Production options

[wpurdom]

I agree with the view that there is a lot more demand by the hard-core group for variations than it is probably reasonable for Matrix to incorporate in completed scenarios or preference options. Perhaps a reasonable approach would be to enhance editor capabilities and also have a variable file for items like CIV2 did. Then those with the time and energy could produce some fun ahistorical variations as happened with CIV2 also.
My wish list would include changing the onset of kamikazes, altering production, altering units from non-reinforcing to reinforcing (or doing the same thing by nationality). (I don't know if, at this point, actually doing all this if I had the ability is fantasy or a real possibility). My view is that one shouldn't force hard-core players to go over data files with a bit-editor - in general all data files should be alterable, you ought to be able to alter computer-opponent games with the editor in case you want to go real far out in simulations, and you ought to be able to alter some of the vairables in some of the formulas. (E.g., to what level can you train any given nationality, what is the training level of reinforcments.) At some point maybe some of this might raise infringment concerns for Matrix or 2x3, I don't know.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by mdiehl
The sinking of 4 IJN CVs at Midway was a little bit of luck and a lot of deliberately planning on the part of the USN. And the loss of 4 IJN CVs did not change planning for CVs under construction. The build program anticiapted the need for lots of fleet carriers because you need lots of CVs if you're to have a prayer operating near airbases operated by your enemy.

Hm, mdiehl,

a battle is 90% luck and 10% planning (at last in ww2), because all the planning had been worthless if the dauntlesses had not the "lucky" 5 minutes.. and that is the problem with EVERY wargame. If i play the japanese side (JS), i try to avoid midway, because with the loss of the mighty fleet, most things are gone, i only can try to damage as much allied ships. Sure, with Victory points (how boring) you can manage this, but i think the most fun is to CHANGE the war, or to hold the line 6 or 9 months longer.

in the first second of the game, everything is ahistorical... so why try to stop some more possible changes....

i agree, that we need a "historical" setting, if you want to play it this way, fine, forget the button "ahistorical production", but i also think we need such new ways because in pacwar, i mostly sunk the us fleet very quick and waited 6 months for new us ships to kill - or, as the us side, after sinking most japanese ships, i had a boring land war, with NO fun...

So, i dislike victory points as a gamestopper, i dislike a game who is only a slave of historical production (because i make the same failures as they made historically) and and and.

An other example, i am succsessfull and kill the few allied carriers in early 1942, now i want more destroyers or de´s or more cargo ships to produce... but i get them in.... 1944. Or the allied side lose all carriers but didn´t put the atlantic fleet to help (what the usa had done if things had gone worse)...

I think, the allied side should have some orders from the computer, one is the cargo for the atlantic battle, the destroyers, the planes and more. An other thing is the supply of eto with weapons... if the japanese are better as historically, the allied side can draw troops or ships or planes from europe, or decrease the support of stalin (or viceversa), or you produce more planes you need, is it realistc that they weren´t used in russia ?

You see, if you want to play historical, only historical battles with historical results are allowed... but this would be a slide show, no game. Again, why are you against it (as a option??)

it brings more fun, more surprise (because if you alter production, the computer, too, can do it, so if you sunk 3 carriers you are surprised that the pc has 4 others to hit you, but historically, the 3 were all the other side had in that period.....)

No fantasy game with stupid changes, but a new way to victory, for both sides (a functional jet is ready in 1946, only if germany loose earlier, this can be speeded up, or for the japanese, if the germans give their plans earlier to the japanese (ut then the allies can cath these plans and can react better), so many possibilites... why not ????

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
I think people are getting confused here.

This is a war game, not an empire building game.

War games have you fight during an historical era, using what commanders then used. It places you in command of the military forces of the nation, and you must do your best to fight with what you are given.

What is being asked here is to expand the game from a war game, to an empire game, where you control the military, but industry and government as well. Historically there was no single individual who had this power, say except an extreme version of Hitler.

The way I would like to see production is to fit more or less what history did, produce what is needed. When the IJN lost a bunch of CV's at Midway, the industry automatically compensated by planning the construction of the Unryu and Shiano CV. Had the Japanese not lost their CV's all at once, they probably would have completed the Shiano as a BB.

I would like to see a War in the Pacific where the production does change, but is not up to the whim of the player, it adds too much control to the process of the game, relying particularly on hindsight. Production should change in regards to the course of the war.

The thing that I know of that COULD be under the control of the player is accepting and refusing proposals of the industrial community. What miltaries did was to place an order to meet a requirement (i.e., the IJAAF requirement for an inline interceptor eventually resulted in the Ki-61). Originally, in the Ki-61 saga, the Ki-60 was given priority, and eventually cancelled by the military and had the Ki-61 instead. What this did was to slow down the introduction of a high speed interceptor for 6 critical months. Now, what I believe the extent of player manipulation would be for accepting and declining projects, and putting input toward requirements. Actually designing 'the perfect aircraft' was impossible. However, it could be a gamble. You put your resources toward the Ki-60 over the Ki-61, and you end up with a poor aircraft (while putting cash toward the Ki-61 instead of the Ki-60 would result in a good aircraft appearing early, or possibly even accepting the Ki-60 for production would result in an aircraft reaching production sooner, but be not quite as good had you waited). However, this also might be too much control.

Even Pacific War offered the player way too much control over production. Most players would never build the Ki-43-II over the Ki-61/Ki-44 and changed factories to produce these two aircraft. The problem with offering control to industrial output results in games never following their historic results, primarily because things are too manipulated.

Wargames are NOT a matter of repeating history over and over again, but to try and change history by using the tools avalible with better skill and cunning then your historic counterparts. Just because you get the same ships does not mean you have to use them the same way.

Well, that is your opinion, also, who decides what will be built after what loss ???? Because, if you loose no ships, what happen with your production, or why should the us navy for example give up their carrier sail alone strategy if they loose no carrier untill 1943 and then (bad luck) they loose 6 or 7 in one week (you know, sometimes things went wrong), or if the war is mostly calm, whith low losses, why should the usa with their germany first strategy put the ships in the pacific ???? I think that is a endless story, the question is simple, do we want more buttons to manipulate or not... i say YES, you say no.... but why do you want to forbid me to play the game the way i like to play... you only leave everything untouched and everything is okay for you, and i can manipulate and be happy too ?

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"Question: How much longer would the war in the Pacific have lasted if the IJN had adopted KM sub tactics and instituted unrestricted submarine warfare?"

Not much longer. The problem with WW2 submarines is that they had to come up for air. For the shallow-depth, slow-diving IJN boats, the nemesis would have been airpower. The USN deployed several auxiliary carriers by September 1942, so forming H-K attack groups or providing really good, *dedicated* asw support would not have been that challenging. You'd see fewer unescorted ships crawling across the Pacific, but the US had the resources available to provide proper escort by the time the G'canal campaign started. And by then, convoying vessels was common practice.

