ORIGINAL: spence
With hindsight it doesn't seem like much of a victory at all. Only 2 relatively obsolete battleships permanently lost. I think the way PH is commonly perceived in most people's consciousness is that the Japanese destroyed the whole American fleet. I remember reading somewhere that the Japanese would have been better advised to go after the oil storage farm and the port facilities and that would have knocked the US out of the fight for a longer period of time than hitting the battleships actually did.
That's just what LCDR Fuchida (leader of the strike and purported (mostly by himself) advocate of the "third strike") said to his interrogators after the war.
In his book on Pearl harbor Alan Zimm analyzes this particular proposition. Destroying oil tanks sounds quite easy after all. Strangely, the Navy had recognized that oil burns, in fact burns quite well; and had taken some precautions to protect the tanks (especially from one another). They built earthen berms around each tank capable of containing the oil contained in the tank. It should also be noted that in order for Bunker C/NSFO #6 to even flow (you know, like a liquid) it is necessary to heat it to about 140F. It is not very volatile so a fire in a single tank would NOT have been likely to spread to adjacent tanks. One might also consider that the number of bombs which could have been carried for this "proposed" strike was limited to those that the (surviving) a/c could have carried (most limited to one or maybe two bombs) and in any case well under 250 a/c (which were not B-17s or B-24s).
Also the Americans were quite likely to have their flak guns manned and ready for any repeat performance by the KB. As it was the 2nd strike (on Dec 7th) still benefiting some from surprise suffered damage to roughly a third of its aircraft. Alan Zimm argues that the "Oil Tank Raid" is mostly a combination construct of American hysteria following the initial raid combined with Fuchida's postwar testimony regarding his imaginary prescience.
The KB did what nobody had done before by launching two massive coordinated air strikes against an enemy bastion. It satisfied Yamamoto's desire to shock by sinking battleships. If there had been any carriers in the harbor it probably would have sunk them as well. BUT the KB was a raiding force. The KB was not like the 1944-45 style USN CVTFs that parked themselves off the enemy's shore and pounded whatever they wanted to for as long as they wanted to do so. The KB was a PIONEER in carrier operations, not their ultimate expression of power.
Do you think PH was any kind of "great victory"?
Also what about port facilities like dry docks? Surely striking them could have been more ruinous for the US.
