Jap ASW forces

[Skyros]

I don't see John saying anything about giving them more than what they had the question is if they had changed there doctrine could they have mounted a better effort and does the game get it right or not. We allow both sides to change doctrine and use there subs and carriers in ways that they either did not do in the war or not until later in the war. WHy should the Japanese not be able to do the same with asw?

I understand that it may be two strong and I think the fact that there is not an asw rating for the leaders is what is causing this issue. They may have been competant at surface combat but sigificantly lacked skill at asw, which they would need to learn and increase in the early years of the war.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

So you are claiming that the IJN was manned and commanded by a bunch of incompetent buffoons who couldn't figure this out?

I tend to agree ‘somewhat’ with both you and Brady, but tend to disagree more with both. The poor performance of Japanese ASW was because of command/strategic/psychological/doctrinal factors more than anything else. Take a look at m10bob’s Japanese Subchasers thread, and you will see that Japan had a quite reasonable “potential” ASW capability from about 1938 onward. However, their use of that capability, and their development of its future, can only be described as incompetent in the extreme. They had the basic tools: they chose neither to use them, nor even to sharpen them.

Japan had some decent SCs. The CH-1/4 was operational from about 1938; CH-13 from about 1940; and Ch-28 kicked off in mid 1942. Japan built anywhere from 58 to 61 total (depends on who’s counting). Most had a 3” on the nose, some 13mm-25mm MGs, couple DC rails, couple DC throwers, hydrophones; some (perhaps as many as one half) had T-93 sonar, and had T-13 or T-22 radar fitted in mid ’44. Not at all a bad boat. Compares ok to our PC-461 class except we had mousetraps, SO radars, QB/SL sonar (linked to the DC projectors), stuff like that; and we built 362 of them.

The really interesting (odd) thing is that Japan, despite having a decent design, didn’t use it. It took them 3 years to build 31 CH-28s – that’s less than 1 per month. In the meantime, they settled on a purpose-built small SC (SCS-1) on a standard trawler hull, and built perhaps 120 of these – one 3”, couple MGs, 10 knots, and maybe a frikkin hydrophone – basically naked, slow, and dumb.

They got really intense with the building program for these pukes in late ’42 and peaked in early ’44. When your SC can’t keep up with a convoy, can’t keep up with a sub in cruise mode, and can barely catch a strong man in a rowboat, one can only think – what the heck were these people thinking of?

I think you are hitting all around the "bush" here John. Basic reality was that Japan was a second/third rate industrial power trying to play in the big leagues. She managed to do some things very well, but to do so others simply had to get "short shrift". Even in the US economy priorities had to be set, and some things put on the back burners to give others priority.

Japan's economy simply didn't have enough "burners", and ASW was a low priority. If they had read the lessons of Great Britain in the First World War correctly, then maybe ASW would have gotten more inter-war attention and development. But then they would have had to give up something else...

[frank1970]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Frank

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

The real clincher in this discussion is that the period of maximum Allied submarine success in the Pacific coincides exactly with the period when the Japanese finally pulled their collective heads out and were making their maximum effort in the ASW field.  So even when they WERE trying, they were lousy at it.  [8|]

And German maximum weapons construction was in 1944, when US airforce ruled the skies.
Therefore American 8th airforce was lousy in doing her job?
No, sorry, I don´t buy your logics.

Actually, it was. German arms production peaked in the summer of 1944, then declined. During 1944 her synthetic oil industry was smashed, which meant those new tanks had no fuel. And by 1944, one of the major tasks of the 8th Air Force was to bring the Luftwaffe up to fight so the P-51's could shoot them down. You admit the "US airforce ruled the skies.", so you make my point quite well. So I'm afraid your "logics" (sic) are the faulty ones.

No. Strategic bombing was a failure. Too high costs for too little gains. Although the Allies used thousands of planes from 1942 on to smash German industry they didn´t succeed in doing it.
And I don´t buy your assumption the bombers were only bait to get after the fighters.

