How to judge Japan's attack without the benefit of hindsight?

[Canoerebel]

Tim, just to clarify, I wasn't making a dig at Halsey's comment or your use of it.  I was - probably inartfully - trying to point out the sharp contrast between the statements given by Grew and Halsey, both of which were rather well-suited to the circumstances the two faced.

[vinnie71]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

We should not lose sight of the fact, deplorable but true, that no practical and effective code of international morality upon which the world can rely has yet been discovered, and that the standards of morality of one nation in given circumstances have little or no relation to the standards of the individuals of the nations in question. To shape our foreign policy on the unsound theory that other nations are guided and bound by our present standards of international ethics would be to court sure disaster.

Wow, that is truly profound. Grew was indeed an insightful man. The point could be very well made that this premise is still very much in play in world problems today.

Point is - who is to decide what is right or what is wrong at an international level? Morality at international level???? Sorry, but that never existed and will never exist until we have different nation states in competition. Just participate at international fora and see for yourselves. What we get is moralistic justifications of actions, not a set standard of morals for all to follow.

One example - the much vaunted rights of man. These are essentially a Western concept forced on all those countries that decided to join the UN. Yet, when we look around the world, one can easily see that they are not necessarily respected or even interpreted as we in the west think they should. Why? Because they are an alien concept to 75% of humanity.

Even worse is the situation concerning war, warmaking and all those moral issues normally associated with war. All rules are thrown out of the window when survival is at stake. Such rules are meant to 'humanise' war and reduce it to a sterile exercise in which no one gains anything. These rules are also intended to protect vested interests mainly rather than reduce or eradicate war. The current UN setup is also intended to protect the vested interest of a few countries, which is contrary to the spirit of its charter....

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

" But given the militarists who dominated her government, reality is that she almost had to get her teeth kicked in before she would accept this."

You missed the English idiom Termi. The statement was that having their teeth kicked in was almost the only way the Japanese militarists were going to "see the light" of reality...

Well, her teeth were kicked in by months of aerial firebombing capped by two nuclear bombs, but lets leave it there...

Might as well.., as we're in perfect agreement. A Japanese Government not led by militarist fanatics could have surrendered at the end of Summer of 1944 (when it was plain defeat was inevitable) and saved everyone the horrors of the last year of the war.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: Terminus

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

" But given the militarists who dominated her government, reality is that she almost had to get her teeth kicked in before she would accept this."

You missed the English idiom Termi. The statement was that having their teeth kicked in was almost the only way the Japanese militarists were going to "see the light" of reality...

Well, her teeth were kicked in by months of aerial firebombing capped by two nuclear bombs, but lets leave it there...

Might as well.., as we're in perfect agreement. A Japanese Government not led by militarist fanatics could have surrendered at the end of Summer of 1944 (when it was plain defeat was inevitable) and saved everyone the horrors of the last year of the war.

Considering that elements of the IJA actually tried to intervene when Hirohito made the final decision to surrender, it is safe to say that short of a complete "beheading" of the IJA hierarchy, peace was not going to come by anything short of what history gave us. Chilling to think that a few never-say-die zealots were willing to bring Japan and the entire Japanese race to the brink of oblivion and almost succeeded.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Considering that elements of the IJA actually tried to intervene when Hirohito made the final decision to surrender, it is safe to say that short of a complete "beheading" of the IJA hierarchy, peace was not going to come by anything short of what history gave us. Chilling to think that a few never-say-die zealots were willing to bring Japan and the entire Japanese race to the brink of oblivion and almost succeeded.

The potsdam declaration didn't help. Ultimately, for the greater post-war good....i think it made sense, but it did also have the immediate effect of hardening the attitudes of both Germany and Japan, civilian and military while the war was still going on. It made for great press in Axis circles. Richard Frank's book on Japan's last year spent some verbage on this subject and revealed that the declaration was not super popular within the higher level US military command.

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: fbs

But who would pay for that? It's not like the US could just direct its industry the way that Speer did. If a significant fraction of the public did not support a war in the other side of the world, Roosevelt might be limited on what he could order, ergo the industrial production would suffer.

Sorry fbs, but the above quote strongly suggests to me that beyond knowing that aggregate German production increased under Speer, you really have no knowledge as to:

(a) what was actually increased,
(b) the lead times involved,
(c) the structure and business relationships of German industry/businessmen,
(d) the "committees" established by Speer,
(e) the ineficiencies introduced or tolerated by Speer,
(f) how the USA actually produced it military materiel
(g) the much higher American industrial efficiency,
(h) the many different techniques available to finance war which are not dependent on how popular a particular war is with the public

Alfred

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Considering that elements of the IJA actually tried to intervene when Hirohito made the final decision to surrender, it is safe to say that short of a complete "beheading" of the IJA hierarchy, peace was not going to come by anything short of what history gave us. Chilling to think that a few never-say-die zealots were willing to bring Japan and the entire Japanese race to the brink of oblivion and almost succeeded.

