either side, in most cases, can do better, or should do better whichever side he plays. Certainly one could do better as the USSR, but the greater challenge to the player is usually to the side that lost, and so asking whether it's possible is always in order; just like that same question was asked for the japanese for the WITP game (War in the Pacific). It's also far more obvious that you did better than history, if you won as the side that lost, hence you have accomplished something. When playing the USSR, it's much more vague. What, if you take Berlin in '44 that's better? Sure it is, but when did Kiev get retaken, and so on. Besides, speed isn't necessarily indicative of better play, as you might double the losses of the USSR and still take objectives quicker.

[GaryChildress]

ORIGINAL: sulla05

Half of Lend Lease material came through Pacific ports in Soviet ships. So a drop in the Artic convoys could have made a large impact.

These figures are for armored vehicle and aircraft production in 1940 and 1944. Please remember the effect bombing had on the 1944 figures and also the loss of Soviet territory and therefore material during the same.

amored vehicle 1940

German - 1,788

Soviet - 2,625

1944

German - 18,956

Soviet - 28,159


Aircraft 1940

German - 7,829

Soviet - 10,565


Aircraft 1944

German - 35,076

Soviet - 40,300

Impressive numbers for Germany, although they would have been partially divided between two fronts, whereas the Soviets could throw almost everything into their Western front.

Also as far as U-boats being more effective in the Lend Lease battle, how could U-boats have been more effective? Didn't Germany pretty much do everything it could with U-boats? What was left to do better? [&:]

[Cmdrcain]

ORIGINAL: Charles_22


I personally don't believe that. I think war with germany, for the USA, was inevitable. Within 2 months, germany would have had a DoW from them if germany didn't DoW on them first. The USA couold get away with neutrality until they were attacked, but once they were attacked, there was no reason to sit back and let europe stay nazi, perhaps even lose England, or the other alternative was all of europe (except england perhaps) becoming Red. Japan and germany being allies didn't help the USA staying neutral with germany very likely either. The fact that the USA was already helping england to a considerable degree before 12/7/41, put them technically at war with germany anyway, but each side kept ignoring the uboat sinkings and help the british were getting. If the USA had really stayed neutral, then perhaps Hitler wouldn't had declared war. The USA was doing all it could to get involved in the european war and still be looked at by some as neutral. I'm not sure if Hitler wanted to show the japanese friendship by honoring their pact as more of a motivation than the USA getting him angry. That's why I say the USA would had declared war pretty soon, because they were practically at war with germany as it was anyway. Even if Japan didn't attack, germany might had still resorted to a DoW with the USA at some point, simply because they weren't behaving very neutral and if time progressed it would probably only got worse. I guess if Japan didn't attack, maybe Hitler was waiting on reports that the USA had actually put armies in england before he would DoW.

Oh eventually Germany and USA would have been at war, but the discussion is if Germany could have beaten USSR, at time of Pearl Harbor the anger etc of that time was on Japan... which is whay at that time the rage etc of public and congress likely would NOT have been favorable for roosvelt to ask for a DoW vs germany.

It is THAT action by Hitler that Gave roosvelt his ability to do a EUROPE FIRST.

Otherwise it would been a Japan first and only until Germany provoked a DoW like a german sub torping a ship.

The Imminent effect of germanys DoW was to allow US Ships to take full action all way to britain... send massive supplies to britain...start sending troops to Britain and etc..

Without a German DoW I doubt roosvelt could have gotten a DoW vs Germany...not in face of west coast fears, not in face of public anger vs japan, etc.

We can go over this a great deal but we don't really know...

But my view is that without German DoW, roosvelt would have had to concentrate on Japan at least for up to a year...or until Germany acted vs US... that could also have curtailed supplies to USSR, sides britain... given Germany time to concentrate on USSR...
Germany could have brought more troops to USSR since without Britain alone able to re-invade... and likely a reduction in supplies to britain/USSR,
Germany would not have had to keep as many troops in west...

Once USA started sending troops and air fleets to britain, germany HAD to keep troops in West


The fact is germanys DoW did nothing for germany, japan did not aid germany in any way...
it only gave roosvelt his opening to put Japan on back burner... especially as
german subs started full out attks on atlantic and gulf shipping and even some shelling of east coast.

Sorry, but Germanys DoW was shooting self in foot... even if USA had eventually declared on germany, they would have had months of use of extra troops from west areas...

That could have tipped balance vis a vis USSR

And also if roosvelt had to do a japan first and couldn't get a DoW vs germany
USSR if had more setbacks could have made a peace... and Germany then returned efforts vs britain... instead of a D-Day for allies there could been a D-Day for germany and Britain invaded...US troops captured... and USA facing a germany across the ocean...getting smaller by germanys rocketry advances..

Nope, that DoW by hitler was the stupidest thing germany could do and ensured germany was not going beat USSR...

[Cmdrcain]

ORIGINAL: sulla05

Well nothing I have writen is something that I'm just pulling out of my hat. They were all suggestions that were in the minds of the major players at the time or was brought up to them verbally or in memo form.

