Here is how I feel an opportunity has presented itself. The Japanese have put themselves into a position where they have to commit to either the invasion of Gili Gili or defending Guadalcanal.
I can use my Australian forces to defend Gili Gili, and my American forces to attack Guadalcanal. I dont have to choose between the two.
The Japanese can act in 3 different ways to my invasion of Lunga.
1. Their carriers continue supporting their invasion of Gili Gili, in which case I easily gain a nice airfield in the Eastern Solomons.
2. They react and send their carriers to battle mine. If this happens, I am willing to duke it out with them because I have something like 20 more CV/CVL/CVE coming in the next year or so to replace my losses. They dont.
3. They can send part of their carrier force to confront mine, in which case I will win under the same conditions as point 2 above.
Gaining Lunga will strengthen my position, not weaken it. It will give me another good airfield, and I already have the air squadrons from the Lexington and Yorktown that have rebuilt to full strength by this point. I'll station them at Henderson.
This attack will also take away the offensive momentum from the Japanese.
This is my reasoning, at least. I understand where Mogami is coming from, but I also think he is being overly cautious.
Allied AAR
Lunga air
Hi, Do not airbases require 3x supply to operate bombers?
The rule is never divid your forces in the face of an superiour undefeated enemy. The Japanese presently can divide and still outnumber you at the points of contact. US 350 CV planes most likly will be facing IJN CV planes of 400-450 plus LBA. What are your plans reqarding Japanese surface units heading to Lunga while their CV's chase down yours? My basic point is
if Lunga has no Japanese LCU to speak of then they have 2-3 divisions someplace and you have not detirmined where the Japanese plan on using them. Your South-Eastern bases do not have 2-3 divisions defending them.
Human Japanese reaction to US landing on Lunga under present conditions.
1. Strand the US LCU on Lunga
2. Defeat US CV forces by bringing IJN CV into battle with them.
Not required to sink them (desirable) just force their withdrawl.
US air assets are scattered all over find the least protected and move LCU there. Set up new base and then find the next weakest and repeat. Kept going to victory. With Japan presently haiving the material lead in Theatre they can hit more places then you can defend. Esp after further weaking by assuming added bases without the means of protecting. First make sure everything is secure and as you aquire more units you expand.
All the while remembering that first you must defeat the Japanese where he goes (he does not have to follow you, but you must follow him since you are not a threat to his supply lines or important bases. If you can not defeat him going to his ground will not fix the problem only enhance his advantages.
2 TF with 2xCV versus 4CV 3CVL (possible is more right? are you 100% certain this is enemy force available? You have to wait for conditions that reduce the number of CV (they are raiding Gilli Gilli reinforce it to attrit Jap CV airgroup before risking CV battle. Subs to where the IJN CV's are operating. You always have time for invasions after you have removed the ability of the enemy to respond. What would your reation be as Japan if what you are planning took place under the present conditions (I mean after you stopped jumping around the room doing the dance and clapping your hands while giggling )
The rule is never divid your forces in the face of an superiour undefeated enemy. The Japanese presently can divide and still outnumber you at the points of contact. US 350 CV planes most likly will be facing IJN CV planes of 400-450 plus LBA. What are your plans reqarding Japanese surface units heading to Lunga while their CV's chase down yours? My basic point is
if Lunga has no Japanese LCU to speak of then they have 2-3 divisions someplace and you have not detirmined where the Japanese plan on using them. Your South-Eastern bases do not have 2-3 divisions defending them.
Human Japanese reaction to US landing on Lunga under present conditions.
1. Strand the US LCU on Lunga
2. Defeat US CV forces by bringing IJN CV into battle with them.
Not required to sink them (desirable) just force their withdrawl.
US air assets are scattered all over find the least protected and move LCU there. Set up new base and then find the next weakest and repeat. Kept going to victory. With Japan presently haiving the material lead in Theatre they can hit more places then you can defend. Esp after further weaking by assuming added bases without the means of protecting. First make sure everything is secure and as you aquire more units you expand.
All the while remembering that first you must defeat the Japanese where he goes (he does not have to follow you, but you must follow him since you are not a threat to his supply lines or important bases. If you can not defeat him going to his ground will not fix the problem only enhance his advantages.
2 TF with 2xCV versus 4CV 3CVL (possible is more right? are you 100% certain this is enemy force available? You have to wait for conditions that reduce the number of CV (they are raiding Gilli Gilli reinforce it to attrit Jap CV airgroup before risking CV battle. Subs to where the IJN CV's are operating. You always have time for invasions after you have removed the ability of the enemy to respond. What would your reation be as Japan if what you are planning took place under the present conditions (I mean after you stopped jumping around the room doing the dance and clapping your hands while giggling )
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
I've been lurking around the AAR threads for a while, but thought it would be worth putting my .02 in on this one. I am definitely in agreement that the Lunga Operation should continue - especially if the Jap carriers rush over to try to intervene - you might have the opportunity to hit them in mid-stride and pull off a Midway type victory here. If not that kind of victory, the chance to attrite their carriers in preparation for further operations in the future is also worth it.
Also, the Jap carrier squadrons are going to be suffering from fatigue from the on-going Gilli Gilli operation, given the advantage to the US Airgroups in a straight-up fight. If all seven Jap carriers make the move towards Lunga (and we don't know if they have the replenishment force available to make the move possible), I feel that you could still pull off a win - even against a superior carrier force (though American carriers carry more plans, making the odds not as bad as they could be).
Lastly, I see you're in the Worcester area - happen to know where Leicester & Rochdale are? My family is all around that area still (and has been for about 150 years). Good luck with the attack - fortune favors the brave.
Also, the Jap carrier squadrons are going to be suffering from fatigue from the on-going Gilli Gilli operation, given the advantage to the US Airgroups in a straight-up fight. If all seven Jap carriers make the move towards Lunga (and we don't know if they have the replenishment force available to make the move possible), I feel that you could still pull off a win - even against a superior carrier force (though American carriers carry more plans, making the odds not as bad as they could be).
Lastly, I see you're in the Worcester area - happen to know where Leicester & Rochdale are? My family is all around that area still (and has been for about 150 years). Good luck with the attack - fortune favors the brave.
Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon.....
Snigbert. Just my $.02.
I think there are good points on both sides. I think I might suggest something in between:
- A raid in force on San Cristobal or eastern Malaita.
The idea would be to pick something that can be covered by CAP from Nevea. The Rennell and Nevea bases are probably not ever going to get big enough to base large bombers out of, their main purpose is to provide bases for CAP coverage of amphib and supply ops.
If say take the Marine raiders in by DD to San Cristobal. Protect them with Cap from Nevea. Move the carriers up to the east of San Cristobal and stage a simultaneous raid on Lunga.
Then run like hell.
If you stick around for longer than a day you'll probably get creamed.
If it works out right, you will pull the carriers off the landings at Gili Gili - giving the B-26's an opening, and you will be gone by the time the carriers show up
Send enough supplies with the Marines to last them a while.
Next time you run supplies cover the convoy with CAP from Nevea.