The potsdam declaration didn't help. Ultimately, for the greater post-war good....i think it made sense, but it did also have the immediate effect of hardening the attitudes of both Germany and Japan, civilian and military while the war was still going on. It made for great press in Axis circles. Richard Frank's book on Japan's last year spent some verbage on this subject and revealed that the declaration was not super popular within the higher level US military command.

Agreed. While the argument could be made that he who chooses to start a war of aggression is not owed the opportunity for an honorable defeat, from a purely pragmatic standpoint giving some quarter may ultimately be in everyone's best interest. The failure of the US hierarchy to grasp how important the survival of the Monarchy was to many Japanese may have hard set the events of the final month of the war to the course they took. We will never know but perhaps if Truman had softened the Postdam Declaration in just that one area, there would have been no A-Bombs.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Agreed. While the argument could be made that he who chooses to start a war of aggression is not owed the opportunity for an honorable defeat, from a purely pragmatic standpoint giving some quarter may ultimately be in everyone's best interest. The failure of the US hierarchy to grasp how important the survival of the Monarchy was to many Japanese may have hard set the events of the final month of the war to the course they took. We will never know but perhaps if Truman had softened the Postdam Declaration in just that one area, there would have been no A-Bombs.

Similar problems occured during the First World War. More than one opportunity to end the conflict early was squandered on both sides by unreasonable "peace terms." When Russia absolutely could not stay in the war anymore, the eventual terms of Brest-Litovsk were considered so outragious by the new Bolshevik party delegation, that the Treaty signed or not, was considered illegal and void (and that the future Soviet Gov would simply disregard it when it was able too)

Conversely, the harsh terms metted out by Germany on Russia only served to convince France and Britian that they had to fight on to the end lest Germany try to mett out a similar "agreement" with them. Lastly when what goes around, came around to Germany, the Vers. Treaty was just as outragious to them but like the Russians, the Germans had no choice nor were they allowed to even discuss/debate the terms. It was "sign it or else" end of story.

Key difference at the end of WWII was the post-war plan. Reconstruction and rebuilding vs. revenge and spoils of war (at least on the Western Side) The Russians were still in the WWI mode but i can't fault them given what they had lost during the war.

[vinnie71]

Are we sure that the Potsdam decleration could have been different? Frankly I'm under the impression that Truman was trying to bring in the Russians at all costs to shorten the war, and was ready to give them anything in order to have their intervention. Stalin also was not ready to intervene in a war that the other allies wanted to get out of. The harshness of the declaration was driven by such thoughts and also instigated by those who had suffered at their hands.

Besides even the place from which it was promulgated contained a message: we conquered mighty Germany - you're next in line. Any nation would fight all the harder after that. The Japanese had never been conquered by anyone and therefore still harboured the illusion that they could somehow pull through.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58


Japan had numerous options in, say, 1930. Just because the British and French and Dutch empires were empires doesn't mean they weren't interested in peaceful trade for raw materials. Do you have any evidence that, if China had remained un-invaded, Japan would have been denied strategic resources and at least some access to finished goods markets? Of course they had options.

Or, said another way, the history of Japan for the past 65 peaceful, incredibly productive years has been a mirage?

It isn't quite so simple.

Post Bretton Wood and GATT, the world has seen a great increase in world trade. Notwithstanding the failure of the Doha negotiations, the impediments to world trade today are nothing compared to the situation in the 1930s. The barriers to world trade which existed in the 1930s severely impacted upon the economies of countries whose domestic market was too small to absorb their gross output.

Another point to bear in mind is the structural composition of 1930s economies. Even the most advanced economies had only a small service sector, instead being heavily reliant on manufacturing, which output was predominantly directed to the domestic market.

We should not assume that the post 1945 conditions which have allowed the Japanese economy to grow were also available prior to the war.

Alfred

I take your points, of course. Capital flows now; in a high-tarriff, non-digital, hard-money world it was harder. The mercantile system had, for centuries, made colonies attractive as consumers of finished goods from the home nation. Consumer consumption was far more limited, primarily foodstuffs, clothing, and domestic, mostly durable, basics like stoves and wash tubs (not video games.)