Of course, if you're gonna give the IJN "altered" sub doctrine it, in effect, means that they've thrown away the "Decisive Battle Doctrine" in favor of siege warfare. The price for changing IJN sub doctrine should be the significant retardation of delivery of CVs and IJN naval aviation in favor of army aviation, container ships for the co-exploitation sphere, substantial reductions in IJN doctrinal aggressiveness, and smaller budgets for naval R&D and training. It may even mean giving up the Long Lance, since the expenditures might easily have been granted to an army weapon system... like a tank that worked, for example.

Hm, if the japanese use german raider tactics (well i know, it is difficulty), they can create a massacere and huge problems with the allied transport system. the pacific is not the atlantic, with friendly countries around it, and it is a little bigger. So, no, you need to much ships to defend your convois and these ships you will miss, in the eto, at the frontline or (if you produce even more ships) at the economic frontier.... also, if you explain different versions of gaming with your words, it is useless o play the japanese (or allieds), because we all know what happened, we all would try to avoid the mistakes, so why play at all ? This question comes along with every post of you. What do you want to play ? Honestly, i can´t see it. I want new weapons (historical produced or developed) earlier, from some ships more, some less, better equipment and so on... what is wrong with that ? you are not forced to do the same, you hit the "historical settings" button and everything is okay... and i hit the "increased control of XXXX button and manipulate it...

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by Maniac
I agree with having control over production but only to a certain extent...

I understand that alot of you feel that the game would be ahistorical but when you really think about it the game is ahistorical already...

Say the battle of the Coral Sea happened in game but the results weren't historical? then you would have to go the rest of the game with historical production and that kind of contradicts itself because in history the production was based on results of what were happening in the war, if we lost some of our carriers in PH on Dec 7 1941 than I am sure the production in the ship yards would have been alot different

every situation will require different needs from the production yards.

You can not tell me that you will have the same battle results as the commanders in the Pacific had in WWII so why should we have the same priority in Production as them? there has to be some player control

But the player shouldn't neccesarily have total control over production where you get to change the armament of guns on ships and pretty much making them super space ships and junk

Lets say for example that you lost a lot of Transports in a cargo run that ran sour because you ran into a CV TF, well you should be able to switch some production over to compensate for you loses its what makes logic since. Because how unrealalistic would it be if you have a ton of fighting ships but not enough trasports to keep your bases suppllied then you should be able to request trasports be made

what if you loose a ton of airplanes in a battle for an island, you loose way more bombers than fighters, and now you are in desperate need for fighters, if you get historical production then you are going to be screwed because now you are going to have way to many fighters and not enough bombers


my point is simple, the game is set with historical units and wwII demographs, but the situations you get in and the results will not be historical at all, because now we are in the commanders shoes and we can't have fixed production because it wont be to our needs...it would just flat out be unrealalistic to have a fixed production because it would be based on the results of the historical events and not the results of what has happened in the game

I hope my points make sense

Well, that sounds good but has one problem included... no engine produces a useful reaction on such results, because the game engine isn´t smart enough to handle this for the japanese player (the allied side is different), because the resources are to short and this forces the player (choosing the japanese side) to play tactics and a strategy the computer wants). The allied side , with so many planned ships to come, is easier, esp. if computer controlled. You only change your priorities, let´s say they loose all carriers, now the engine switch destroyer capacities to carriers, draw some ships (british or american) from the atlantic and force the carrier building program, also the training of the crews will start earlier (like on the soil ) .... so it is a lot easier to handle. The ai japanese side has more problems, but at last, the computer can develop a strategy for six months and act only for this strategy (sure, it will be adopted).. but for the japanese player, it is stupid. His production ai switches ships to something else he didn´t want. Lets say, i want to conquer india (sure, mdiehl wants to forbid this, i bet, because it is ahistorical....) and i say forget the carriers, i need airplanes for the army, but the loss of the carriers cause a huge carrier building program and kill my chance to conquer india.... the only one who can handle the production for the player perfect, is the player.... he knows what he want, the computer not....

[mdiehl]

"Hm, if the japanese use german raider tactics (well i know, it is difficulty), they can create a massacere and huge problems with the allied transport system. the pacific is not the atlantic, with friendly countries around it, and it is a little bigger. So, no, you need to much ships to defend your convois and these ships you will miss, in the eto, at the frontline or (if you produce even more ships) at the economic frontier.... also, if you explain different versions of gaming with your words, it is useless o play the japanese (or allieds), because we all know what happened, we all would try to avoid the mistakes, so why play at all ? This question comes along with every post of you. What do you want to play ? Honestly, i can´t see it. I want new weapons (historical produced or developed) earlier, from some ships more, some less, better equipment and so on... what is wrong with that ? you are not forced to do the same, you hit the "historical settings" button and everything is okay... and i hit the "increased control of XXXX button and manipulate it..."

There's alot in your post and I am having a little difficulty sorting out the points. Japan was not Germany, and the US was not the UK. There was not alot of strategic US material that was accessible to surface vessels: most of it was handled along interior lines in the US, except, of course, oil, which was typically moved in bulk freighters. The *only* vessels that could operate within US coastal waters (where materials crucial to US war effort were moved... in contrast to Atlantic convoys that had to go to Britain) were submarines. Oil would be their primary target if they were Japanese submarines. So, if you are envisioning something like the Kormoran cruising the Pacific Coast, then you are envisioning (IMO) target practice for US west-coast shore batteries and land based air.

Also, as you pointed out, the Pacific is a big place. Any Japanese vessel is going to need a base of operations to conduct warfare against US strategic resources. There were no Japanese bases (even allowing for the capture of, say, Midway, or Unalaska) from which a proper warship (BB, CB, CA, CL, DD, PG) could operate with sufficient range to reach the US west coast. So it's got to be submarines. Even then, assuming you take Midway and Unalask, you still don't have much capacity to berth, repair or supply these, because these facilities would need to be built (Midway) or geared-up (Unalasaka) for IJN service requirements.

So basically what you're hoping for is to interdict the los from the US to Australia. That means you need to take the Solomons and Espirito Santo at minimum, which is what the IJN tried to do anyhow, and at which they failed. Assuming the accomplish that, to nail a US convoy in the deep ocean requires adequate recon (which the IJN never developed in its mobile forces), and you're going to be really limited in what you can use (the BBs and CBs won't have the range, and merely using them often would self-inflict more strategic damage to Japan than they could cause to US convoys). So that leaves CV vs CV engagements (that the IJN could not afford because of the attrition), and the *un* enviable position of IJN CAs attemtping to take on the likes of Washington, SoDak, and NC in teh open seas (where the IJN ships would never benefit from mitigating circumstances, like land masses rendering a cofused radar picture).

