Realistic Results: what are these things, what aren't they?
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
Air combat
Hi, In my last run through of the Pearl Harbor strike 9 Zeros were shot down. This is the highest total I have yet seen. (lowest was 2)
I am currently only doing tests with "out of the box" experience, morale and fatigues. I am not altering any data for any group.
"The biggest problem I've seen lately is the huge masses of Japanese a/c operating from New Guinea and New Ireland. Strikes escorted by fifty Zekes should be an extreme rarity. If they're not, UVs problem may not be the a/c model at all, but rather a flawed supply and logistics model that lets the Japanese keep that many a/c flying at the end of a very narrow and overstretched logistical pipe."
Mdiehl, I understand the above to apply to historic scenarios.
Do you think in WITP the Japanese could commit the resources to making the logistical pipe more efficient?
There is a limited number of air assets to use but if the Japanese move air HQ and support units to a base capable of supporting larger number of aircraft could they support more then historically was the case.
In my tests in the South Pacific I try to keep 4x required supply at main airfields (for both allied and Japanese)
I'm finding that even if I move more airgroups and support into Rabaul the Allies have no problem matching or exceeding what I can commit.
I'm unable to find any evidence that Japan began planning for further operations before Feb 42. Then the plans were rather sketchy and haphazard. Operation MO is not very well conceived or executed.
There are some players who run their games from turn to turn and often conduct operations in the same manner.
However what if the Japanese player when making his first turn is looking past the SRA and committing resources to prepare well in advance for operations after the SRA concludes and material is available for use else where.
With the use of preparation points it now takes a ground unit 100 turns to be fully prepared for landing on an enemy hex or even to defend a hex it is placed in.
If you simply lift a Bde unit without preparing first, upon landing the bulk of it's components breakdown.
I believe the airfields on Rabaul were capable (space wise) of supporting several hundred aircraft. (Port Moresby as well grew to immense size.)
Lae was used by the allies as a medium bomber base and they kept many times the number of aircraft there (compared to what the Japanese deployed there)
For me the problem is not getting results close to actual when I limit the battles to historical size and composition. It's understanding results when I use what the bases and logistics can support. (The battles grow to sizes beyond what occurred.) Since the allied force is closer to the historical force I wonder what would have been the result if the Japanese had waited to bring in more force or had began preparing for the battles earlier.
My plans (as Japan) always revolve around my having larger numbers in place as soon as possible. Opening the airbattle with the aim of closing allied airfields (and damaging as many ac as possible) Followed by having resources close by to replace my losses (pull out damaged units and replace with fresh ones) The entire object of the airbattle is to provide a window of several days to move troops via transport to secure advanced bases. I believe it is very important to have more bases in an area then the enemy has.
In defending their bases I hope the allies commit their surface forces and CV. The main object in any of my operations is the enemy combat forces (not a geographical point)
I desire to draw outnumbered enemy forces into battle. If the enemy refuses combat I secure the new bases and prepare them for a repeat type operation later.
The reason I ask for your thoughts on what might have been possible compared to what was actually done is, I don't see many games of WITP following a historic path. The further from Dec 7 1941 the game progresses the further from history it will move.
On another topic:
One example of Allied intell in WITP. Suppose on turn 5 (12 Dec 1941) I set the objective of the 23rd Mixed Bde to Port Moresby to begin preparing to capture that base. On following turns the Allied player might read in his intell report "23rd Mixed Bde has objective of Port Moresby"
I am currently only doing tests with "out of the box" experience, morale and fatigues. I am not altering any data for any group.
"The biggest problem I've seen lately is the huge masses of Japanese a/c operating from New Guinea and New Ireland. Strikes escorted by fifty Zekes should be an extreme rarity. If they're not, UVs problem may not be the a/c model at all, but rather a flawed supply and logistics model that lets the Japanese keep that many a/c flying at the end of a very narrow and overstretched logistical pipe."
Mdiehl, I understand the above to apply to historic scenarios.
Do you think in WITP the Japanese could commit the resources to making the logistical pipe more efficient?
There is a limited number of air assets to use but if the Japanese move air HQ and support units to a base capable of supporting larger number of aircraft could they support more then historically was the case.
In my tests in the South Pacific I try to keep 4x required supply at main airfields (for both allied and Japanese)
I'm finding that even if I move more airgroups and support into Rabaul the Allies have no problem matching or exceeding what I can commit.
I'm unable to find any evidence that Japan began planning for further operations before Feb 42. Then the plans were rather sketchy and haphazard. Operation MO is not very well conceived or executed.
There are some players who run their games from turn to turn and often conduct operations in the same manner.
However what if the Japanese player when making his first turn is looking past the SRA and committing resources to prepare well in advance for operations after the SRA concludes and material is available for use else where.
With the use of preparation points it now takes a ground unit 100 turns to be fully prepared for landing on an enemy hex or even to defend a hex it is placed in.
If you simply lift a Bde unit without preparing first, upon landing the bulk of it's components breakdown.
I believe the airfields on Rabaul were capable (space wise) of supporting several hundred aircraft. (Port Moresby as well grew to immense size.)
Lae was used by the allies as a medium bomber base and they kept many times the number of aircraft there (compared to what the Japanese deployed there)
For me the problem is not getting results close to actual when I limit the battles to historical size and composition. It's understanding results when I use what the bases and logistics can support. (The battles grow to sizes beyond what occurred.) Since the allied force is closer to the historical force I wonder what would have been the result if the Japanese had waited to bring in more force or had began preparing for the battles earlier.