And yet, there WAS in-theater trade between local, non-colonial geographies. Even colonies were not prohibited from importing items that the home country either could not value-add economically, or chose not to (Holland was not an industrial superpower for example. GB was, at least in some sectors, such as textiles.) Would it have been easy for Japan to structure an export economy based on low-value-added commodities like raw steel? No. But it was possible to try. Parts of Belgian Africa were a possibility, maybe South Africa, French Indo-China was on a loose leash as colonies went at the time, my impression of Oz is they would have listened to sales pitches, some low volume opportunities existed in Micronesia, etc. China was poor, but the coastal areas had a bit of money to spend on construction supplies, light water-craft, etc. Japanese shipbuilding was good on a world quality scale, and they were non-unionized yards. I've never studied the numbers, but I think Japan could have competed there.

I don't imagine that a 1930s Japan could have performed as a 1960s Japan did--the colonial system being a prime roadblock. My point was that they had other options to try before engaging in seizure and slave labor practices in Korea, China, and Indo-China. But, we'll never know.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: fbs

But who would pay for that? It's not like the US could just direct its industry the way that Speer did. If a significant fraction of the public did not support a war in the other side of the world, Roosevelt might be limited on what he could order, ergo the industrial production would suffer.

FDR came up with a number of ways by which nations at war who's "continued survival" was linked to US national security, could purchase/receive goods from US manufacturers. Lend-Lease of course is the best example. Britian traded territory for warships. Simple war loans weighted against a nation's gold reserves etc etc. It's not substantially different today in how war's are financed. The declaration of war didn't really change how the system worked...just kicked it into high gear. The manufacturers and their work force got paid....the supplies, guns and ammo were produced. US was already the "Arsenel of Democracy"

And during the war itself US production was not free market at all. It was profoundly socialist (in the REAL meaning of the word, not the 2010 corruption. The government controlled, and in many cases "owned", through GFE, the primary means of production.) The number of war production boards was high, and they had absolute veto power over allocation of resources and interim-level raw materials like steel, glass, oil, aluminum and rubber. Liberty and Victory ships were built by private yards, but they had no say in the design, number, scheduling, or manning of their own yards. Washington did.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: vettim89


Chilling to think that a few never-say-die zealots . . .

Now, now. We're not discussing North Korea . . .

[Nikademus]

nope...that was the crackpotsdam declaration.


[:D]

[Whisper]

I am just a Marine, but the Corps likes us to have a koledge edjukation so they paid for me to get a MBA from Tufts, it wasn’t LSU and they talk funny but it was alright. Macro and micro economic theory depends on minimal outside perturbations and a steady state system for the equations to perform properly. There has never been an econometric system that could be analyzed by the models. All you can do is try and account for the socio/political demands on the model corners. Tariffs, trade routing, currency regulation, all break the model, so analysis is right out of the sphincter.

Look at the corners of the model, not the curves. This is why Russia, with her most productive areas under foreign occupation, could still produce more steel, energy, guns, tanks, planes, than the bad guys. This is why the US can produce infinitely more resources, oil, ships, guns, planes, tanks, just because somebody says so.

Model corners are not open they are lifetime limited by a resource input. You can break the econ curve but only for so long. US could do it, Russia could do it, Germany couldn’t do it even though she had France and Eastern Europe under thumb, and Japan was utterly hopeless. Breaking the model requires enough total input to shift the output curves, at least for the short term.

Social inertia becomes important. People out of work will sign on to a paycheck. They do not care where the money comes from if they get a piece of it. National imperatives in a country as large and as wealthy as the USA can do a lot. In econ terms, nobody gives a racoon’s butt if USA was building warships. It was building something and putting people to work. Social inertia says ‘go for it’.

But then I am just a stupid Marine.

[Whisper]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
And during the war itself US production was not free market at all. It was profoundly socialist (in the REAL meaning of the word, not the 2010 corruption. The government controlled, and in many cases "owned", through GFE, the primary means of production.) The number of war production boards was high, and they had absolute veto power over allocation of resources and interim-level raw materials like steel, glass, oil, aluminum and rubber. Liberty and Victory ships were built by private yards, but they had no say in the design, number, scheduling, or manning of their own yards. Washington did.

Oh not really so. nodody knows what you mean by being REAL profoundly socialist. And there is no such thing as a socialist econometric model, well there is, but it is not definable except under local conditions.

Assume what you mean is government intervention. This is not socialism. Socialism implies a desirable fundamental shift in the model. Government intervention moves the model parameters to the corners. It does not shift the paradigm. Just look at all the socialist countries today. Even today look at the US. In my simple mind I look at social inertia (population x time), resources, technology (resource efficiency), national will, and only then is it smart to start analyzing.