But, if you want to try it, best of luck to you. If the model reflects the real difficulties that the IJN would entail in attempting to implement the strategy, I'd *love* to be the US player against such a strategy.

I have no problem with new weapons. I do want to see realistic limits. If you want to pretend that there was a possible version of WW2 in which the Japanese industrial and technological research capacity rivalled the US that's fine. But don't call it the Pacific War or even Planet Earth, or don't call it a simulation, because that would be false advertising.

Moreover, I'm not at all fond of Axis Fanboy games in which the Axis are presumed to be supermen, and given access to strategies, tactics, and equipment to which they had little or no access, and are given complete benefits of hindsight, and in which the Allies are straightjacketed into the initial deployments that they historically made, the weapons systems they historically used, and the routine unsubstantiated assumptions about the relative competance of pilots and ship crews vis a vis combat.

So sure, you can have IJN strategic sub warfare turned on. In compensation, I want reliable US torpedoes, with reliable contact and magnetic influence exploders that work from the get go. If you want Japanese ME262s in operational service, you can have 'em -- in exchange for US F104s and F4D Skyrays on angle-deck US carriers in 1944. I regard the two possibilities as roughly comprable in terms of their likelihood.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"Hm, if the japanese use german raider tactics (well i know, it is difficulty), they can create a massacere and huge problems with the allied transport system. the pacific is not the atlantic, with friendly countries around it, and it is a little bigger. So, no, you need to much ships to defend your convois and these ships you will miss, in the eto, at the frontline or (if you produce even more ships) at the economic frontier.... also, if you explain different versions of gaming with your words, it is useless o play the japanese (or allieds), because we all know what happened, we all would try to avoid the mistakes, so why play at all ? This question comes along with every post of you. What do you want to play ? Honestly, i can´t see it. I want new weapons (historical produced or developed) earlier, from some ships more, some less, better equipment and so on... what is wrong with that ? you are not forced to do the same, you hit the "historical settings" button and everything is okay... and i hit the "increased control of XXXX button and manipulate it..."

There's alot in your post and I am having a little difficulty sorting out the points. Japan was not Germany, and the US was not the UK. There was not alot of strategic US material that was accessible to surface vessels: most of it was handled along interior lines in the US, except, of course, oil, which was typically moved in bulk freighters. The *only* vessels that could operate within US coastal waters (where materials crucial to US war effort were moved... in contrast to Atlantic convoys that had to go to Britain) were submarines. Oil would be their primary target if they were Japanese submarines. So, if you are envisioning something like the Kormoran cruising the Pacific Coast, then you are envisioning (IMO) target practice for US west-coast shore batteries and land based air.

Also, as you pointed out, the Pacific is a big place. Any Japanese vessel is going to need a base of operations to conduct warfare against US strategic resources. There were no Japanese bases (even allowing for the capture of, say, Midway, or Unalaska) from which a proper warship (BB, CB, CA, CL, DD, PG) could operate with sufficient range to reach the US west coast. So it's got to be submarines. Even then, assuming you take Midway and Unalask, you still don't have much capacity to berth, repair or supply these, because these facilities would need to be built (Midway) or geared-up (Unalasaka) for IJN service requirements.

So basically what you're hoping for is to interdict the los from the US to Australia. That means you need to take the Solomons and Espirito Santo at minimum, which is what the IJN tried to do anyhow, and at which they failed. Assuming the accomplish that, to nail a US convoy in the deep ocean requires adequate recon (which the IJN never developed in its mobile forces), and you're going to be really limited in what you can use (the BBs and CBs won't have the range, and merely using them often would self-inflict more strategic damage to Japan than they could cause to US convoys). So that leaves CV vs CV engagements (that the IJN could not afford because of the attrition), and the *un* enviable position of IJN CAs attemtping to take on the likes of Washington, SoDak, and NC in teh open seas (where the IJN ships would never benefit from mitigating circumstances, like land masses rendering a cofused radar picture).

But, if you want to try it, best of luck to you. If the model reflects the real difficulties that the IJN would entail in attempting to implement the strategy, I'd *love* to be the US player against such a strategy.

I have no problem with new weapons. I do want to see realistic limits. If you want to pretend that there was a possible version of WW2 in which the Japanese industrial and technological research capacity rivalled the US that's fine. But don't call it the Pacific War or even Planet Earth, or don't call it a simulation, because that would be false advertising.

Moreover, I'm not at all fond of Axis Fanboy games in which the Axis are presumed to be supermen, and given access to strategies, tactics, and equipment to which they had little or no access, and are given complete benefits of hindsight, and in which the Allies are straightjacketed into the initial deployments that they historically made, the weapons systems they historically used, and the routine unsubstantiated assumptions about the relative competance of pilots and ship crews vis a vis combat.

So sure, you can have IJN strategic sub warfare turned on. In compensation, I want reliable US torpedoes, with reliable contact and magnetic influence exploders that work from the get go. If you want Japanese ME262s in operational service, you can have 'em -- in exchange for US F104s and F4D Skyrays on angle-deck US carriers in 1944. I regard the two possibilities as roughly comprable in terms of their likelihood.

Well, after beeing attacked, i can say, you won´t read my post, and your biggest problem is that your mighty us navy was err, hit in the eggs in pearl... so you have a super problem with normal questions and different opinions about games....

i see a game as a way to have fun, you, as it seems, only want a game to show the (fill in the evil enemy you want) that a real american guy show it the (fill in again) ... That is, open said, bullshit...

i play in pacwar the japanese and allied side, i prever the japanese, so ihave more ships to sunk :p , that is all.
Why do you take it so personell, if someone want a different game as you ? Did i wrote i want superhumans (how do you know us baden-württemberger???) or 50 shinano carriers with miracle jets??? no, but i want to optimize (as the japanese player, it is allowed to play them, or not??) my strategy to win the war, even if i know it is not possible. But, hell, i can try it.