When the Allies changed their targets to bridges and railroadstations the success of bombing was larger.

Though now elaborate why the Japanese player should not be able to change strategy and therefore get better results? Because you don´t like it?

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

German U-Boats sank approximately 15,000 tons of Allied Shipping per sub lost during the War.

US Subs sank approximately 122,000 tons of Japanese Shipping per sub lost during the War....,
even with lousy torpedoes.

Being on the winning side might have something to do with that. Lots of Allied sub successes were scored in late 1944 and 1945, when Japanese navy and airforce were overwhelmed in every other area as well, increasingly falling apart from losses, strain and inadequate supply/maintenance. Moreover, Germans were in much worse strategical position, with all subs being forced to pass through Bay of Biscay chokepoint when moving to or from patrol areas. Thick ASW air patrols there were perhaps the main factor that broke German sub offensive in spring of 1943, although entire North Atlantic was eventually covered by anti-submarine air searches (Japanese simply didn't have nearly enough resources for anything similar, particularly late in the war). Never mind that, starting again, from early 1943, the number and quality of Allied escorts skyrocketed. (Japanese, at the same time, were strained more than before, due to combat losses and overloaded repair shipyards.)

In 1942, though, the things were completely different. In the Pacific too. In RL, Japanese subs performed much better than American ones throughout 1942, if we consider the overall value of sunk or damaged ships for the war effort. And yes, they sank a noticeable number of transports as well, despite their doctrine. So I don't understand why people complain when they do so in the game. Well, uber-aggressive use of subs, aimed at inflicting maximum damage in 1942, regardless for the cost (as later they will be massacred anyway), might produce results that seem disproportionally huge, but, well, like it or not, all players base their plans on the foreknowledge of the general course of events. People don't seem to complain about Allies evacuating troops from Malaya to Singapore starting on day 1, so why complain about adjustments to Japanese sub tactics?

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, it was. German arms production peaked in the summer of 1944, then declined. During 1944 her synthetic oil industry was smashed, which meant those new tanks had no fuel. And by 1944, one of the major tasks of the 8th Air Force was to bring the Luftwaffe up to fight so the P-51's could shoot them down. You admit the "US airforce ruled the skies.", so you make my point quite well. So I'm afraid your "logics" (sic) are the faulty ones.

Except, at late summer of 1944, Germans already started losing strategically vital territories. Never mind that rebuilding both major fronts from shambles put yet-unprecedented strain on German manpower. Yet the military production peaked at September. As about ruling the skies, what, did someone expected anything else when Allied air forces outnumbered German several times to one? Actually, the fact that Luftwaffe managed to fight for so long, even though Britain alone produced more aircraft than Germany, starting from 1941, testifies, that Allied air doctrine was far from perfect.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Brady
The poor preformace of Japanese ASW forces during the war had mostly to do with the fact that their were no escorts present for most US sub vs Japanese merchant men encounters. This was because the Japanese did not take the whole busisness seriously enough, untill much later in the war.

So you are claiming that the IJN was manned and commanded by a bunch of incompetent buffoons who couldn't figure this out?

I tend to agree ‘somewhat’ with both you and Brady, but tend to disagree more with both. The poor performance of Japanese ASW was because of command/strategic/psychological/doctrinal factors more than anything else. Take a look at m10bob’s Japanese Subchasers thread, and you will see that Japan had a quite reasonable “potential” ASW capability from about 1938 onward. However, their use of that capability, and their development of its future, can only be described as incompetent in the extreme. They had the basic tools: they chose neither to use them, nor even to sharpen them.

Japan had some decent SCs. The CH-1/4 was operational from about 1938; CH-13 from about 1940; and Ch-28 kicked off in mid 1942. Japan built anywhere from 58 to 61 total (depends on who’s counting). Most had a 3” on the nose, some 13mm-25mm MGs, couple DC rails, couple DC throwers, hydrophones; some (perhaps as many as one half) had T-93 sonar, and had T-13 or T-22 radar fitted in mid ’44. Not at all a bad boat. Compares ok to our PC-461 class except we had mousetraps, SO radars, QB/SL sonar (linked to the DC projectors), stuff like that; and we built 362 of them.

