What were the Brits thinking?

[Anthropoid]

ORIGINAL: starsis1

Real quick - British did build a large-deck carrier BEFORE armoured deck carriers - Ark Royal. It had much larger aircraft capacity and was in many ways similar to the Yorktown-class USN carriers

Well that certainly smashes the "culture" hypothesis I was rambling on about then doesn't it!

I hear and believe you guys when you say that (a) the choices had a pragmatic logic to them given the European theatres, and moreover that (b) the RNs armored designs performed well in the roles for which they were primarily intended in the Euro theatre. In short, you guys are saying that, in the Pacific they might seem useless, but in the European theatres they were demonstratively useful.

Still I wonder if a less-armored, higher-capacity design would have worked even better? No? Yes? Maybe? That would seem to be the underlying spirit of the OPs original question. I don't know the ships all that well, but for you guys that do, imagine some of the Atlantic/Med engagements in which RN CVs were engaged . . . now imagine that the RN CV involved had instead been its American contemporary sister CV design. How might things have turned out different?

It sounds like the extra armored design did not actually function to "repel" attacks as effectively as it had been envisioned?

[sprior]

but rather for more cultural reasons?

but rather for more cultural reasons?

Interseting but flawed. After all it was the RN that brought the world's first iron-clad into being, the Dreadnought (so good they named an entire type of ship after her), the first submarine service, the first aircraft to take off rom a ship, the first ship to be designed as an aircraft acrrier, etc (need I go on?). So, no, I don't think inate conservatism was the cause.

I can just picture some incredulous RAAF advocate debating with this RN colleague, "What do you mean you want two million pounds to build a big floating airport!? You navy chaps just use big cannons don't you!?"

That was, with Trenchard and "the bomber always gets through" thing. he called for "air control" believeing the RAF could contril the land and sea at, and this is important given the state of UK finances in the 30's, less cost than the Army or RN.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles ... 7E9617.pdf

[frank1970]

ORIGINAL: mariandavid

Not sure if mentioned before in this long series of posts but:
- the armoured deck philosophy was only introduced in 1936. Before that RN CV's were similar in concept to those of the USN; eg the Ark Royal had a hanger capacity of about 55 aircraft - similar to that of the Yorktown etc. The change came because the RN made three judgements, all of them correct

- that war would break out within five years

- that CV's would be dueling with land-based aviation since the RN and the French controlled the open seas

- the land based fighters were superior to any carrier based of the foreseeable future - would therefore be struck below and would be protected by an armoured deck. In turn this meant that the double hanger of the Ark would have to be replaced by the single one of the new carriers.

The RN was of course absolutely right on the relative values of land and carrier aircraft. I am not sure what the USN was flying in 1939 but I suspect it was far less competant than a Me 109E; while the Wildcat was contemporaneous with the Fw 190A! Perhaps if the FAA had been under total Admiralty control from the early '30's enough pressure could have been exerted to force Hawker and Supermarine to 'navalise' their fighter designs in 1938. But that is the only way by which the armoured deck concept would have been reversed.

I don´t know whether this site works exact,as it is about a game, but comparissons are easily made.

http://www.gonzoville.com/charts/

[Anthropoid]

Fascinating read Sprior! One of these days (post-tenure, since I risk being tarred and feathered by my predominantly pacifistic left-leaning colleagues!) I'm going to write an article that applies evolutionary psych models to a military history issues. But I have a lot more to learn and I always appreciate hearing you guys discussing this stuff in detail

[Nikademus]

An oft unmentioned handicap faced by the RN.....the fact that UK was one of the first nation's to have an independant air force and that air force wanted to control EVERYTHING air.

The side with bigger pockets can afford to be both conservative 'and' innovative.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: sprior

Interseting but flawed. After all it was the RN that brought the world's first iron-clad into being, the Dreadnought (so good they named an entire type of ship after her),

HMS Warrior was the first ironclad I think.

[Nikademus]

La Gloire was the first. Warrior was the first iron hulled ironclad though.

He meant "Dreadnought" was the first All-big gun battleship.

[wpurdom]

Shattered Sword has a discussion of the 3 different design philosophies, with the lightest treatment of the Brits. The original CV designs involved sticking a flight deck what was basically a crusier or battlecrusier hull. Sword implicitly asks the question instead of what were the Japs thinking. After reading the Shattered Sword analysis, one wonders whether AE fully reflects the disadvantages of the Jap design vis-a-vis the US.
 