The submarine comment wasn´t for the game but for the real war, but it was also 20/20. I reacted to your comment about who useless such a behavior had been, and i disagreed. Is this forbidden to have a different opinion ? We disagree surely in many things, and this never will change - but i think we both want this game and i can only repeat my question - what is your problem with my wishes of more control in the game ? combinied with a editor i (well not me, but maybe some others) can kill all these "yankees" you belive i want to do... Do this change your playing ? No. So why so upset ? Your opinion about american planes in ww2 are different to mine, so why do not change the parameters (if we both are wrong) to ou favour and think we play the "right" version ??? Is that evil ?
So, please, calm down. My wishes didn´t bother your possibilities, but your wishes restrict my wishes... so couldn´t you accept a different opinoion and allow both of us to have fun ?
And sorry if i offended you, but i reacted to your post. So please, calm down, and let us act "friendly" or go to the aow-forum

[Jeremy Pritchard]

The United States pulled virtually every ship they could to the Pacific at the times that they did. In December 1941 the Yorktown, Ranger and Wasp were in the Atlantic. The Yorktown was sent as soon as possible, and once the Wasp was done in its important role in ferrying aircraft to Malta it was sent to the Pacific. The USS Washington was required to patrol convoys in the Atlantic and North Atlantic, and the New Mexico Class (the most modern vessels in the Atlantic fleet other than the USS Washington) were sent to the Pacific in early 1942. Most of the destroyers in the Atlantic were Clemson/Wickes, and there were also very few Cruisers (when compared to the Pacific).

These forces were REQURIED. They were needed to safeguard the massive convoys of troops and materials, as well as to support the troops on the land (Landings in Algeria, Sicily, Italy and Normandy would have been impossible had the USN withdrawn any more vessels to the Pacific). No matter how bad things got in the Pacific, the vessels in the Atlantic would have stayed there, as they were vital to the survival of the effort in Europe. They sent every ship they could at the earliest time possible. Should this option be initiated, with proper historical constraits, you will undoubtedly find ships being freed at historic times, unless you find a way to abuse the system.

The Japanese produced about every type of vessel to their maximum. The only thing that they could have done was to not have built the Yamato class. They built as many DD's as possible. Their carrier production was also at maximum. There really is not that much of an option to change vessel production.

Realistically, production and production options were very limited. They might appear to have a lot of options, but realistically, there were not. Production took a long time, and by the time the ship is built, chances are you will either not need it, or have been defeated (had the US lost all their carriers at Midway, there would have been no way in making up for these losses until the arrival of the Essex class, which could not have been sped up!). You should never see the Ranger in the Pacific for any duration of time, other than as an aircraft ferry, nor would the Wasp ever appear earlier than it actually did. Japanese escorts were actually layed down in 1942, but construction did not have them appear until 1943.



No matter what you say there is a difference between wargames and empire games.

WARGAMES:

You change history using the tools that your historical counterparts had availible to them under the same pressures that they felt. You win because you are a better or equal MILITARY LEADER as your historical counterparts.

EMPIRE GAMES:

You make your own history, creating everything from your ships to your empire from scratch. You have very little limitations as you create everything and there are no real restraints of history. You win because you are a better or equal EMPEROR as your PBEM or AI opponents.


Why don't they give the option for both in their game? Because implementing it properly will make for so many resources to be used in making it work correctly, and a lot of time that could have been spent making sure that the game works without any bugs. Creating this system will delay the release, make what was implemented more buggy due to less playtesting, and cause more bugs due to increasing the game's complexity. This option only makes an option that might be used by some. Why waste all this time and resources to add options when it can be better spent making the general game better?

Asking for something is easy, actually making it, and making it work is difficult.

If they could make this option without losing any quality AND SPIRIT of the game, and without having it delayed then I am all for it. However, I know that this will not be the case, and if it is put in, you can expect more bugs and this game in stores 1 year later than it should.

[doomonyou]

The real problem with any of these games is surprise. WWII was all about the WTF factor. Hi I am france la la la la la what the hell are the germans doing in belgium HELP AHH IT BURNS. America sits lollygaggling along, Pearl Harbor sitting without even rudimentary patrols out and radar men who detect massed bomber flights and ignore them..Soviets didn't think Hitler would attack them so soon...surprise Uncle Joe, Adolf's here!!! The only realistic alternative is to allow the game to start POST pearl harbor, allowing the American's to respond roughly the way they did, but allow the person whose playing post-pearl harbor to do what they feel they want to both strategically and production wise.

I think that WITP should start out with exactly historical and then allow great latitude in things....including the production. I think the research component should be fairly straight jacketed, but the actual production of known aircraft vessels and weapons to be more open to interpretation.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

In regards to Japanese production, historically (and realistically) the Japanese switched heavy production over to fighters instead of bombers because no matter what the losses, their pitiful industry MUST produce as many fighters as possible in order to survive against US production. No matter how many bombers were lost, the Japanese would have made as many fighters as they could over bombers (probably more so due to the fact that bombers were probably shot down due to insufficient fighter escort!).

In 1941 Fighter and Bomber Groups were about 1:1, but by 1943 it was about 2:1, and by 1944 about 5:1.

When Japan produces 50 000 aircraft during the war, and the US produce 90 000 in 1944, you know for sure that the Japanese will build as many fighters as they can just to survive. Even if the Japanese get favorable kills of 10:1 they will still eventually have attrition levels of fighters (which are way more important than bombers for a nation like Japan in their industrial situation) that will gain in the favour of the US.


Had the Japanese lost 8 Heavy Cruisers at Midway instead of 4 Carriers, they would still have changed the Ibuki to a CVL and have built the Unryu. The Japanese built around 60 (maximum) fleet destroyers in WW2, and around 30 DE's.

Should industry be given full human control, you should not be allowed to build 1944 designs in 1941. So, you will end up with production in 1941 limited to realistically what was designed at the time (no good escorts were designed at this time, except for the 4 CD class escorts which were good for only coastal duty). You could choose to build Yugumo DD's or Hatsuharu DD's, but since no DE's were designed until 1944, you would get no Matsu DE's until then. There would not be the opton for building a Japanese ASW fleet in 1942 because the R&D was not behind it. You simply had no good designs to work off of.


The Japanese did use raider tactics in the Indian Ocean, to good effect, until the British closed the Indian Ocean, then they stopped. Even still, the Pacific makes for a much worse area for commerce raiding surface vessels then the Atlantic. What made the Atlantic so good for the Germans was the following.

1. Wide spaces of ocean far from LBA and enemy scouts. The surface forces have a lot of empty ocean to hide, and spot weakly guarded merchant convoys or individual ships (where commerce raiders were most successful). The Pacific is dotted with islands along all the major sea routes making ASW from the air comparatively easy, with very few zones outside of air escort.

2. Neutral countries. Without neutral contries commerce raiders would never have survived long. Their fleet of supply ships were based from these neutral ports and could hide in there from UK anti-raiders. The Pacific does not offer this.

3. Sufficient bases along enemy supply routes. Norway was the scene of most of Germany's sucessful commerce raiding. This was successful because it was exactly on the merchant route from the US and UK to Russia. The only way Japan could do this is by securing New Caledonia and the islands around it, to interdict supplies from Australia. However, the US could easily move convoys further south (the Allies could not do this on the Norway coast because of the closeness to the arctic circle).

