Night bombing

[Chickenboy]

castor troy: Steve has unearthed some interesting information about radar bombing B-29 units. Pretty impressive 'pinpoint' tactical night bombing capabilities. I'll let him post a link to the late-war "Eagle" ground radar bomber groups and their late war missions. These only really came into their own beginning June 1945-but they did exist and they were effective. Just very late in the fight.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

castor troy: Steve has unearthed some interesting information about radar bombing B-29 units. Pretty impressive 'pinpoint' tactical night bombing capabilities. I'll let him post a link to the late-war "Eagle" ground radar bomber groups and their late war missions. These only really came into their own beginning June 1945-but they did exist and they were effective. Just very late in the fight.

ok, but then we are talking about the last three months of the war. Now I wonder how many Japanese airfields one would have to bomb during the night in the last three months of the war when the Japanese didn't even have an airforce left. In the last months of the war, Germany had jetfighters, but I wouldn't generally say that Germany had these "Wunderwaffen" and what they could have done just because they were employed late war. Well, they had them, but far too late, if you get what I mean.

IMO, for the majority of the war, neither the USAAF nor the RAF heavy bomber force was able to take out pin point targets at night, independent if you call those targets "tactical" or "strategic" targets. If they were able to do so just before the USAAF dropped A-bombs on Japan, ok, no problem with it. But then to come back to the op queury, that ability the USAAF seems to have had two months before the war ended is something they didn't have for the three years of fighting earlier. If they had, they never employed it, or all the books I have read missed it.

I think a statement like this was more reality than hitting pin point targets:

The first three months of the XXI Bomber Command’s operations based out of the Marianas were not impressive. By January 1945, XXI had dropped a mere 1,500 tons of bombs on Japan. Accuracy was poor, and on half the missions only one out of 50 bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the target.

And that was quite late in the war already. So now take your heavy bomber formations of 43/44, send them out at night to bomb a Japanese airfield in Burma. If you get one out of 50 bombs within 1000 ft of the airfield you target (and that would be great already), I wonder if you damage it at all, pretty much depending on where that bomb falls I guess, it may detonate right in empty space next to a runway, or it could also detonate right in a workshop if you are lucky enough, not if you targeted the area around the workshop though as you would then miss it by far.

As to the game, like I've said earlier, hitting manpower at night is fine, taking out an airfield or a factory because you actually hit it is another story for me. And that doesn't mean you would never hit it at all.

[AW1Steve]

The "Eagle system" or APS-7 was developed early in the war and deployed in Europe in 1943 as a BTO system (bomb through overcast). The B-29's sent to the Pacific had APS-13. The B-29B was designed as a night bomber and brought back the APS-7. The big problem with the APS-7 was not it's accurracy (which was considered the champion even in the 1950s) was that the damned thing had a massive "flying wing" type antenna that was a pain in the neck to maintain and had a narrower field of vision. The APS-13 was a GP RADAR. The APS-7 was more for specialty , precision jobs. Like in a lead pathfinder bombing aircraft. (With an expert crew and RNB operator).

My point is , it wasn't that they didn't have the capability , it's that they chose NOT to use it. And that's the whole crux of our argument. [:)]

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

The "Eagle system" or APS-7 was developed early in the war and deployed in Europe in 1943 as a BTO system (bomb through overcast). The B-29's sent to the Pacific had APS-13. The B-29B was designed as a night bomber and brought back the APS-7. The big problem with the APS-7 was not it's accurracy (which was considered the champion even in the 1950s) was that the damned thing had a massive "flying wing" type antenna that was a pain in the neck to maintain and had a narrower field of vision. The APS-13 was a GP RADAR. The APS-7 was more for specialty , precision jobs. Like in a lead pathfinder bombing aircraft. (With an expert crew and RNB operator).

My point is , it wasn't that they didn't have the capability , it's that they chose NOT to use it. And that's the whole crux of our argument. [:)]

I agree with Castor Troy about the timing nature of the capability argument. The articles clearly stated that the Eagle system wasn't ready for prime time before the end of the war in Europe and that it only really came into its own as a capable system the last few months of the war in the Pacific. This jibes with the XX and XXI air corps abandoning their nighttime 'tactical' bombing efforts in November 1944-February 1945. They abandoned it because the capability wasn't really there yet. That changed thereafter (June 1945), but the USAAF had, in the meantime, found an effective means of strategic firebombing that worked very well. This was the mainstay application of the bomber force thereafter.

