*** Hitler's Secret Weapons ***

[GoodGuy]

Anecdote:

Hitler fought in World War I, and after a gas attack, he went blind. The MD's in the military hospital could not find a (physical) reason for his blindness, so historians tend to think that he was either just simulating or suffering of post-traumatic stress disorder. One of the doctors prepared a personality profile, and concluded that:

Hitler showed psychopathic traits and the profile in fact worded it almost literally such that he was a "psychopath with hysterical symptoms", according to Bernhard Horstmann, who researched Hitlers medical case/file for 20 years.
Horstmann put the findings together and wrote a book called "Hitler in Pasewalk". Pasewalk was the location of the military hospital (IIRC).


The "hysterical symptoms" tried to describe the blindness, and assumed it to be a result of the stress disorder, a term and illness not entirely known/understood at the time. Most historians and MDs agree that Hitler's actual temporary blindness was real and not simulated.

The analysis also states that Hitler was deemed ineligible for ANY executive or managerial functions, a hint for Hitler's superiors not to place him in a higher rank that required leadership responsibilites.
The US secret service reported about Hitler's medical file in 1943 for the first time, the US report had been published in 1973, but not been discovered before around 2003(?) when Horstmann stumbled over the report. The psychologist, Dr. Edmund Forster, who created the analysis, had a good rep and was also a proven expert for Hypnosis-Therapy. Horstmann also puts up the thesis that because of the experiences with the hypnosis treatment - conducted by Forster to treat/cure the blindness - Hitler later on changed from an unstable soldier to a furious dictator. This thesis is pretty controversial among historians and psychologists alike.
The Academy's (of Arts in Vienna, ran by jews as he might have argued) refusal to accept Hitler as a student (due to him being "talent-less" <- my term, not their term), his pre-war (before 1913) experiences as a (poor) painter (he painted postcards for a living), the cloudy origin of his grandfather (who may have been a jew, birth certs and records had been manipulated after Hitler's father was born) and World War I experiences may have influenced him more than just a hypnosis, imho.

Anyway, in his report, Dr. Forster explicitly warned about this young soldier (Hitler). [:D]

Starting around 1933, after Hitler had seized power, Hitler desperately tried to get a hold of all records.
During the following months the doctor was forced to visit the Gestapo HQ in Berlin several times, with the officer urging the doctor to hand over Hitler's files. The story reads like a movie thriller....
On the 11th of September, Dr. Forster committed suicide. Horstmann states that Forster had been advised to commit suicide by the Gestapo, and that there's a high chance that a Gestapo officer handed out a pistol during the last "meeting". His wife had confirmed that the gun that was found next to his dead body did not belong to her husband.
Horstmann even spins an additional plot, with the possibility that the former Reichskanzler (Chancelor) Kurt von Papen also tried to get a hold of Hitler's medical files, as he wanted to discredit Hitler during a future opportunity.
Von Papen assigned Ferdinand von Bredow to search for the files. Oberst von Bredow's son, Carl-Hasso von Bredo, is sure that Hitler got to know about that search and the people involved, insofar his father was "someone who knew too much".

It is possible that Doctor Forster had handed over the original documents prior to his death, probably to his brother, who served as diplomat in Paris. The final whereabouts of the files are unknown, but Hitler eliminated everyone who could have known about the main statement of the medical report: That Hitler was a dangerous psychopath.
Interestingly, reports about his furious anger during military briefings/planings and his orders to execute various officers at later stages (Remagen, Eastern Front), indeed draw the picture of a psycho.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro
My primary point in this is that the actual number of 262's totally completed is much smaller than the normal given figure's-assuming there were actually 600 found along forested roadway's missing the nose cones.

The total number of 1400 something completed 262s is being backed up by original sources and recent literature, with just slightly different numbers.

