PT Boats are awesome

[Fallschirmjager]

My opponent got me back two turns later. I sent my PT force back to Manilla to re-fuel and re-arm and sent them out again for some night attacks. Unfortunatly on the hex outside of Bataan they were caught in the day time by 44 Zeros that my opponent had put on naval attack at 100 feet. They were shredded by 20mm cannon fire and 7 of 9 were sunk and the last two had heavy fires but made it back to Bataan. They will probably sink in the next few turns or if I can get them back to Manilla I never expect them to be able to be repaired to a combat ready state again.
So there goes my last naval force in the PI.

[Kull]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

They have been. If they show up by suprise while you are unloading they are still going to cause you problems..., but most of the time (in my testing) they are driven off or (in daylight) turn away. I'd suggest everyone wait for the patch to see what has been done before getting too involved in this subject.

That sounds good. As for those who continually defend the PT's ability to swoop in on enemy TFs and deliver decisive blows, I ask only this: ONE EXAMPLE. Please? From the whole war? In theory it sounds like perfect sense. They charge in at high speed out of the night, deliver their deadly cylinders, and race off leaving behind an ocean full of flaming ships. Except for one minor problem. It NEVER HAPPENED. Not once.

To me, Surigao Strait is the perfect example of how truly ineffective PT Boats were, at least in the context of accurately delivering torpedoes on target:
- It was 1944, by which time the PT crews and commanders had had years to practice their craft and hone their experience.
- They had radar and knew exactly where and when their targets would appear.
- They had huge numbers (37, although some sources say 39).
- They attacked in restricted waters.
- They attacked a target that didn't know they were coming.
- And they had ZERO hits.

As the battle progressed and the second Japanese division entered a flaming hell of battle in which their compatriots had largely been destroyed (by everything other than PTs), they tried to turn and escape. And only then did the Allied PTs score their hits. Against a ship they didn't aim at. And another that was dead in the water and took three runs to hit (after the first two shots missed). And that was a burning target that wasn't moving.

My original assertion - that Destroyers would "shred" PTs - simply doesn't hold up against the facts. Only seven were destroyed by enemy surface fire during the whole Pacific War. I absolutely agree that these things were nimble and had high survivability. But at the same time, the PT defenders here have to admit that the expereince of 4 years of war proves that these things were COMPLETELY inaccurate. Against barges, PT boats were hell on wheels. Against everything else? Well, if you take a few 1000 shots, you're bound to hit something.

And for those who still believe these things should be able to successfully attack targets in the open ocean? Again. ONE EXAMPLE? Please?

[Fishbed]

I guess Fallschirmjager's result is not far off from the reality: apart from reefs, the biggest threat to PT boats were planes, actually, if we're looking at the breakdown of PT casualties.

I guess it could be the best remedy to PT-Boat concentrations, if indeed fighters are that good at hunting them. No more big flotillas unless you have complete air superiority.

[Dili]

"That sounds good. As for those who continually defend the PT's ability to swoop in on enemy TFs and deliver decisive blows, I ask only this: ONE EXAMPLE. Please? From the whole war?"

PEDESTAL convoy August 13
Passed through minefields between Africa and Sicily around midnight.
8 Italian torpedo boats make 15 attacks -other sources report 7 German S-boots too.
Cruiser Manchester hit, sinks by evening
Santa Elisa (US) hit by torpedo, entire ship on fire and abandoned
Almeria Lykes (US) torpedoed, sinks immediately
British Wairangi and Glenorchy torpedoed, on fire. No survivors from Glenorchy
Rochester Castle torpedoed but keeps going. It is now 4 AM.

http://www.usmm.org/malta.html

None of Axis PT's had radar.

And for those who still believe these things should be able to successfully attack targets in the open ocean? Again. ONE EXAMPLE? Please?

Why not? For start you never said why they shouldn't. Many circunstances that never occured in WW2 can happen in Game. War is not a script.

[Kull]

ORIGINAL: Dili

http://www.usmm.org/malta.html

Nice try, but those weren't US PT Boats firing Mark 8 torpedoes with the US aiming system. It's like saying that since the IJN and USN both fielded submarines, the exploits of one are proof for the other. Prove to us that US PT Boats took out or severely damaged entire convoys with torpedoes in the Pacific.

Why not? For start you never said why they shouldn't. Many circunstances that never occured in WW2 can happen in Game. War is not a script.

War is also not a fantasy. When you can prove that PT Boat attacks could and did take place in the Blue Water of the open ocean, then it will be believable in game. I allowed facts to change my opinion as to survivability of PT Boats in action. You are dogged in your refusal to accept the verdict of facts when it comes to torpedo accuracy and open ocean combat.