I agree that if there were to be an Operation Olympic and invasion of the home islands, that the USAAF would have 'potato patched' all of the Japanese airfields it could have. This would have been during daylight raids-there was a great deal of support for daylight 'precision' raids for much of the war. Perhaps the nighttime tactical bombing permitted by the late adoption of Eagle-equipped wings could have occurred as well.

This is all post June 1945. USAAF capabilities at the late war juncture were significantly better than 1942-1943 and 1944.

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

The "Eagle system" or APS-7 was developed early in the war and deployed in Europe in 1943 as a BTO system (bomb through overcast). The B-29's sent to the Pacific had APS-13. The B-29B was designed as a night bomber and brought back the APS-7. The big problem with the APS-7 was not it's accurracy (which was considered the champion even in the 1950s) was that the damned thing had a massive "flying wing" type antenna that was a pain in the neck to maintain and had a narrower field of vision. The APS-13 was a GP RADAR. The APS-7 was more for specialty , precision jobs. Like in a lead pathfinder bombing aircraft. (With an expert crew and RNB operator).

My point is , it wasn't that they didn't have the capability , it's that they chose NOT to use it. And that's the whole crux of our argument. [:)]

I agree with Castor Troy about the timing nature of the capability argument. The articles clearly stated that the Eagle system wasn't ready for prime time before the end of the war in Europe and that it only really came into its own as a capable system the last few months of the war in the Pacific. This jibes with the XX and XXI air corps abandoning their nighttime 'tactical' bombing efforts in November 1944-February 1945. They abandoned it because the capability wasn't really there yet. That changed thereafter (June 1945), but the USAAF had, in the meantime, found an effective means of strategic firebombing that worked very well. This was the mainstay application of the bomber force thereafter.

I agree that if there were to be an Operation Olympic and invasion of the home islands, that the USAAF would have 'potato patched' all of the Japanese airfields it could have. This would have been during daylight raids-there was a great deal of support for daylight 'precision' raids for much of the war. Perhaps the nighttime tactical bombing permitted by the late adoption of Eagle-equipped wings could have occurred as well.

This is all post June 1945. USAAF capabilities at the late war juncture were significantly better than 1942-1943 and 1944.

I agree that that is WHAT happened. You are absolutely right. BUT here's the question. This historic game is always about possibilities. The what if's in real life. And I feel that one of the greatest variants of "what if" is in personalities. What if the British desert army's chosen commander hadn't died enroute to assume command , and they had to shove Montgomery in instead? Whay if a local commader had not played with "skip bombing" and more importantly , his boss hadn't supported it? Had he held to the "not consistant with Mitchell's teaching" philosophy? Or had Kenney not supported "Pappy" Gunn in his "gunship" experiments? All of these possibilities were within the capabilities of the times. But what if someone in higher command had set them on the shelf and not brought them out in 1943? But waited till, oh say spring 1945?

Guy's , all I'm saying is for the of Thread keep an open mind! Imagine if Lemay had been sent to the Marianas earlier.....or better yet , George Kenny. Someone NOT wedded to the "Mitchell" philosphy (and later led to his being a less than successful founding father of Strategic Air Command......Lemay relieaved him and created the legend that became became SAC).


And how many months do you think it would take of INTENSIVE training and delopement to make this work? It only took about 2 years for the Manhatten project. You already have the APS-7. Do you honestly think it would take 2 years to tweak the system to do what you want? I feel it could be done in 2 months just using local resources (as was done with Pappy Gunn's gunships).

All you needed was a man in charge who wanted it.

[AW1Steve]

By the way guys, has any one looked into what was the primary mission of B-29's in Korea? The same planes with no modifications (as it was a second line aircraft , down graded to a MEDIUM bomber , replaced by the B-50(Super-duper-fortess, and improved B-29) and the B-36 in the heavy attack role. After all , many historians refer to Korea as the "war fought with WW2 surplus". 5 years later (and in a military so starved for funds that the USN had four active carriers (and a few more under SLOOOOW refits).