[mdiehl]

Adnan, nothing I said should be construed as an attack against you personally. And your assessment of my motives in non-sequitur and in any case wrong. If you *must* know my motive, it is to avoid spending money on yet another game that, allowing for ahistorical "counterfactuals," throws them all on the side of the Axis, or that othrrwise uses a deeply and demontsrably flawed model for -- pick just about any subject. There have been so many.. A3R, ERS, GGPW, the Pzgeneral series, WW2:PTO, Victory in the Pacific, Flat Top -- all flawed to varying degrees. To be sure, only two of them are computer games. I've tossed away alot of money on these things over the years, and found some of them to be entertaining. But, as I enjoy playing against *human* opponents more than the AI (which is almost always easily defeatable), I'd prefer a game where "Make it so" is not the model for Axis production or combat abilities. I also agree in the general sense with everything that Jeremy just said about the difference between "Empire" games and sims. I do not agree with Jeremy when he says "No matter how bad things got in the Pacific, the vessels in the Atlantic would have stayed there, as they were vital to the survival of the effort in Europe." IMO, had the threat to India been a real one, Torch would have been substantially delayed so that the US could really put the screws to Japan, thereby forcing them to withdraw from the Indian campaign.

" The submarine comment wasn´t for the game but for the real war,"

I understood you to be talking about the real war. I was extrapolating how the "real war" would have proceeded if the IJN had a submarine strategic warfare doctrine. I suggested that there would be significant trade-offs, because the IJN was, more so than other navies, highly designed-for-doctrinee. It had to be. Japan's armed forces and procurement system could not afford to screw around with things like unguided missiles, heavy armor, heavy mobile artillery, strategic bombers. For example, the IJN spent way too much money developing a weapon system, the 18" gun, that was demonstrably inferior (after its performance tests were compared post WW2) to the USN 16" gun long-range shell, with respect to range, accuracy and penetration. But, the qualitative superiority through bigger guns was an entrenched doctrine, and its pursuit undoubtedly sacrificed other alternative doctrines and weapon systems. Don't take my word for it, consult almost any text. At the moment I'm reading "The Barrier and the Javelin" where it comes up, again, by yet another highly regarded historian (H.P. Wilmott).

Likewise, your comment about IJN surface raiders was intriguing. My point, in a nutshell, is that there's no place that Japan could safely use them. And what would your targets be? Unless your alternate history envisions a United States with no integrated interior railroad network, or substantially lacking in natural resources (and hence, dependent on bulk-cargo imports, as was the UK), then against what would you engage in strategic warfare? There has to be at least some basis for your premise for it to become an engaging "what if" scenario.

"Your opinion about american planes in ww2 are different to mine..." [and] "so couldn´t you accept a different opinoion and allow both of us to have fun ?"

Not all opinions are created equal. Mine is substantiated by numbers pertaining to actual combat losses, actual production and maintenance problems, and actual documented aircraft handling characteristics. Do I want to pay for a game that subscribes to your set of desires? No. At the very least, these things have development costs. It is far more important to me to have the effort invested in getting the historical model correct than in creating some really strange suite of production or doctrinal counterfactuals.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Going to the India thread, I really don't think that the United States was capable of the offensive actions of 1944-45 in 1942. They would have been able to have captured the forward bases in the Marshal Islands, but they would not have been able to have quickly moved into the Japanese Controlled Central Pacific with knowledge that 6+ IJN Carriers were 'somewhere'. This type of thinking is what caused the Midway disaster for the Japanese, the search for the decisive naval battle. The Japanese thought that they could secure Midway before the US got there, and with that base and their carriers they would easily smash any opponent.

I also don't believe that the Atlantic COULD have lost any more ships then it did. Malta was still being contested in 1942, and without the ferrying operations the control of the Medeterranean could have been delayed. The Wasp was needed in the Atlantic, and had the USN been wiped out (a very small chance, as the last time an entire fleet was destroyed in one engagement was 1905), one smaller carrier would not survive very long, nor would it accomplish anything.

The US Atlantic fleet was already at a bare minimum. It was not a matter of postponing offensive operations had ships been detached, but of losing initiative. Once war with Japan began the Royal Navy had to detach many of its warships (previously on convoy duty) to the Far East. This had to be made up by USN vessels or else the convoys to Russia would have to be stopped and the Germans might decide to bring the Tirpitz on a sortee into the Atlantic.

While you should not overestimate the strength of the Japanese and Germans (which is your crusade), you should not underestimate them. What they were able to take in months it took years to take back from them. Frankly, it was amazing that these two nations were able to do so much damage to the world, to take a large slice of territory so quickly, and give it up with so much of a fight. I really do not understand how come it took the Japanese 3 years to be defeated if the United States was just so superior to them. While I don't beleive that the Japanese had superior equipment, I don't believe that theirs were so inferior.

[mdiehl]

"Going to the India thread, I really don't think that the United States was capable of the offensive actions of 1944-45 in 1942. They would have been able to have captured the forward bases in the Marshal Islands, but they would not have been able to have quickly moved into the Japanese Controlled Central Pacific with knowledge that 6+ IJN Carriers were 'somewhere'. This type of thinking is what caused the Midway disaster for the Japanese, the search for the decisive naval battle. The Japanese thought that they could secure Midway before the US got there, and with that base and their carriers they would easily smash any opponent."

If you are correct in assuming that Kido Butai would not be needed for an invasion of India, you'd be right about the threat to a USN TF in a PTO amphibious operation in early 1942. I just don't agree that you can invade India without all of the available Japanese CVs. If they're operating in India, they're going to be there a while, and that frees up the USN for alot of mischief... from Doolittle-style raids in force, to the conquest of the CenPac with the use of raider battalions. In March/April 1942, the USN would not have needed nearly teh tonnage in transports to support the scale of amphib assaults of 1944-45, because IJN ground defenses were very weak in 1942. You could bypass the Marshalls, and be grateful every time an IJN raid sortied to, say, Saipan, to be decimated by any P40 squadron stationed there.

"I also don't believe that the Atlantic COULD have lost any more ships then it did. Malta was still being contested in 1942, and without the ferrying operations the control of the Medeterranean could have been delayed. The Wasp was needed in the Atlantic, and had the USN been wiped out (a very small chance, as the last time an entire fleet was destroyed in one engagement was 1905), one smaller carrier would not survive very long, nor would it accomplish anything."

I can't see anything to wipe out the US fleet. If teh 6 fleet carriers are off India, along with heavy cruiser and BB support, and the overwhelming preponderance of the logistical traind evoted to India, what's left to attack the USN? Answer: no tmuch.