My plans (as Japan) always revolve around my having larger numbers in place as soon as possible. Opening the airbattle with the aim of closing allied airfields (and damaging as many ac as possible) Followed by having resources close by to replace my losses (pull out damaged units and replace with fresh ones) The entire object of the airbattle is to provide a window of several days to move troops via transport to secure advanced bases. I believe it is very important to have more bases in an area then the enemy has.
In defending their bases I hope the allies commit their surface forces and CV. The main object in any of my operations is the enemy combat forces (not a geographical point)
I desire to draw outnumbered enemy forces into battle. If the enemy refuses combat I secure the new bases and prepare them for a repeat type operation later.
The reason I ask for your thoughts on what might have been possible compared to what was actually done is, I don't see many games of WITP following a historic path. The further from Dec 7 1941 the game progresses the further from history it will move.
On another topic:
One example of Allied intell in WITP. Suppose on turn 5 (12 Dec 1941) I set the objective of the 23rd Mixed Bde to Port Moresby to begin preparing to capture that base. On following turns the Allied player might read in his intell report "23rd Mixed Bde has objective of Port Moresby"
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
More efficient? No. I think greater efficieny in the organization of Japanese logistics was a historical impossiblity. Too much "make it so" in the Japanese mindset and not enough people willing to ask "with what?"
Also, the Japanese support model (for ex in constructing airbases, improving ports and harbors, fortifying positions) was very labor intensive. In contrast the Allies (esp the US) were mechanically intensive. The Allies should be able to improve facilties at a rate that is at least a full order of magnitude (10x as fast) better than the Japanese.
Bigger pipeline? Sure. But the only way this should be possible is if some other area of Japan's perimter is completely starved of all supplies and begins to wither on the vine. Japan STARTED the war shy several million tons of necessary shipping. Every major HQ was in a competition for adequate supply in what was a zero-sum game. Thus, if eighty Zekes are operating out of Rabaul, there should be no mechanics available at many of Japan's other defensive-perimter bases. That means that Japanese air units at other bases should very rapidly lose readiness just for existing outside of the home islands.
Also, the Japanese support model (for ex in constructing airbases, improving ports and harbors, fortifying positions) was very labor intensive. In contrast the Allies (esp the US) were mechanically intensive. The Allies should be able to improve facilties at a rate that is at least a full order of magnitude (10x as fast) better than the Japanese.
Bigger pipeline? Sure. But the only way this should be possible is if some other area of Japan's perimter is completely starved of all supplies and begins to wither on the vine. Japan STARTED the war shy several million tons of necessary shipping. Every major HQ was in a competition for adequate supply in what was a zero-sum game. Thus, if eighty Zekes are operating out of Rabaul, there should be no mechanics available at many of Japan's other defensive-perimter bases. That means that Japanese air units at other bases should very rapidly lose readiness just for existing outside of the home islands.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
- Tristanjohn
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Re: Realistic Results: what are these things, what aren't they?
I haven't seen Gary's formulas so I don't how his model's values are plugged in, what work they do, when they do it and all that.Snigbert wrote:"The flaw is the game doesn't try to model American strengths across the board as far as I can see, instead assumes an overall weakness, whereas it does attempt to model Japanese strengths (with a catchall quality called "Maneuver") while pretty much ignoring their weaknesses. That's what's known as either design bias and/or confusion, and it's found in every bad model around."
So if you include a characteristic of aircraft which, in this case, happens to favor the Japanese, you are showing bias...Well, from what I have read the Japanese Zero did have better turning at lower speeds than equivalent American aircraft...while American aircraft had advantages which made them more durable and better firepower (two characteristics of aircraft also included, which favor American aircraft). Why do you only point out the areas where it happens to favor Japan and ignore where it favors the US?
What weaknesses do you see the game assuming for Americans?
Specifications for handling characteristics for planes in the database which might affect combat include maximum speed, maximum altitude, climb rate, manuever and durability. I'd certainly throw max/alt out the window and I've already thrown out cruise speed as useless.
Also affecting combat (presumably) are plane ratings for durability and armor. Guns are assigned a general rating called "Gun Value" for all planes but I assume the effects of these weapons are handled individually by gun system (a guess on my part).
So, for all I can see Gary's got A6M2's flying around faster than Wildcats (I use F4F4's as my platform for comparison's sake) and climbing faster than Wildcats and maneuvering more nimbly than Wildcats and I guess in his mind that's that for handling characteristics. The "Zero" is much better than the Wildcat in his mind, no doubt about it.
As for total firepower and its effect, Gary apparently gives the Wildcat an edge here, but to what extent I can't be sure and I won't ever know without a look at those formulas. The numbers he does give for stuff like armor and durability and fire effects strike me as arbitrary but for all I know these make sense somehow in the end given his formulas (whatever they are).
I'm told (I don't know, just been told) that pilot experience and morale and fatigue is not as important (somehow--haven't seen the formulas) as leader ratings for leadership and inspiration.
For what it's worth, in Scenario #14 pilot ratings for A6M2 and A6M3 planes stationed at Rabaul come in modeled higher/better than for their Wildcat counterparts, and as a general rule the discrepancy in favor of the Japanese is even more pronounced when it comes to leaders.
Saratoga Wildcats enter Scenario #14 with scores of 80|62|13 (experience|morale|fatigue) with the Japanese A6M2's rated 84|87|13.
While leadership for Wildcats off the Enterprise and Wasp is somewhat better at 65|71 and 66|78 (leadership|inspiration) respectively, to the Japanese A6M2's (63|70) Saratoga leadership lags behind at 59|71. Of course nothing touches the Rabaul-based A6M3's led by Sakai (82|87).
The "Vals" at Rabual are 83|83|14, the "Bettys" 80|90|12 and 83|91|13, the "Nells" at Truk 83|90|14 and 78|82|15 and so on.