The really interesting (odd) thing is that Japan, despite having a decent design, didn’t use it. It took them 3 years to build 31 CH-28s – that’s less than 1 per month. In the meantime, they settled on a purpose-built small SC (SCS-1) on a standard trawler hull, and built perhaps 120 of these – one 3”, couple MGs, 10 knots, and maybe a frikkin hydrophone – basically naked, slow, and dumb.

They got really intense with the building program for these pukes in late ’42 and peaked in early ’44. When your SC can’t keep up with a convoy, can’t keep up with a sub in cruise mode, and can barely catch a strong man in a rowboat, one can only think – what the heck were these people thinking of?

That having whatever SCs their available facilities can actually produce in numbers is better than having nothing? Mike Scholl is correct here: Japan simply could not allow everything.

[xj900uk]

There was NO Japanese ASW. They didn't do it. It's not that they COULDN'T have, they just didn't. "Inadequate" presumes that they tried. They didn't. They ignored it until it was too late

Agreed. It just never occured to them. They never mastered the convoy system either. Their transports (especially tankers) were ripe for destruction the moment the US sorted out their problems with their torpedos. That was their first mistake.
Their 2nd mistake was not to train/instruct their own sub captains to go after merchant shipping, particularly allied tankers (of which there was a genuine shortage until early '44) Instead they insisted on them engaging surface heavy warships - there were even precise instrucitons on how many torpedos to use depending on the target! That was mistake number 2.
There was one IJN admiral who argued for better ASW and small CVE's linked to hunter-killer TF's to hunt down US subs, but he was never listened to until '44 by which time it was far too late (can't remember his name, sorry)

[Puhis]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Their 2nd mistake was not to train/instruct their own sub captains to go after merchant shipping, particularly allied tankers (of which there was a genuine shortage until early '44) Instead they insisted on them engaging surface heavy warships - there were even precise instrucitons on how many torpedos to use depending on the target! That was mistake number 2.

This "mistake" is a myth, that sub doctrine had nothing to do in real war. First allied mercant was sunk 7th december 1941. During the war IJN submarines sunk and damaged plenty of merchants, transports and tankers. There was quite succesful mercant hunters, for example I-10 sunk 8 merchant during summer 1942, in 6/1942 I-20 sunk 6 mercants and tanker. Other succesful merchant hunters were for example I-21, I-26, I-27...

After allied landed Guadalcanal, more and more subs had to supply Salomon bases, and later Aleutians, Lae, Wewak, Wake and so on. Subs could spend months just transporting supplies to some remote bases. That kept them away from allied supply lines.

[PzB74]

I think ASW is much more realistic in AE than in stock WitP.
In real life doctrine was the decisive factor regarding both how Japan defended against enemy subs and deployed their own boats.

Playing as Japan I've seen my subs taken a beating quite a few times already after only 3 months of war, true mines have sunk most of them but US asw wasn't truly great in 42 as mentioned before.

If you effectively manage both your offensive and defensive dispositions in AE related to subs and ASW it will make a great difference. Both sides need to train their ac in the ASW role, deploy convoy systems and escort their ships. Sending out unescorted ships is really dangerous and I expect the US subs to become a great menace when reliable torpedoes and radar comes into play.

True, Jap subs are effective; maybe the react feature got something to do with it?
- With reduced react range of 1 this has changed a bit I feel. Still, Jap subs achieved some great successes against US warships during WWII; if they had concentrated on merchant ships and convoys they would undoubtedly have achieved more - but this is again doctrine which the individual player now can invent himself.

My 2c is that I will have to play into 43-44 before I come with any further remarks about sub / asw capabilities.