The answer to my question? Attacking inland airfields at night with RADAR bombing. [:)]

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
And how many months do you think it would take of INTENSIVE training and delopement to make this work? It only took about 2 years for the Manhatten project. You already have the APS-7. Do you honestly think it would take 2 years to tweak the system to do what you want? I feel it could be done in 2 months just using local resources (as was done with Pappy Gunn's gunships).

All you needed was a man in charge who wanted it.

You're right.

All the desire in the world would be misplaced until the capability existed though. If Lemay really, really, really wanted the A-bomb in February 1945, it wouldn't have mattered. It just plain wasn't ready, in spite of the mountain of money and resources directed towards it. It wasn't ready until it was ready.

However, something with less resource-consumptive than the Manhattan project could have been expedited if championed by someone that could 'get things done'. Lemay was such a man and could have expedited the novel technologies that he saw most befitting his style of warfare. To a point. Could this have been moved up several months? Yes. I think so. Would this have been available in 1942. No. It wasn't ready yet-not on anyone's drawing board even.

As an aside-I think of Christie's adamant opposition to the mark XIV magnetic exploder deactivation. Without him standing in the way of progress, the silent service would have had a much better 1942, sinking dozens (hundreds?) more vessels.

Where's that gray line then? Dunno. What do you think? Based upon your reading, when would an expedited (functional) version of Eagle been available in PTO? What's realistic?

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
And how many months do you think it would take of INTENSIVE training and delopement to make this work? It only took about 2 years for the Manhatten project. You already have the APS-7. Do you honestly think it would take 2 years to tweak the system to do what you want? I feel it could be done in 2 months just using local resources (as was done with Pappy Gunn's gunships).

All you needed was a man in charge who wanted it.

You're right.

All the desire in the world would be misplaced until the capability existed though. If Lemay really, really, really wanted the A-bomb in February 1945, it wouldn't have mattered. It just plain wasn't ready, in spite of the mountain of money and resources directed towards it. It wasn't ready until it was ready.

However, something with less resource-consumptive than the Manhattan project could have been expedited if championed by someone that could 'get things done'. Lemay was such a man and could have expedited the novel technologies that he saw most befitting his style of warfare. To a point. Could this have been moved up several months? Yes. I think so. Would this have been available in 1942. No. It wasn't ready yet-not on anyone's drawing board even.

As an aside-I think of Christie's adamant opposition to the mark XIV magnetic exploder deactivation. Without him standing in the way of progress, the silent service would have had a much better 1942, sinking dozens (hundreds?) more vessels.

Where's that gray line then? Dunno. What do you think? Based upon your reading, when would an expedited (functional) version of Eagle been available in PTO? What's realistic?

Andre I'm not a science minded guy like you. My math ability is so poor why do you think I became a history major? [:D] But I did spend an entire Navy career as an OPERATOR. And if I learned nothing else , is the usefulness of a system , or weapon, is discovered AFTER development. The use of the APS-7 as a night attack RADAR seems to have occurred AFTER it got to the Pacific, not in states side development. The developers sent over a "so-so" BTO RADAR , and some local squadron guys said, "Hey, has anyone tried this at nightbombing?".

I keep pointing to Pappy Gunn for a reason. His gunship versions don't appear anywhere but the Pacific. Why? B-25's were used all over the world. But gunships were NOT used in Africa,Italy or northen Europe. Why do you suppose that is? One clue might be the designations. When an airframe has a major change , you change the letter AFTER the Designation. P-51a,P-51b< etc. When you make a minor major[:D] change , you add a number AFTER the letter. So let's say your gunships is a B-25D1. Hm....they don't appear anywhere else, and putting 8-50 cals., plus God knows what else , and eliminating 1-2 crew positions is a MAJOR airframe. But the USAAF considerd this a LOCAL mod, and as soon as said B-25D's went elsewhere , they ripped out the guns, put in the bombsight and bombardier and returned it to factory stock.

Tactic and local mods are entirely up to the local commander (or at least use to be). BUT the B-29 didn't belong to the local commander. It belonged to the Joint chiefs of staff.