I haven't gone back to check the planes coming off Japanese carriers but from memory they're across the board better than their USN counterparts.
How all that plays exactly out with Gary's formulas in mind is anyone's guess.
I do notice that Japanese consistently achieve glamorous results in the game versus my air assets, especially if it's a CV-CV.
Japanese air assets on land do pretty much equally well, though, and from what I can see are not suffering fatigue at the same rate as Allied planes, either. I've noted how often Japanese fighters and bombers attack PM and Gili Gili, sometimes with startling success. Fighter sweeps from Kavieng and Rabaul to PM and Gili Gili every turn seem to pose no problem to the Japanese player. And that's twice per turn, one sweep attack for each air phase, and with the same squadron. Turn after turn.
Put it all together (somehow--haven't seen those formulas) and the result is an early advantage to the Japanese air assets.
The primary counter argument seems to be that while it's true the Japanese start the game with better pilots and leaders soon enough attrition takes it toll and the Allies mop up. Or something similar. Apparently the belief is that this models WWII history.
Back to results: I'm one of the few around here who sees skewed results in play. I'm told by more than one the results I get do not match theirs in any manner, shape or form, that in their games the Japanese are getting shot up up and shot down at a rate that quite closely matches history. I've further been told that if I ever learn to play the game "correctly" perhaps my results will improve.
And that's about all I know.
Re the air module, that is. The simulation lacks in other areas as well.
Regarding Frank Jack Fletcher: They should have named an oiler after him instead. -- Irrelevant
- Tristanjohn
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Re: Realistic Results: what are these things, what aren't they?
mdiehl wrote:BTW, that all presumes that anyone thinks the model is really broken. Mogami seems consistently to get something approaching 1:1 losses in the early war. It makes me wonder whether a fix is necessarily needed. The biggest problem I've seen lately is the huge masses of Japanese a/c operating from New Guinea and New Ireland. Strikes escorted by fifty Zekes should be an extreme rarity. If they're not, UVs problem may not be the a/c model at all, but rather a flawed supply and logistics model that lets the Japanese keep that many a/c flying at the end of a very narrow and overstretched logistical pipe.
Not just overall supply, though that has to be part of it. Upkeep of planes, upkeep of pilots has to be figured in. Also, these planes can fly twice per turn from New Ireland and Rabaul to PM and Gil Gili. I've seen this for both bombers and fighters--the latter seem to do this every turn if so ordered. (What shape they're in back home I've no idea, but fly they do. I just don't bother to meet them.
Kind of ridiculous.
Regarding Frank Jack Fletcher: They should have named an oiler after him instead. -- Irrelevant
Re: Air combat
Mogami when the Japanese player makes his 1st mouse click on the 12/07/41 turn history goes right out the window...Poof!Mogami wrote: The reason I ask for your thoughts on what might have been possible compared to what was actually done is, I don't see many games of WITP following a historic path. The further from Dec 7 1941 the game progresses the further from history it will move.
1st thing the Japanese player will do and it will not even be a planned thought on his part will be to end the Japanese Army/Navy problem, (he will put into place a unified chain of command and unified war plan) he will without even thinking about it remove his biggest problem he (historically) faces and thus he begins the deviation from the get go.
But how long can you sustain and operate these kind of numbers?Mogami wrote: There is a limited number of air assets to use but if the Japanese move air HQ and support units to a base capable of supporting larger number of aircraft could they support more then historically was the case.
In my tests in the South Pacific I try to keep 4x required supply at main airfields (for both allied and Japanese)
I'm finding that even if I move more airgroups and support into Rabaul the Allies have no problem matching or exceeding what I can commit.
You should be able to use places like Rabaul to stockpile aircraft and supplies to their max allowable numbers and even operate them for a while but he should not be able to sustain operations for a very long time due to (If everything works right) the Japanese inability to keep the amount of supplies needed flowing. Supply shortages should force the Japanese to scale back numbers in protracted actions.
UV's biggest problem as I have pointed out before is the unlimited supply allowing sustained air operations with for too many aircraft for far too long at least in WITP the allied player will be able to interdict the Japanese supply lines and force him to scale back operations to what he can keep supplied.
I would also like to make one comment on the Japanese pilot experience issue.
I think the Japanese should get and deserve higher experience ratings at the start 12/41, they had been getting shot at for several years it does not matter if the opposition they were facing was substandard and inferior to what the British or US might have offered but the simple fact remains lessons learned while being shot at count more then just flying formations and practicing combat missions, slightly faster reflexes accelerated thinking process better overall picture of the situation Etc. I do think it counts for something and is an advantage but that advantage begins to dissolve once US starts shooting and learning these lessons themselves.
CD
Hi, Mogami. Going back to CD. The problem may be the confusion between beach defense (BD) and coastal defense (CD). In the Pacific War, no combat vessels actually engaged CD systems. The Japanese systems were limited to the homeland and Korea. No US BB's engaged the CD complexes with 41cm guns at Tokyo Bay or in the Tsushima Straights. Likewise, no IJN surface groups engaged the CD complexes around Manila Bay and Honolulu (with its 16" M1919 and Mk2M3 guns). Most bombardment groups engaged beach defenses, such as the 5" Mk.8 guns of the USMC at Wake or off Guadalcanal or even the 8" guns at Tarawa (BTW, these were not captured at Singapore, they were removed from old British built armored cruisers of the 1905 war). Such weapons were not on mobile mounts, but were limited to field fortifications for protection and mostly limited to direct fire (rather than elaborate spotting, RF and computing systems available to CD systems). During the scare of 1940, the British "dotted" their coastal areas with "emergency" batteries. Any guns that could provide some form of direct fire on landing craft were positioned across from beaches. Much of the Atlantic Wall at Normany was made up of beach defenses. If the Allies had landed off Calais, they would faced concrete emplaced 40.6cm and 38cm guns with CD FCS and would have suffered far more damage to their fire support ships than did off Normandy. As it was, the Japanese BD units actually landed a few rounds from time to time. But a hastily emplaced BD with limited logistical support shouldn't have the ability to impact ops so drastically as is being described.