[John Lansford]

In my CG the AI ASW tends to get contact on my subs, but not prosecute them to damage or sinking.  I've lost fewer than 10 subs and I'm in 1/43 now.  OTOH I've sunk well over 20 IJN subs, mostly with DC attacks, and damaged dozens more.  I agree that sending unescorted TF's anywhere near known sub locations is asking for multiple sinkings; what I disagree with is the ease that subs will attack and sink ASW assets.  They should be trying to avoid, not attack, ships patrolling on ASW missions; attacking one just calls attention to the sub, a bad idea when you've got heavy aircover and more ASW vessels on patrol.

[jackyo123]

ORIGINAL: PzB

I think ASW is much more realistic in AE than in stock WitP.
In real life doctrine was the decisive factor regarding both how Japan defended against enemy subs and deployed their own boats.

Playing as Japan I've seen my subs taken a beating quite a few times already after only 3 months of war, true mines have sunk most of them but US asw wasn't truly great in 42 as mentioned before.

If you effectively manage both your offensive and defensive dispositions in AE related to subs and ASW it will make a great difference. Both sides need to train their ac in the ASW role, deploy convoy systems and escort their ships. Sending out unescorted ships is really dangerous and I expect the US subs to become a great menace when reliable torpedoes and radar comes into play.

True, Jap subs are effective; maybe the react feature got something to do with it?
- With reduced react range of 1 this has changed a bit I feel. Still, Jap subs achieved some great successes against US warships during WWII; if they had concentrated on merchant ships and convoys they would undoubtedly have achieved more - but this is again doctrine which the individual player now can invent himself.

My 2c is that I will have to play into 43-44 before I come with any further remarks about sub / asw capabilities.

I had a couple of sub attacks last night where DD's were escorting large convoys of 20+ ships - in the majority of cases the sub attacked the escort, and not the xAK's.

Wish there was a way to code out the overwhelming likelihood that the subs attack the escorts.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Hey guys. I'm not sure if my opinion means s--t these days but I don't think ASW is that far off.....aside from the fact that there does not seem to be a chance of evasion of torps for targetted ships. Torpedoeing PTs and DDs etc should be a difficult endeavour, yet...."Blammo!"

That and DC penetrations, thoufg few right now, should be alot mor damaging given their lack of frequency...IMO. In lieu of the fact that theredoes not seem to be any chance of actually forcing asub to he surface in combat.

Regarding air asw, not alot of kills should be made because, seriously, how many subs are on the surfaace in daylight in enemy waters? Simply reducing the chance of attack through air patrols would be in order.

Ron, I have seen two subs forced to the surface by DC and then destroyed by gunfire in my game so far. It actually says it in the combat replay. In addition I had one crippled sub taken out by a Japanese surface force using gunfire. It was so damaged that I suppose it could not submerge.

You are right, the sub game is not so broken. In fact it is my favorite part of AE. We need to get deeper into our games to really know if it needs more fixing. I will say there is a big difference between Pbemail games agaist a human and AI games. So when writing of your experiences you all should say what type of game.

I might suggest as a HR that neither side replace captains of any ship smaller than a DD to keep Japanesed ASW from getting out of hand. However, so far in my two games I have not seen Japanese ASW as being very good. Now Japanese subs themselve are seriously deadly but so far it is not out of hand.

[Canoerebel]

Japanese ASW took a dramatic turn for the better in my game not too long ago.
 
In 1941 and 1942, the Japanese sank five Allied subs.
 
In the first five months of 1943, the Japanese have sunk six American subs and have damaged many more.
 
ASW attacks were rare before the recent patch or hot fix changed things, but they are common now.  As you guys move into late '42 and '43 I think you'll find the same thing.  Japanse ASW is too potent.

[Miller]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Japanese ASW took a dramatic turn for the better in my game not too long ago.

In 1941 and 1942, the Japanese sank five Allied subs.

In the first five months of 1943, the Japanese have sunk six American subs and have damaged many more.