What people may forget at this point is that the SS took over production of the Me 262 during the last 2 months or so. They actually employed KZ inmates for the production AND completion in the underground base in Bavaria, totally unhampered by Allied bombings, enabling them to project an output of 1400 - 1500 fighters a month! As they had the manpower resources this figure was absolutely realistic, IF they wouldn't have lost the industrial base in the Ruhrgebiet area ("Ruhrkessel" or "Ruhr-pocket").
Several hundred (600?) middle sections (fuselages) had been finished until the end of the war, but I don't know
a) where the engines were supposed to be built and
b) if it was realistic to get some 3000 engines per month for this ambitious project.
The total number of Me 262s floating around in this thread refer to the number of completed MEs, imho, and I have read that around 700 were lost due to various reasons, with less than 200 lost in combat. These losses had to be replaced (which happened, but lack of fuel prevented a deployment of more than 100-200 operational MEs at any given time... for the entire "Fatherland"[;)] - that's an extremely low number).

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy


...d 700 were lost due to various reasons, with less than 200 lost in combat. These losses had to be replaced (which happened, but lack of fuel prevented a deployment of more than 100-200 operational MEs at any given time... for the entire "Fatherland"[;)] - that's an extremely low number).

While it is a very low number for what was actually required, it still seems high. Perhaps my info is dated, but didn't the Reich Fighter Fleet only maintain 200 day fighters on average in an operational condition?

Perhaps "day fighter" is the key. Even though the 262's were used as daylight interceptors, they were acting outside of their original purpose. When the order came down to deploy them as fighters (Feb '45 IIRC) Hitler insisted that they be given to the night fighter squadrons-against all advice. So, perhaps they actually did achieve that figure of 200 operational a/c. As you say, that would have been deployed all round what remained of Nazi territory rather than a key component of the Reich Fighter command. If 200 ME 262's were ever deployed against a single raid, the battle would have been famous-and a sad day for the US Air Force/AAC.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

Perhaps my info is dated, but didn't the Reich Fighter Fleet only maintain 200 day fighters on average in an operational condition?

Rechecking sources....

Example: On 10th of April 1945, the official list had listed 264 planes to be in the inventory (which could mean "in transit", "to be repaired", "repairs underway", "completed", "parked due to lack of fuel", "operational" etc etc. - my words to display that the figures likely included all states), with 134 of them being fully operational (and on the front).
No more than 200-250 MEs were present in combat units, at any given time during the war. Quite some of the completed planes couldn't be delivered to the squadrons and many had been destroyed on the ground.
It's also possible that the units had to cannibalize operational planes in order to retrieve spare parts for a number of planes. I have no sources covering this question, though.

I have to state my initial statement more precisely: no more than 100 Me 262s were operational, sometimes (some sources say often) even less.
Main reasons: lack of fuel, Allied bombings, lack of spare parts, lack of trained pilots.

The wings had been manufactured by KZ inmates from April 1944 to April 1945 already, and the SS completely took over production in April 1945, moving the production to the underground facilities called "B8 Bergkristall" in Sankt Georgen an der Gusen in Austria (I thought it was in Bavaria). The projected monthly output (beginning in May 1945) was 1250 planes, not ~1400.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Mike Parker

yes it has to mean  50km engagement envelope.  Those specs are very impressive, and I have to believe they are not realistic, I have no doubt they were theoretical project specs, I just think an operational system would not have been near those figures.

In fact the prototypes of the Waterfall rocket got pretty close to the specs issued by the RLM, speed ranged from 400 meters to 800 meters per second (depending on the version I guess). Just the requested range could not be reached, the engine died down after around 26 kilometers. Still, quite some accomplishment, as it's half of the projected range.

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: Warfare1
I think the reason why we focus on German research is because the Nazis started the war; not the British. Any casual reading of WWII will reveal that the first two years were touch and go for the Allies.

So I think any research that may have led to weapons that could have given the Nazis an even greater edge is worth exploring.

Yeah, but the thing is - the Nazis were not the only nation to have secret weapons in the pipeline that were stymied by indifference from on high.

I am always bemused by the focus on the Axis in these threads. There were plenty of what-ifs for cool toys on the Allied side as well.

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

[Jeffrey H.]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

Rocket technologies was one area where I think we can all agree on in which Germany had a clear (actually a huge) advantage. Luckily, the wrong choices were made by Hitler-or whoever. We need to keep in mind that any anti AA missile defense system would have amounted to fighter low level attacks. This would have been quite costly for the Allies.

