Fortress Palembang: Problems and Solutions

[GreyJoy]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo
Having been on the receiving end of several very good Japanese players ...

Yeah. Yer right. At least I didn't say this though. [:'(]

[:D][:D][:D]

[Onime No Kyo]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo
Having been on the receiving end of...several very good Japanese players ...

Yeah. Yer right. At least I didn't say this though. [:'(]

Bah. Creative editing. I watch Fox news too on occasion. I know how its done. [8|]

[Onime No Kyo]

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
ETA: I do agree with my German colleague about another thing: the interest in watching you fall on your sword. Alternatively, fall on mine, comrade Allied Fanboi! BANZAI! [;)]

I know youre from Palisades and all, but that sounds vaguely homosexual even for you lot. Not that theres anything wrong with that. [:'(]

[:D]

I do like my forumbrothers.

1) This is English, you cant do that turn four words into one nonsense here. [:-]
2) A handshake will do just fine.

[GreyJoy]

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo




I know youre from Palisades and all, but that sounds vaguely homosexual even for you lot. Not that theres anything wrong with that. [:'(]

[:D]

I do like my forumbrothers.

1) This is English, you cant do that turn four words into one nonsense here. [:-]
2) A handshake will do just fine.

isn't that correct to say "I do like".... isn't that use of the verb <do> a way to stress the following verb <like>?

[Onime No Kyo]

But getting back on topic, I still dont see anything objectionable about it. As the Japanese player you know where your must have bases are. Considering that you can shut down the Singapore AF in 4-8 days its up to you whether you want to go for Palembang or piddle around Borneo.

As the Allied player, sticking one, much less several divisions in Palembang is pure waste. (Edit: That is to say you will lose them for sure, which plays right into the Japanese player's hands because he knows exactly how many units the Allies have). I can see how transferring troops from Singapore might be advantageous but its all a balancing act. Besides, if the Japanese player is on the ball, the Allies wont have much to transfer from Singapore.

Gamey is leading your SCTF with a singleton transport to soak up torpedoes. This is not gamey.

So if you'll pardon me, it sounds like someone needs a waaamulance.

[Historiker]

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo




I know youre from Palisades and all, but that sounds vaguely homosexual even for you lot. Not that theres anything wrong with that. [:'(]

[:D]

I do like my forumbrothers.

1) This is English, you cant do that turn four words into one nonsense here. [:-]
2) A handshake will do just fine.

Can you even play the allies? I mean, how could you order ships with "mousetrap" on them? [X(]

[Onime No Kyo]

Try that in German. I'll use Google translate. [:'(]

[n01487477]

ORIGINAL: Shark7

ORIGINAL: n01487477

ORIGINAL: Historiker

Is it still possible to add a device several times to one base? I had seen (and experienced it) this problem in witp times. A simle workaround was to set 5 or more oilwells into one base, with the combined output of the single well that was in stock. In even of damage, one was able to repair x (= number of oilwells) times faster than in stock.

I've thought about this for my Options_88 mod. The mod is non-historical in terms of shipping and aircraft and yet I wanted to make it an economic mod that was harder - so I'm at a crossroads with no clear answers. Whether to keep it as is, cause it did take a long time for the Japanese to repair it historically or to double it or x? and make it easier to repair.

From what I recall...

1. The oilfields and refineries were barely damaged at all. The demolition charges failed in some cases, or the fields were taken very quickly in others.
2. The Japanese had specially trained oilfield engineer units that repaired the oilfields far faster than the Allies had predicted they could.

Let me preface this with 2 points
1. This is not a rebuttal of Shark7
2. I live in a korea and don't have the availability of books that others seem to have - my research here is therefore internet based and therefore maybe flawed. If any of you have other information or links to provide me - I'd be appreciative.

Let's look at Shark7's points... I can't find much on the effectiveness of the demo charges, but basically it took a year to get back to pre-war production. Even with this level the Japanese found it hard to get it home and utilise it... Not sure how fast they predicted, but a year is a fair amount of time. The other solution in game other than splitting them (which I'm now stronger on), is to have them damaged which would nullify the damage effect of capture...

Anyway, here is some of the stuff I've found - it does amaze me however, how much the US war effort gave logistically on two fronts. Heady days.

Some Background ...