Reading Lundstrom, his analysis of Japanese fighter tactics shows a real similarity between IJN and USN tactics. The IJN favored wingmen supported high speed attacks from the rear, not dogfighting. The IJAAF fighter pilots (like their Italian counterparts) were the ones who emphasized "dogfighting". The major difference was the USN superiority in deflection shooting and the IJN's combat experience. The IJNAF was committed to combat from carriers in early 1937, Mogami, during the landing of IJA and IJN ground forces in southern coastal China. Then the land attack groups were committed in late 1937 as the Chinese moved back beyond the range of the IJAAF. Chinese resistence forced the development of drop tanks for the A5M and the extension of the range requirement for the A6M to provide escort to the bombers. A study of the Chinese theater and the Soviet-Japanese confrontations like Nomohan show the IJAAF as not reaching the levels of operational and tactical expertise displayed by the IJNAAF.
I hate to agree with mdiehl but Lundstrom's studies show that between Dec 41 and Dec 42, the exchange rate between A6M and F4F fighters in fighter on fighter combat was basically even. There were, however, large swings, when one side or the other achieved operational or tactical surprise or were able to concentrate sufficient numerical superiority over the battlefield. This was not only because of the balance between pilots cited above, but because of the balance between the aircraft, the A6M a superb offensive aircraft, and the F4F a superb defensive fighter. David Brown, the retired RNAS Capt who flew everything from Swordfish to Phantom IIs, thought well of both aircraft. But there weren't enough F4F's to go around and so the A6Ms had a major impact against other types of Allied fighters and the IJAAF wasn't flying A6Ms, but Ki.27s, with few Ki.43s and suffered accordingly. Fighter on fighter combat was not the only facet of air combat.
Finally, WITP is a strategic-operational level sim/game. The individual outcomes at tactical level are not as important as the correct operational-strategic outcome based on the correlation of forces.
Reading Lundstrom, his analysis of Japanese fighter tactics shows a real similarity between IJN and USN tactics. The IJN favored wingmen supported high speed attacks from the rear, not dogfighting. The IJAAF fighter pilots (like their Italian counterparts) were the ones who emphasized "dogfighting". The major difference was the USN superiority in deflection shooting and the IJN's combat experience. The IJNAF was committed to combat from carriers in early 1937, Mogami, during the landing of IJA and IJN ground forces in southern coastal China. Then the land attack groups were committed in late 1937 as the Chinese moved back beyond the range of the IJAAF. Chinese resistence forced the development of drop tanks for the A5M and the extension of the range requirement for the A6M to provide escort to the bombers. A study of the Chinese theater and the Soviet-Japanese confrontations like Nomohan show the IJAAF as not reaching the levels of operational and tactical expertise displayed by the IJNAAF.
I hate to agree with mdiehl but Lundstrom's studies show that between Dec 41 and Dec 42, the exchange rate between A6M and F4F fighters in fighter on fighter combat was basically even. There were, however, large swings, when one side or the other achieved operational or tactical surprise or were able to concentrate sufficient numerical superiority over the battlefield. This was not only because of the balance between pilots cited above, but because of the balance between the aircraft, the A6M a superb offensive aircraft, and the F4F a superb defensive fighter. David Brown, the retired RNAS Capt who flew everything from Swordfish to Phantom IIs, thought well of both aircraft. But there weren't enough F4F's to go around and so the A6Ms had a major impact against other types of Allied fighters and the IJAAF wasn't flying A6Ms, but Ki.27s, with few Ki.43s and suffered accordingly. Fighter on fighter combat was not the only facet of air combat.
Finally, WITP is a strategic-operational level sim/game. The individual outcomes at tactical level are not as important as the correct operational-strategic outcome based on the correlation of forces.
Air combat
Hi, Several items discussed have already been changed for WITP so there is no need to continue using them to beat up the model.
Leaders can be changed in WITP.
Sweeps only occur one per day (a fighter group set to sweep will only fly one time. It might be 1st or 2nd air phase but will only happen once)
Both players can fly their groups to death in UV/WITP. If the Japanese player is flying sweeps twice per day every day I'd wager he is losing Zeros to Ops. I played one game as allies where I pulled out all airgroups from PM and over a 3 month period accounted for several hundred Japanese aircraft because the Japanese player just kept flying missions there every day regardless of weather or fatigue or morale.
Buy the time I decided to begin commiting my airunits to the battle Japanese op loss were over 900. (mine were below 100) The Japanese were quickly defeated.
Overall I think all pilots are over rated in UV/WITP. I think there should be normal trained pilots (max 75 exp) and exceptional pilots (99's)
exceptional pilots are not 99's because of training or experience. They are just naturally better flyers (and most importantly better marksmen)
So the majority of pilots from all nations would begin around exp 50 with naval pilots being in the 60's (up to 75) I think USN torpedo pilots are always under rated (I would rate them higher then other USN types)
Whatever rating is given to the A.V.G. would be the baseline for other pilots. IJN pilots would be equal to or minus 5 and USN pilots would be equal to or minus 5. (Since the A.V.G. was composed of select pilots and I consider Naval pilots to also be select pilots)(Naval pilots had to be more skilled for carrier ops and navigation.)