I believe this advantage was a response to, at least initially, the restrictions of the Versailles treaty on artillery.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

Yeah, but the thing is - the Nazis were not the only nation to have secret weapons in the pipeline that were stymied by indifference from on high.

I am always bemused by the focus on the Axis in these threads. Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

Well, I might be wrong, but doesn't the thread's title "Hitler's secret weapons" imply that the author aimed to have the focus on the Axis? I find it amusing that you complain about the lack of diversity in a thread that was exclusively created to cover details of Axis toys, actually.[:D]

Maybe you should ask Warfare 1 to change the topic's title to "secret weapons of WW II". Alternatively, you might want to create your own thread covering Allied "secret" weapons. [:)]

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

Great! I believe that this would have made a massive number of German civilians happy. [:D]
I also think that Germany would have ended up with the majority of German tanks in the West (during or after the Normandy landings) would have been crushed, as the very versatile Mosquito was also an excellent tactical bomber/fighter-bomber, it didn't only excel in defensive nightfighter missions, but in other roles too. I doubt that it would have drastically changed anything regarding the German armament efforts, though, as the RAFs main effort was morale bombing, partially before the Casablanca meeting already, and on a fully fledged level after the meeting.

I never advocated the Nazi course, nor the Nazi's aim to rule the world (or at least Europe), nor Nazi ideology in general.
Also, I find those people here (in Germany) suspicious who try to put the public focus on German civilian losses during WW2, where some of them seem to try to relativize the war crimes committed by German forces by saying "hey, now, after 60 years, we have the right to point out Allied war crimes and/or their morale bombings".

Since many Germans supported Hitler all through the war, I wouldn't totally deny considerations that bring up the question whether they somehow deserved a beating or not. One could be also tempted to conclude, if someone starts a war that he then has to deal with the consequences, in all aspects.

But it's not that easy if it comes to the fate of uninvolved (ie. not actively participating in acts of war) civilians. In this thought-process, German bombings of foreign cities are to be included, of course.
But your what-if scenario would have saved half a million, or maybe even a million lifes, I don't have sources at hand right now that detail the total number of civilian losses in German cities.

Anyway, don't take the following numbers as me being angry or whining about Allied strategies, I simply want to throw in some numbers, for this what-if.

There are lists which can be found in books and on websites, giving an idea what British heavy bombers accomplished.
There is even a rough list on the German Wikipedia branch, containing newest researches:

That list contains 101 German cities (which of course isn't complete), from A - Z, indicating the number of losses caused by the FIRST attack and the LAST attack, where some of the biggest (and most deadly) attacks had been conducted by Allied heavy bombers in February/March 1945, at a time where Germany was already defeated.
The list does not include the results of numerous bombings in between the first and last attack, and some of the cities had been bombed once "only".
The majority of the listed attacks were part of the morale bombing campaign, the numerous smaller or strategic operations (aiming at armament facilities and resources) mostly conducted by the USAAF (apart from those RAF raids that aimed at submarine shipyards, at Germany's last BB in Norway, at major bunkers, and other numerous minor operations), are not included.

I got a calculator and added the numbers....

Results of major bombings on 101 German cities:

• Number of attacks : 165
  Losses : 267,371 dead civilians (only first and last attack counted)
  Targets during these particular missions : Mostly civilians, urban infrastructure, rarely shipyards/railyards/urban factories.
• Examples:
  - Operation Gomorrha (raid over Hamburg in 1943) : ~35,000 civilians dead, some 125,000 wounded, RAF raid
  
  - Dresden : 2,660 dead (first attack)
  - Dresden : ~25,000 dead (last attack on 13th/14th February 1945), RAF raid, city packed with refugees, which was known by the RAF. Some sources claimed 60,000 - 100,000 dead, newest studies suggest 18k to max. 25,000.
  
  - Swinemünde : 8,000 - 23,000 dead civilians (refugees, body count wasn't thoroughly conducted due to the high level of disorganisation in the city and due to the need to bury/burn the dead immediately, to avoid epidemics)
  - raid was conducted by the USAAF on 12th of March 1945.

