Does someone really understand IJA's dumb decisions?

[Platoonist]

Japan’s decision for war rested on several assumptions, some realistic, others not. The first was that time was working against Japan—i.e., the longer they took to initiate war with the United States, the dimmer its prospects for success. The Japanese also assumed they had little chance of winning a protracted war with the United States but hoped they could force the U.S. into a murderous, island-by-island slog across the Central and Southwestern Pacific that would eventually erode the American will to fight on to total victory. The Japanese believed they were racially and spiritually superior to the Americans, whom they regarded as an effete, creature-comforted people divided by political factionalism and racial and class strife. Ultimately, the Americans were businessmen not samurai. They would calculate costs and benefits and come to terms with the realities created by Japanese arms.

American attempts to deter Japanese expansion into the Southwestern Pacific via the imposition of harsh economic sanctions, redeployment of the U.S. Fleet from southern California to Pearl Harbor, and the dispatch of B-17 long-range bombers to the Philippines all backfired because the United States insisted that Japan evacuate both Indochina and China as the price for a restoration of U.S. trade. The United States demanded, in effect, that Japan abandon its empire, and by extension its aspiration to become a great power, and submit to the economic dominion of the United States. Something no self-respecting Japanese politician could accept...unless they wanted to be assassinated five minutes later.

[jiajia1]

Tenchu!

tenchu.jpg (42.58 KiB) Viewed 1204 times

[RangerJoe]

Part of the problem was miscommunication at the diplomatic level. The United States government wanted Japan to withdraw its forces from China. The Japanese would have withdrawn from China and but not from Manchuria/Manchukuo. The United States did not mean Manchuria/Manchukuo, the United States knew the Japanese position because of the interception and decoding of the Japanese diplomatic messages. But the United States did not clarify the misunderstanding so there is blame there for not being clear about the United States position.

In the summer of 1940, the United States moved the Pacific Fleet from the main base to a forward base at Oahu. The Japanese took this as a threat and the Pacific fleet commander, Admiral James O. Richardson, was replaced after personally protesting this move.

A description of an attack on the bases at Oahu:

https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-h ... rl-harbor/

About Kimmel and his preparations . . .

https://pearlharbor.org/admiral-kimmel/

[Titar]

Here is a controversial view. Up to the point where Japan declared war on the US, and the events leading up to that, most of the aggressive actions by local commanders would have looked like successes to the average Japanese person.

I understand that the Japanese mindset at the time was it is OK to disobey orders and go on the offensive or start a conflict so long as you are doing it for the greater good of Japan. You can get pretty far with local autonomy in decision making and a lot of determination/good morale.

Before Japan bit off more than it could chew, Japan would have seemed to be very successful to the average Japanese person. Take a look again at how large the Japanese empire was even before 42.

So why change what appears to be working? Of course this behavior lead directly to US intervention, but only the civilian branch of leadership was worried about long term consequences.

[Platoonist]

I understand that the Japanese mindset at the time was it is OK to disobey orders and go on the offensive or start a conflict so long as you are doing it for the greater good of Japan. You can get pretty far with local autonomy in decision making and a lot of determination/good morale.

The Japanese themselves called it Gekokujō. Variously translated as "the lower rules the higher" or "the low overcomes the high".

It seems there were many high-placed Japanese politicians and miltary leaders who understood the daunting odds that Japan faced in a looming war with the US but felt they had no choice but to take the gamble. Otherwise, they might face assassination or hounding from office. Maybe even civil war. I think it points out the critical difference with Germany's path to war. There it was all driven from the top, especially from the ideology of Hitler himself. But in Japan the major impetus for war came from below in the middle and lower ranks of the military. By the 1930s, insubordination from below was producing a strong sense of military superiority, independence from any kind of civilian supervision, and endemic violence.

You do get the sense that if any of these hot-headed nationalist officers had known the long odds that Japan faced, they wouldn't have cared anyway. Martial spirit would suffice to overcome all.

[Bella]

This is a really old thread, but I'm currently obsessed with the game (Allied, at February 11, 1942) and thought I'd throw this in for anyone stumbling through these ancient discussions, like I am.

For an excellent understanding of Japanese ideas, plans, dreams considering the coming Pacific war, I recommend the two books by English historian H.P. Willmott: Empires in the Balance, covering the pre-war deliberations of both the Japanese and Americans, and The Barrier and the Javelin, which covers the war from Pearl Harbour to Midway. This series was intended to be a trilogy, with the third book covering the rest of the war, but it was never written.