The perfect model in my opinion would rate pilots on flying/ marksmanship/health/luck Leaders would be rated for tactics.
In UV/WITP I think the leader ratings are what decides if a group gets the bounce or not.
Leaders can be changed in WITP.
Sweeps only occur one per day (a fighter group set to sweep will only fly one time. It might be 1st or 2nd air phase but will only happen once)
Both players can fly their groups to death in UV/WITP. If the Japanese player is flying sweeps twice per day every day I'd wager he is losing Zeros to Ops. I played one game as allies where I pulled out all airgroups from PM and over a 3 month period accounted for several hundred Japanese aircraft because the Japanese player just kept flying missions there every day regardless of weather or fatigue or morale.
Buy the time I decided to begin commiting my airunits to the battle Japanese op loss were over 900. (mine were below 100) The Japanese were quickly defeated.
Overall I think all pilots are over rated in UV/WITP. I think there should be normal trained pilots (max 75 exp) and exceptional pilots (99's)
exceptional pilots are not 99's because of training or experience. They are just naturally better flyers (and most importantly better marksmen)
So the majority of pilots from all nations would begin around exp 50 with naval pilots being in the 60's (up to 75) I think USN torpedo pilots are always under rated (I would rate them higher then other USN types)
Whatever rating is given to the A.V.G. would be the baseline for other pilots. IJN pilots would be equal to or minus 5 and USN pilots would be equal to or minus 5. (Since the A.V.G. was composed of select pilots and I consider Naval pilots to also be select pilots)(Naval pilots had to be more skilled for carrier ops and navigation.)
The perfect model in my opinion would rate pilots on flying/ marksmanship/health/luck Leaders would be rated for tactics.
In UV/WITP I think the leader ratings are what decides if a group gets the bounce or not.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
- Daniel Oskar
- Posts: 112
- Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2000 10:00 am
First a little background. I'm a retired Marine Officer/Naval Aviator, and my last tour was as a primary flight instructor. In my last fleet squadron I was the unit Weapons and Tactics Instructor. What I am getting at is that I know a little more than the average guy when it comes to training and combat effectiveness. I would submit that total flight time, closely followed by quality of training are the biggest factors influencing pilot experience. A young pilot, with less that 300 hours devotes a considerable amount of his attention just flying the aircraft. He has to concentrate on basic skills like maintaining formation, navigating, managing fuel, ect... As experience increases the effort devoted to these tasks diminishes, they become second nature, almost subconcious. This makes the aviator a dangerous man, as now his time in the air is almost entirely devoted to the mission at hand. Statistics from the Naval Safety Center put a number on when this happens, at around 1100+ hours. Obviously quality of training is a big factor, as flying around the traffic pattern for 1100 hours is unlikely to make you the ace of the base. The best quality of training is combat, but it is also the most unforgiving of mistakes. I can't give you data for the USAAC, but I do have some stats on the USN/USMC and IJN as far as experience is concerned. The minimum time to qualify for front line service, in hours, is as follows:
year USN IJN
1941 305 700
1942 305 700
1943 500 500
1944 525 225
1945 525 90
These were the minimums. At the start of the war ~50% of USN pilots had 305-600 hours, ~25% had 600-1000, and the rest had 1000+. On the IJN side I dont have as detailed numbers, but we can assume a similar distribution of skill, with the benifit of many of the seasoned aviators having flown combat in China. As a final note, USN/USMC aviators were training together untill assignment to a tactical squadron. Following that, often the USMC lapsed in carrier landing proficiency with a resulting slight increase in mishap rate initially when returning to shipboard operations.
year USN IJN
1941 305 700
1942 305 700
1943 500 500
1944 525 225
1945 525 90
These were the minimums. At the start of the war ~50% of USN pilots had 305-600 hours, ~25% had 600-1000, and the rest had 1000+. On the IJN side I dont have as detailed numbers, but we can assume a similar distribution of skill, with the benifit of many of the seasoned aviators having flown combat in China. As a final note, USN/USMC aviators were training together untill assignment to a tactical squadron. Following that, often the USMC lapsed in carrier landing proficiency with a resulting slight increase in mishap rate initially when returning to shipboard operations.
Air Combat
Hi, Thanks Dan that is good dope.
I'm interested if some kind of conversion to UV/WITP's 0-99 exp system could be devised from using training hours and combat hours to arrive at a UV/WITP rating.
What is your impression of exceptional pilots? Personally I think there are certain pilots that are off the scale compared to their peers. (So I would like a max rating for normal pilots)
What would be the difference between training and combat in gaining experiance? (assuming pilot survives)
using 0-99 scale what is max you would allow a pilot to gain just from training?
How would you rate pilots based on training hours and then those with added combat?
Also I understand your post to mean the replacement pilot pools in UV/WITP should change by year.
with USN/USMC replacement pilots climbing while IJN pilots decline (I would agree with this. I only hope there is some in game mechanism for the Japanese to alter this. (providing they have the fuel and training aircraft)
It would be nice if both players could select pilots in training to be used as replacements. So if lower demand then pilots get more training and arrive at higher ratings.
Thanks for posting. Semper Fi
Edit: Looking at aircraft values a thought occured to me. (I'm sure this is not part of UV/WITP)
The P39/P400: Could the engine placement partly account for the troubles this aircraft had in Air to Air and it's success as a ground attack aircraft?
I'm interested if some kind of conversion to UV/WITP's 0-99 exp system could be devised from using training hours and combat hours to arrive at a UV/WITP rating.