- Result/effect: The campaign failed, as morale didn't drop significantly. Quite contrary, the morale bombing rather formed a stronger bond between leadership and the people, so that German historians came up with the term "2nd Nazi takeover", offering them total control and boosting loyalty widely.
Pictures taken in 1943 and 1944, showing ruins decorated with banners (with stuff like "we believe in ultimate victory" or "Führer - you command, we follow"), speak for themselfs. Not necessarily representative, but still a then popular expression of defiance.

Of these 165 attacks, only 11 were carried out by the USAAF, the vast majority by (*hint hint* [;)]) British heavy bombers. It seems like a few missions were combined/concerted attacks (less than 10), conducted by USAAF and RAF, in cases where industrial areas were within city limits or right next to the cities. Besides the USAAF's raids on Tokyo and the 2 atomic bombs, the USAAF bomber wings rather focused on what I'd call "real strategic bombing", means on the destruction of factories, infrastructure and resources, and they were often reluctant to join the morale bombing.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Jeffrey H.

I believe this advantage was a response to, at least initially, the restrictions of the Versailles treaty on artillery.

Yes and no.
In the 1920s, many - if not most - of the developers had vague ideas about spaceflights. In the 1920s, the enthusiasm for space flights and rocket technology was pretty widespread in Germany. Many of the pioneers of the German efforts in 1930s and 1940s started out as members of the "Space flight association" in 1927, a civilian organisation publishing books and forming a pool of fans, tinkerers and scientists which were all focusing on rocket technology, either in theory or in hands-on approaches. Shipping around the treaty, and use for military purposes were not (explicitly) projected.

Funding was a big problem, though, so that's where the association tried to get the military's attention.

The treaty did not list rockets, as some 100 years before the treaty had been signed, rockets had been replaced by artillery guns, and were considered to be ineffective and inaccurate.

The German military observed the progress since 1929, but didn't fund any of the various efforts before 1932. Through the 1930s suitable engines had to be researched and developed, and problems with steering/stabilization had to be solved. The steering mechanism for the V2 was not available before 1939.
In 1932, the Army decided to fund the engine development in Kummersdorf, and not the association's efforts, which meant that people like Wernher von Braun had to leave the association and try to get a job in the Army or in civilian facilities, because the association went bankrupt.

After Generaloberst Fritsch had visited the facilties in Peenemünde in 1936, the military immediately started to fund the engine/rocket development in Peenemünde, leading to a more goal-oriented development. Until the outbreak of WW II, other development teams and even individuals had been funded directly or indirectly as well, the developer Sänger received 8 Million Reichsmarks just for his work on engine concepts (until 1937), without creating any prototype (afaik), for example. He worked on a particular engine until 1934, which used gasoil and oxygen, though. Due to the focus on Peenemünde, other projects had been canceled bit by bit until around 1939 or 1940, I think.

After the successful campaign in Poland the German Army then rather thought that rockets wouldn't be needed anymore, because the war would be "won soon", so the developers had to come up with ambitious goals (regarding range, speed, and payload) in order to win the Army over to keep up the funding. Afaik, in general, it wasn't until 1942 that Army and RLM came up with specifications for rockets (maybe with one or another exception). Until around that year it was basically up to the devs to determine purpose and specs of their developments for the military.

[sprior]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

ORIGINAL: Warfare1
I think the reason why we focus on German research is because the Nazis started the war; not the British. Any casual reading of WWII will reveal that the first two years were touch and go for the Allies.

So I think any research that may have led to weapons that could have given the Nazis an even greater edge is worth exploring.

Yeah, but the thing is - the Nazis were not the only nation to have secret weapons in the pipeline that were stymied by indifference from on high.

I am always bemused by the focus on the Axis in these threads. There were plenty of what-ifs for cool toys on the Allied side as well.

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

What if the Centurion tank had been on the battlefield 6 months earlier? The problem is you can't just say, "What if the Germans...?" without considering what the Allies were doing too.

[sprior]

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

Great! I believe that this would have made a massive number of German civilians happy.

Why? The Mossie could lift the same as a B-17.

they were often reluctant to join the morale bombing.