Above all, take every opportunity you get to engage the carrier based air. The planes and pilots are the real weapons and the Japanese cannot replace them. If you can run his air groups down to 30 - 40% strength then you will have a fair fight on your hands if you decide to take him on at 4 CV's to 7.
With 346 a/c you probably already have close to parity. A couple of weeks of high intensity ops will drag him down even further.
I agree with Mogami though. I think you are a month to six weeks from being ready for the big strike.
I think there are good points on both sides. I think I might suggest something in between:
- A raid in force on San Cristobal or eastern Malaita.
The idea would be to pick something that can be covered by CAP from Nevea. The Rennell and Nevea bases are probably not ever going to get big enough to base large bombers out of, their main purpose is to provide bases for CAP coverage of amphib and supply ops.
If say take the Marine raiders in by DD to San Cristobal. Protect them with Cap from Nevea. Move the carriers up to the east of San Cristobal and stage a simultaneous raid on Lunga.
Then run like hell.
If you stick around for longer than a day you'll probably get creamed.
If it works out right, you will pull the carriers off the landings at Gili Gili - giving the B-26's an opening, and you will be gone by the time the carriers show up
Send enough supplies with the Marines to last them a while.
Next time you run supplies cover the convoy with CAP from Nevea.
Above all, take every opportunity you get to engage the carrier based air. The planes and pilots are the real weapons and the Japanese cannot replace them. If you can run his air groups down to 30 - 40% strength then you will have a fair fight on your hands if you decide to take him on at 4 CV's to 7.
With 346 a/c you probably already have close to parity. A couple of weeks of high intensity ops will drag him down even further.
I agree with Mogami though. I think you are a month to six weeks from being ready for the big strike.
Iain Christie
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
Mogami is not really Super Chicken
Hi, I know it appears I am a very meek commander. In truth I only believe in the offensive. The defense is merely a breakwater to gain the material advantage the offensive demands (and deserves in order toi insure success at minium price)
I seek the offensive. On the defensive I try to provide for the future requiments for the offensive. Attacking a superour force only hands to enemy that which he seeks but may be unable to attain against a skillfull defender....attack under favorable conditions.
I seek the offensive. On the defensive I try to provide for the future requiments for the offensive. Attacking a superour force only hands to enemy that which he seeks but may be unable to attain against a skillfull defender....attack under favorable conditions.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
The bomber attacks against the carriers, did they have fighter protection? It may be best to move most of your bombers out of N.G. and move in more fighters. Then run only figher sweeps against the carriers. This will set them up for the future carrier battle, with many of the carrier pilots killed or tired. You know where the Japanese carriers are right now. The time to weaken them is now. So hold your other forces back and see what you do over the next week against the carriers. Then pull the Japanese carriers into the battle you want and were you want, maybe run a bombardment mission by some CA against a base of your chosing.
Recon first
At the very least find out what is actually on Lunga, then only move enough to capture the place (if in fact you have what is required) meanwhile resolve the Gilli Gilli/CV situation. There is always time to do what is needed except go back to do what should have been done before disaster.
Where are the Jap LCU?
4 Jap BB have been engaged in battle this leaves how many iunaccounted for?
Japan only has 22 CA how many are in theatre? How many CA do you have?
Run ASW sweep ahead of CV TF the area you plan on stationing them prior to invasion is a primary area for IJN SS operations.
Where are the Jap LCU?
4 Jap BB have been engaged in battle this leaves how many iunaccounted for?
Japan only has 22 CA how many are in theatre? How many CA do you have?
Run ASW sweep ahead of CV TF the area you plan on stationing them prior to invasion is a primary area for IJN SS operations.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Personally you guys are being too meek it sounds like 
A lot of this depends on the game, and not having played it yet I don't know, but my thoughts are:
1) What are the chances the Japanese will know there are two CV groups each with two CV's (plus a CVE)?
2) What is the likely breakdown of Japanese CV's? (5 CV's and 2 CVL's)? Also, what are the chances the Zuiho is still around anyway after taking a couple of bomb hits? To really showcase my ignorance, the Zuiho is a CVL I believe, not a CV, right?
3) This is the big one: Would the Japanese commander dispatch all six or seven carriers against the invasion, and this again is contingent on 1, how likely is it that the Japanese commander really things there are 2 groups of 2 CV's out there already ...
4) Finally, correct me if I'm way off here, but it sure seems like 4 US CV's + 1 CVE is a pretty even match up against 5 Japanese CV's + 2 CVL's (and more likely one less than that), especially since the Japanese have been engaged and not likely at 100% air group complements already (though probably not significantly worn down).
The US player knows they have a much bigger pipeline and can absorb losses, so it seems like such a fight, which at worst is even, especially after the Japanese commander has already played his hand at Gili Gili, is a pretty solid move.
A lot of this depends on the game, and not having played it yet I don't know, but my thoughts are:
1) What are the chances the Japanese will know there are two CV groups each with two CV's (plus a CVE)?
2) What is the likely breakdown of Japanese CV's? (5 CV's and 2 CVL's)? Also, what are the chances the Zuiho is still around anyway after taking a couple of bomb hits? To really showcase my ignorance, the Zuiho is a CVL I believe, not a CV, right?
3) This is the big one: Would the Japanese commander dispatch all six or seven carriers against the invasion, and this again is contingent on 1, how likely is it that the Japanese commander really things there are 2 groups of 2 CV's out there already ...
4) Finally, correct me if I'm way off here, but it sure seems like 4 US CV's + 1 CVE is a pretty even match up against 5 Japanese CV's + 2 CVL's (and more likely one less than that), especially since the Japanese have been engaged and not likely at 100% air group complements already (though probably not significantly worn down).
The US player knows they have a much bigger pipeline and can absorb losses, so it seems like such a fight, which at worst is even, especially after the Japanese commander has already played his hand at Gili Gili, is a pretty solid move.
I agree with Mogami
I have to go with Mogami on this one. I haven't played UV, but if you look historically, you are ahead of the actual Guadalcanal invasion, and you haven't won Midway decisively, as was the case in the real battle. If you are hoping for some luck, it usually favors the defender in these battles. If you are able to pull off the invasion successfully, I would question the play balance of the game. The Japanese CV pilots are still better trained than the Americans at this point. You don't have radar yet, so their night combat abilities will be better, and you are going to attack them without LBA support. You don't have to wait until the end of the game, but You should use attrition on the CV pilots before you go in.
kp
kp
The Earth is but a hollow nougat, reverberating with the sounds of the big bands... 
One more vote for Mogami's plan
The AI to date appears to be quite competent so I would highly doubt that it would leave its backdoor (Lunga) open while it struck South. (BTW was the Japanaese invasion of GG successful or is it too soon to tell?)
It would appear that too many things have to go your way for the Lunga operation to be successful in the long term.
Your landing force has to sieze and hold Lunga which is not a given. Before an invasion of Lunga can even be considered you must find out what is on that island that could oppose your landing force otherwise you are shooting craps with arguably your best offensive LCU. Losing this LCU would seriously impair all future offensive ops. Also it does not appear that you have enough naval assets to insure that you can keep the Ist Marine Div in minimal supply for the duration.