What was to become Indonesia's most important oil fields (Duri and Minas) in central Sumatr, were discovered just prior to World War II by Caltex (a joint venture between the American companies Chevron and Texaco). Production did not, however, figure in World war II. By the time of World War II, the annual output of 65 million barrels annually was more than enough to make Japan self-sufficent and fuel not only Japanese industry, but all of the increased demands that would be rquired for a naval war in the Pacfic. The DEI did not produce crude oil. The Dutch at a cost od 150 million gilders built a huge refinery at Balik Papan in eastern Borneo (1920s).
http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/stra/w2j-oil.html

...And Oil

Next, let's examine Japan's situation with respect to petroleum production at this stage in the war. In the fourth quarter of 1942, Japanese oil production (which was almost entirely concentrated in her conquered territories, such as the Indies) was 1,194,000 tons. Of that, only 643,000 tons made it to Japan (which is where practically all the refineries were), the rest being either lost to attack, or consumed in the conquered territories. So roughly 214,000 tons of oil per month was making it to Japan. However, the Imperial Navy alone was consuming about 305,000 tons of heavy oil (in the form of fuel oil) per month by this stage in the war (Parillo, p. 237). Keep that figure in mind: 305,000 tons.
...
Furthermore, by this time (October-November 1942) it must have been begining to become clear to the Japanese that the oilfields in Java and Sumatra were not going to be brought back into production at nearly the rate that pre-war estimates had counted on. The Dutch and their Allies had done a much more thorough job of demolition in the oilfields than the Japanese had hoped. This, coupled with the sinking of a transport filled with equipment and valuable refinery personnel, meant that Japanese efforts to get the production field back into production were doomed to be much slower than hoped by the Japanese military. The fact that the Imperial Navy had built up large stocks of petroleum before the was could not compensate for this sobering knowledge, especially given the high rate of fuel consumption thus far in the war. The week-long Battle of Midway alone had consumed more fuel than the Japanese Navy had ever used before in an entire year of peacetime operations (Willmott, "The Barrier and the Javelin").
http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm

This point is countered by ...
Shark7's Point2

The most important oil field was Palembang. Before the war, 8,000,000kl oil was produced in the NEI and more than half of it was produced in Palembang.

The Japanese GHG estimated that the production of oil would be 300,000kl in the first year after occupied the NEI and 1,000,000kl in the second year. However, the actual production in the first year was 5,000,000kl. It is because the damage of the oil fields was less than expected and 7,700 Japanese oil engineers worked hard to recover the oil production. In 1943, the oil production was recovered to the prewar level.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=87104

And backed by ... (Ironically - going to war for Oil seems to have backfired...)

Japanese Oil Sources 1938-1945, barrels per day

Crude Refined Domestic Syntetics/ Total |DEI Crude Oil
Imports Imports Production Substitutes |Production
|
1938 50,422 38,477 6,753 912 96,564 |157,036
|
1939 51,625 32,378 6,389 2,011 92,403 |170,101
|
1940 60,411 41,398 5,652 3,984 111,445 |169,429
|
1941 8,576 14,361 5,318 5,159 33,414 |147,134
|
1942 22,318 6,515 4,630 7,345 40,808 | 65,753
|
1943 26,981 12,745 4,970 5,551 50,247 |132,312
|
1944 4,496 9,334 4,342 5,693 23,865 | 60,820
|
1945 0 0 4,432 4,874 9,306 | 20,822
(1st half)
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=87104#wrap

So, Shark7 made some good points and I just wanted to thank him for making me look harder... The following is related to other options I'm thinking about and wanted some feeback for my mod. Sorry to hijack the thread (BUT it seems to have already been...)


An interesting aside...post-war with Kurita

The old man and the oil
by Byron W. King


HE WAS A frail old fellow, dressed in loose-fitting clothes, working in his garden and chopping potatoes. Less than a year before, in 1945, he was in command of one of the largest fleets that had ever been assembled by any nation. His name was Takeo Kurita, vice admiral of the former Imperial Japanese Navy.

A young U.S. naval officer named Thomas Moorer and his translator approached Kurita. They explained to the admiral that they were working for a historical study group, gathering information about the war that had recently ended for Japan on such unfavorable terms. They asked Kurita if he would agree to discuss his experiences. And so began a series of interviews of the former Japanese military commander by representatives of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analysis Division.

"We Ran Out of Oil"

Kurita held nothing back. There were no state secrets any more. "What happened?" asked the American officer. "We ran out of oil," replied Kurita, matter-of-factly.