ASW attacks were rare before the recent patch or hot fix changed things, but they are common now.  As you guys move into late '42 and '43 I think you'll find the same thing.  Japanse ASW is too potent.

I disagree. Going off your figures I am averaging slighly better than one a month, so over the course of the war I will sink approx 50-70 subs. How many did the Allies lose in the pacific? Seems pretty realistic to me.

Bear in mind most of my sub kills (and losses) have been in shallow water or base hexes.....

[Canoerebel]

Forty-two American subs were sunk in the Pacific in World War II to all causes.  Of that number, 25 or 26 were attributed to surface vessels or unknown causes. Based upon what I've seen through the first five months of '43, Allied losses to surface vessels will be much higher.  I do know this - the effectiveness of Japanese ASW changed dramatically after one of the recent patches or hot fixes. 

[Puhis]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

In the first five months of 1943, the Japanese have sunk six American subs and have damaged many more.

ASW attacks were rare before the recent patch or hot fix changed things, but they are common now.  As you guys move into late '42 and '43 I think you'll find the same thing.  Japanse ASW is too potent.

Well, in real war in first five months of 1943, japanese sunk 6 US subs. But I guess that even historical japanese ASW results are too potent for some... [&:]

[Shark7]

The problem here is that there is zero comparison. This is apples and oranges comparing the historical results against a player that already knows what to do to fix the problem day 1.

As far as the devices, the Japanese ASW devices are not as potent as the Allied devices. And the Allied devices and ships get increasingly more powerful through the war.

[John Lansford]

Puhis, at least one of those six lost in early '42 was a write off at Cavite from a bombing attack.
 
I too have seen subs forced to the surface and sunk by gunfire; one of my S-boats that sank Kaga had this happen to it, and my forces have sunk at least one that way too.  I agree that a depth charge "hit" should be much more damaging to the sub; the "sub damaged" from a near miss is the cumulative damage we always see portrayed in movies (pipe fittings breaking off, gauges & lights shattering, etc) but a true hit should either sink or force the sub to the surface.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Forty-two American subs were sunk in the Pacific in World War II to all causes.  Of that number, 25 or 26 were attributed to surface vessels or unknown causes. Based upon what I've seen through the first five months of '43, Allied losses to surface vessels will be much higher.  I do know this - the effectiveness of Japanese ASW changed dramatically after one of the recent patches or hot fixes. 

Sources I get say 48 in the PTO, two Atlantic, and two to accidents in training. Fifty-two total.

http://www.valoratsea.com/losses1.htm

[Miller]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Forty-two American subs were sunk in the Pacific in World War II to all causes.  Of that number, 25 or 26 were attributed to surface vessels or unknown causes. Based upon what I've seen through the first five months of '43, Allied losses to surface vessels will be much higher.  I do know this - the effectiveness of Japanese ASW changed dramatically after one of the recent patches or hot fixes. 

Sources I get say 48 in the PTO, two Atlantic, and two to accidents in training. Fifty-two total.

http://www.valoratsea.com/losses1.htm

Plus add perhaps half a dozen Dutch/British subs?

[Canoerebel]

ORIGINAL: Miller

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Forty-two American subs were sunk in the Pacific in World War II to all causes.  Of that number, 25 or 26 were attributed to surface vessels or unknown causes. Based upon what I've seen through the first five months of '43, Allied losses to surface vessels will be much higher.  I do know this - the effectiveness of Japanese ASW changed dramatically after one of the recent patches or hot fixes. 

Sources I get say 48 in the PTO, two Atlantic, and two to accidents in training. Fifty-two total.
http://www.valoratsea.com/losses1.htm

Plus add perhaps half a dozen Dutch/British subs?

There were 42 (or perhaps 43) destroyed by combat-related factors in the PTO. This is the number I've seen in a variety of sources.

By the way, in my game the Allies just lost two mores subs (both to different Japanese subs on the same day!), bringing the total to eight in the first five months of 1943.