Under your plan the USN must lure the IJN under protection of Allied LBA ( sort of the IJN's decisive battle concept in reverse ) although there is no need for the IJN to seek out such a battle at this time as they appear to be able to impose local naval superiority whenever and wherever they please. When and if this battle comes I suspect it will be on their terms.
Lastly, have you considered what is Japan's intention beyond Gili Gili? Given the size of Japan's carrier force (same size as Pearl and Midway) this does not appear to be a limited operation and I would suspect that this is phase one in a larger op., probably to reduce or seize PM, maybe more.
If I HAD to make any adjustments to Mogami's suggestion it would be to incorporate Iain's idea for selectively raiding forward Japanese bases. At the very least it would slake one's desire to conduct major offensive ops. and provide recon as well.
NB Imagine how opinionated we are all going to be when we actually have copies of UV
Again, thanks for the AAR's
-g
It would appear that too many things have to go your way for the Lunga operation to be successful in the long term.
Your landing force has to sieze and hold Lunga which is not a given. Before an invasion of Lunga can even be considered you must find out what is on that island that could oppose your landing force otherwise you are shooting craps with arguably your best offensive LCU. Losing this LCU would seriously impair all future offensive ops. Also it does not appear that you have enough naval assets to insure that you can keep the Ist Marine Div in minimal supply for the duration.
Under your plan the USN must lure the IJN under protection of Allied LBA ( sort of the IJN's decisive battle concept in reverse ) although there is no need for the IJN to seek out such a battle at this time as they appear to be able to impose local naval superiority whenever and wherever they please. When and if this battle comes I suspect it will be on their terms.
Lastly, have you considered what is Japan's intention beyond Gili Gili? Given the size of Japan's carrier force (same size as Pearl and Midway) this does not appear to be a limited operation and I would suspect that this is phase one in a larger op., probably to reduce or seize PM, maybe more.
If I HAD to make any adjustments to Mogami's suggestion it would be to incorporate Iain's idea for selectively raiding forward Japanese bases. At the very least it would slake one's desire to conduct major offensive ops. and provide recon as well.
NB Imagine how opinionated we are all going to be when we actually have copies of UV
Again, thanks for the AAR's
-g
Raids are good
Hi, Yes raids are good. The Primary task during the initial stages of a campaign are to learn the enemies disposition and intentions.
Raids are an excellent way to gather Intel and keep the enemy off balanced without risking too much. In game terms you want every base possible to display the US icon. Even with no garrison you will get an idea of Japanese movement when the icons change (I consider a friendly icon to represent a Coast Watcher) Any lightly held Japanese base should be attacked (but not held afterwards) This will force the Japanese to use their LCU to garrison their bases, reducing the amount available for use against US bases or countering future US operations. Presently we have a very incomplete picture of Japanese intentions and forces available. The Raiders using those large SS (Narwhal Argonault) should be busy scouting.
Raids are an excellent way to gather Intel and keep the enemy off balanced without risking too much. In game terms you want every base possible to display the US icon. Even with no garrison you will get an idea of Japanese movement when the icons change (I consider a friendly icon to represent a Coast Watcher) Any lightly held Japanese base should be attacked (but not held afterwards) This will force the Japanese to use their LCU to garrison their bases, reducing the amount available for use against US bases or countering future US operations. Presently we have a very incomplete picture of Japanese intentions and forces available. The Raiders using those large SS (Narwhal Argonault) should be busy scouting.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Re: Raids are good
The Japanese can not ignore the Invasions of Lunga, they must react or give the Americans a base that allows them to stage toward Rabual.
The Americans win by bleeding the Japanese white, 'a death of a thousand pin pricks'. Any time the Americans can come out even in a battle they win.
Wearing down the Japanese Airgroups is as good as sinking the carriers.
The boys at PM will gain a lot of experence practicing on a Japanese base at Gilli Gilli.
If the Japanese split their carrier group to hit both Launga and Gilli Gilli the American carriers will have an overwelming advantage against either group.
If the Japanese use their surface fleet against Lunga then the American Carriers will destroy the crusiers and destroyers that the Japanese will need to counter the American surface fleet.
If the Japanese stage a counter invasion of Lunga then their transports will suffer.
The order of destruction of Japanese assets is: Transports, CA, BB, CV air crews.
If the Japanese are short of tansports, no invasions or supplies.
If the Japanese are short of CA's, BB and DD no support for invasions.
If the Japanese lose to many aircrews their carriers are worthless.
Attrition, Attrition, Attrition
The Americans win by bleeding the Japanese white, 'a death of a thousand pin pricks'. Any time the Americans can come out even in a battle they win.
Wearing down the Japanese Airgroups is as good as sinking the carriers.
The boys at PM will gain a lot of experence practicing on a Japanese base at Gilli Gilli.
If the Japanese split their carrier group to hit both Launga and Gilli Gilli the American carriers will have an overwelming advantage against either group.
If the Japanese use their surface fleet against Lunga then the American Carriers will destroy the crusiers and destroyers that the Japanese will need to counter the American surface fleet.
If the Japanese stage a counter invasion of Lunga then their transports will suffer.
The order of destruction of Japanese assets is: Transports, CA, BB, CV air crews.
If the Japanese are short of tansports, no invasions or supplies.
If the Japanese are short of CA's, BB and DD no support for invasions.
If the Japanese lose to many aircrews their carriers are worthless.
Attrition, Attrition, Attrition
Be bold, and mighty forces will come to your aid
Unfortunately I was tied up last night and didn't get the chance to play some more. Tonight I should get some more time in, once I get home.
Thantis: I certainly do know where Rochdale and Leicester are. I drive through Rochdale on almost a daily basis. My parents live in Charlton so I drive down Stafford St. to see them. When you get a copy of the game we'll have to play sometime.
Let's see...lots of good opinions here. Mogami, I hope I didn't suggest that I thought you were being chicken. I just think you are more of an Omar Bradley and I'm more of a George Patton.
Actually, one time I took a quiz where you had to answer questions about how you would react in different strategic situations, and based on your responses it would compare you to one of 16 historical generals. I was closest to Robert E. Lee.
Contemplating the Japanese carriers, here is my guess as to what they have available.
1. CV Akagi - Confirmed sighting
2. CV Kaga (which suffered 1 or 2 250 lb bomb hits, but is most likely doing fine) confirmed sighting
3. CV Hiryu - confirmed sighting
4. CV Soryu - confirmed sighting
5. CV Zuikaku - After the damage she took, I highly doubt she is operational. She's probably in Japan being repaired.
xx. CV Shokaku - Confirmed Sunk
xx. CVL Shoho - Confirmed Sunk
6. CV Junyo - Not confirmed in the area, but I would say highly likely based on her usual release
7. CVE Unyo - Not confirmed in the area, but also highly likely
CVL
8. CVL Zuiho - 2 bomb hits confirmed in area
9. CV Hiyo - Not released from Japan yet
10. CVL Ryujo - Not confirmed but very likely
So this is what I believe they have:
Kaga 85 planes
Akagi 85 planes
Hiryu 72 planes
Soryu 72 planes
Zuiho 30 planes
Junyo 53 planes
Unyo 30 planes
These are estimates on the planes, I dont recall exactly what each carries. But that works out to be around 427 planes? I plan on keeping my carriers out of range of Rabaul as well, and I havent seen any Vals or Kates operating out of Lunga so I should be safe there. (Mogami- For level bombers you need a level 4 airfield, it isnt dependent on how many supplies you have but they do use huge amounts of supply). If I can quickly seize Lunga, I can move 2 groups of 25 Dauntlesses each, 1 group of 15 devastators, and fill the rest of the 150 open spaces on Lunga with Aircobras.