What is your impression of exceptional pilots? Personally I think there are certain pilots that are off the scale compared to their peers. (So I would like a max rating for normal pilots)
What would be the difference between training and combat in gaining experiance? (assuming pilot survives)
using 0-99 scale what is max you would allow a pilot to gain just from training?
How would you rate pilots based on training hours and then those with added combat?
Also I understand your post to mean the replacement pilot pools in UV/WITP should change by year.
with USN/USMC replacement pilots climbing while IJN pilots decline (I would agree with this. I only hope there is some in game mechanism for the Japanese to alter this. (providing they have the fuel and training aircraft)
It would be nice if both players could select pilots in training to be used as replacements. So if lower demand then pilots get more training and arrive at higher ratings.
Thanks for posting. Semper Fi
Edit: Looking at aircraft values a thought occured to me. (I'm sure this is not part of UV/WITP)
The P39/P400: Could the engine placement partly account for the troubles this aircraft had in Air to Air and it's success as a ground attack aircraft?
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
- Daniel Oskar
- Posts: 112
- Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2000 10:00 am
As far as exceptional pilots, I have known a few. It seems to me that it is harder to spot that in a group of senior guys. The exceptional ones stand out early, in flight school and the RAG. They have natural talent, and seem to catch on quicker than the rest. By the time guys hit the fleet they are the ones who become your section/division/flight leaders in short order.
As far as coding, I am no expert, but my subjective reply to the value of combat hours vs training hours would be 2 to 3:1 in value. When I went to WTI the training was as realistic as it could be short of shooting some of us down. That experience was probably the most valuable training of my career, but it wasn't combat. One thing the UV system doesn't model in terms of a squadron's leadership. The CO, as well as the flight/division/section leaders are the heart of the squadron. They develop, train in, and use tactics. They do the most preflight planning. These guys are important, and if a they are lost, it will have a major effect on the combat effectiveness of the unit. (not only experience but morale) Imagine a 4 plane division being led by a 2ndLT with 500 hours. He won't even come close to fighting that division as effectively as the 1500 hour Captian he replaced. When it hits the fan that division may go to every man for himself.
I do think the pool should be adjusted to reflect the changes in training, and additionally I thing fewer leaders should be in the pool for the IJN. The Japanese stayed up front untill they were killed or unable to fly.
As far as the P-39/P-400, it was a dog mostly because of the lack of a supercharger. The engine placement was taken into account during design, it had to be to keep the CG in safe limits. The big allison engine put out plenty of ponies on the deck, but without a supercharger it was starved for air as altitude increased. Up high if it pulled G to maneuver, it would scrub off speed. The powerplant was too anemic to replace said speed rapidly, so you have a sluggish airplane. In addition, I'm sure there is a pretty big difference in wing loading between it and the Zero.
As far as coding, I am no expert, but my subjective reply to the value of combat hours vs training hours would be 2 to 3:1 in value. When I went to WTI the training was as realistic as it could be short of shooting some of us down. That experience was probably the most valuable training of my career, but it wasn't combat. One thing the UV system doesn't model in terms of a squadron's leadership. The CO, as well as the flight/division/section leaders are the heart of the squadron. They develop, train in, and use tactics. They do the most preflight planning. These guys are important, and if a they are lost, it will have a major effect on the combat effectiveness of the unit. (not only experience but morale) Imagine a 4 plane division being led by a 2ndLT with 500 hours. He won't even come close to fighting that division as effectively as the 1500 hour Captian he replaced. When it hits the fan that division may go to every man for himself.
I do think the pool should be adjusted to reflect the changes in training, and additionally I thing fewer leaders should be in the pool for the IJN. The Japanese stayed up front untill they were killed or unable to fly.
As far as the P-39/P-400, it was a dog mostly because of the lack of a supercharger. The engine placement was taken into account during design, it had to be to keep the CG in safe limits. The big allison engine put out plenty of ponies on the deck, but without a supercharger it was starved for air as altitude increased. Up high if it pulled G to maneuver, it would scrub off speed. The powerplant was too anemic to replace said speed rapidly, so you have a sluggish airplane. In addition, I'm sure there is a pretty big difference in wing loading between it and the Zero.
"BTW, that all presumes that anyone thinks the model is really broken. Mogami seems consistently to get something approaching 1:1 losses in the early war. It makes me wonder whether a fix is necessarily needed. The biggest problem I've seen lately is the huge masses of Japanese a/c operating from New Guinea and New Ireland. Strikes escorted by fifty Zekes should be an extreme rarity. If they're not, UVs problem may not be the a/c model at all, but rather a flawed supply and logistics model that lets the Japanese keep that many a/c flying at the end of a very narrow and overstretched logistical pipe."
I wish I got those kinds of escorts from my Zeros. The only time I have seen that sized escort, personally, is when I have 3 or more CV TFs operating in a hex together and they launch a coordinated strike.
Even then, just being there doesnt mean they take part in the combat. Just like CAP, only some of the planes are at the right altitude, location, etc to make a difference.
"Also, the Japanese support model (for ex in constructing airbases, improving ports and harbors, fortifying positions) was very labor intensive. In contrast the Allies (esp the US) were mechanically intensive. The Allies should be able to improve facilties at a rate that is at least a full order of magnitude (10x as fast) better than the Japanese."
Just FYI, the Allies do build bases considerably faster than the Japanese. I'm not sure whether it's a function of the game engine or just the fact that the Allies have so many engineers and seabees. For example, I held Irau with an engineer and a base garrison unit for a few weeks with Japan and nothing was built. The Allies landed and took the location, and two days later they had a functioning airfield. That kind of upset me, but it was realistic.
I wish I got those kinds of escorts from my Zeros. The only time I have seen that sized escort, personally, is when I have 3 or more CV TFs operating in a hex together and they launch a coordinated strike.