It appears to me that the USN went with the least innovative design on the big issues. Certainly the Brits were not irrational in trying to develop an armored CV, particularly given their concentration on the Atlantic and Med. After all, the USN went with that after the war. It is also far from clear that they got any advantage from their actual design - the resistance to damage seems to have been offset by the greater difficulty of repair of any damage done, before one even considered the drag on operations and limitations on the number of planes. The Brits may have been too far in advance of their times, trying to be too innovative, before the requisite information was available to pull it off.
 
The USN approach was simple - (1) defend the CV by getting there the first with the most planes (2) better protection against catastrophic damage by superior fire-fighting and open sides on the hanger deck, using the hanger deck as the strength deck to protect the rest of the ship.
 
The Japs also tried to innovate their CV design and may have come up with the worst design by building an enclosed box with no armor. The enclosed box meant that they couldn't warm up planes on the hanger deck so (1) they couldn't send a full-complement strike, (2) they couldn't dispose of dangerous materials - such as ordinance, planes on fire, etc. except by painstakingly sending the ordinance back from where it came from - tying up the ability to bring up new armament (3) once fuel became uncontained - creting a fuel-air bomb - e.g., the Soryu, Kaga, and Taiho (sp? - the super-CV sunk by the sub). The lack of armor meant that one fairly light bomb, placed by a dive-bomber, starting a fire, could easily mean the end of everything - where the USN could open up the sides to disperse the fuel fumes and push dangerous materials off the side.

[Nikademus]

to be fair, any carrier caught with fueled and bombed planes on deck or in the hanger is a deathtrap. Lexington and Wasp were both lost due to similar circumstances as well as Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. (Lexington - fuel explosion - Wasp was in the process of arming/fueling when hit) Shokaku and Zuikaku took multiple poundings from big 1000 pound bombs yet survived. USN was quicker to appreciate this ultimate vulnerabilty and took steps to improve damage control after the Lexington experience. Franklin was nearly lost save but the superlative effort by her crew in refusing to give up the ship.

DK Brown interestingly noted that no UK carrier was lost to fire/explosion....a hidden plus to the often maligned UK carriers.

[Iridium]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Read it.

I found it overly critical regarding UK design philosophy. Liked DK Brown's analysis better. Armored decks weren't a flawed concept, but the "armored box" proved to be due to the restrictions it imposed on hanger heights and the containment of blast effects though hindsight makes it seem obvious naturally.

I think it's highly critical of the UK design theory only because the author is looking at it as a long term investment (the vessel itself will last a long time even after damage etc). While other obvious ways of looking at these ships would be whether they performed their mission or if they were successful in saving their crew from peril.

The most I found interesting from this read was that the UK CVs did not last long after WWII and many were complete wright offs after damage that would have been repairable on an Essex.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Iridium



The most I found interesting from this read was that the UK CVs did not last long after WWII and many were complete wright offs after damage that would have been repairable on an Essex.

I found that highly questionable......given that the UK carriers were subjected to far larger ordinances than the US carriers endured which also assumes that the US carriers would have survived such equivilent oridnances in the first place. Like Victorious, Franklin's damage was also such that the carrier was not deemed fit to return to service post war....yet this is excused while the Victorious' experience is not.

Like i said, I found DK Brown's analysis more even handed.

[Dixie]

ORIGINAL: Iridium

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Read it.

I found it overly critical regarding UK design philosophy. Liked DK Brown's analysis better. Armored decks weren't a flawed concept, but the "armored box" proved to be due to the restrictions it imposed on hanger heights and the containment of blast effects though hindsight makes it seem obvious naturally.

I think it's highly critical of the UK design theory only because the author is looking at it as a long term investment (the vessel itself will last a long time even after damage etc). While other obvious ways of looking at these ships would be whether they performed their mission or if they were successful in saving their crew from peril.

The most I found interesting from this read was that the UK CVs did not last long after WWII and many were complete wright offs after damage that would have been repairable on an Essex.

Well, they did their job at the time. The RN couldn't have replaced a damaged carrier with another like the USN so the armoured carrier concept worked there. The BPF was in effect everything that the RN could send to the Pacific. As for the damage they suffered, it's entirely possible (although I can't say for definate) that the damage just reinforced the decision to scrap them. In the post-war period money was tight again, there's no guarantee that the carriers would have been kept anyway.