Not in Japan they weren't, why do you think they used mostly incendiaries? And even in Europe 8th Air Force "on March 9, H2X radar-equipped B-17s mounted a third attack on the Reich capital though clouds." Think that was anymore accurate than bombing by H2S aircraft bombing at night?

[sprior]

PLUS:

Quantity has a quality all its own.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: sprior

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

Great! I believe that this would have made a massive number of German civilians happy.

Why? The Mossie could lift the same as a B-17.

Max Hastings felt that the Mosquitos instead of Heavy bombers train of thought was an "improper use of Hindsight" as he put it. He doubted for one that there were enough carpenters in England to produce the # of Mosquitos required, + the difficulties of suddenly trying to reverse the industrial buildup that was producing said heavy bombers made such an argument impractical.

The latter strikes me as particularily relevent. Kind of goes hand in hand with the 109/190 situation for Germany.

[sprior]

But we're not dealing with reality here, it's all fantasy from the Axis view point, so I can too.

[Nikademus]

reality is overrated. [;)]

[06 Maestro]

"I'd love to see the source that put up that claim ! " (re: mine locations for 262 fan blade material)

Good Guy- Unfortunataly, I am not certain which book's I read that from. It is likely I still own it, but which one[&:]. There was another somewhat new book about the ME 262 published about 17 years ago that mentioned the situation of the raw material/mines, but I did not buy that one. I can say with certainty that ME 262 was in the title[:D] (of the newer book) and it was thick.

Should I locate that info I will promtly send it to you.

[Dixie]

ORIGINAL: sprior

Or what ifs on doctrine. What if the RAF focused on Mosquitoes instead of heavy bombers?

Great! I believe that this would have made a massive number of German civilians happy.

Why? The Mossie could lift the same as a B-17.

they were often reluctant to join the morale bombing.

Not in Japan they weren't, why do you think they used mostly incendiaries? And even in Europe 8th Air Force "on March 9, H2X radar-equipped B-17s mounted a third attack on the Reich capital though clouds." Think that was anymore accurate than bombing by H2S aircraft bombing at night?

Depends on how much they focussed on the Mossiem at the top end of the scale... It would have great effects on the RAF as well. Lower casualties and possibly a larger quantity of aircraft. The lower casualties and smaller crews would have had a smaller drain on the British manpower reserves, leaving more guys to man extra aircraft or serve in the army and navy. In particular there would maybe have been more quality mid-level leaders available for the army. The RAF snapped up as many of these guys as they could for aircrew. A Mosquito would have had a lesser logistics requirement, meaning more technically minded types available to serve in the other arms instead of as RAF groundcrew. More aluminium available for fighters, or steel could be shipped across to the UK instead and less fuel and bombs needed to keep BC operational. More Merlins available for the Americans to put into long-range fighters and for the Brits to put into Spitfires. A focus on heavy bombers would leave coastal command able to get more long range aircraft for convoy patrols. There could have been a switch to daylight 'precision' raids. Plus plenty of other effects [;)]


As for the USAAF, whilst their stated aim was precision bombing the technology of the era meant that any strategic campaign was in effect an area campaign. IIRC the USSAF dropped their bombs on cue from the lead bomber rather than from individual targetting which would add to the innacuracy. The Brits suffered the post war negatives as they never claimed their campaign was anything other than area targetting.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: sprior

Why? The Mossie could lift the same as a B-17.

No.

1) Mosquito:
The early Mosquitos couldn't deliver more than 4 bombs (4 x 115 kg), the bomber production version B(=bomber) MK IV could carry no more than 2,000 lbs (4 x 500 lbs = 4 x 230 kg), which was made possible by shortening the bombs' stabilizers.

The PR MK XVI could carry 1800 kg of bombs and it was first flown in August 1944. It was designed as high-alt photo-recon version (hence "PR"), one of the first (if not the first) versions with pressurized cockpit. Only some 435 of these versions were built.
Afaik, they were not employed as level bomber.

Only some fifty-four B Mk IVs were modded to carry a load of 4,000 lbs (1812 kg) HE bombs, operating as "light night-striking force".

