Moderators: wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
ORIGINAL: el cid again
You write well Retired. I particularly like your descriptions of the commander's personalities. I also have to revise upward substantially the degree to which we agree on things.
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Your scenario proposal is very similar to RHSEOS - but goes one step farther:
EOS assumes that only the decision for war (July 1941) forces a planning regime on the Japanese. It is modeled on a real organization, led by Col Tsuji, which did the planning for Malaya - using some information from civil and naval sources. The EOS scenario thus forces Japan to start with considerable inefficiencies - particularly in terms of aircraft - and only STARTS to rationalize these about the time the war begins. Your scenario would allow much better integration in that regard: JAAF could be using the Zero as an escort fighter for example - and Ki-27 production could be curtailed considerably.
Now there WERE plans for escort production - also for a mass produced medium submarine (only two prototypes were built). RHS elects to produce the modified version - with oxygen torpedoes - but your scenario would allow production of the earlier version in numbers - without them. These were fine, maneuverable boats, and might matter - and be a better buy than numbers of big ones.
I personally like the idea of not using all the "ships that never were" - or of using the truly obscure ones that might have mattered (like second class escorts). This would have to be something like a "super Japan enhansed scenario" because Japan would be even more powerful - since being efficient early might matter a good deal.
The problem - of course - is how to end the war? Once begun war's take on a life of their own - and the US alone should usually defeat Japan. But Japan must face not only the Allies we think of (UK, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) but also devote major forces to China and the USSR. It remains one of the greatest military problems of all time - to take on such a full plate - and it is not likely a wise thing to bet on winning most of the time!
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Note that RHS scenarios do NOT go into 1946. Technically they end on 1 January 1946 - so players can get an end of year report and automatic victory calculation if they want. But we think the game should usually be called on 1 Nov 1945 and allow no replacements on or after 1 Oct.
This freed up a lot of slots, dovetales with USSBS analysis the war must be over by then, and permitted more to be done in the part of the war in most games. It isn't practical to put those slots back in.
Joe recommends calling the game on 1 Sep if atom bombs were used and 1 Nov if not. I have not addressed atom bombs - but kept the unit/device structure to allow them to work. I hope to make them work better - and to work for both sides - someday. I need to create a test bed for that - and I regard it as very different from regular stuff. First get the other things right.
ORIGINAL: el cid again
In a perfect world we might run this out longer. But we cannot simulate even the Allies properly without more slots - and so we didn't try. At the time Joe said "no game ever gets to 1945, and probably none ever will"
That turned out to be too pessimistic - and Andrew reports a game into 1946. Pilot issues have been addressed - and the system may work well enough into 1945. It isn't yet clear RHS economics work that far - but we will know in a couple of days (I have a machine that runs faster than is believable - and will get there). I WAS FIGURING ON GAINING A FEW SLOTS ON THE JAPANESE SIDE WITH "RATIONALIZATION", BUT I'M NOT AS FAMILIAR AS YOU WITH THE WHOLE "SLOTS" MESS
I do not think we can easily say what would be the impact of Japanese successes continuing? The politics are simply not built into the system.
But one only has to read Marshall and FDR to appreciate that they believed there were political consequences of heavy losses. My mother trained to do combat photography out of US houses - making film and developer from kitchen and bathroom chemicals - and cameras from shoe boxes! Clearly some in the USA were not inclined to give in easily! NO POLITICIAN WANTS TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH CASUALTIES - BUT I THINK WE UNDERESTIMATE THE WILLINGNESS OF AMERICA TO FINISH WW II (ESPECIALLY AGAINST JAPAN) NO MATTER WHAT THE COST.
But I don't think we would be mounting out wave after wave of failed invasions of places if they were failing utterly. SINCE WE NEVER MOUNTED A "FAILED INVASION", I'M NOT SURE WHAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT.
The farther things go, the less we can say with certainty. But surely the US should win this war - and it should win it sooner - particularly in simulation where everything is more efficient - and command less divided.
US war policy in PTO was not very clever (frontal attacks anyone?) - so I expect good players to win this in 1944 - occasionally in 1943. 1945 is for the poor players. Mostly.
Japan can win - but only in 1942. Otherwise a "victory" means "the war ends without a decisive defeat" - not much more than that. There is this for the otherwise bad Axis strategy of short war: ONLY short wars are affordable. Long ones cost too much - even to winners. AND I REGARD ANY SYSTEM THAT ALLOWS JAPAN TO "WIN" IN 1942 AS HOPELESSLY BROKEN AND SCREWED UP. WE'LL HAVE TO AGREE TO DISSAGREE ON THAT ONE.