"The US Atlantic fleet was already at a bare minimum. It was not a matter of postponing offensive operations had ships been detached, but of losing initiative. Once war with Japan began the Royal Navy had to detach many of its warships (previously on convoy duty) to the Far East. This had to be made up by USN vessels or else the convoys to Russia would have to be stopped and the Germans might decide to bring the Tirpitz on a sortee into the Atlantic."

There was no almost no chance of a Tirpitz sortie in 1942. She was not even ready for trials. The only major threat that the USN had to deal with in the Atlanmtic in 1942 (indeed, *could* deal with, and inadequately at that) were teh Uboats. You do not need USN CVs, BBs or CAs for that job. And there were many Royal Navy heavy fleet elements that were not sent eastward when Japan jumped into action.

"While you should not overestimate the strength of the Japanese and Germans (which is your crusade), you should not underestimate them. What they were able to take in months it took years to take back from them."

Quite so. Then again, there was no particular urgency to "hurry up" against Japan. Had they assaulted India in force, it is quite likely that the Allies would have pursued ahistorical strategies as well.

"Frankly, it was amazing that these two nations were able to do so much damage to the world, to take a large slice of territory so quickly, and give it up with so much of a fight."

It's not *that* amazing. Both nations seem to have timed their military mobilizations pretty well (unlike Italy, which would have been a force in 1935, and was a joke in 1940). The Germans were aided substantially by a series of French blunders, and then, subsequently, a kind of willful ignorance on Stalin's part (Gee, why are all those Panzer Divisions massing along my border? Hitler lied to everyone else but he would not lie to *me.*") The Japanese conquests occurred in largely demilitarized zones (Indonesia and Hong Kong). They only faced serious opposition in the PI (where US isolation favored the siege that occurred, after the direct approach was attempted by the Japanese army and ground to a halt). That leaves the Malay peninsular campaign, brilliantly conducted (but again with overwhelming air superiority in numbers, and a few key British blunders that made Japanese advances easier than they ought to have been).

In short, the Japanese siezed the day and the Allies cooperated to a great degree. The Allies could have done a whole lot better from the get go.

"I really do not understand how come it took the Japanese 3 years to be defeated if the United States was just so superior to them."

Because the US effort was directed primarily at Germany. Through 1942, although the New Guinea, Solomons and Midway campaigns devastated the IJN and the Japanese army divisions thee, and the naval air flotillas, the US effort was (in terms of its relative ability to deploy power), a backhand slap. The real s**t did not hit the Japanese fan nutil 1944, and the Japanese had no very effective form of resistence.

"I don't believe that theirs were so inferior."

It wasn't. It was peculiarly adequate to the tasks at hand through April 1942. After that it became progressively less adequate. Both in terms of technology, and also in terms of the jobs required of it.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Ok, I agree with what you said above. The Axis would not have been as sucessful as they were had not the Allies blundered in many key areas. France should not have fallen, and its troops were some of Europe's best, but since France did fall, the impression is that all French troops were cowards and surrendered without a fight, even though only a small portion did, but they were in the key area.

The Japanese would not have been as sucessful in the Philippines had MacArthur kept to the original plan and held up in Bataan. The Japanese would probably still have Bataan under seige by the time of Midway had he done this. Percival defended Singapore Island poorly, he defended everything, and thereby defended nothing. The 17th Indian Division was positioned badly in Burma so when they had to retreat they had to cross a single bridge, which was accidentally demolishoned too early, cutting off a significant portion of the force, resulting in too few troops to hold Rangoon.

However, the Japanese and Germans did do significant acts to cause the Allied war effort to speed up as well.

[doomonyou]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
Ok, I agree with what you said above. The Axis would not have been as sucessful as they were had not the Allies blundered in many key areas. France should not have fallen, and its troops were some of Europe's best, but since France did fall, the impression is that all French troops were cowards and surrendered without a fight, even though only a small portion did, but they were in the key area.

The Japanese would not have been as sucessful in the Philippines had MacArthur kept to the original plan and held up in Bataan. The Japanese would probably still have Bataan under seige by the time of Midway had he done this. Percival defended Singapore Island poorly, he defended everything, and thereby defended nothing. The 17th Indian Division was positioned badly in Burma so when they had to retreat they had to cross a single bridge, which was accidentally demolishoned too early, cutting off a significant portion of the force, resulting in too few troops to hold Rangoon.

However, the Japanese and Germans did do significant acts to cause the Allied war effort to speed up as well.

Yes lets see what the axis do wrong...I can't quite remember...something about Barbarosa or something...

[RevRick]

wasn't Barbarossa delayed six weeks to pull Mussolini's chestnuts out of the fire in Greece. Seems to me that with an extra six weeks to work on the Soviets, Moscow would have fallen and then Barbarossa would have been a success - at least in 1941.

[mdiehl]

I'd heard the same about Barbarossa, but it's been heavily disputed by fellows with a much higher tolerance for and proclivity to dish out invective than I.

I thought that most of the units in the Balkan campaign were not immediately used in Barbarossa anyhow. There may have been some conflict of logistical priorities, or some other concern. The ETO has never been my primary area of interest.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Adnan, nothing I said should be construed as an attack against you personally. And your assessment of my motives in non-sequitur and in any case wrong. If you *must* know my motive, it is to avoid spending money on yet another game that, allowing for ahistorical "counterfactuals," throws them all on the side of the Axis, or that othrrwise uses a deeply and demontsrably flawed model for -- pick just about any subject. There have been so many.. A3R, ERS, GGPW, the Pzgeneral series, WW2:PTO, Victory in the Pacific, Flat Top -- all flawed to varying degrees. To be sure, only two of them are computer games. I've tossed away alot of money on these things over the years, and found some of them to be entertaining. But, as I enjoy playing against *human* opponents more than the AI (which is almost always easily defeatable), I'd prefer a game where "Make it so" is not the model for Axis production or combat abilities. I also agree in the general sense with everything that Jeremy just said about the difference between "Empire" games and sims. I do not agree with Jeremy when he says "No matter how bad things got in the Pacific, the vessels in the Atlantic would have stayed there, as they were vital to the survival of the effort in Europe." IMO, had the threat to India been a real one, Torch would have been substantially delayed so that the US could really put the screws to Japan, thereby forcing them to withdraw from the Indian campaign.