Think of it in two simplified civil war analogies. The USA entered the war with new Springfield RIFLES. Yet used Musket tactics. Local commanders figured out that this was not necessarily a good thing , and some of them modified their tactics. Others did the same old crap till may of 1865.

Calvalry troops considered the sabre the prime weapon. Jeb Stuart kept them , but employed pistols as the primary weapon. Buford, got rid of the sabres , gave his men carbines, and fought them as Dismounted dragoons (at Gettysburg) in the same battle that Custer used them traditionally. My Point? Custer , strangely enough was the only one who followed official doctrine. And had the greatest losses. The Army didn't chage it manual till well after the war.

What I'm saying is that the military is a doctrine central beast. Changes occur because some local commader decides "this isn't working". On his own hook he goes off and tries something else. And tries it again. Then he goes to his boss and tells him , and prays that he backs him up. Then MAYBE the local commader will report up the chain of commad "hey this crap works"! Military thinking , unlike what (Rumsfeld and McNarra wanted) is generally evolutionary , seldom Revolutionary. And the troops figure out how best to use the new toys.

In my own community there used to be a trusium on finding subs. "Use whatever tactics you want (and everybody thinks that they are a tactical genius and has his own ideas....even E-1's) but the minute you screw up and lose contact, you damned well better have book in your hand and be seen using it"! [:D] (Because you don't want to face "the green table" (official inquiry) and say "I ignored the book and used my own tactics). In short, you can do whatever you want if it succeeds , but if you fail......[:D] And lets be honest, almost all of the commanders were career professionals. That doesn't usually lead to risky career endangering experiments.

[AW1Steve]

I feel that an expedited bombing RADAR COULD have been modified in two months, and deployed after a month or so of training and experimentation. But they could also have just "held their nose and gone" with somewhat lesser results in a week.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
The developers sent over a "so-so" BTO RADAR

OK, when was this (APS-7) in widespread use in PTO? This could be your 'earliest possible date' endpoint.

ETA: Interesting Hyperwar summary too. Can you post it here in case anyone's still following this conversation? [;)]

ETA II: If (as per previous posts) B-29Bs 'came standard' with the APS-7 units, when did B-29Bs come into theatre in quantity?

[AW1Steve]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
The developers sent over a "so-so" BTO RADAR

OK, when was this (APS-7) in widespread use in PTO? This could be your 'earliest possible date' endpoint.

ETA: Interesting Hyperwar summary too. Can you post it here in case anyone's still following this conversation? [;)]

As requested, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/V/AAF-V-20.html

[JeffroK]

Why hadnt the B29 been used for tactical bombing??

The Paficic Air Forces had a substatial force of A20, A26, B25 & B24 and P38, P47 & P51 to do this task and from time to time the results were as devasting as any JFB fears.

[JeffroK]

From Steve's link

The first attack, against Tokyo, burned out 15.8 square miles of the city, killed 83,793 people, and injured 40,918, being perhaps the most scathing air attack of the whole war. In rapid succession Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and again Nagoya were hit in a ten-day fire blitz that destroyed over thirty-one square miles while the command was perfecting its new tactics.The invasion of Okinawa on 1 April and the enemy's wholesale use thereafter of kamikaze attacks against the assaulting fleet interrupted the strategic bombardment campaign; for over a month the B-29's were sent against airfields in Kyushu, the source of most of the kamikaze attacks, in the only serious diversion to tactical operations suffered by XXI Bomber Command. That assignment completed, the Superforts returned to their primary task with a flexible program, the so-called "Empire Plan," in which the choice between daylight attacks on precision targets and radar or night bombing of urban areas was determined by the weather.

........