Again and again during the interviews with Moorer and others, Kurita referred to a lack of fuel as the key reason that the Japanese forces were ground down to memories and ghosts. Kurita reflected on why his fleet was all but annihilated at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. Kurita explained that he brought his ships into that action without knowing whether there was sufficient fuel to bring them out of the zone of combat. Thus, Kurita's ships sailed slowly to their fate, conceding the element of surprise to the vigilant Americans, because the Japanese commanders were attempting to conserve enough fuel to return home. And so, lacking surprise, many of Kurita's ships never had the opportunity even to turn around before being sent to the bottom by U.S. submarines and air power, along a track of sorrow that covered several seas.

Kurita explained that during the Leyte Gulf battle, he deployed his ships on a dangerous night passage through the San Bernardino Strait. "I was low on fuel," he said. Kurita's fleet tankers had been sunk or dispersed. The only fuel available to the Japanese ships was whatever was in their own tanks. "Fuel was an important consideration, the basic one," said Kurita. There was not enough fuel for his ships to sail around the adjacent landmasses, so they were forced by necessity to transit the relatively narrow straits.

Several months after the Japanese disaster at Leyte Gulf, in February 1945, forces of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps met with no naval resistance whatsoever during the invasion of Iwo Jima. The Japanese had simply conceded the sea and airspace around the island to the American attackers. The reason was that the Imperial Navy had elected to conserve fuel for the final defense of Japan.

By early 1945, almost all ships of the Japanese fleet had been deactivated. Powerful battleships, and even aircraft carriers, that had cost immense sums to construct before the war with the U.S. and during the early years of the conflict, were mere cold iron tied up to the pier for lack of fuel. Japan's basic military decision-making process was not how to defend against American attacks on many fronts. Japan's main effort was simply to struggle to preserve its dwindling levels of oil reserves.

Flying on Pine Needles

By mid-1944, Japan's economy and its military were being starved of energy supplies, the consequence of an ever-tightening noose applied by U.S. and Allied air and naval forces. U.S. submarines sank hundreds of Japanese ships in this time frame, including critically needed tankers full of oil. The American submarine campaign against Japanese sea power all but cut off the sea lines of communication between Japan and its so-called "southern resource area."

In desperation, Japanese war planners utilized every possible means to convert available resources into fuel substitutes. The Japanese manufactured alcohol from confiscated food supplies such as potatoes, sugar, and rice, thus forcing a direct competition between human stomachs and mechanical gas tanks. But alcohol has an energy content of about 65,000 Btu per gallon, whereas aviation gasoline delivers about 130,000 Btu per gallon. So on the best of days, Japanese aircraft took off with half the energy equivalent of their American counterparts in their fuel tanks. And aerial combat proved the disparity, with American aircraft utterly dominating the skies.

People in Japan were forced to tighten their belts even more when large amounts of garden vegetables began to be used for manufacturing lubricating oils. And even old rubber products such as tires and rain slickers were "distilled" to recover whatever oil could be had. But it was not enough.

By late 1944, the Japanese navy commenced a project to manufacture aviation fuel from pine tree roots. "Two hundred pine roots will keep an airplane in the sky for one hour," said a Navy spokesman. The Japanese navy distributed over 36,000 kettles and stills, in which countless pine tree roots met their fate. Many a hillside of Japan was utterly denuded of trees. But each kettle or still could produce only about 4 gallons of raw product, and even that required significant treatment to upgrade to anything approaching usable fuel. Compounding the problem, each still required its own fuel supply, and this exacerbated an already severe fuel shortage in Japan. By one estimate, 400,000 Japanese worked full-time in order to support a dispersed, inefficient industrial base that could produce all of about 2,500 barrels of pine oil per day. In the end, a mere 3,000 barrels of "pine root" aviation fuel were ultimately delivered to the Japanese navy. And the pine derivative gummed up aviation engines after just a few hours of use. The entire project was a massive waste.

The Way to Lose a War

Many years later, the American naval officer Thomas Moorer had retired as a four-star admiral and chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an interview, the retired American Adm. Moorer reflected on the retired Japanese Adm. Kurita that he had met long before. "He had been in command of the entire fleet," recalled Moorer, "and now here he was digging potatoes."

"The lesson I learned," said Moorer, "was never lose a war." And the American admiral added, "The way to lose a war is to run out of oil"

Finally - I've been looking at a whatif based on Pearl losing most of its fuel...