I will have 346 planes plus cap from Nevea, which will only be 10 or so at a given time due to the long range for the aircobras.
There is the question of keeping Lunga supplies. I feel I can do this by moving the 4 Transport airgroups from Townsville to Noumea and having them fly support. They did the job for Gili Gili, which was supporting an entire Australian division. Also, I can use fast transports. Japan will certainly attempt to contest a resupply effort, but this will draw them into a slug fest with my surface ships, under the watch of Henderson's planes. I'll be happy to duke it out with them because I have plenty of reinforcements coming.
I haven't decided for sure on this course of action, I'm definitely interested in other suggestions. The idea of raids is interesting, but I'm worried about the idea of breaking up my best LCU and possibly throwing away a part of it. I think the 1st Marine Division can take on any division the Japs might have on Lunga.
I also like the idea of withdrawing the Bombers from PM and replacing the with fighters. I'm not sure if I can use the sweep command on a naval location, however. I think you can only order it on bases.
How is this for an alternate strategy to my invasion plan:
1. Use airplanes at PM to wear down the Jap carrier airgroups and hope for some hits on their carriers. They do have huge CAPS, as I mentioned before. Last time we attacked them we had 66 bombers damaged or destroyed.
2. Stage recon flights over Lunga to determine the force present there.
3. Bombard the hell out of Lunga to keep them from building up the airfield. I'm at a critical moment here...as soon as they get it to level 4 they can field level bombers and suddenly they're interdicting everything in the Southeast.
4. Conduct some raids to figure out what Japan has in the Eastern Solomons.
5. Keep them tied up on Gili Gili as long as possible.
At the moment Gili Gili is not in danger of falling...they only landed a regiment thus far. I can keep them busy trying to support that regiment and just resupplying my troops there enough to keep them holding on to the base. The old Stalingrad strategy, get them to keep committing stuff they cant afford.
Anyway, I'll head home in a bit and write an update for whatever happens. Keep the good ideas coming!
Thantis: I certainly do know where Rochdale and Leicester are. I drive through Rochdale on almost a daily basis. My parents live in Charlton so I drive down Stafford St. to see them. When you get a copy of the game we'll have to play sometime.
Let's see...lots of good opinions here. Mogami, I hope I didn't suggest that I thought you were being chicken. I just think you are more of an Omar Bradley and I'm more of a George Patton.
Actually, one time I took a quiz where you had to answer questions about how you would react in different strategic situations, and based on your responses it would compare you to one of 16 historical generals. I was closest to Robert E. Lee.
Contemplating the Japanese carriers, here is my guess as to what they have available.
1. CV Akagi - Confirmed sighting
2. CV Kaga (which suffered 1 or 2 250 lb bomb hits, but is most likely doing fine) confirmed sighting
3. CV Hiryu - confirmed sighting
4. CV Soryu - confirmed sighting
5. CV Zuikaku - After the damage she took, I highly doubt she is operational. She's probably in Japan being repaired.
xx. CV Shokaku - Confirmed Sunk
xx. CVL Shoho - Confirmed Sunk
6. CV Junyo - Not confirmed in the area, but I would say highly likely based on her usual release
7. CVE Unyo - Not confirmed in the area, but also highly likely
CVL
8. CVL Zuiho - 2 bomb hits confirmed in area
9. CV Hiyo - Not released from Japan yet
10. CVL Ryujo - Not confirmed but very likely
So this is what I believe they have:
Kaga 85 planes
Akagi 85 planes
Hiryu 72 planes
Soryu 72 planes
Zuiho 30 planes
Junyo 53 planes
Unyo 30 planes
These are estimates on the planes, I dont recall exactly what each carries. But that works out to be around 427 planes? I plan on keeping my carriers out of range of Rabaul as well, and I havent seen any Vals or Kates operating out of Lunga so I should be safe there. (Mogami- For level bombers you need a level 4 airfield, it isnt dependent on how many supplies you have but they do use huge amounts of supply). If I can quickly seize Lunga, I can move 2 groups of 25 Dauntlesses each, 1 group of 15 devastators, and fill the rest of the 150 open spaces on Lunga with Aircobras.
I will have 346 planes plus cap from Nevea, which will only be 10 or so at a given time due to the long range for the aircobras.
There is the question of keeping Lunga supplies. I feel I can do this by moving the 4 Transport airgroups from Townsville to Noumea and having them fly support. They did the job for Gili Gili, which was supporting an entire Australian division. Also, I can use fast transports. Japan will certainly attempt to contest a resupply effort, but this will draw them into a slug fest with my surface ships, under the watch of Henderson's planes. I'll be happy to duke it out with them because I have plenty of reinforcements coming.
I haven't decided for sure on this course of action, I'm definitely interested in other suggestions. The idea of raids is interesting, but I'm worried about the idea of breaking up my best LCU and possibly throwing away a part of it. I think the 1st Marine Division can take on any division the Japs might have on Lunga.
I also like the idea of withdrawing the Bombers from PM and replacing the with fighters. I'm not sure if I can use the sweep command on a naval location, however. I think you can only order it on bases.
How is this for an alternate strategy to my invasion plan:
1. Use airplanes at PM to wear down the Jap carrier airgroups and hope for some hits on their carriers. They do have huge CAPS, as I mentioned before. Last time we attacked them we had 66 bombers damaged or destroyed.
2. Stage recon flights over Lunga to determine the force present there.
3. Bombard the hell out of Lunga to keep them from building up the airfield. I'm at a critical moment here...as soon as they get it to level 4 they can field level bombers and suddenly they're interdicting everything in the Southeast.
4. Conduct some raids to figure out what Japan has in the Eastern Solomons.
5. Keep them tied up on Gili Gili as long as possible.
At the moment Gili Gili is not in danger of falling...they only landed a regiment thus far. I can keep them busy trying to support that regiment and just resupplying my troops there enough to keep them holding on to the base. The old Stalingrad strategy, get them to keep committing stuff they cant afford.
Anyway, I'll head home in a bit and write an update for whatever happens. Keep the good ideas coming!