Even then, just being there doesnt mean they take part in the combat. Just like CAP, only some of the planes are at the right altitude, location, etc to make a difference.
"Also, the Japanese support model (for ex in constructing airbases, improving ports and harbors, fortifying positions) was very labor intensive. In contrast the Allies (esp the US) were mechanically intensive. The Allies should be able to improve facilties at a rate that is at least a full order of magnitude (10x as fast) better than the Japanese."
Just FYI, the Allies do build bases considerably faster than the Japanese. I'm not sure whether it's a function of the game engine or just the fact that the Allies have so many engineers and seabees. For example, I held Irau with an engineer and a base garrison unit for a few weeks with Japan and nothing was built. The Allies landed and took the location, and two days later they had a functioning airfield. That kind of upset me, but it was realistic.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
P39/P400
Hi, About the P39/P400 I am interested in if because the engine was in the back the aircraft was easier to shoot down by stern attack then other allied aircraft.
I've seen accounts where P-39's on their way down were trailing anitfreeze/coolant rather then smoke and flames.
But when making ground attacks the same engine placement was a protection (for the engine)
The Soviets asked for every P-39 they could get and used them almost the entire war. They even fought air to air since the air combat there took place much lower then in the Pacific.
I've seen accounts where P-39's on their way down were trailing anitfreeze/coolant rather then smoke and flames.
But when making ground attacks the same engine placement was a protection (for the engine)
The Soviets asked for every P-39 they could get and used them almost the entire war. They even fought air to air since the air combat there took place much lower then in the Pacific.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Since the original topic was realistic results, and thus far most of the discussion has been on aircraft, and the air combat model. One area that in my opinion has not been addressed adequately is ground combat, and in particular fortifications and the difficulties posed by the terrain.
Historically Buna and Munda proved to be tough nuts for the allies to crack, because of the fortifications and the manner in which the jungle provided natural camouflage. In UV bases seem to fall far too easily.
Another area where formidable terrain and tenacious resitance set the stage for a possible strategic riposte was at Biak and Lone Tree Hill near Samri. It should be noted that at the same time SWPAC forces were slugging out against the Japanese that operations were getting underway in the Central Pacific towards the Mariannas by the USN, therefore SWPAC was lacking in naval resources. The Combined Fleet prepared operation Kon to drive the Allies away from Biak and assembled a massive fleet including both Yamato and Musashi; however the local superiority was squandered when the fleet was instead dispatched to the Mariannas.
I don't think the current model as used by UV could create such outcomes where a numerically smaller forces is able to deny key basing areas and thus set the stage for a possible devasting counter attack. I do have slight hopes for WitP though, since Mogami was held up by the heroic defenders of Wake Island in his AAR.
Historically Buna and Munda proved to be tough nuts for the allies to crack, because of the fortifications and the manner in which the jungle provided natural camouflage. In UV bases seem to fall far too easily.
Another area where formidable terrain and tenacious resitance set the stage for a possible strategic riposte was at Biak and Lone Tree Hill near Samri. It should be noted that at the same time SWPAC forces were slugging out against the Japanese that operations were getting underway in the Central Pacific towards the Mariannas by the USN, therefore SWPAC was lacking in naval resources. The Combined Fleet prepared operation Kon to drive the Allies away from Biak and assembled a massive fleet including both Yamato and Musashi; however the local superiority was squandered when the fleet was instead dispatched to the Mariannas.
I don't think the current model as used by UV could create such outcomes where a numerically smaller forces is able to deny key basing areas and thus set the stage for a possible devasting counter attack. I do have slight hopes for WitP though, since Mogami was held up by the heroic defenders of Wake Island in his AAR.
Ground Combat
Hi, Ground combat has had some changes installed for WITP.
A deliberate attack can only reduce fort level by 1.
Combat is now also a bit bloodier in the early going.
Defenders attack without waiting for orders when enemy lands on beach.
(Shock attack if good odds bombardment if not)
A deliberate attack can only reduce fort level by 1.
Combat is now also a bit bloodier in the early going.
Defenders attack without waiting for orders when enemy lands on beach.
(Shock attack if good odds bombardment if not)
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
- Tristanjohn
- Posts: 3027
- Joined: Wed May 01, 2002 4:50 am
- Location: Daly City CA USA
- Contact:
LTCMTS wrote:Finally, WITP is a strategic-operational level sim/game. The individual outcomes at tactical level are not as important as the correct operational-strategic outcome based on the correlation of forces.
I was with you all the way until you wrote that.
This is one of the most serious (philosophical) problems with this and other similar simulations. It's a ready-made, easy and totally inadequate excuse for apologizing all the way home as to why the simulation doesn't feel right even though at the end of the game the correct side has "won" and the casualty totals appear to be more or less in the ballpark. This logic falls worrying near, indeed encourages the inveterate gamer's simplistic approach to these kinds of studies, namely, to exploit every tactical hole in the system he can find and then crow long and loud afterward about his superior "gamemanship."
While the rest of what you wrote made sense, this is called "dumbing it down." And we've all had considerably more than enough of that.
Regarding Frank Jack Fletcher: They should have named an oiler after him instead. -- Irrelevant
"This is one of the most serious (philosophical) problems with this and other similar simulations. It's a ready-made, easy and totally inadequate excuse for apologizing all the way home as to why the simulation doesn't feel right even though at the end of the game the correct side has "won" and the casualty totals appear to be more or less in the ballpark. This logic falls worrying near, indeed encourages the inveterate gamer's simplistic approach to these kinds of studies, namely, to exploit every tactical hole in the system he can find and then crow long and loud afterward about his superior "gamemanship.""