As a level bomber, the Mosquitos would have been shred either by flak or by fighters, I believe. The (wooden) structure didn't offer enough protection/survivability to be deployed as level bomber in numbers.
The Mosq's were mainly used as pathfinders for the heavy bomber squadrons, hence the desperate German attempts to intercept them or drive them off. The Germans even build one or 2 special squadrons eclusively meant to kill the Mosquitos, weaving a boasted propaganda story around that effort. The effort turned out to be an almost total failure, as only few kills could be achieved.

The Mosquitos also served as excellent bomber escort fighters and tactical fighter-bombers, in a def. and off. role.

2) B-17 Flying Fortress:

The B-17G could carry up to 8,000 lbs (medium/short-range), the usual long-range setup was around 4,800 lbs (2200 kg)

Not in Japan they weren't, why do you think they used mostly incendiaries? And even in Europe 8th Air Force "on March 9, H2X radar-equipped B-17s mounted a third attack on the Reich capital

That's why I mentioned Tokyo, and Swinemünde as examples for American morale bombings. The USAF flew such missions too, no doubt, but the majority of these missions were conducted by RAF units. There are interesting studies, I think even the US Army Strategic Bombing Survey stated that American Wings had flown a good amount of morale bombing missions, and I say they carried out more of these missions than some people would expect. Still, looking at the attacks on military and industrial targets, their focus was clearly on hitting those, and not on morale bombing.

"... on March 9, H2X radar-equipped B-17s mounted a third attack through clouds." Think that was anymore accurate than bombing by H2S aircraft bombing at night?

Before using radar, the USAF bombers often switched to secondary targets, or tried to get below the ceiling, when approaching industrial/military targets, as hits were all that mattered. For the daylight missions, weather reports and recon data were vital parts of the planing process, and were actually used. Without clouds, daylight missions were way more accurate than the RAF's night missions.

Radar bombing through clouds was not more accurate than the RAF's night bombings, most likely. But it wasn't less accurate either.

Here's a picture of a group of B-17Fs commencing radar bombings:

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: Dixie
As for the USA AF, whilst their stated aim was precision bombing the technology of the era meant that any strategic campaign was in effect an area campaign. IIRC the USAF dropped their bombs on cue from the lead bomber rather than from individual targeting which would add to the inaccuracy. The Brits suffered the post war negatives as they never claimed their campaign was anything other than area targeting.

Judging by today's standards I would agree. However, for that era, the difference in US/British strategy was, well, like day and night. The US forces could totally devastate a factory with 200 to 400 bombers in one mission. The RAF would destroy large parts of a city while doing little damage to a prime manufacturing plant located within the same city. Of course, in time, the British strategy had huge effects also, but it took many thousands of sorties to accomplish a total factory shutdown.

To live within a few blocks of a US bombing target was not very safe, but to live anywhere in the same city as a RAF target was very unsafe. I'm aware that not all US missions were strictly "precision raids", so I'm not claiming any moral high ground-do not misunderstand. I do, however, maintain that for the tonnage dropped US raids had a much greater effect on German production.

To avoid thread drift; what about the "Arrow"? A push/pull a/c that first flew in '41, but was never utilized. It had a fantastic range with internal bomb storage. Its top speed far exceeded any other prop a/c. IIRC, it was also the first time an ejector seat was installed as normal equipment. This was done to placate fears of aviators of having to bail out with another prop right behind them. This a/c is another example of superb German aviation engineering and also of a huge waste of these same engineering assets.

While it is true that the Allies could have played a different game with technology, their focus was war winning. Germany was the power which had huge investments in new equipment (actually fully developing 3 or 4 times more a/c than the U.S.) which were not utilized do to some strange decision making process. Thus it is much easier to speculate about "what ifs" of new German weapons-especially a/c.

For example, the HE 219. This a/c would have been a disaster for the RAF bombing campaign, but was constantly delayed because of what really seems like political difficulties with Goering-or someone very high up in the RLM. IIRC, it was also Heinkle which developed a far superior single engine fighter early in the war-the only time it saw combat was while being flown by company pilots defending Heinkle factories. There was also the dive bomber by HE (or possibly Henshel) which had a forward facing weapons officer-very modern concept. This a/c was much superior to the JU87, but not chosen (pre-war times) due to a flaky decision making process. Was it not HE that developed the first jet a/c-flown in September of '39?