[bradfordkay]

Kull, I can see where you are coming from, but your assertion doesn't prove that they couldn't make open ocean attacks in decent weather. A main reason that they didn't is because they never had either the opportunity or the need: in the areas where they were operating, the Japanese weren't using convoys of large ships. Thus to say that because they never did means that they never could is stretching the point.

Again, I will state that I would agree with a negative modifier to small craft combat die rolls (not just PTs, but PCs, YPs, etc) in open ocean in bad weather. But to categorically prohibit something that might have been able to happen (such as the attacks by motor torpedo boats in the Med) just doesn't make sense to me.

[Kull]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Kull, I can see where you are coming from, but your assertion doesn't prove that they couldn't make open ocean attacks in decent weather. A main reason that they didn't is because they never had either the opportunity or the need: in the areas where they were operating, the Japanese weren't using convoys of large ships. Thus to say that because they never did means that they never could is stretching the point.

Again, I will state that I would agree with a negative modifier to small craft combat die rolls (not just PTs, but PCs, YPs, etc) in open ocean in bad weather. But to categorically prohibit something that might have been able to happen (such as the attacks by motor torpedo boats in the Med) just doesn't make sense to me.

My opinion is that they didn't because they couldn't. Even moderate swells would make these things painful to ride in, much less shoot from, plus they lose one of their biggest assets which was to attack from and escape to the coastal shallows. But it's also possible that they didn't because of lack of opportunity. I'll grant you that it would be hard to prove which of the two is correct.

But for me, the far, far larger issue involves torpedo accuracy. The very nature of their combat doctrine - move in, shoot, and then run away - makes it hard to determine how effective they really were from a review of combat reports. Which is why I keep going back to Surigao Strait. The battle was extremely well documented and not subject to the lack of verifiable results that encumber most PT actions. Plus the PT Boats had EVERY advantage here and the results were almost laughably abysmal. If your weapons platform has to make three separate runs at a dead-in-the-water ship to get even one hit, I highly doubt that even freighters have much to worry about.

[Scott_USN]

German S-Boats had success in attacking and the Royal Navy became very cautious of them. I am not sure what their kill numbers are but they did break up supply convoys in the Med and attacked british ships around Baltic and North Seas.
 
The US PT boats were also feared or if not feared they did cause considerable problems just by being in the area of operations.

[Kull]

When I talk about "unverifiable" actions, here is an example of what I'm talking about. In no way am I impugning the courage or integrity of the men involved, but "fog of war" was a very real thing, and this is a classic example:

ORIGINAL: Dili
At Close Quarters
PT Boats in the United States Navy
http://funsite.unc.edu/hyperwar/USN/Clo ... html#index

16. ENGAGEMENT OFF CEBU
For a time PT 41 was the only operational boat in Squadron 3. Bulkeley returned in the 41 to Zamboanguita, put a patch on the 35 and towed her to Cebu City, where there was a marine railway. When he came back to Mindanao he found that Kelly had made emergency repairs to the 34 at a little machine shop in Inlug Cove, to the north of Cagayan. the 34 could make all of 12 knots without shaking herself to pieces. That was sufficient for the trip to Cebu, where further repairs could be made at the Opan Shipbuilding & Slipway Corp. This was a small yard whose 71-year-old proprietor, "Dad" Cleland, refused to worry about payment for his work. "You fight 'em and I'll fix'em," he told Bulkeley.

While at Cebu the boat crews worked for 3 nights helping load two submarines with food and supplies for Corregidor. The submarines gave Bulkeley torpedoes to reload the 41's empty tubes.

The 34 went back in the water on the afternoon of April 8. On the same afternoon Bulkeley learned that Army planes had seen two enemy destroyers heading south through Tañon Strait, between Cebu and its western neighbor, Negros. The ships should clear the southern tip of Cebu about midnight.

Bulkeley, with Cox in the 41, followed by Kelly in the 34, slid down the eastern side of Cebu to meet the enemy force as it emerged from the strait. DeWitt L. Glover, CQM, on the 41, was the first to sight the enemy. "There she is!" he shouted. Then, as it dawned on him what he saw, "Jumping Jesus! There she is!"

What he saw, 5,000 yards ahead, gliding slowly eastward just 2 miles off the tip of Cebu, was not the expected destroyers, but a light cruiser, armed with 5.5- and 3-inch guns, bristling with smaller automatic weapons.

The 41 led the way, idling in on the cruiser's port side. At 500 yards Cox fired two torpedoes. They ran erratically, straddling the target bow and stern. The 41 increased speed, circled to the right, and Bulkeley fired her last two torpedoes. Both Bulkeley and Cox saw the torpedoes run true, one to the bow and the other beneath the bridge, but observed no explosion.