If you can afford to have large numbers of ships in service to cover potential damages, then the Essex is a far better design.

[sprior]

DK Brown interestingly noted that no UK carrier was lost to fire/explosion....a hidden plus to the often maligned UK carriers.

No fleet carrier was but at least one escort carrier was, but I can't remember the name.

[Nikademus]

lol....good point.....UK's days as a global naval power were numbered after two world wars. All of the grisled old capital ship veterans were destined for the scrapyard in very short order (many already having been allowed to run down through lack of maintenance)....the KGV's and Vanguard would last for a time till relegated to the reserve fleet....then the breakers. A sad end to proud warriors. I still recall how the UK had to scrap together enough working ships to form the TF's needed to retake the Faulklands back in the early 80's. Even that is beyond the RN now unless i'm mistaken (There's still a formidable nuclear sub force)

Economics.

One wonders how much longer the USN will be able to afford it's big carrier fleet.

[Dixie]

ORIGINAL: sprior

DK Brown interestingly noted that no UK carrier was lost to fire/explosion....a hidden plus to the often maligned UK carriers.

No fleet carrier was but at least one escort carrier was, but I can't remember the name.

HMS Dasher iirc.

[mariandavid]

HMS Dasher: Which brings the whole debate back to the start - with in this case RN officers pointing out the terrible design and damage control features of an USN carrier! (Dasher was an US built escort carrier)

[Fishbed]

Still I wonder if a less-armored, higher-capacity design would have worked even better? No? Yes? Maybe? That would seem to be the underlying spirit of the OPs original question. I don't know the ships all that well, but for you guys that do, imagine some of the Atlantic/Med engagements in which RN CVs were engaged . . . now imagine that the RN CV involved had instead been its American contemporary sister CV design. How might things have turned out different?

The most I found interesting from this read was that the UK CVs did not last long after WWII and many were complete wright offs after damage that would have been repairable on an Essex.

I don't see why there's even a debate here. Although you can arguably debate on where bombs may have landed, I don't picture US CV taking as much damage as what Illustrious or Indomitable took in the Mediterranean. Remember Franklin was nearly lost to two 250 kg AP bombs - Indomitable got stuck with two (GP?) 1000kgs and Illustrious by more than half a dozen bombs in rather quick succession, and was hit again at anchor, and they still managed to get saved. Considering the priority of the day, which was having sturdy fighting ships for 10 years able to sustain the demands of the European theater rather than having ships you could use up into the seventies, I hardly see in fact where the British thinking failed on this one: they were good at what they were made to do, and that's just what they'd be all about.
Considering the amount of punishment one had to face from above in the Med, even maybe with a better CAP, using US CV types instead of British ones would have resulted in more sunken boats and floating bodies I guess - although I take it old YT showed us the design was still pretty sound and sturdy.

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford
I doubt Akagi could have been saved even with sufficient air cover or closer to the home islands.  In Shattered Sword there was a line drawing of how she looked before scuttling; she had burned all the way down to the waterline in places and was a complete ruin.  I guess the hulk could have been towed back but she would have had to be completely rebuilt, even more than Franklin in 1945.

I recalled the drawing in Shattered Sword was of the Kaga. Maybe I'm misremembering?

Bill

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

to be fair, any carrier caught with fueled and bombed planes on deck or in the hanger is a deathtrap. Lexington and Wasp were both lost due to similar circumstances as well as Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. (Lexington - fuel explosion - Wasp was in the process of arming/fueling when hit) Shokaku and Zuikaku took multiple poundings from big 1000 pound bombs yet survived. USN was quicker to appreciate this ultimate vulnerabilty and took steps to improve damage control after the Lexington experience. Franklin was nearly lost save but the superlative effort by her crew in refusing to give up the ship.

DK Brown interestingly noted that no UK carrier was lost to fire/explosion....a hidden plus to the often maligned UK carriers.

You can add the Princeton to this list too. One plane slipped through CAP and that was all it took thanks to fires from ordinance on the parked planes.

Bill

[wdolson]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Economics.

One wonders how much longer the USN will be able to afford it's big carrier fleet.

The US spends 10X the #2 spender on military (the UK) in the world. I do think we're reaching a point where those large expenditures can't be justified. CVNs are cool, but they are also expensive. The USN also maintains a huge amphibious fleet.

No political comment here one way or the other. I'm just looking at the expense, which is huge.

Bill