After WITP II - connected to War In Europe - on the same scale - we can look at this better. We will have more slots too. [This is of course about as accurate a prediction as reading tea leaves - but developers I know think that is what Matrix is up to]
ORIGINAL: el cid again
I don't accept the conventional American view that economics is everything in war. While economics determine the instrumentalities of war, and economic competition often is a cause of war, ultimately politics is the decisive arm. I think Ceasar has it truly right: the enemy is never defeated unless and until he is defeated in his mind: then he is utterly defeated. Consider Yamashita at Singapore: out of ammunition and other vital supplies to the extent he was about to suspend operatoins,
he still allowed the British to surrender when they offered. Their defeat was not quite as immediate as they believed it was. Similarly, we could not get the same Yamashita to surrender at all in 1945 - we found it much more convenient to get him a written order from the Emperor than to defeat him on the field.
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Mike,
I think that even if we accept that Hannibal "won" all his battles in Italy ( a contention I wouldn't accept except if we limit the mathematics of "win" determination to the most narrow parameters possible... said parameters being so narrow as to render King Phyrrus' victories non-phyrric) what Hannibal demonstrated is that the tactical is subordinate to and must serve the operational while the operational is subordinate to and must serve the strategic which in turn is subordinate to and must serve the national/hegemonical policy objectives. As Hamilcar said of Hannibal, he knew how to win a victory but not how to USE a victory. In short, tactically he was brilliant and operationally better than average but strategically and at the national policy objective levels he was quite poor. Given that two of the three were virtual annialations of the Roman side, I think that we CAN accept that he "won". But he lacked the means to take Rome (with the possible exception of the morale ebb following Cannae you refer to), so Romes superior logistics and infastructure could always put another army or three into the field.
I would argue that the Soviet Union's victory on the Eastern Front ( which did so much to defeat Nazi Germany) had far less to do with the quantity of the Soviet Army ( although that is a view common in the west) and FAR more to do with the fact that Soviet doctrine is based on a very clear concept of the relative importance of the various levels of war such that the Soviets were always willing to suffer tactical and/or operational defeats if it served their strategic and national policy goals. Certainly quantity helped insomuch as it allowed the units attrited in such defeats to be rebuilt quite easily but it was not the key reason, IMO, for Soviet success. You can argue it all you want..., but without the Soviet's millions of trained reserves and the ability to replace and improve all her equipment again and again, that "doctrine" doesn't mean squat.
An excellent example of this can be seen in the Chir river debacle in late-42. Most western writings list the Chir River operation as a debacle for the Soviets since Balck managed to lead numerically inferior forces in tactically and operationally brilliant manoeuvres which inflicted great loss on the Soviet forces facing them. However I would contend that the debacle was actually German insofar as by allowing these mobile forces to be tied up for this period of time in operations of minimal importance the Germans failed to add their weight to the thrust to relieve 6th Army and thus the Soviets managed, by committing forces to what was likely to be tactical and operational defeat, to secure a great strategic advantage ( many believe that the added weight of the two mobile formations committed to the Chir River could, if committed to the relief of the 6th Army, have proved decisive). You forget one fact. Without the 48th Panzer Corp's defense of the Chir Line, ALL of Manstein's forces would have been cut off by a Russian breakthrough to the Sea of Azov. The option to use them elsewhere is an illusion.
As to Colonel Blimp aka Percival... Well it is truly said that very often winning a battle is just a matter of outlasting the other side until they convince themselves they can't beat you. Hang on long enough and most armies in the world will throw in the towel. Admittedly there is a limit to how great an inferiority "outlasting" can compensate for but it can compensate for an awful lot, more than is usually accepted. Yamashita was a brialliant leader who got the most out of what he had. Percival was a bumbling incompetent who bounced from crisis to disaster with no clue what he was trying to do, while frittering away his numerical superiority in dribs and drabs. It takes two to Tango..., and it also takes two to create a true military disaster.
As to the perception of impossibility I offer the following. The easy way is usually mined. Impassable terrain is usually barely defended and it is infinitely easier to work one's way through a thicket than work one's way through minefields, entrenched defenders and copious supporting fires. This is one of the reasons I so strongly disagree with those who want to create house rules to prevent invasions of certain points because they are "impossible"... My view is that if it should be impossible than, as the enemy commander, it is their JOB to make it impossible. Geography and distance merely make things difficult, being killed in front of the objective is the ONLY thing that makes it impossible. Relying on distance ( e.g. Panama's a long way from Japan so any invasion of Panama should be banned... a house rule someone foisted on me) would, in real life, not be sufficient to ensure safety. Distance plus 500 aircraft, 40,000 ground troops and level 9 forts ensures a LOT more safety but it is the gamer's job to create that safety, not to just rely on it a la diktat. The reality of the situation was that the Japanese had neither the troops, the transport, or the supply to conquer India or even China, let alone the Soviet Union. If the game makes it possible, the game is wrong. Period.