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
Japanese Stratagy
Greetings, If the Japanese try to fight in both New Guinea and the Solomons half the battle for the allies is already won. While they have a material advantage early (at least lasting into Aug/Sept if they divide their efforts they lose both battles. (providing the allies do not play into it by over reacting. )
I don't have the knowledge you possess concerning your actual resources so you do what you think is best. My major caution being there is no reason to take any risks. Insure the safety of Port Morsby/New Cal and Espirtu. Then with remaining force if there is enough you certainly would want to occupy Lunga before it was capable of supporting bombers. (or at least try to prevent it from building to that level if possible)
I suspect my general stratagy when I do this scenario as allies will be to engage Zuikaku/Shokaku/Shoho as you did only try to control where battle takes place. Allies can not really ignore threat these ships carry early in campaign before enough LCU present to defend bases (notably PM) I am rather inclined to let Japan have Gilli Gilli early and then use it to drain Japanese resources. After PM has sufficent cap to cover resupply I will begin staging LCU supply there for eventual use in capturing New Guinea.
In Solomons I will place the 1st Mar Div on ES and build the bases there to max. While conducting recon of all bases within air range. Then just wait for my CV reinforcments to arrive. Have the S boats operate out of the closest port and stationed in the upper slot. With any Gatos stationed on Truk/Rabaul supply route.
The starting point of my plan is I must first destroy the IJN CV. As long as this has not happened Japan is capable of countering any moves by LCU. One bit of data I still need is what is the length of this scenario May 1 1942-???????
I have seen that the Oct-Jan period is when the Japanese need to make their move if trying to meet Auto victory conditions but what is length without auto victory? This info is needed to
decide 'drop dead dates' for offensive actions. (for both sides)
Given the historical lossess imposed on the USN in circumstances far more favorable to them ( IJN having fewer CV)
I don't believe the US is in a position to try attrition warfare versus Japan in May-Aug time frame. Attritiion while a workable concept only works for the side with the material edge. While US reinforcments will eventually give numerical advantage over the short haul in this campaign it is actually Japan that could adopt this tactic early. Then move to target bases and spend the period of US reinforcment preparing the defense of their new bases. That is why I believ the US should husband their intial forces early on. At least during the period required to detirmine enemy intentions. It all relies on the CV's being able to drive the Japanese CV from the Campaign. The follow on LCU movements then become mute points.
I don't have the knowledge you possess concerning your actual resources so you do what you think is best. My major caution being there is no reason to take any risks. Insure the safety of Port Morsby/New Cal and Espirtu. Then with remaining force if there is enough you certainly would want to occupy Lunga before it was capable of supporting bombers. (or at least try to prevent it from building to that level if possible)
I suspect my general stratagy when I do this scenario as allies will be to engage Zuikaku/Shokaku/Shoho as you did only try to control where battle takes place. Allies can not really ignore threat these ships carry early in campaign before enough LCU present to defend bases (notably PM) I am rather inclined to let Japan have Gilli Gilli early and then use it to drain Japanese resources. After PM has sufficent cap to cover resupply I will begin staging LCU supply there for eventual use in capturing New Guinea.
In Solomons I will place the 1st Mar Div on ES and build the bases there to max. While conducting recon of all bases within air range. Then just wait for my CV reinforcments to arrive. Have the S boats operate out of the closest port and stationed in the upper slot. With any Gatos stationed on Truk/Rabaul supply route.
The starting point of my plan is I must first destroy the IJN CV. As long as this has not happened Japan is capable of countering any moves by LCU. One bit of data I still need is what is the length of this scenario May 1 1942-???????
I have seen that the Oct-Jan period is when the Japanese need to make their move if trying to meet Auto victory conditions but what is length without auto victory? This info is needed to
decide 'drop dead dates' for offensive actions. (for both sides)
Given the historical lossess imposed on the USN in circumstances far more favorable to them ( IJN having fewer CV)
I don't believe the US is in a position to try attrition warfare versus Japan in May-Aug time frame. Attritiion while a workable concept only works for the side with the material edge. While US reinforcments will eventually give numerical advantage over the short haul in this campaign it is actually Japan that could adopt this tactic early. Then move to target bases and spend the period of US reinforcment preparing the defense of their new bases. That is why I believ the US should husband their intial forces early on. At least during the period required to detirmine enemy intentions. It all relies on the CV's being able to drive the Japanese CV from the Campaign. The follow on LCU movements then become mute points.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Interesting Comparison
"Let's see...lots of good opinions here. Mogami, I hope I didn't suggest that I thought you were being chicken. I just think you are more of an Omar Bradley and I'm more of a George Patton.
Actually, one time I took a quiz where you had to answer questions about how you would react in different strategic situations, and based on your responses it would compare you to one of 16 historical generals. I was closest to Robert E. Lee. "
Greetings, Oh boy can I open a can o worms on this subject.
While I would not be offended to be compared to Bobby I would not select him as my role model. Forced to divided his forces and attack in order to prolong the war he did so and was successful mainly because he was able to impose his will on the enemy commander not because he was able to defeat the opposing army.
(Mac retreated despite winning the battles. During the 7 days the AOP only lost once but nonetheless Mac acted as though he had to retreat. Lee defeated McCellan not the AOP). Lee while a good tactician failed to understand the war as a whole. (it was being lost in the West but excepting for short period after Gettysburg when relations with Longstreet were strained) never consented to reinforcing the western theater. He never was able to develop a strategic plan for conduct of the whole war.
He tended to embark on offensives into Northern territory that risked what could not be afforded to be lost without having clear attainable objectives. Ultimatly it must be said his success was due to his having able Lts in Jackson and Longstreet. Once deprived of their presence the ANV was unable to mount offensives and this during the period of parity in strength between the two opposing armies. However I contribute this to the command and control difficulties of the period (Imagine Lee or Grant with radio communications and both would see a marked improvement in their operations) As was the personalities of Corps commanders becomes much more important in American Civil War
then in WW2.
Also I am not a gambler. No person who ever wore an American uniform was ever more of a gambler then Lee.
However if the options available to him when he assumed command of the ANV are examined and all that do not allow the Confederacy the chance to assume control of events are tossed out you find your self left with the course he followed. He had to do what it did. That he accepted the risk and resposablities for the results is a measure of him as a man. The ANV 1 or 2 years later would prehaps have produced the outcome he sought. It just did not possess the command and control in 1862 it had in 1863 prior to the loss of Jackson.
I'm not a Bradley. I am not a conservative thinker. I am a chess player who does not open an attack without possessing some sort of advantage (time/space/material) and a target (a weakness in the enemy position) Attack for the sake of attack is not my forte. (nor something I consider desirable or admirable) First I try to gain an advantage and then leverage that to attain victory. Once I have converted into an attack mode I believe it should be conducted in the most rapid and ruthless manner poosible.
Analysis of the starting positions here give Japan the material lead but the Allies having the Space/time advantage. They should use it to whittle away the Japanese material and then convert into the offensive to exploit the advantages they start with and will be able to maintain unless they throw it away in reckless operations. If I was to pick someone I would be happy to be compared to it would be the Iron Duke.
I would use Waterloo as an example of how to fight not just a battle but a war. Knowing the Prussians are coming he chooses to stand and fight a larger force. He merely chooses the ground and time. But even then he refuses to commit the entire strength of his force (maintaining a reserve to commit when the time to switch to offensive arrives) Then he absorbs the enemy offensive (power lost in unjustified attacks, is lost to later required defense) When his material disadvantage is relieved by the arrival of the Prussians he immediately switches to attacking an enemy still in disorder from failed piecemeal uncoordinated attacks. But attack was the entire plan from the beginning he only first made sure he established favorable conditions for it's conduct. The power of a successfull defense can be converted into successfull attack and is a valid and admirable concept when used as part of a larger longterm plan.