While the 41 was circling, Kelly brought the 34 in broad on the bow and fired two torpedoes at 500 yards. The cruiser's searchlight blazed a path through the night, sweeping the sky, then catching the 41 for a moment, finally settling on the 34. At the same time the cruiser opened fire and increased speed rapidly. Kelly saw his torpedoes miss astern.

--21--

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The 41 circled to the starboard side of the cruiser to strafe her decks in an attempt to draw fire from the 34. But the cruiser held the 34 in the searchlight beam and directed automatic fire and salvos from its main battery at the PT. Kelly made a U-turn to the left, passing astern of the cruiser and coming up on the starboard quarter from almost dead astern. During the turn the 34 dropped back to about 2,500 yards. Kelly ordered his gunners to fire into the searchlight. Japanese shells were whistling over; one carried away the mast just aft of the cockpit. Willard J. Reynolds, CCStd, whose machine-guns were the first to fire at the searchlight, was hit by shrapnel in the neck and shoulder.

"It was estimated," Kelly said, "that the cruiser was making 20-25 knots. Pursuit was maintained for about 5 or 10 minutes by which time the PT 34 was within 300 yards of the cruiser whose searchlight beam was depressed almost to the vertical in order to keep the PT 34 illuminated. Although this was considered a very poor position for firing torpedoes, the cruiser's automatic fire was coming so close that further delay was impossible. Two Mark XIV (45 knot) torpedoes were now fired with 6-foot depth setting in an overtaking shot from close on the cruiser's starboard quarter.

"The PT 34 now turned right at maximum speed to retire south only to be simultaneously taken under fire by a destroyer some 2,000 yards to starboard as well as being kept under fire and illumination by the cruiser. It looked like we were trapped. Our mast had been shot away and our topside was riddled with .50-caliber holes. The cruiser turned, apparently to follow us and prevent our escaping, the destroyer closing us to port. Just then two spouts of water some 20 feet high and 30 feet apart were seen by me through binoculars to appear amidships at the cruiser's waterline at 5-second intervals. My first reaction was that the cruiser had been hit by two rounds from the destroyer firing on me to starboard. However, Chief Torpedoman Martino had also seen the hits and reported them to me as torpedo hits. Apparently the cruiser had turned directly into the path of the torpedoes. All this occurred in less than a minute after firing. The cruiser's searchlight immediately began to fade as though there had been a power failure aboard. All its guns stopped firing and that was the last I ever saw of it."

The 34, able to make 38 knots now that her torpedoes were gone, then started maneuvering to evade the destroyer on her starboard hand. "By violent zigzagging and executing a series of right angle turns this was accomplished after about 10 minutes, without receiving further hits," Kelly

--22--

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said. "The PT 34 then headed northward for the entrance of Bohol Strait in order to return to Cebu City. Since there were no more torpedoes aboard, it was considered advisable to head back to the base before the Jap destroyers could cut us off.

"A few moments after setting a northeasterly course a destroyer was seen dead ahead bearing down on the 34 at high speed. Only by swerving to the left was a collision avoided and we passed down their starboard side close aboard without their firing a shot. They immediately turned and commenced pursuit illuminating us with their searchlight and taking us under fire with their main battery. They kept up the chase until about 0130 when we were some 5-6 miles to the north of them. Searchlights to the southward were observed by us until about 0200."

While the 34 was making its second attack and then maneuvering to shake the first destroyer, the 41 tried to create the illusion of many torpedo boats by firing machine-gun bursts at different positions. The 41 then headed back toward the cruiser to ascertain its condition, but suddenly was illuminated by another destroyer which opened fire and gave chase. Heading east at top speed, the 41 found one enemy destroyer blocking its escape to the north, and two more to the east. The boat turned south and ran to Port Misamis, Mindanao, where the inlet was too shallow for destroyers to follow.

What were the results of the action? Kelly believed that the cruiser was of the 3,230-ton Tenryu class, because the center stack appeared to be wider than the other two. He is certain that his last two torpedoes hit. Eight days after the action, Kelly, having escaped through the Japanese lines on Cebu, reached Dumaguete, Negros. There he met a U.S. Army private who had been in an Army speedboat aground on Siquijor Island and had seen the action. The private told Kelly that he had seen a destroyer illuminate the cruiser and go alongside it half an hour after the engagement. He was sure that the cruiser had sunk later. Kelly also met at Dumaguete an American professor from the local university, who had watched the engagement from shore. He, too, believed the cruiser had sunk.