This is also a gaming forum and not a history one. If Gary Grigsby's new game was advertised as " you can play the Germans but you will lose no matter what you do ". I don't think it will get many buyers. I and we have just brought up historical possibilities that luckily did not happen.

My honest military opinion is if Manstein was given a free hand in 1943, and there was a lot of talking with people trying to make him the army head at that time, he could have bled the Soviets dry and forced a separate peace.

Brings up Q if grigsbys game has a No USA entry scenario so Ussr has say supply reduced all war... hummm

[Randomizer]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

ORIGINAL: Randomizer

On another note, before one goes off narrating the wartime production situation as related by the self-serving Albert Speer, have a read of The Good Nazi by Dan van der Vat.  It's food for thought.
Best Regards

Food for thougt? In what way? Does it relate to how Germany might have won the war? No it does not. It is more unfounded, unproven allegations by a man with a one track mind- on a subject which has nothing to do with this thread.

A. Speer could not be convicted (of genocide) in a very hostle tribunal so I see no reason to condem him brcause some flake is rying to make a name for himself (alng with the cash). Speer was a genius and a good man caught up in terrible times. Even if he was not a good man, I would still read his books-as I'm not into book burning to assuage my ego. I'm after information, what are you after?

Sounds more like you are only after information that agrees with your established world view.

Actually I have read and own copies of all Speer's books and even an electronic copy of the interview he gave to Playboy magazine way back when. Many take Speer's word in all things as absolute gospel, I'm a bit more skeptical and tend to think that he tends to tell his audience whatever he believes they wish to hear. As one so close to the events it would be a miracle if his accounts were not biased in his own favour and I do not believe in miracles. Van der Vat's book is pretty well supported by documentery evidence, much of it from the Nazi archieves sent to America post war and so not available to Speer. Biased as well perhaps but another source of data that should not be discarded merely because you don't happen to like the message.

Speer's reliability as an eyewitness regarding German wartime production is relevant here since he is generally used as primary source material for war production from mid-war to the end. I do not say don't use him, merely to use his accounts with caution.

[GaryChildress]

ORIGINAL: Cmdrcain

ORIGINAL: sulla05

Well nothing I have writen is something that I'm just pulling out of my hat. They were all suggestions that were in the minds of the major players at the time or was brought up to them verbally or in memo form.

This is also a gaming forum and not a history one. If Gary Grigsby's new game was advertised as " you can play the Germans but you will lose no matter what you do ". I don't think it will get many buyers. I and we have just brought up historical possibilities that luckily did not happen.

My honest military opinion is if Manstein was given a free hand in 1943, and there was a lot of talking with people trying to make him the army head at that time, he could have bled the Soviets dry and forced a separate peace.

Brings up Q if grigsbys game has a No USA entry scenario so Ussr has say supply reduced all war... hummm

I think the game is pretty well strapped with historical conditions. No USA entry is probably outside the scope of the game. Basically the question becomes, could Germany have defeated the USSR given existing historical constants. I don't think giving a 72 hour work week in '41 to the Germans is even in the scope of the game. Things like limited production and having to fight on two fronts are pretty much a given. Could Germany have defeated the USSR given those constraints?

My inclination is "no". Therefore a German player should not be capable of total victory in the game. The question becomes what should constitute victory for the German player. I think giving an instant victory objective like taking Moscow in '41 and maybe the oil fields in the Caucasus would make the game interesting and give the players something to desperately fight over. Simply fighting over who gets the most victory points in the end sort of seems tame to me.

[Helpless]

Half of Lend Lease material came through Pacific ports in Soviet ships. So a drop in the Artic convoys could have made a large impact.

I don't see the logic here, the loss of Arctic convoys (22.6%) would have some impact, but not very large comparing to other routes - Pacific (47.1%) or Iran (23.8%)

[wosung]

Interesting discussion.

Could Germany have defeated the USSR?
Which role did the Wallies played? Why did Hitler declared war on the USA?
What about the victory conditions for War in the East?

Retrospectively it sounds funny, but Wehrmacht planners and NS elite thought the Campagn in the West to be the really hard campaign, NOT the one against Russia or a war against the USA.

All military planning, the hassle about Mansteins Sichelschnitt, and the postphoning of the starting date of Fall Gelb show how nervous high command and political leadership were. Would it be a repetition of WW1?

On the other side Wehrmacht planners and NS elite planned/started Operation Barbarossa in a highly optimistic mood and there was no deeper discussion or planning inside the inner circle of the regime before Hitler declared war on the USA.

In both cases (USSR/USA) the NS inner circle ignored warnings from German technocrats, who first hand knew about production capabilities and technological standards of the future enemy. In spring 1941, an official German airforce delegation was shown around in USSR aircraft industry by aircraft desiger Mikoyan, the brother of People’s Commisssioner of Trade. Deeply impressed they came home, but nobody believed them.