Actually, one time I took a quiz where you had to answer questions about how you would react in different strategic situations, and based on your responses it would compare you to one of 16 historical generals. I was closest to Robert E. Lee. "
Greetings, Oh boy can I open a can o worms on this subject.
While I would not be offended to be compared to Bobby I would not select him as my role model. Forced to divided his forces and attack in order to prolong the war he did so and was successful mainly because he was able to impose his will on the enemy commander not because he was able to defeat the opposing army.
(Mac retreated despite winning the battles. During the 7 days the AOP only lost once but nonetheless Mac acted as though he had to retreat. Lee defeated McCellan not the AOP). Lee while a good tactician failed to understand the war as a whole. (it was being lost in the West but excepting for short period after Gettysburg when relations with Longstreet were strained) never consented to reinforcing the western theater. He never was able to develop a strategic plan for conduct of the whole war.
He tended to embark on offensives into Northern territory that risked what could not be afforded to be lost without having clear attainable objectives. Ultimatly it must be said his success was due to his having able Lts in Jackson and Longstreet. Once deprived of their presence the ANV was unable to mount offensives and this during the period of parity in strength between the two opposing armies. However I contribute this to the command and control difficulties of the period (Imagine Lee or Grant with radio communications and both would see a marked improvement in their operations) As was the personalities of Corps commanders becomes much more important in American Civil War
then in WW2.
Also I am not a gambler. No person who ever wore an American uniform was ever more of a gambler then Lee.
However if the options available to him when he assumed command of the ANV are examined and all that do not allow the Confederacy the chance to assume control of events are tossed out you find your self left with the course he followed. He had to do what it did. That he accepted the risk and resposablities for the results is a measure of him as a man. The ANV 1 or 2 years later would prehaps have produced the outcome he sought. It just did not possess the command and control in 1862 it had in 1863 prior to the loss of Jackson.
I'm not a Bradley. I am not a conservative thinker. I am a chess player who does not open an attack without possessing some sort of advantage (time/space/material) and a target (a weakness in the enemy position) Attack for the sake of attack is not my forte. (nor something I consider desirable or admirable) First I try to gain an advantage and then leverage that to attain victory. Once I have converted into an attack mode I believe it should be conducted in the most rapid and ruthless manner poosible.
Analysis of the starting positions here give Japan the material lead but the Allies having the Space/time advantage. They should use it to whittle away the Japanese material and then convert into the offensive to exploit the advantages they start with and will be able to maintain unless they throw it away in reckless operations. If I was to pick someone I would be happy to be compared to it would be the Iron Duke.
I would use Waterloo as an example of how to fight not just a battle but a war. Knowing the Prussians are coming he chooses to stand and fight a larger force. He merely chooses the ground and time. But even then he refuses to commit the entire strength of his force (maintaining a reserve to commit when the time to switch to offensive arrives) Then he absorbs the enemy offensive (power lost in unjustified attacks, is lost to later required defense) When his material disadvantage is relieved by the arrival of the Prussians he immediately switches to attacking an enemy still in disorder from failed piecemeal uncoordinated attacks. But attack was the entire plan from the beginning he only first made sure he established favorable conditions for it's conduct. The power of a successfull defense can be converted into successfull attack and is a valid and admirable concept when used as part of a larger longterm plan.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Mr Know-it-all
Greeting again. I do not wish to imply that any idea/concept/approach other then my own is somehow not a valid workable method of winning. There are many ways to skin a cat. The major difference I observe in the differing ideas is not one of tactics. It is one of acceptable risk. In this regard I admit to a conservative view. I know it is only a war-game and that I am not responsible for any actual humans or material of my country.
It is my experience that war-games tend to be much bloodier then the actual affairs and players will take chances they would be more reluctant to take if they were in actual command of living units. I look for unexpected/bold operations and then work out the details then if I find I could carry them out I ask 'is the risk within acceptable means-does it offer enough reward to place the force in jeopardy to achieve it? Before sending combat units out to engage the enemy you must be willing to lose the entire force. The fortunes of war sometimes produce outcomes other then what you have anticipated. A force that must not be lost at any cost is also one that has lost it's ability to dictate events to the enemy. No purely static defense in history has ever prevailed in a war versus a flexable mobile attacker. The sole purpose for a defense should be to allow for the favorable conditions to switch to the offense.
The single issue separating all the posters in this forum in the various AAR threads is really just the differing levels of acceptable risk. I feel the Japanese are almost compelled to take greater risks then the Allies (everything I post concerning conduct of operations in UV implies a game between 2 human players) There is one enemy Japan cannot defeat without help from the opposing player...Time. The US needs in fact do very little except avoid disaster. Japan is forced to take actions that will provoke the US into such a disaster and then win in a decisive manner in order to maintain the lead.
The allies just have to wait for the right invitation before fighting. Lunga is much more important to future Japanese plans then the reverse. The Allies have a ready made area they can fight and win in given time..New Guinea. While the AI Japanese might not defend Lunga with enough force to hold it. A human Japanese most certainly will. Making any early allied effort towards it very difficult unless they have first fought and won a "midway' Since I plan all my actions for use against humans I might be in fact too cautious vis the AI
It is my experience that war-games tend to be much bloodier then the actual affairs and players will take chances they would be more reluctant to take if they were in actual command of living units. I look for unexpected/bold operations and then work out the details then if I find I could carry them out I ask 'is the risk within acceptable means-does it offer enough reward to place the force in jeopardy to achieve it? Before sending combat units out to engage the enemy you must be willing to lose the entire force. The fortunes of war sometimes produce outcomes other then what you have anticipated. A force that must not be lost at any cost is also one that has lost it's ability to dictate events to the enemy. No purely static defense in history has ever prevailed in a war versus a flexable mobile attacker. The sole purpose for a defense should be to allow for the favorable conditions to switch to the offense.
The single issue separating all the posters in this forum in the various AAR threads is really just the differing levels of acceptable risk. I feel the Japanese are almost compelled to take greater risks then the Allies (everything I post concerning conduct of operations in UV implies a game between 2 human players) There is one enemy Japan cannot defeat without help from the opposing player...Time. The US needs in fact do very little except avoid disaster. Japan is forced to take actions that will provoke the US into such a disaster and then win in a decisive manner in order to maintain the lead.
The allies just have to wait for the right invitation before fighting. Lunga is much more important to future Japanese plans then the reverse. The Allies have a ready made area they can fight and win in given time..New Guinea. While the AI Japanese might not defend Lunga with enough force to hold it. A human Japanese most certainly will. Making any early allied effort towards it very difficult unless they have first fought and won a "midway' Since I plan all my actions for use against humans I might be in fact too cautious vis the AI
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Mogami,
I look forward to playing against you. It will be interesting to see how our levels of acceptable risk clash with one another.