Hell, in 1939 we'd have had wargamers declaring that any attempt to bypass the Maginot line via the "impassable" Ardennes was unfair yet the equivalent is being argued in WiTP by Allied players time and again and most people just nod sagely and agree because whatever base being mentioned "shouldn't be able to be taken by Japan"... crazy! Well, as I said..., it's my scenario and if I ever get around to building it, you don't have to play it. There are plenty of "Uber-Japan" Fantasies floating around to keep you happy.
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Mr Scholl,
1. No, I still say that saying he "won" is to focus only on the tactical side of things. He killed lots of Romans but did he actually get much closer to achieving his national policy objectives due to those victories? No he did not. He killed lots of Romans but he didn't actually achieve anything decisive. There's more to "winning" than achieving a favourable attrition rate. Granted that might be lost on most attritionists out there but it is true nonetheless. By the standards of the day, he "won" all his battles in Italy. That's what I said, and that's what I meant. My point was that for all his tactical genius, he lacked the manpower and economic support to defeat Rome. Whereas Rome could "lose" and "lose" and "lose" and still be able to equip and field superior armies to Italy and other theatres.
2. Doctrine and its practical soundness is not dependent on whether or not one has massive reserves. I am making a point about Soviet doctrine subjugating lower-level objectives to higher-level objectives and the fact that this is superior to a doctrine which often let lower-level objectives take precedence over higher-level objectives. This point stands irrespective of whether or not one side or the other has a preponderance of mass. Obviously though most Westerners view Soviet operational art as nothing more than the committment of wave after wave of troops until the Germans ran out of bullets and the objective fell. This is a gross misunderstanding. Again, my point was that without her massive economic, material, and manpower reserves, Soviet "doctrine" didn't matter one whit. Russia, like France and Poland before her, would have been crushed. She lost more troops and equipment in 1941 than France, Britian, and Poland combined had put in the field..., and it was her ability to replace them and go on fighting that stopped Hitler.
3. Disagree. The ability of a Soviet breakthrough at Chir to be achieved in a strategically decisive manner AND break German LOCs straight through to the Sea of Azov is illusory. The Soviet forces committed to the Chir River operations just didn't have the logistical support for more than a local breakthrough. Painful in tactical and operational terms? Yes. Strategically decisive? No. House and others have written about this aspect and perusing them should provide further information on this issue for you.
4. Umm, I don't know why you are repeating yourself there. I agreed with you regarding the need to pair a brilliant commander with a bumbler to create the sort of fiasco we saw in Malaysia. Are you not reading my post and just disagreeing to disagree? It seems strange to take issue when I'm agreeing with you. That was because your "comment" on this point didn't make much sense. I was repeating myself to see if you had understood
5. Well I think that many things are possible with a more complete political model which allows co-opting of local satraps, uprisings etc. After all there are far more likely outcomes for the world at a gamedate of 1500 AD than to have a "British Empire" rule large portions of Africa, India, Autralia, the Middle East and the Pacific. However these things were accomplished through judicious co-option of the local leadership and their incorporation into a more British system of allegiance, land ownership and obligations ( as well as the not so occasional outright genocide when a particular tribe or geographical area proved too troublesome). I'm including this example not since I believe there is a direct correlation but because I think it illustrates a general point that the "impossible" is rarely so.
Again we come up against a philosophical difference in approach. You are willing to rule things impossible. I prefer to view them as extremely difficult and probably not accomplishable within the confines of time and resources BUT I'd like a model in which it COULD be done, theoretically, if sufficient time and resources were committed to the endeavour. Obviously some things would require more time and resources than others so co-opting Chinese warlords ( which happened) would be much quicker and cheaper than co-opting the local satraps who commanded over 50% of Indian troops with arms on the Indian sub-continent ( since that didn't really happen on any scale... but could be seen to be possible given what happened with Bose and the Indian national Army). I see it as being able to reccognize that some things are impossible. The Army that would have been needed in India was still bogged down in China after 4 years of effort. And the shipping to get it there was already in use trying to seal off the Pacific and get the "harvest" of the SRA in motion back to Japan before the economy collapsed.
6. I wasn't dealing with your scenario specifically and find it odd that you should take it that I was. This would, of course, explain the vehemence of your response and the fact that you've read me to disagree with you when I haven't actually done so. Well, the discussion you chose to jump into was about the scenario I was proposing, so how could I assume otherwise?