" The submarine comment wasn´t for the game but for the real war,"

I understood you to be talking about the real war. I was extrapolating how the "real war" would have proceeded if the IJN had a submarine strategic warfare doctrine. I suggested that there would be significant trade-offs, because the IJN was, more so than other navies, highly designed-for-doctrinee. It had to be. Japan's armed forces and procurement system could not afford to screw around with things like unguided missiles, heavy armor, heavy mobile artillery, strategic bombers. For example, the IJN spent way too much money developing a weapon system, the 18" gun, that was demonstrably inferior (after its performance tests were compared post WW2) to the USN 16" gun long-range shell, with respect to range, accuracy and penetration. But, the qualitative superiority through bigger guns was an entrenched doctrine, and its pursuit undoubtedly sacrificed other alternative doctrines and weapon systems. Don't take my word for it, consult almost any text. At the moment I'm reading "The Barrier and the Javelin" where it comes up, again, by yet another highly regarded historian (H.P. Wilmott).

Likewise, your comment about IJN surface raiders was intriguing. My point, in a nutshell, is that there's no place that Japan could safely use them. And what would your targets be? Unless your alternate history envisions a United States with no integrated interior railroad network, or substantially lacking in natural resources (and hence, dependent on bulk-cargo imports, as was the UK), then against what would you engage in strategic warfare? There has to be at least some basis for your premise for it to become an engaging "what if" scenario.

"Your opinion about american planes in ww2 are different to mine..." [and] "so couldn´t you accept a different opinoion and allow both of us to have fun ?"

Not all opinions are created equal. Mine is substantiated by numbers pertaining to actual combat losses, actual production and maintenance problems, and actual documented aircraft handling characteristics. Do I want to pay for a game that subscribes to your set of desires? No. At the very least, these things have development costs. It is far more important to me to have the effort invested in getting the historical model correct than in creating some really strange suite of production or doctrinal counterfactuals.

Hi mdiehl,

maybe i misuderstood your comments, so let stop the shooting

Now to the basics...
1.) the fighter comparisation:
You know, you see the early us fighters equal to the japanese, also the crews. I see it different, so we could endless debate this without a result.
2.) japanese surface raiders
Sorry, i never wrote something about the idea of japanese surface raiders (or i get old quicker as i thought). With the raiders, i agree, no japanese raider could be succsessful very long in the pacific, because you have only "good" (japanese) or "evil" (allied) ships here, and this means no good effort for the raider. In the indian ocean, maybe they could be survive longer, but the japanese hadn´t the resources, crews or ships to create a succsessfull raider a la kormoran. If we had some (one or two) german raiders in the indian ocean, this would be nice, but it is no must be in
3.) japanese production in the game:
a.) your opinion what i want: I want the possibility to produce 20 yamatos, 50 shinanos and 250 aganos, along with 2.000.000 planes and 200.000 troop ships
b.) my wishes: Calculate the real production capacities, build in some multiplicators (to expand industries) and then let me (as the gamer) decide what i want to produce. The known planes can be produced, if you concentrate this production (like everyone who know only 1% of the real war) on some planes, fine, if not, it has it benefits, too (like producing the ki44 makes it easier to get the frank or such a routine), if you start a "huge" carrier building program, you also must start to "produce" a lot more pilots, so it is quite difficulty, this sounds difficulty, but to balance the production and the combat values, you need a lot of tests, so it should be "easy" to build in this, too. The idea of BTR was, in my eyes, great, but not deep enough. Not only engines, frames, but also radio, radar (if you want it) and gears, guns... okay, i studied economics... so maybe i´m so interested in such things, who know.... but if i only can play a game with little to none possibility to change production to my best opinion, i´m out. Why ? because in a huge campaign game, i want to use my strategies, otherwise, make a game with only the us-side to choose... for the player who plays the japanese side, it is deadly boring. You have only little resources, so you must do what you can. But the japanese has no chance to do it better (or the ai sucks) as historical, so why should i play it ? Or, i am playing the japanese (the us side comes later) and have huge succsess, sinking nearly the whole fleet of the usa, and i plan for the counterstrike. I want to conquer india (i think, it could have been possible, because the brits were really hated by the indians - well after the japanese are in india, they had changed their opinion quickly..), but i need more planes for this combat, but i have useless planes for sea-war, but the usa can send in some ships in august 1944, but now, in september 1942, i want to plan my 1943-war..... also, you (lets say you are my opponent who made these mistakes) know exactly what i have and what i can do against some actions of you in 1944 or maybe earlier.... why should i plan ? But if you think, i produce this, but i produce something different, it is more interesting. Sure, some fantasy is in this way, but if you want only historical correctness, then you never ever should play a campaign, only some 1-2 days long scenarios...
Now the allied side: if i have more succsess, i don´t need more carriers (if i don´t loose one, but the japanese has lost all), 1/2 of the carriers for some heavies would be fine for me (esp. if i had conquered raboul and truk and most of guinea...) but with the production limitations, i have "worthless" carriers but not enough heavies to support the landings.... and if i have lesser losses in some planes, why do i need 2500 more p40 (in my eyes, you know, they were s-h-i-t) if i can have a better plane 6 months earlier (or, if you don´t want the r&d-possibility) 400 p38 more (or whatever excange-rate you want...)
I think, we have total different wishes, so the best is, we stop it, because it is useless, and you don´t want to play "my" game and i don´t want to play "your" game... so you hope your ideas will realized and i hope your plan will be ignored, so i can play the game i want it.... i don´t want this, but i see your playing totaly boring and you see it viceversa (or you dislike these games) My idea is (if it is possible) that the game can both. So you can play the game your way (play with fix production) and i can play it with the modification mode on... here i can´t understood you, you want to forbid the cance for me (and if i read the posts here correctly) and many others to have fun with the game. This, you should explain to me, if you are so kindly to answer (or maybe i misunderstood you completly, that could be true, because i translate everything from german to english and your post from english in german, so it can be possible that i lose some informations from you)

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by mdiehl
"Going to the India thread, I really don't think that the United States was capable of the offensive actions of 1944-45 in 1942. They would have been able to have captured the forward bases in the Marshal Islands, but they would not have been able to have quickly moved into the Japanese Controlled Central Pacific with knowledge that 6+ IJN Carriers were 'somewhere'. This type of thinking is what caused the Midway disaster for the Japanese, the search for the decisive naval battle. The Japanese thought that they could secure Midway before the US got there, and with that base and their carriers they would easily smash any opponent."

If you are correct in assuming that Kido Butai would not be needed for an invasion of India, you'd be right about the threat to a USN TF in a PTO amphibious operation in early 1942. I just don't agree that you can invade India without all of the available Japanese CVs. If they're operating in India, they're going to be there a while, and that frees up the USN for alot of mischief... from Doolittle-style raids in force, to the conquest of the CenPac with the use of raider battalions. In March/April 1942, the USN would not have needed nearly teh tonnage in transports to support the scale of amphib assaults of 1944-45, because IJN ground defenses were very weak in 1942. You could bypass the Marshalls, and be grateful every time an IJN raid sortied to, say, Saipan, to be decimated by any P40 squadron stationed there.