Robert E Lee is certainly no hero of mine either...Although I'm not sure how much management he had of the overall war, I was under the impression his authority ended with the ANV.
I'm a Yankee born and bred from the land of abolitionists, I'm not fan of Bobby Lee. I'd rather go worship at the statue of Robert Gould Shaw in Boston Common
I look forward to playing against you. It will be interesting to see how our levels of acceptable risk clash with one another.
Robert E Lee is certainly no hero of mine either...Although I'm not sure how much management he had of the overall war, I was under the impression his authority ended with the ANV.
I'm a Yankee born and bred from the land of abolitionists, I'm not fan of Bobby Lee. I'd rather go worship at the statue of Robert Gould Shaw in Boston Common
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"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
Last Days of July
I sort of lost track of what happened on which days, because I had trouble writing things down in the dark last night. Didn't want to alert the fiance I was still playing.
Anyway, this is what happened the last week or two of July.
My plan was basically ruined when Gili Gili fell. The Japs very quickly managed to land a large force there. Perhaps I should have concentrated Port Moresbys bombers on the APs rather than the supporting carriers. I did manage to get a bomb hit on the Akagi. And I also recognized the Junyo was present.
Gili Gili really fell due to gross mismanagement on my part. They were being bombed round the clock, as well as bombarded, and I left them withering on the vine there as their supplies became lower and lower. I was afraid to send in convoys to resupply them because of the huge Japanese carrier presence. So I tried using my (now 5) airgroups of transports from Townville, but with the amount of supplies Gili Gili was losing in each air strike and bombardment, I couldn't keep the lifeline flowing.
So I lost an entire division of Australians. I officially apologize to all of you Aussies out there. Thank God I wasn't in charge during the real war, eh? This event bummed me out, and made me realize that Mogami was right. I can't be launching an offensive while the Japanese can still move in and take one of my large bases with impunity.
Adding to this, recon photos of Lunga showed there were more than 20000 troops there. I'm not going to throw the Marines into that viper's nest if I can't give them 100% support.
But I still wanted to hurt the Japs, and I think I did alright. I ordered my 4 carriers in their 2 TFs to patrol near Taivu. Lunga responded by attacking with some Vals and Zeros which were shot down by my CAP of 137 planes
Then we spotted a TF of 7 APs in the slot, I'm not sure if they were loaded and headed to Lunga, or on their way back. It didn't matter, though, because I sank all seven of them with 3 air strikes from my carriers.
And then my carriers disappeared back to Luganville before the Japanese carriers could react.
I moved the Marines to Luganville. Rennell turned into a level 1 port so I put together some APD task forces to ferry fuel to Rennell, and moved 6 PT boats there. Also created a TF of 4 DMs to lay mines around Rennell in case the Japs decide to try bombarding there again.
I also managed to sink 2 more APs with subs.
An extra airgroup of Hudsons was moved to Cooktown, because they have the range to interdict shipping to Gili Gili from there. The large bomber force at PM was ordered to work away at the ground forces at Gili Gili, soften them up for a while. Alternating between ground attacks and port attacks.
Two fresh infantry divisions have arrived at Brisbane, and I think I could retake Gili Gili, but I prefer letting them keep the base for a while. It seems that in Gili Gili and Lunga they have 2 divisions in relatively forward positions. I am going to make them pay like hell to try and keep those divisions supplied. And use my carriers for quick raids on either location.
Sound like a plan?
Anyway, this is what happened the last week or two of July.
My plan was basically ruined when Gili Gili fell. The Japs very quickly managed to land a large force there. Perhaps I should have concentrated Port Moresbys bombers on the APs rather than the supporting carriers. I did manage to get a bomb hit on the Akagi. And I also recognized the Junyo was present.
Gili Gili really fell due to gross mismanagement on my part. They were being bombed round the clock, as well as bombarded, and I left them withering on the vine there as their supplies became lower and lower. I was afraid to send in convoys to resupply them because of the huge Japanese carrier presence. So I tried using my (now 5) airgroups of transports from Townville, but with the amount of supplies Gili Gili was losing in each air strike and bombardment, I couldn't keep the lifeline flowing.
So I lost an entire division of Australians. I officially apologize to all of you Aussies out there. Thank God I wasn't in charge during the real war, eh? This event bummed me out, and made me realize that Mogami was right. I can't be launching an offensive while the Japanese can still move in and take one of my large bases with impunity.
Adding to this, recon photos of Lunga showed there were more than 20000 troops there. I'm not going to throw the Marines into that viper's nest if I can't give them 100% support.
But I still wanted to hurt the Japs, and I think I did alright. I ordered my 4 carriers in their 2 TFs to patrol near Taivu. Lunga responded by attacking with some Vals and Zeros which were shot down by my CAP of 137 planes
Then we spotted a TF of 7 APs in the slot, I'm not sure if they were loaded and headed to Lunga, or on their way back. It didn't matter, though, because I sank all seven of them with 3 air strikes from my carriers.
And then my carriers disappeared back to Luganville before the Japanese carriers could react.
I moved the Marines to Luganville. Rennell turned into a level 1 port so I put together some APD task forces to ferry fuel to Rennell, and moved 6 PT boats there. Also created a TF of 4 DMs to lay mines around Rennell in case the Japs decide to try bombarding there again.
I also managed to sink 2 more APs with subs.
An extra airgroup of Hudsons was moved to Cooktown, because they have the range to interdict shipping to Gili Gili from there. The large bomber force at PM was ordered to work away at the ground forces at Gili Gili, soften them up for a while. Alternating between ground attacks and port attacks.
Two fresh infantry divisions have arrived at Brisbane, and I think I could retake Gili Gili, but I prefer letting them keep the base for a while. It seems that in Gili Gili and Lunga they have 2 divisions in relatively forward positions. I am going to make them pay like hell to try and keep those divisions supplied. And use my carriers for quick raids on either location.
Sound like a plan?
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
RE Lee
I was busy writting this novel while Snigbert was making his last post. Please ignore anything rendered obsolete.
Hi. Snigbert there are worse Generals to be compared to, If a quiz gave me RE Lee I would not be insulted but would I be surprised. Excepting of course that when he assumed command he realized the static defense would fail against McCellans slow siege warfare style so doing the only thing possible he risked a faster defeat but did the only thing that had remote victory chances. Perhaps his personal knowledge of McCellans character was of some use and shortened the odds in his mind. Certainly very few of the great commanders in history would have reacted the way McCellan did. Rather then be over joy'd at an entrenched enemy coming out into the open he believed himself to be the one in danger and retreated. (I can never comprehend how he remained-even long after the war when everyone knew otherwise-convinced he was outnumbered.)
Very few officers would have chose to fight at Antietam.
Very few would have been able to keep the field. But he did.
Did Lee get his reputation solely from McCellan, no but every Union officer afterwards (till Grant) was always in awe of what the ANV had done and forgot how much it owed to 'Little Mac' being perhaps the most timid commander ever to wear an American uniform. Although Grant never assumed command of the AOP he realized the need for him to be there (since Sherman et al could be trusted to operate on their own in pursuit of his strategic objectives) Lee was never able to dazzle the AOP while Grant was there. Grant is one of my heroes. He learned from every engagement. Developed long range plans. Was not relient on reinforcements before moving. And always made the enemy army the target rather then geographic locations.