The B-29's participated in two types of operations that demanded specialized training and tactics. One was a campaign against oil refineries by the 315th Wing, equipped with an improved radar (AN/APQ-7) mounted in stripped-down B-29's. Bombing wholly at night, the wing achieved a remarkable degree of accuracy, destroying or heavily damaging Japan's ten largest petroleum or synthetic oil plants and much of the nation's storage capacity.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

From Steve's link

The first attack, against Tokyo, burned out 15.8 square miles of the city, killed 83,793 people, and injured 40,918, being perhaps the most scathing air attack of the whole war. In rapid succession Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and again Nagoya were hit in a ten-day fire blitz that destroyed over thirty-one square miles while the command was perfecting its new tactics.The invasion of Okinawa on 1 April and the enemy's wholesale use thereafter of kamikaze attacks against the assaulting fleet interrupted the strategic bombardment campaign; for over a month the B-29's were sent against airfields in Kyushu, the source of most of the kamikaze attacks, in the only serious diversion to tactical operations suffered by XXI Bomber Command. That assignment completed, the Superforts returned to their primary task with a flexible program, the so-called "Empire Plan," in which the choice between daylight attacks on precision targets and radar or night bombing of urban areas was determined by the weather.

........


The B-29's participated in two types of operations that demanded specialized training and tactics. One was a campaign against oil refineries by the 315th Wing, equipped with an improved radar (AN/APQ-7) mounted in stripped-down B-29's. Bombing wholly at night, the wing achieved a remarkable degree of accuracy, destroying or heavily damaging Japan's ten largest petroleum or synthetic oil plants and much of the nation's storage capacity.

Jeff-interesting...the second part of your quote (included here) wasn't in your last post. But yes, looks like airfield bombing-at night, by radar-was done on Kyushu post April 1945. So we're moving the line further back based upon IRL. Fine with that. There's a difference between April (or March or February) 1945 and early 1942 in terms of implementation of night 'tactical' bombing. The former is within the bounds of reason. The latter will result in a flawed implementation based upon the game's limitations.

[JeffroK]

As has been mentioned, if there was a need they might have come up with a plan.

About page 633 In support of ICEBERG.
The raids were designed not only to destroy airfield installations but to keep enemy fighters at home and hence out of the battle for Okinawa. Fighter opposition to the B-29's fluctuated but was generally weak. During the third week in April, after the command had intensified its attacks, the Japanese increased their fighter forces in Kyushu from a combat strength of 75 single-engine and 22 twin-engine planes to an estimated total of 282, including 60 Navy interceptors. Apparently the enemy was funneling fighters through Kyushu to escort kamikazes going down to Okinawa. Later some of the short-range interceptors were sent back to Tokyo and indeed the enemy shifted his dwindling air forces so continuously that mission planning for Kyushu strikes after 30 April was based on a day-by-day estimate of the opposition that might be expected.95 Interceptions varied from none at all on 4 raids to 199 individual attacks on 27 April.

B-29 crewmen reported a total of 1,403 such attacks and claimed 134 enemy planes destroyed and 85 probably destroyed. Antiaircraft was weak except at Kushira and the two Kanoya fields; only one plane was destroyed by flak. In all, 24 B-29's were destroyed and 233 damaged.

This was a light loss ratio; what the B-29's accomplished in return (other than against enemy interceptors) is difficult to evaluate. The B-29's went in at lower levels than in day strikes at heavily defended targets, at altitudes from 10,000 to 18,000 feet, and they frequently laid excellent bomb patterns on the runways, dispersal areas, and installations, But the enemy usually had warning enough to get his planes off the fields, and he was able to repair cratered runways in a matter of hours. After considerable experimentation with fragmentation and GP bombs, the command concentrated on the 500-pound GP, with fuzes varying from instantaneous to delays up to 36 hours, a combination which did hinder repairs. Best results were obtained against storage, maintenance, and repair facilities, but these affected future rather than current air operations. In general, the whole campaign was judged by Twentieth Air Force leaders to have confirmed their opinion that the B-29 was not a tactical bomber. Specifically, it was estimated that between 17 April and 11 May, 95 per cent of the enemy's 1,405 combat sorties were flown on the same day that some of their key bases were being attacked by the Superforts.

Yet the effort was not wholly wasted: the kamikaze threat was defeated by the combined efforts of all available forces; the B-29's helped by keeping the enemy off balance, by making it difficult to plan and execute large and coordinated attacks such as the severe one of 6/7 April. Certainly the Navy was anxious that the B-29's keep at the job of striking at the Kyushu fields even when it became clear that a complete neutralization could not be achieved.