Wharton School people think I am a reactionary nazi in amphibious green. Chicago School people think I spent too much time with my Anthropoly girlfriend (who I married, btw).

Those socio/politico phrases don't mean much really. The reality of this stuff will boil your crawfish (to borrow a phrase from jwe).

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Whisper

I am just a Marine, but the Corps likes us to have a koledge edjukation so they paid for me to get a MBA from Tufts, it wasn’t LSU and they talk funny but it was alright. Macro and micro economic theory depends on minimal outside perturbations and a steady state system for the equations to perform properly. There has never been an econometric system that could be analyzed by the models. All you can do is try and account for the socio/political demands on the model corners. Tariffs, trade routing, currency regulation, all break the model, so analysis is right out of the sphincter.

Look at the corners of the model, not the curves. This is why Russia, with her most productive areas under foreign occupation, could still produce more steel, energy, guns, tanks, planes, than the bad guys. This is why the US can produce infinitely more resources, oil, ships, guns, planes, tanks, just because somebody says so.

Model corners are not open they are lifetime limited by a resource input. You can break the econ curve but only for so long. US could do it, Russia could do it, Germany couldn’t do it even though she had France and Eastern Europe under thumb, and Japan was utterly hopeless. Breaking the model requires enough total input to shift the output curves, at least for the short term.

Social inertia becomes important. People out of work will sign on to a paycheck. They do not care where the money comes from if they get a piece of it. National imperatives in a country as large and as wealthy as the USA can do a lot. In econ terms, nobody gives a racoon’s butt if USA was building warships. It was building something and putting people to work. Social inertia says ‘go for it’.

But then I am just a stupid Marine.

Well, the USN didn't pay for my MBA . . .[:)]

I agree with you as far as econ goes, but I think the discussion is outside of pure econ. As you say, Japan's challenge in the 1920s and 30s wasn't purely economic, but social and political. Powerful men can ignore or bend economics--for awhile. (See Mao in the 1950s.) Japan's world-view in 1930 wasn't primarily or even secondarily economic. It was racial (or ethnic if you're going that way.) They thought reality was whatever fit their view of what should be. My argument vis a vis their economic options in 1930 (most of the discussion here has focused on their options in 1940-41--too late. The die was cast.) is somehat based on hand-waving their racial superman foundations away and expecting them to "act western." Which they weren't going to. But they could have. Except . . . they couldn't have. See what I mean?

The Soviets out-produced the Nazis for many reasons, few of them economic. Fear is not included in most models I'm familiar with (fear of the Nazis, but also of the armed political cadre watching you produce.) Having the land mass to fall back and re-industrialize is also economic, in that the land was a prime factor of production, but also not, given that it wasn't a reproducable factor for the other competitors for economic supremicy. No apples-to-apples with Germany IOW. The Ruhr was fixed and not moble within space that could be esily reached by Allied airpower. OTOH, east of the Urals was Never-Never Land for the Germans.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Whisper

But then I am just a stupid Marine.

I've known a lot of 'stupid' Marines. Most of them were just good at keeping their brains from showing except when it really mattered. You have my respect.

[herwin]

When Tai-sho died, the new Emperor Showa (Hirohito) redirected Japanese strategic planning from autarky to expansionism.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Whisper

Oh not really so. nodody knows what you mean by being REAL profoundly socialist. And there is no such thing as a socialist econometric model, well there is, but it is not definable except under local conditions.

I should have better defined my terms. I meant industrial, not agrarian socialism, whereby the central government (not "the people" however defined) controls the factors of production, primarily land, raw materials, and productive equipment, plus distribution infrastructure. Socialsim does observe free market pricing to a great extent, at least at the retail level, and makes adjustments to the model to meet the demands of the interface with capitalist economies.

I distinguish socialism from communism, where the above are owned or controlled by any aglomeration of "the people" without color of government (a pure agrarian commune perhaps.) "Communism" being different than "Marx-Leninism", which is really socialism on steroids, with cost and price controls and a general ignoring of the outside world's capitalist economies. Under this definition, Jesus Christ was a communist, but not a Marx-Leninist. I doubt He was a socialist, as He probably fully supported His carpentry business with private capital.

Finally, I contrast these definitions with current US political scene balloon juice where the relatively minor structural changes to the healthcare system underway are trumpeted as galloping socialism. They aren't. And I'll stop there.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: herwin

When Tai-sho died, the new Emperor Showa (Hirohito) redirected Japanese strategic planning from autarky to expansionism.

The Emperors reined, but did not rule. They directed nothing.