Lee was the senior military advisor to Davis prior to commanding the ANV. Afterward more then anyone else he held the ear of the president. No plan of his was ever refused. As such his insight directed the Southern war efforts. Longstreet proved at Chickamaga(sic) that the eastern theater could influence events in the West. The war was being lost in the West Yet Lee never considered going there himself. Knowing where a war is being lost and not coming up with any plan to counter the trend reveals something to me. (not that there was anything that could realistically alter the course) Perhaps after all it was only his since of duty that put him where he was and he knew all along what the outcome would be (the 'Lost Cause' myth)
Perhaps but I really don't feel he was the kind Of person to sacrifice so many others following his personal sense of duty. So I left with the belief he was unable at the strategic level to find a solution.
Acceptable risk impliess that the forces commited to battle be those that can be afforded to be lost but the fruits of their victory are such as to make the effort worth while. Certain Japanese assets carry enormous risks. (The CV's mainly)
They can never be replaced. The US on the other hand knows it can replace lost units. It only has to decide whether they can be lost at a particular time. The paradox in UV is the Japanese MUST commit their CV's in order to maintain their offensive. The US will no doubt at some point feel the need to use theirs. But can be picky about how where and when. Trades favor the US. The Japanese must not only defeat the US CV's they must do so without undo loss in order to be able to oppose the future US reinforcement CV.
Historically Japan in the Campaigns covered by UV tried to fight over too board a front with too little force.
There are two separate campaigns going on. NG and the Solomons. The Japanese used the same resources to fight them both while the Allies had two separate commands.
Guadalcanal entered the picture after the US had decided to use Santa Cruz as a spring board to drive toward Rabaul as a follow on to Midway to put the Japanese on the defensive and prevent their further expansion. Only the fact of the Japanese building the airbase at Lunga made it a target.
The Japanese planned the airfield to guard their flank while they continued their offensive in NG against PM.
The US landings there achieved success in both campaigns when the Japanese diverted resources from the NG effort to try to recapture. There after neither of their efforts had sufficient force to achieve the separate aims.
I do not know (before actually having a look at the game) whether NG is a viable target for the Japanese in UV.
This leaves the Solomons. If Lunga is the best base to construct an airfield within air cover of Shortland then it will certainly be where I direct my opening efforts as Japan. But I will not leave it hanging with only engineers defending it. I will target Santa Cruz with everything able to keep the US worried over it's welfare. The plan being to draw the US starting forces out as early as possible. The main goal is to buy time to move assets where needed without interference
This concludes another Mogami rambling narrative. Stay tuned for chapter 1012
Hi. Snigbert there are worse Generals to be compared to, If a quiz gave me RE Lee I would not be insulted but would I be surprised. Excepting of course that when he assumed command he realized the static defense would fail against McCellans slow siege warfare style so doing the only thing possible he risked a faster defeat but did the only thing that had remote victory chances. Perhaps his personal knowledge of McCellans character was of some use and shortened the odds in his mind. Certainly very few of the great commanders in history would have reacted the way McCellan did. Rather then be over joy'd at an entrenched enemy coming out into the open he believed himself to be the one in danger and retreated. (I can never comprehend how he remained-even long after the war when everyone knew otherwise-convinced he was outnumbered.)
Very few officers would have chose to fight at Antietam.
Very few would have been able to keep the field. But he did.
Did Lee get his reputation solely from McCellan, no but every Union officer afterwards (till Grant) was always in awe of what the ANV had done and forgot how much it owed to 'Little Mac' being perhaps the most timid commander ever to wear an American uniform. Although Grant never assumed command of the AOP he realized the need for him to be there (since Sherman et al could be trusted to operate on their own in pursuit of his strategic objectives) Lee was never able to dazzle the AOP while Grant was there. Grant is one of my heroes. He learned from every engagement. Developed long range plans. Was not relient on reinforcements before moving. And always made the enemy army the target rather then geographic locations.
Lee was the senior military advisor to Davis prior to commanding the ANV. Afterward more then anyone else he held the ear of the president. No plan of his was ever refused. As such his insight directed the Southern war efforts. Longstreet proved at Chickamaga(sic) that the eastern theater could influence events in the West. The war was being lost in the West Yet Lee never considered going there himself. Knowing where a war is being lost and not coming up with any plan to counter the trend reveals something to me. (not that there was anything that could realistically alter the course) Perhaps after all it was only his since of duty that put him where he was and he knew all along what the outcome would be (the 'Lost Cause' myth)
Perhaps but I really don't feel he was the kind Of person to sacrifice so many others following his personal sense of duty. So I left with the belief he was unable at the strategic level to find a solution.
Acceptable risk impliess that the forces commited to battle be those that can be afforded to be lost but the fruits of their victory are such as to make the effort worth while. Certain Japanese assets carry enormous risks. (The CV's mainly)
They can never be replaced. The US on the other hand knows it can replace lost units. It only has to decide whether they can be lost at a particular time. The paradox in UV is the Japanese MUST commit their CV's in order to maintain their offensive. The US will no doubt at some point feel the need to use theirs. But can be picky about how where and when. Trades favor the US. The Japanese must not only defeat the US CV's they must do so without undo loss in order to be able to oppose the future US reinforcement CV.
Historically Japan in the Campaigns covered by UV tried to fight over too board a front with too little force.
There are two separate campaigns going on. NG and the Solomons. The Japanese used the same resources to fight them both while the Allies had two separate commands.
Guadalcanal entered the picture after the US had decided to use Santa Cruz as a spring board to drive toward Rabaul as a follow on to Midway to put the Japanese on the defensive and prevent their further expansion. Only the fact of the Japanese building the airbase at Lunga made it a target.
The Japanese planned the airfield to guard their flank while they continued their offensive in NG against PM.
The US landings there achieved success in both campaigns when the Japanese diverted resources from the NG effort to try to recapture. There after neither of their efforts had sufficient force to achieve the separate aims.
I do not know (before actually having a look at the game) whether NG is a viable target for the Japanese in UV.
This leaves the Solomons. If Lunga is the best base to construct an airfield within air cover of Shortland then it will certainly be where I direct my opening efforts as Japan. But I will not leave it hanging with only engineers defending it. I will target Santa Cruz with everything able to keep the US worried over it's welfare. The plan being to draw the US starting forces out as early as possible. The main goal is to buy time to move assets where needed without interference
This concludes another Mogami rambling narrative. Stay tuned for chapter 1012
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
If Lunga is the best base to construct an airfield within air cover of Shortland then it will certainly be where I direct my opening efforts as Japan.
You should know that Shortland is a much better Port than Airfield. It is only a natural 1 or 2 airfield, IIRC, so it will take some effort to base LBA there.
You should know that Shortland is a much better Port than Airfield. It is only a natural 1 or 2 airfield, IIRC, so it will take some effort to base LBA there.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the