Bulkeley, on the 41, thought that the cruiser was of the 5,100-ton Kuma class, because of its widely flared stacks. He saw no explosions, but said that just after the 34's second attack, the cruiser was completely enveloped in a cloud of yellowish brown smoke. He also saw the searchlight dim gradually, then flicker out, as though from power failure. Finally, Bulkeley reported that the first destroyer swept past the cruiser and illuminated it briefly by searchlight. "It could be seen," he reported, "that the cruiser was sinking by the stern with her bow up in the air."

--23--

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Japanese sources indicate that the Kuma was attacked by torpedo boats on this date, but that the Kuma took only one hit--a torpedo that failed to explode. Whatever the damage, or lack of it, the Kuma remained afloat until January 11, 1944, when she was sunk off Penang by a British submarine. And the magnitude of the damage, or lack of it, neither increases nor diminishes the courage of the officers and men who pressed home a closerange attack on a dangerous enemy 100 times their size.

Some very interesting data here. Eight torpedos were fired at one cruiser at ranges varying from 300 to 500 yards, and only one hit, and that failed to explode. Despite this, the combat report is loaded with information indicating that multiple explosions occurred, and even one statement (by the book's author no less), that he saw her sinking with bow in the air.

Which is very much my point. Read the entire document and it's full of this kind of thing. PT Boats were manned by very brave men indeed, but as torpedo weapons platforms they weren't very accurate, and the reports of successes, no matter how dramatic, have to be taken with very large grains of salt.

[bradfordkay]

"While at Cebu the boat crews worked for 3 nights helping load two submarines with food and supplies for Corregidor. The submarines gave Bulkeley torpedoes to reload the 41's empty tubes."

"Two Mark XIV (45 knot) torpedoes were now fired"


Okay, in these reports you have PTs using the Mk14 torpedoes loaded from submarines in December 1941. Are you trying to claim that the results of these attacks are going to be representative of the combat capability of PTs throughout the war? It seems to me that if those attacks had been made in late 1943 or 1944 there is good likelihood of different results, due to improvements in the torpedoes themselves.

 Yes, the PT was not the best platform, but it probably isn't as bad a platform as you have been so loudly proclaiming.

[Kull]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

"While at Cebu the boat crews worked for 3 nights helping load two submarines with food and supplies for Corregidor. The submarines gave Bulkeley torpedoes to reload the 41's empty tubes."

"Two Mark XIV (45 knot) torpedoes were now fired"


Okay, in these reports you have PTs using the Mk14 torpedoes loaded from submarines in December 1941. Are you trying to claim that the results of these attacks are going to be representative of the combat capability of PTs throughout the war? It seems to me that if those attacks had been made in late 1943 or 1944 there is good likelihood of different results, due to improvements in the torpedoes themselves.

Yes, the PT was not the best platform, but it probably isn't as bad a platform as you have been so loudly proclaiming.

The point of the excerpt was to show that even when PT Boats claimed successes, there's an excellent chance that they are totally wrong. Surigao Strait on the other hand was totally verifiable and proves how terrible of a torpedo platform they were. And you can't blame that one on "bad torpedoes". They were wonderful anti-barge boats (once armed with decent deck guns) and they were absolutely a huge annoyance to the enemy. But as a surface combat unit, the PT Boat isn't much to talk about. Probably no more successful than midget subs when ranked on a hit-per-boat basis.

[bradfordkay]

So, adjust the "to hit" numbers, but don't nerf the things entirely. That's my argument...  

[Kull]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

So, adjust the "to hit" numbers, but don't nerf the things entirely. That's my argument...  

And there, my friend, we are in violent agreement! [:)]

[Dili]

Nice try, but those weren't US PT Boats firing Mark 8 torpedoes with the US aiming system. It's like saying that since the IJN and USN both fielded submarines, the exploits of one are proof for the other. Prove to us that US PT Boats took out or severely damaged entire convoys with torpedoes in the Pacific.

Then represent the US PT's editing all problems you think they have and don't cripple the game with more hardcode and forcing developers spend time in this.
Put US PT's with less maneuverality, less speed, worse torpedos(ex:reduce the torpedo range to 1) and bad crew. There is nothing that forces you to not put US PT crew with value of 30.

[Kull]

ORIGINAL: Dili

Nice try, but those weren't US PT Boats firing Mark 8 torpedoes with the US aiming system. It's like saying that since the IJN and USN both fielded submarines, the exploits of one are proof for the other. Prove to us that US PT Boats took out or severely damaged entire convoys with torpedoes in the Pacific.

