Torpedo Ordnance

[ChezDaJez]

Japanese tried to introduce radically new designs, and build radically different fighters for different purposes (they wanted specialized interceptors, that had nothing in common with general purpose fighters, and so on).

With the exception of the Shinden and a very few others, most Japanese fighter designs were not radical in nature. They were not radical engineering departures from their previous fighters. Design to meet different missions, true. But the engineering contained within them was conventional. Their use of substitiute materials in many cases was innovative but introduced an entire new set of growing pains.

Late war Japanese aircraft such as the George and the Frank had the potential to go 1 on 1 vs most allied aircraft but engine reliability issues severely limited their performance. In many cases, their engines were only able to develop less than 75% of their standard horsepower. Reduced oil pressure caused by excessive bearing tolerances and poorly performing superchargers were the main culprits. But when they worked, they could hold their own against allied opposition... assuming of course, a good pilot could be found to fly it.

And as you state, one of their biggest problems was the lack of coordination between the services. Each was highly secretive and took extreme measures to ensure the other service was kept in the dark. Yoshimura, in his book "Zero Fighter", tells the story of the A6M and the extreme security surrounding its development. Navy officials forbid Mitsubishi workers who worked on Army projects from even entering the hangar where the A6M prototype was developed.

Chez

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Japanese tried to introduce radically new designs, and build radically different fighters for different purposes (they wanted specialized interceptors, that had nothing in common with general purpose fighters, and so on).

With the exception of the Shinden and a very few others, most Japanese fighter designs were not radical in nature. They were not radical engineering departures from their previous fighters. Design to meet different missions, true. But the engineering contained within them was conventional. Their use of substitiute materials in many cases was innovative but introduced an entire new set of growing pains.

A whole new design, that uses virtually no major parts of the old, sharing maybe only weapons and some instruments is radical in the time of war. In RL, changing a plane's model on conveyor belt, when old and new models have so little in common, is a very complex and torturous process that can disrupt production almost as much as bombing of the factory and demands great deal attention from the designers, to direct the massive changes in production process, swiftly find causes of inevitable problems and stamp out teething troubles. And when the new model also requires high quality of craftsmanship, while you suffer from general shortages of qualified and experienced workforce, suitable engineering tools, and so on, it is highly likely to appear on the frontlines too late and in too little, too unreliable numbers. For the same reason (limited resources, primarily human resources), having up to 6 wholly different model lines of single-engined fighters in production at the same time is very wasteful. With the level of contol their military had over their industry, Japanese could have done better.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: PaxMondo

Bump.  Help?

I don't know. Maybe some bug in the game? In my GC game, there is no such problem even with less supplies.

[ChezDaJez]

A whole new design, that uses virtually no major parts of the old, sharing maybe only weapons and some instruments is radical in the time of war.

Our definitions of "radical" differ. To me, an example of a radical aircraft would have been the Shinden. Aircraft such as the George and Frank were conventional designs and conventionally constructed. That they had quality problems with the manufacture and maintenance of these aircraft doesn't make them radical. Using your defintion, any new design would be radical. The Hellcat would be a radical departure from the Wildcat for example.

Given that the US was producing at least 5 different fighter aircraft in the late war (P-38, P-47, P-51, Hellcat, and Corsair), I would the only differnece in that regard would be that the US had the resources and manufacturing base to do it, the Japanese did not.

As to the rest of your posting, I agree. The Japanese shot themselves in the foot in every way possible. they certainly were experts on how not to wage a war.

Chez