"I also don't believe that the Atlantic COULD have lost any more ships then it did. Malta was still being contested in 1942, and without the ferrying operations the control of the Medeterranean could have been delayed. The Wasp was needed in the Atlantic, and had the USN been wiped out (a very small chance, as the last time an entire fleet was destroyed in one engagement was 1905), one smaller carrier would not survive very long, nor would it accomplish anything."

I can't see anything to wipe out the US fleet. If teh 6 fleet carriers are off India, along with heavy cruiser and BB support, and the overwhelming preponderance of the logistical traind evoted to India, what's left to attack the USN? Answer: no tmuch.

"The US Atlantic fleet was already at a bare minimum. It was not a matter of postponing offensive operations had ships been detached, but of losing initiative. Once war with Japan began the Royal Navy had to detach many of its warships (previously on convoy duty) to the Far East. This had to be made up by USN vessels or else the convoys to Russia would have to be stopped and the Germans might decide to bring the Tirpitz on a sortee into the Atlantic."

There was no almost no chance of a Tirpitz sortie in 1942. She was not even ready for trials. The only major threat that the USN had to deal with in the Atlanmtic in 1942 (indeed, *could* deal with, and inadequately at that) were teh Uboats. You do not need USN CVs, BBs or CAs for that job. And there were many Royal Navy heavy fleet elements that were not sent eastward when Japan jumped into action.

"While you should not overestimate the strength of the Japanese and Germans (which is your crusade), you should not underestimate them. What they were able to take in months it took years to take back from them."

Quite so. Then again, there was no particular urgency to "hurry up" against Japan. Had they assaulted India in force, it is quite likely that the Allies would have pursued ahistorical strategies as well.

"Frankly, it was amazing that these two nations were able to do so much damage to the world, to take a large slice of territory so quickly, and give it up with so much of a fight."

It's not *that* amazing. Both nations seem to have timed their military mobilizations pretty well (unlike Italy, which would have been a force in 1935, and was a joke in 1940). The Germans were aided substantially by a series of French blunders, and then, subsequently, a kind of willful ignorance on Stalin's part (Gee, why are all those Panzer Divisions massing along my border? Hitler lied to everyone else but he would not lie to *me.*") The Japanese conquests occurred in largely demilitarized zones (Indonesia and Hong Kong). They only faced serious opposition in the PI (where US isolation favored the siege that occurred, after the direct approach was attempted by the Japanese army and ground to a halt). That leaves the Malay peninsular campaign, brilliantly conducted (but again with overwhelming air superiority in numbers, and a few key British blunders that made Japanese advances easier than they ought to have been).

In short, the Japanese siezed the day and the Allies cooperated to a great degree. The Allies could have done a whole lot better from the get go.

"I really do not understand how come it took the Japanese 3 years to be defeated if the United States was just so superior to them."

Because the US effort was directed primarily at Germany. Through 1942, although the New Guinea, Solomons and Midway campaigns devastated the IJN and the Japanese army divisions thee, and the naval air flotillas, the US effort was (in terms of its relative ability to deploy power), a backhand slap. The real s**t did not hit the Japanese fan nutil 1944, and the Japanese had no very effective form of resistence.

"I don't believe that theirs were so inferior."

It wasn't. It was peculiarly adequate to the tasks at hand through April 1942. After that it became progressively less adequate. Both in terms of technology, and also in terms of the jobs required of it.

Hm, only one comment, the tirpitz WAS ready in 1942, because she saw action in this time, like the trip against pq17 (well they were called back, but hitler with his paranoia to loose such a ship never had allowed this ship to set sail if it wasn´t ready. If the tirpitz was something, then ready... maybe you made a mistake with the year 1941......

for the rest, like i wrote one post eralier, we have a 100 % different opinion about ww2 (and maybe many other things) so you belive you are right, and i belive, i know more than you (at the eto for sure), but can be wrong anyway. But it is useless..Maybe about some greek invasion troops in persia or the romans we will find a theatre of war we can agree, here, we can´t.

[mdiehl]

"(i think, it could have been possible, because the brits were really hated by the indians - well after the japanese are in india, they had changed their opinion quickly..)"

What you think is becoming less relevant to me with every post.

The idea of a pan-Indian uprising in support of the Japanese is pure fantasy. A more careful and considered examination of Indian social and economic structure in 1942 would show that the vast majority of Indians could not give a hoot about the British or the Japanese. The military castes, who are the most important ones vis a vis control, were for the most part staunchly pro-British. The Brahmin castes were somewhat divided on the issue, being (1) the benefittors of British control in the basic colonial/imperialist regime of economic extraction, and (2) educated, and therefore acutely aware of the pervasive sneer inherent in all things having to do with the British classist system. Few of the Brahmins harbored an interest in Japanese occupation, which they correctly assumed would lead to the replacement of an incredibly condescending and exploitive and intermittently brutal regime, with a systematically brutal, genocidal, condescending and racist regime. Everyone in India knew what was forthcoming from the well-known tribulations suffered by the Chinese in 1937-1941. It was a serious point of contention among the Brahmin castes. Gandhi's opinion (and he was by far the most inluential of the anti-British cohort) was that neutrality was advisable. Most Brahmins were siding with the Brits, because (with the outbreak of the Paicifc War), the UK admin suddenly had much greater cause to cater to their demands.

The other comments about the Indian campaign that I made stand as points of military consideration that Japan would have to solve. Whether you like 'em or not does not concern me. Whether an "invade India" option *demands* that the Japanese player come up with believable solutions to these problems does concern me.

I no longer care about your opinioin of the P40 or the F4F and I'm not interested in detailing, again, the overwhelming evidence against you. You've got no basis in casualty figures or performance stats to support your opinion. You're just wrong. That's what I meant when I suggested that all opionions are not equal. When you can articulate a basis for evaluating whether or not a particalur plane-pilot combination was (a) inferior to, (b) as good as, or (c) better than some opponent's plane pilot combination, let me know. At least there will be some basis for evaluating your claims.

You're right, Tirpitz was available in Jaunary 1942. Other than causing the UK a general sense of anxiety, she seems not to have accomplished very much in her career. Despite Tirpitz, the UK battle plan envisioned sending 8 old BBs and 3 fleet CVs to Eastern Fleet by mid 1942. That would still have left them with several fast BBs to smack down Tirpitz, and that would have been enough to do the job *with ease.* In the end, the deployments to Eastern Fleet were retarded by the Med and North African campaigns. I've simply posited that the threat to India would have been sufficient to force the Allies to delay Torch.

Of course, another way to deal with Tirpitz would have been to borrow the North Carolina for a few hours, and pound Tirpitz to scrap. The contest would have been quite one-sided.