The Japanese realized that oil was the bottleneck in their fighting strength; any lengthy delay in securing an oil source would be disastrous. (48) Indeed, it was stated at a conference in late October 1941 that Japan needed to occupy the oilfields in the southern areas by March. If this did not occur, adding in such factors as normal stockpile depletion and getting the oilfields back into production, the Japanese would run out of oil in about 18 months. (49) By September 1941, Japanese reserves had dropped to 50 million barrels, and their navy alone was burning 2,900 barrels of oil every hour. The Japanese had reached a crossroads. If they did nothing, they would be out of oil and options in less than 2 years, If they chose war, there was a good chance they could lose a protracted conflict. Given the possibility of success with the second option, versus none with the first option, the Japanese chose war. (50)

There are many critical points of this preconflict period. The Japanese realized the importance of oil to their modern military machine, and any operations undertaken in the vast Pacific theater would require large amounts of oil. They were willing to send a huge task force of irreplaceable ships thousands of miles into hostile waters (and all the attendant oil this operation would consume) to attack a formidable enemy fleet to help achieve oil self-sufficiency. (51) The concurrent plan to seize the US possessions in the Central Pacific would ensure the Japanese would control all the oil-producing regions between the west coast of the United States and the Persian Gulf. Finally, there is the planning of the Pearl Harbor raid; without oil tankers, it would have been impossible for the Japanese Navy to accomplish that mission. Armed with this knowledge, would the Japanese realize this same need for oil applied to the US Navy?

...

Like the Japanese, the Pacific Fleet had its own oil problems. The only major base for the US Navy in the Pacific was located in Hawaii. All major fleet logistics, repair, and storage were at the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The Navy also suffered from a severe shortage of oilers, which limited the operations radius of the fleet.

Nagumo did not realize the magnitude of his error in not completing the destruction of Pearl Harbor by attacking the base and fuel facilities. His pedantic and traditional view of naval strategy blinded him to the opportunity of a lifetime.
The Japanese knew all about those oil storage tanks. Their failure
to bomb the Fleet's oil supply reflected their preoccupation with
tactical rather than logistical targets.... Nagumo's mission was
to destroy Kimmel's ships and the airpower on Oahu.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m ... ntent;col1

And also, changing the fuel requirements of merchants V warships
http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm


Other links...
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu ... 0278ah.pdf
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com ... power.html
Oil & War How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat
Goralski, Robert & Russell W. Freeburg

There is an old saying, "Amateurs talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics." Commanders and their staffs must remember the importance of logistics to achieving the overall goal, for friendly forces as well as the enemy.

[Shark7]

n01487477

Always happy to make some one else work. [:D]

I was going strictly off memory from stuff I had read years ago, not exactly the most accurate reference. [:D] [;)]

It is just another good example of how no plan survives contact with the enemy, and that nothing ever goes as you expect it to.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

I've never played a PBEM as Japan so I wont claim to know the problems, I'm just curious as to why so many people here seem to think that reinforcing Palembang is such a ridiculous notion.If we take it as a given that Palembang is the major oil producing location on the map, you can also take it as a given that the Allied commander would know that as well as the Japanese commander trying to capture it.

Now, if theres some sort of a game mechanics question involved, thats a different matter. But to say that its a "ridiculous" notion is ridiculous in itself, it seems to me.

From a historical point of view it would be totally ridicoulos. In the game, you would be better off stripping whole India and send everything to Palembang so that the enemy will never take it no matter what while a single Navguard could take all of India. Losing India but holding Palembang would be sort of better for the Allied than the other way around. Now nobody isn't going that far (probably) but when I read about pulling lots of troops from Malaya to Palembang, this would not have happened! Singapore was more important than Palembang and no brain dead commander would have sent a Division from Singapore to Palembang.

[Miller]

Gamey or not, FP should not be an issue for a decent IJN player. Even the smartest Allied player will not be able to get enough troops there in time to stop a very early Jap move for it.

[Historiker]

ORIGINAL: Miller

Gamey or not, FP should not be an issue for a decent IJN player. Even the smartest Allied player will not be able to get enough troops there in time to stop a very early Jap move for it.