Then represent the US PT's editing all problems you think they have and don't cripple the game with more hardcode and forcing developers spend time in this.
Put US PT's with less maneuverality, less speed, worse torpedos(ex:reduce the torpedo range to 1) and bad crew. There is nothing that forces you to not put US PT crew with value of 30.

Fortunately the Developers seem to agree, and Mike Scholl's reports indicate that PTs are significantly "dialled back". A review of the historical record proves they were a marginal weapons platform at best, and hopefully the patch will get that right.

Edit: Actually the record indicates that speed, maneuverability, and crew skill were all quite high. It just seems to be damned hard to fire off an accurate fish from one of these things.

[Dili]

Sea State affect maneuverality and speed. If they can't hit a thing with good weather the problem is skill.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Kull

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

They have been. If they show up by suprise while you are unloading they are still going to cause you problems..., but most of the time (in my testing) they are driven off or (in daylight) turn away. I'd suggest everyone wait for the patch to see what has been done before getting too involved in this subject.

To me, Surigao Strait is the perfect example of how truly ineffective PT Boats were, at least in the context of accurately delivering torpedoes on target:
- It was 1944, by which time the PT crews and commanders had had years to practice their craft and hone their experience.
- They had radar and knew exactly where and when their targets would appear.
- They had huge numbers (37, although some sources say 39).
- They attacked in restricted waters.
- They attacked a target that didn't know they were coming.
- And they had ZERO hits.

I respectfully disagree with your conclusion from the Surigao Strait AAR.

According to Samuel Eliot Morison (Volume 12, History of United States Naval Operations in WWII), The 45 PT boats were set up along the islands leading into the strait as a scout picket line. Their orders were to continuously update the main SCTF force on the composition of enemy forces, speed, bearing, etc. After radioing their information, they were permitted a strike.

The PT crews had not had any torpedo attack training in well over a year. They had largely been employed as gunboats in the Solomons. The only 'fish' that they had fired in over a year was a single training run against Mios Woendi.

Some of them did attack as stragglers, some as small groups ('sections'). Some missed the attack opportunity altogether. Those that fired torpedoes typically only salvoed a single torpedo against the IJN line. CL Abukama was hit by a torpedo fired from the PT boats, but was undeterred in completing her mission.

I look at Surigao as a piecemeal application of poorly trained and undergunned scout watercraft against a superior force. The results of the attack portion of the mission-poor-reflect their mission, distribution and training variables. If 45 of them had attacked either of Nishimura's split forces as a cohesive group of well-trained attack craft (scout mission be damned), the outcome would likely have been different.

The fact that the combat successes against IJN (non-barges) ships was underwhelming doesn't mean that PTs COULDN'T have done more with a more forceful application of an attack doctrine. The PT boat question is, in my mind, more a failure of imagination on the part of the naval high command.
Akin to the role of PBYs: they served yeoman's work as scout / search / rescue aircraft. Their attack record (number of IJN ships torpedoed by Catalinas) was a lower rate than, say, carrier-based Avengers. That's OK because the attack mission was a peripheral role of the Catalinas. It doesn't mean that the platform is a failure. Not everyone in the armed forces is a 'trigger puller' all the time.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Kull
My opinion is that they didn't because they couldn't. Even moderate swells would make these things painful to ride in, much less shoot from, plus they lose one of their biggest assets which was to attack from and escape to the coastal shallows. But it's also possible that they didn't because of lack of opportunity. I'll grant you that it would be hard to prove which of the two is correct.

On the issue of PTs, my opinion is that they didn't because they didn't-not that they couldn't. Why didn't they? Undertraining, poor torpedo performance, dilution effect, access to timely intelligence, failure of high command to apply their strengths more appropriately, etc.

In game terms-other than perhaps lowering the 'naval experience' levels of the crew to reflect their minimal anti-naval torpedo experience-no hard code changes are in order.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Kull
My opinion is that they didn't because they couldn't. Even moderate swells would make these things painful to ride in, much less shoot from, plus they lose one of their biggest assets which was to attack from and escape to the coastal shallows. But it's also possible that they didn't because of lack of opportunity. I'll grant you that it would be hard to prove which of the two is correct.

Both the Germans and the British used MTB's in the Channel and the North Sea..., two bodies of water not known for their placidity. While I'd agree that really rough weather could hamstring PT's, you shouldn't overstate the case.

[John Lansford]

I was going to point out that PT boats rarely got the opportunity to fire torpedoes at anything during the war, much less warships, and by 1944 their role was more of scout, pilot rescue and barge killers than anti-shipping.  If you've been conducting those other missions for over a year and suddenly be asked to torpedo fast moving warships, don't be surprised if the results are poor.