FWIW I agree with you that an RHS scenario should run past 1st January 1946 ( if possible)... although I don't think that will be required since Allied numerical and qualitative superiority is so marked in 1944 and 45... and I wish you the best with your scenario. I'm all for accomodating as many different historical viewpoints, what ifs and various interpretations of what could have been as possible. My view is that until it's been played several times by different people, there is no way of knowing what effect the additional "goodies" the Japanese would recieve would effect the "mid-game". To be fair to the Allied player who would have to deal with this, I proposed extra game time for his "comeback". And even I will admit that if the Allies haven't won by the end of 1946, they have totally "screwed the pooch" and the Japanese player deserves a victory parade and a case of his favorite brew.
In fact nine times out of ten when I get involved in a heated disagreement on this forum it is to disagree with people who are arguing that issue x or y can ONLY be represented in one way and/or that x or y is IMPOSSIBLE. I prefer a much more nuanced viewpoint where impossible is replaced by "appropriately difficult". So, I'm perplexed that you:
a) took my post as applying to your mod... it isn't, I just thought the conversation had taken an interesting theoretical turn and wished to participate... it seems that you are completely unwilling to countenance such participation which is sad but so be it.... and
b) seem to have taken my comments as either personal or entirely in opposition to your own when they are, in fact, objectively neither. Again though, we see things as we are and as we wish them to be and NOT as those things are. I have, in life and work, found that sentence to be almost universally applicable with only a few individuals capable of objective analysis most of the time and I think it applies to your reading of my post.
So, I disagree with your view of Soviet doctrine as relying overly on mass.... In 1941 to 44 pre-war doctrine wasn't really applied as they didn't have the staff to back it up and fell back on amateurish manoeuvres ( see Glantz for a detailed discussion as to how the General Staff created a core of staff officers whom it sent to critical sectors to organise things in those sectors on the proper and effective doctrinal basis whilst letting less critical sectors get by with less effective staff work purely because the Purges didn't leave enough competent, trained staff officers to implement the pre-war doctrine properly)... and feel that it conforms to the usual, ill-informed Western viewpoint which is almost completely ignorant of the writings of Tukhachevsky, Triandafilov and others. I disagree with you that a very favourable casualty ratio is equivalent to "winning" when we ignore the strategic context in which this casualty ratio occurs. I have a less absolute philosophical view of the possible and the impossible and apply it to the game ( fine, philosophies differ... I amn't going to call one correct and the other wrong). And as far as your feeling that I was, in any way, thinking of your mod when I postd what I did... Hell no. I wish you the best with your mod and have always been in favour of people modelling the capabilities of individual units properly and then creating what ifs based on varying TO&Es, OOBs etc. The only place I'm a stickler is in modelling the real units as accurately as possible. But if you wish to believe differently then one of life's sad little truths is there is very little I can do to persuade you of your error.
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Mike: We pretty much agree - but I know Northern Luzon pretty well - and it is not well understood this is a rich place. It holds the largest copper mine in Asia - and that is not the richest of the minerals. It also produces rice in quantity and is not malarial - has mountains to make it defensible - and airfields. The latter may not seem to matter - but consider Rabaul - which twice managed to be a problem at great range - in spite of being abandoned by planes and pilots (the repaird wreaks and healed pilots too ill to move when the order to withdraw had been given).
FYI
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Since Yamashita had been to Europe and North America, he may indeed have had a better sense of the direction of things. By 1945 it may be also that few Japanese soldiers harbored many illusions (though clearly some did). But I believe the decision to defend Baguio City and the hills behind it was sound strategy - even in 1941 - to the extent MacArthur - supposed expert on the Philippines - should have adopted it. Denial of major mineral deposits, and an operational area that does not guarantee every last soldier get Malaria plus Dengue Fever (which happened to all the men on Bataan - though not those on Corregidore), and an area that produces a natural food surpluss sufficient for twice the army Mac had, not to mention very nice ridge lines and swift rivers at the base of each,
make the area the obvious choice. The first time I crested the highest ridge - and saw the horrible approach along a ridge edge the road makes to Baguio - I understood the problems an offensive up that road must entail. The other route into the area - Balinta Pass - was so defensible Mac staffers like Ike believed a single battalion could hold any reasonable opposing force. Years later - after it was disclosed by the officers of Fort Drum - I also learned that one does not have to hold Bataan to close Manila bay - provided one put food on Fort Drum itself - it would have to be slowly ground to concrete dust. [26 feed of grinding was not enough to take out even a single secondary system]. Even War Plan Orange might work - if the Army were not going to become too weak to be effective due to starvation and disease - and it had the vast area of Northern Luzon to retreat into - ridge line by ridge line. Wether one intends to hold out for years - or not - it is a much better place to fight than the malarial plains and hillls to the South.
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Mr Scholl,
I won't be responding to any further reply