Sure. But it forces the Jap player to take unnecessary risks. Whether forcing the Jap player to do so because of an engine exploit has to be decided by the two players.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

Wouldn't the simplest solution be a "Gentlemen's Agreement" to stick to reality? No way the British were going to reinforce Dutch territory when Malaya and Burma were both vulnerable. In return, there was no way the Japanese were going to go thundering off after Australian holdings in the Bismarcks, Solomans, or New Guinea until they had achieved there more important goals in East Asia (ie. before January). Reasonable is always the best solution.

absolutely! If ppl wouldn't come up with most unrealistic - ridicoulos in terms of real life - strategies we would not discuss these things. The game isn't forcing you into realistic strategies and tactics but will play out a hundred times better if you stick to realistic approaches. If someone takes whole India because his initial landing was six IJA divs at Karachi with the next major IJN port being Saigon he will be applauded instead of being told what a ridicoulos approach. You can never be 100% realistic but a more realistic approach to the game sure helps for a better game experience, especially if you want to play it for more than a couple of months game time which is something only very few ppl are willing to try lately, at least that is my impression when reading the forum and my experience of my last three of four PBEMs.

Yep.
The whole idea of "Fortress Palembang" is ridicoulus. Evacuate Java and Malaya to send thousands of combat troops into the swamps at Palembang to let them eat petrol, shoot oil and replace fallen soliders with avgas. [:D]

Yep, as the Allied player I would say a fair trade would be no fortress Palembang for the Allies and no Mersing rush for the Japanese. I want to keep the first few months of the war in perspective.

[Onime No Kyo]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

Yep, as the Allied player I would say a fair trade would be no fortress Palembang for the Allies and no Mersing rush for the Japanese. I want to keep the first few months of the war in perspective.

Youre not very good at haggling. [:'(]

Seems like the Imperial Aggressor side wants to get Palembang "free, gratis and for nothing". I say trade that for not approaching withing 3 hexes of Clark Field until June 1st and we have a deal.

Seriously, though, unless your specific interest is historical reenactment there shouldn't be any issue with the Allies defending Palembang to their utmost. Its a simple equation. If you dont attack it early, expect serious resistance. If you do attack it early, expect to not be able to attack elsewhere. Same formula for Allied players. You know exactly how many unrestricted units you get, and so does the other guy. If you choose to expend them at Palembang, you leave Ceylon, Burma, N. Australia and India open to attack. Your choice.

The supply issue seems moot to me. Point A) If you can dump troops at the place, whats stopping you from dumping supplies there as well? Point Zwei) If you have the option of dumping supplies at either Palembang directly or Oosthafen, what basis for complaint for the Japanese side have. Those supplies wern't "produced" there by "faulty game mechanics". They were brought in. Incidentally, I havent heard anyone object to Soerabaja producing supplies. Seems to be much the same thing to me.

[Onime No Kyo]

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: Miller

Gamey or not, FP should not be an issue for a decent IJN player. Even the smartest Allied player will not be able to get enough troops there in time to stop a very early Jap move for it.

Sure. But it forces the Jap player to take unnecessary risks. Whether forcing the Jap player to do so because of an engine exploit has to be decided by the two players.

Oh dear, no. Cant have the attacker taking risks. [:'(]

Its a known quantity. You can calculate (notice that I said you, not me, I'm much too lazy) exactly how many supplies will be produced by which date and draw yourself a "must take by" date if this "exploit" is really troubling you. You wont be able to account for any additional supplies being brought in by ship, but youre not supposed to. [:'(]

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: Miller

Gamey or not, FP should not be an issue for a decent IJN player. Even the smartest Allied player will not be able to get enough troops there in time to stop a very early Jap move for it.

Sure. But it forces the Jap player to take unnecessary risks. Whether forcing the Jap player to do so because of an engine exploit has to be decided by the two players.

This is what i meant by using Reverse tactics. Yes, Player one can counter the gambit but only by using equally unrealistic (and risky) tactics. Thus the game rewards lunging and grabbing vital turf first before the other can move in and entrench. When Joe and I tried to use conventional military tactics (advance under air and sea cover with proper logistical/base support, we found fortresses like Palembang waiting for us. (the other big one was in the two Mtn hexsides of Java where our opponents had moved every single Dutch unit abandoning the ports, airfields and cities) Simiar situation in NG. We refused to "lunge" or use risky tactics that in the real world would have been insane (and largely unsupportable) It was an eye opening experience.