Again, Germany was the power that had real options on the table for gaining a technological superiority-in the air anyway. Many of us have seen the show LW '46. However, it is the opinion of those that had good info on Germany's aviation engineering that Germany could have possessed multiple, fully functional jet a/c by mid '42-if they had an organization that could properly judge just how long it would take to develop new a/c and to concentrate on just a few models. For the first two years of the war almost nothing was done to pursue this technology which they had a huge lead in.

The U.S. did not even fly its first jet until 1942. By '45 it was still lagging far behind Germany even though it made a major effort to catch up. The ME 262 was not some fanciful dream weapon, it was a weapon that, if pursued earlier, could have had strategic consequences. Add to that jet bombers and CAS a/c and the picture becomes startling.

Some "what ifs" were not just wild dreams, those were just recognized for the potential and practicality far too late in the war to do any good for Germany.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Dixie

A Mosquito would have had a lesser logistics requirement, meaning more technically minded types available to serve in the other arms instead of as RAF groundcrew. More aluminium available for fighters, or steel could be shipped across to the UK instead and less fuel and bombs needed to keep BC operational. More Merlins available for the Americans to put into long-range fighters and for the Brits to put into Spitfires. A focus on heavy bombers would leave coastal command able to get more long range aircraft for convoy patrols. There could have been a switch to daylight 'precision' raids. Plus plenty of other effects [;)]

I'd really appreciate it if you guys would stick to Axis what-ifs. No.... just kidding [:D]

Seriously now, interesting thoughts. I do believe the wooden structure (resulting in lack of protection/survivability) of the plane would have kept it from being as successful as heavy bombers. While the Mosquito's range had been upped to 2700 something kilometers, it wasn't capable of surviving nightfighter sweeps and flak if deployed as level bomber (and in masses). With the Mosq, the focus was on speed, not protection.

A 1946 study/report concluded that the Mosquito proved to be 5 times cheaper than the Lancaster bomber, when comparing the damage inflicted on the ground, in cases where Mosquitos were actually used as bombers.

As for the USAAF, whilst their stated aim was precision bombing the technology of the era meant that any strategic campaign was in effect an area campaign.

The B17's Norden bomb sight was somewhat accurate, way more accurate than the sights the German had employed in their HE 111s earlier in the war, which was one reason for them to commence low-level or medium level bombings only. The early HEs had a max ceiling of 8000 meters, the HE 111 H-16 (produced since autumn 1942) a service ceiling of 6700 meters only.

At later stages in the war, HE 111s went down to 500 ft, using the North Sea route, and just pulled up to around 1,600 feet right before releasing the bombs, due to British fighter opposition and radar effectiveness.

IIRC the USSAF dropped their bombs on cue from the lead bomber rather than from individual targetting which would add to the innacuracy.

AFAIK, the group leader (what's the smallest unit in an Allied aviation group with around 5-7 planes?) gave the signal to release the bombs and not just the Strike Force leader, since some strikes involved 700-1050 bombers.
Even better, the individual B-17 planes still used their own bomb sights for aiming. Since the bombardier(?) used to take over the controls of the plane (as in controlling bearing and speed) without having to leave the formation, this could be achieved (relatively) easily. The bombardier had 2-4 minutes to match speed/bearing and target in his sight, and after the bomb bay was opened, he had another minute to correct stuff before the section leader would give the command to drop 'em.

The Brits suffered the post war negatives as they never claimed their campaign was anything other than area targetting.

They were quite blunt, yes. I would even say that this didn't trigger the negatives, it was in fact the sheer amount of morale bombing missions which used to strike people here, I believe. But like I said in another post, the psycho with the mustache had started it. And the legion Condor, with its bombings in Spain (Guernica)(sp?) kinda invented it. But the Brits either cared less or didn't think accuracy was required. I don't blame the crews, they couldn't deliver the same accuracy that was achieved in daylight missions (with fair-good visibility conditions)

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

To live within a few blocks of a US bombing target was not very safe, but to live anywhere in the same city as a RAF target was very unsafe.

You just expressed what I thought. Good one.