I understand the lack of appeal against 'gamey' games, if you want to play a game with a system that you can exploit, play Warcraft. However I dont understand what loopholes and gameyness have to do with the model being inaccurate.
I understand the lack of appeal against 'gamey' games, if you want to play a game with a system that you can exploit, play Warcraft. However I dont understand what loopholes and gameyness have to do with the model being inaccurate.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
- Tristanjohn
- Posts: 3027
- Joined: Wed May 01, 2002 4:50 am
- Location: Daly City CA USA
- Contact:
Well, put it this way: if I represented the sole market for this sort of software it would be designed differently--otherwise I would not buy it, knowlingly, that is.Snigbert wrote:"This is one of the most serious (philosophical) problems with this and other similar simulations. It's a ready-made, easy and totally inadequate excuse for apologizing all the way home as to why the simulation doesn't feel right even though at the end of the game the correct side has "won" and the casualty totals appear to be more or less in the ballpark. This logic falls worrying near, indeed encourages the inveterate gamer's simplistic approach to these kinds of studies, namely, to exploit every tactical hole in the system he can find and then crow long and loud afterward about his superior "gamemanship.""
I understand the lack of appeal against 'gamey' games, if you rwant to play a game with a system that you can exploit, play Warcraft. However I dont understand what loopholes and gameyness have to do with the model being inaccurate.
Had I bought it just to play and found it to be as it is I might well have taken it back to the store anyway, very "fun" game that it certainly is, secure in the knowledge that my vote with my pocketbook would represent an absolute form of ultimatum to the designer: do better or go out of business.
I have done just that with other titles--Fighting Steel springs to mind in that regard--with the difference being I wasn't the only buyer voting with his pocketbook then. (Although in that case I wasn't alone. Sales were low to begin with, returns were many and I do not wonder why.)
As it happens I bought UV for another pupose: a birthday present for my son. I use it mostly to demonstrate what I fear is likely going to be wrong with WitP--knock on wood--as it's the latter game system I have primary interest in.
Let's turn that around now. There are plenty of people in this forum who haven't a clue about the history these games try to model and couldn't care less. I read a remark from one person within the last week that said he didn't want to be bothered with the details of LBA--his only interest in the game was as a "model" for naval combat.
And now you should appreciate my point better still.
For anyone who does not (hello out there!
It's kinda like archery. In that sport one needs to aim to a point higher than where he intends his arrow to fall if any hope of hitting the mark is entertained.
Don't blame me--it's a simple matter of physics.
Following this universal principle I hope all the flaws and mistakes which I demonstrate in UV will be corrected in WitP, but I much more realistically expect just a fraction of my criticism to be acted on.
How's that?
Regarding Frank Jack Fletcher: They should have named an oiler after him instead. -- Irrelevant
- Tristanjohn
- Posts: 3027
- Joined: Wed May 01, 2002 4:50 am
- Location: Daly City CA USA
- Contact:
Nope. Never ran across the perfect game yet, or perfect anything yet. Is that, by any chance, a sound reason not to try to make things as close to perfect as we can? Should we just settle for less and call it a day?Kid wrote:Tristanjohn
Have you ever found the perfect game? Could you please share your top three games so I know what standards WitP will be held to?
Top (most fun to play) three computer wargames?
Well, perhaps Battles of Napoleon (terribly dated now but excellent work for its time by David Landrey--its good "AI" relied on scripts mostly, but if it works who cares?), Great Naval Battles of the North Atlantic (I believe this was on balance the best title ever published by SSI--it's a real pity this system never received the further development it deserved with subsequent games in the series, and of course Fighting Steel was a bad joke), and either Silent Hunter or Action Stations! (the former game was loads of fun to play, and fairly realistic in some respects if you cared to spend the time; the latter simulation by Alan Zimm represents the hobby's best all-round model of naval surface action, with GNBNA not awful far behind--and please keep in mind AS was developed with CGA graphics for the 286! which ought to give you some idea of just how far we have not come over the past 15 years).
How about you, Kid? Or did you only want to give me a hard time?
P.S. You didn't ask, but I think Gary's Carrier Strike deserves mention, for its potential if nothing else. That game might be one of the most promising systems I've seen to date. He got a lot right with that model. And as long as I'm on it, the subject of his late alpha (or first beta) version of Afrika Korps struck me as the perfect backdrop to his Second Front system--the scale and type of warfare felt just right for it. A missed opportunity, in my opinion, but by then it had been decided (was that your decision, Joel? just asking
Regarding Frank Jack Fletcher: They should have named an oiler after him instead. -- Irrelevant
I just want to make the point that there will never be a perfect game.
I think we differ in the way we look at games. I base my opinion on how much fun I had playing them and how long they held my attention. My all time favorite is MOO II, I still play it. Next would be UV (I’ve been playing for over 20 months now and still look forward for that turn to come in) and then Gettysburg by Talon Soft (actually I enjoy all the Battleground games). I also loved UFO Terror from the Deep but I can't get it to play on the newer machines. Note that they are all turn-based games. When its RTS, I don’t even bother to try the demo.
I think we differ in the way we look at games. I base my opinion on how much fun I had playing them and how long they held my attention. My all time favorite is MOO II, I still play it. Next would be UV (I’ve been playing for over 20 months now and still look forward for that turn to come in) and then Gettysburg by Talon Soft (actually I enjoy all the Battleground games). I also loved UFO Terror from the Deep but I can't get it to play on the newer machines. Note that they are all turn-based games. When its RTS, I don’t even bother to try the demo.
Former War in the Pacific Test Team Manager and Beta Tester for War in the East.