I'm more convinced than ever that Grigsby was smarter than alot of gamers give him credit for.

put another way....an example would be the in real life you advance from a logistical strongpoint and advance along careful lines, preferably under air and sea cover. This is what the Japanese did in their first operational phase within reason. They didn't try leapfrogging Malaya and going to Burma or Sumatra....or skip Kendari and Timor and invade Java. In the game...the most rewarding tactic is to attack the fringes first and work your way back to your support base. It becomes a race. This is not realistic.....but it works, and in cases like Palembang, thats really the only good way i can see Player one defeating this gambit.

[Onime No Kyo]

OK, fair. What do you suggest?

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: Miller

Gamey or not, FP should not be an issue for a decent IJN player. Even the smartest Allied player will not be able to get enough troops there in time to stop a very early Jap move for it.

Sure. But it forces the Jap player to take unnecessary risks. Whether forcing the Jap player to do so because of an engine exploit has to be decided by the two players.

This is what i meant by using Reverse tactics. Yes, Player one can counter the gambit but only by using equally unrealistic (and risky) tactics. Thus the game rewards lunging and grabbing vital turf first before the other can move in and entrench. When Joe and I tried to use conventional military tactics (advance under air and sea cover with proper logistical/base support, we found fortresses like Palembang waiting for us. (the other big one was in the two Mtn hexsides of Java where our opponents had moved every single Dutch unit abandoning the ports, airfields and cities) Simiar situation in NG. We refused to "lunge" or use risky tactics that in the real world would have been insane (and largely unsupportable) It was an eye opening experience.

I'm more convinced than ever that Grigsby was smarter than alot of gamers give him credit for.

put another way....an example would be the in real life you advance from a logistical strongpoint and advance along careful lines, preferably under air and sea cover. This is what the Japanese did in their first operational phase within reason. They didn't try leapfrogging Malaya and going to Burma or Sumatra....or skip Kendari and Timor and invade Java. In the game...the most rewarding tactic is to attack the fringes first and work your way back to your support base. It becomes a race. This is not realistic.....but it works, and in cases like Palembang, thats really the only good way i can see Player one defeating this gambit.

This thread has two arguments and people are generally talking past each other...

In one camp you have -

- "Its a game...the game allows it...so be it....figure out away around it....afterall the game allows other situations that I have to deal with."

In the other camp you have -

- "It should be a simulation and this should not happen in a realistic environment"


Both camps are correct...

I fall in the simulation camp myself. IMO almost all of this stems from the "Supply Point = Everything....just add water and stir" logistics model that exists in the game.

IRL logistically it would have been nearly impossible to stockpile the supplies that would have been necessary to support a large army in a place like Palembang or the mountain redoubt of Java.

If the supply points were broken down into what they actually represent, after setting aside the food water and ammunition a bunch of the "supply" points would disappear creating a much smaller available pool of supplies available for survival and combat which are needed in siege situations.

However because of the "Add water and stir" nature of the logistics model the 7000 tons of ready mix concrete that the engineers were using to build pill boxes the week before are automagically converted into bullets or hardtack the minut the units are cut off and have to fight.

-------

The other thing that the "game" fails to address and many games do not, is the civilian equation.

We as players do not have to concern ourselves with protracted sieges in Singapore or Batavia and the thousands of civilian deaths that would have resulted. Unlike our real life counter-parts...who factored that into their equation and decision to capitulate as quickly as they did.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

OK, fair. What do you suggest?

at this point, there's not alot that can be done. AE is a done product. The most reaching ad-hoc fix is the elimination of supply generation by refinaries. The generic - all nationality aspect of supply as Tree described....not much that can be done there. The port size limitations help but can easily be circumvented. In my personal mod i've reduced summarily aircraft ranges moving them away from their paper stat ranges to account for real life variables. That makes it easier to isolate bases and makes a careful approach more beneficial. JWE's Da Babes mod offers additional intriguing logistical constraints. Those players who want to simulate more restrictive govenors have to resort to house rules. (I always play with a good negotiated set) Those that just want to do anything goes type play have little need of HR's or conditions. I know a couple people who went back to playing WitP stock. Given the time constraints, i'm tempted to at times myself.

[Onime No Kyo]

I agree with you on all points, Nik. And I'm happy that we dont need to revisit the "this game is borked" subject. We all know that the game isnt perfect, o instead of tossing around phrases like "all allied players blatantly exploit the game using the Palembang gambit", lets recognize the weak points of the engine and propose HRs to counter them.