Allied heavy bombers were few and far between in 42-43, and concentrated targets such as mainland Japan uncommon. Both RAAF and USAAF forces continually raided Rabaul at night but in this period were mere pinpricks. But lack of relevant aircraft has an effect, the USAAF had a daylight doctrine, if the RAF sent a Group from Bomber Command to India would we have seen a night bombing campaign.

Can the game engine be altered a bit to "soften" the effects.

I find it hard to get big raids over Japan under the recent patches, 100 bomber raids out of 300 sent is about the norm.
Would upping the maintenance rating of the B29 see fewer in the sky.
Can the number of bombers finding the target be relevant to the range (Could be already, if so can it be tweaked a bit)
Effect of bombs, is this too high??
Experience of B29 crews, a bit high originally?? While the USAAF/USN could put out well trained fighter pilots, nobody had much experience in the B29.

Plus, the JFB can build some Nightfighters instead of '000s of Ki84.[:D]

[Itdepends]

Why is it necessary for the Allies to show time dependent use of historical tactics or equipment when the set up of the game (and players strategy) ensures that Japan never follows the historical time line or path in tactics, strategy or technology?

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: Itdepends

Why is it necessary for the Allies to show time dependent use of historical tactics or equipment when the set up of the game (and players strategy) ensures that Japan never follows the historical time line or path in tactics, strategy or technology?

Agree, particularly as the game design fundamentally operates to penalise strategic bombing vis a vis tactical bombing missions.

I know that Nikademus is of the view that the game makes it too easy to wipe out industry from city air attack. To a point he is correct with regard to mechanics which do allow, for example, 2E bombers to be quite effective in city attacks.

However, in the real world and totally disregarded by the game, is that strategic bombing of industry destroys not just current industrial production but also accumulated production, and that has a significant multiplier effect on reducing future production.

In the game the player is allowed to accumulate stockpiles of industrial output which is totally immune from destruction by enemy means whatsoever. In the real world this is just a fantasy economic position to maintain. When you bomb a real world industrial facility, you destroy not only the machinery to produce, but also the local stockpile of feedstock which is required to feed the machinery. Plus you destroy finished and semi finished output which is still on site. In the real world, if you destroyed an aircraft factory, you not only destroyed the machinery, but also the stockpiled steel, aluminium, engines, radios, guns etc necessary to build the aircraft. Plus any parked aircraft waiting to be delivered.

There is therefore an in game bias against using 4Es on strategic bombing missions which is not present in the real world. To more closely replicate the real world situation, a player conducting strategic airstrikes, against a factory would damage not just factory centres, but also destroy some of the accumulated Heavy Industry points in the pool and some of the airframes in the pools. There would also be much more severe bottlenecks in effecting the neccessary repairs and consequent critical timeline delays.

Not being so disadvantaged as they would be playing this game, the real world commanders got a better ROI using their 4Es on strategic bombing. As pointed out by another poster, the Allies had sufficient 2Es and fighter bombers (which in game are a bit short changed) to carry out the necessary tactical operations.

Alfred

[Reg]

So do you think we should be lobbying for strategic bombing to have less on map effectiveness (factory destruction) and more intangible results (pool reductions)?

It would certainly pose a dilemma to the Allied player who would have no way of seeing the effectiveness of his attacks?? (A historical position?)

[GaryChildress]

ORIGINAL: Miller

We all know its borked, but it has got to the stage now in my game whereby a handful of B29s are scoring 200-300 points per turn in strategic losses. My night fighters do nothing other than die....7:1 kill ratio for the B29, even the later model that carries only a tail gun. Rant over.

It doesn't sound like the game is borked from a reality standpoint. From the sound of it the real "problem" with the game is that Japan just never had a realistic chance to survive an extended war against the Allies. By 1944 everything the Japanese player does should be frustratingly futile if you want the thing to be realistic.

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: Reg


So do you think we should be lobbying for strategic bombing to have less on map effectiveness (factory destruction) and more intangible results (pool reductions)?

It would certainly pose a dilemma to the Allied player who would have no way of seeing the effectiveness of his attacks?? (A historical position?)

I think this one has been suggested before but I dont know if it has been tried/tested:

Split the targets into smaller size units, would that disperse the effect??
What other unintended effects does it have??