Some the most important decisions in WW2, like the German DOW against USSR and USA, or the Japanese DOW against the Wallies were based on a narrow racist world view and on mainly operational considerations. For Axis leaders jewish bolshewik Untermenschen, American jewish plutocrats and rotten white colonial powers weren’t able to stand superior will, spirit and blood nor to produce decent weapons. To put it bluntly: They just didn’t take USSR and Russia serious. For the NS/Wehrmacht elite the only tough enemy were the Brits, (includinge white CW states), somehow aryan, the founders of the largest colonial empire and a tough opposition in WW1.

BTW: Same racist world view resulted in moderate Nazi occupation regimes in Western and Nothern Europe, (administered mostly by the Wehrmacht), but murderous occupation regimes in Eastern Europe (administered by NS ideologues, with the help of Wehrmacht). Differences in occupation policy resulted from racist hirarchy and were NOT a sign of ideological agility. Thus any retrospective contemplation about softer occupation policies misses the core of Nazi-Germany (and Late Imperial Japan). Plus any late war experiments to create puppet regimes immediatly were made hollow by acts of brutality, commited in victorious times.

Could Germany have defeated the USSR?

The plan for Barbarossa was to destroy the Communist Regime in 8 weeks of intense fighting by smashing the Red Army. Apart from some tactical refinement, it was the same operational technique, like in Poland, Norway, the Benelux-countries and France. As before, logistically and economically it was do or die: transport columns were sent directly behind the fast divisions into Russia, before the main body of Wehrmacht infantry divisions. Before Barbarossa even started, armament industry had been re-focussed towards navy and airforce for a gigantomaniac maritime strategy against the Wallies.

After eight weeks the Communist Regime was still fighting and Wehrmacht started to improvise for the next four years. After the first winter German losses of men and materiel were already so high that for the second summer offensive Wehrmacht wasn’t able anymore for a broad offensive, like in 1941. Now it only came down to one offensive thrust in the South, which even had to be covered by weak Italian, Romanian and Hungarian armies. Nevertheless the 1942 offensive started as a success because Stalin and Stavka concentrated their main forces around Moskow.

That the Wehrmacht managed to keep on fighing until 1945 arguably had four reasons:
1. Superior Auftragtaktik and operational abilities, especially, when maneuver was involved.
2. German soldiers fear of asian hordes reaching the motherland.
3. The slow evolution of a post-blitzkrieg concept against infantry antitank defense backed up by armor.
4. German ability to get ahead in the armor technology race in 1943, producing the Tiger and the even faster and better gunned Panther (75 mm KwK extra-long).

But in Summer 1941 in Russia the German blitzkrieg concept failed. Arguably this concept worked best/only in Western Europe, with its good, compatible infrastructure and were the capitals are in reach of a high speed offensive, before logistics and mechanical break downs stop the panzer division for at least a month.

And arguably, the answer for the question if Germany could have defeated the USSR (or, if Japan could have defeated the USA, or China) might lie not so much in the field of military but in the field of organization and politics. Russian stubborness was the will of the regime to fight on and its ability to organize it’s people in a militarily meaningful way.

Arguably, the closest the USSR came to its downfall was not in Nov/Dec 1941 at the gates of Moscow, but in June 1941, when, for a brief moment, Stalin and thus the Stalinist leadership was absent, when he flet the Cremlin to his datcha in disbelieve for the, in terms of Realpolitik, senseless German attack, awaiting to be catched and shot by the Politbureau.

But such a political impact can not be modelled in a game.

As for victory conditions:
It should be easier to model them, than in WitP, because the Pacific war was much more one-sided, than the Russo-German war

As for other critical aspects of the new Grisby game:

1. Logistics, for sure
2. The interface: Managing division-sized pieces, without being a total clickfest.
3. Last not least an AI, which isn’t overburdened by managing it’s division sized army (again: see the detailed and beautiful WitP), but is also capable of simulating historical blunders, like Stalin’s, and later Hitler’s no retreat orders.

Regards

[sullafelix]

What I meant by my uboat statement was for Germany to not even worry about a surface navy. I never understood why the Germans even bothered with a surface fleet with the huge lead that Britain had. Think how many uboats you could make out of the Bismarck and Tirpitz. I'm saying that with a bit of tongue in cheek but you get my drift.
 
As far as figures go the one thing that the Germans loved was to keep paperwork and figures. I for one would not trust any figures from the Soviet Union.
 
The figure argument could go on forever but I'll show one example. The battle of Kursk was supposed to be the death of the panzers and huge amounts of German tanks were destroyed. We now know that the SS panzer corps tank #'s actually increased during the battle. This is because instead of listening to what generals on both side said people actually started looking at the daily return figures from the units involved.
 
I think many people are locked into what happened during WW2 and don't realize how many different scenarios could have come up for real and not just in a conversation 60 years later. As I stated in one of my earlier posts it was a very real and heavily discussed idea for the french and British to bomb the Russian oil fields. What if one or more assasinations ocurred in japan during the 30's and the strike south plan is shelved to go after russia? What if Wever hadn't died during the 30's and Germany possesed four engine bombers?