Japanese ASW

[Sredni]

ORIGINAL: oldman45

On a side note, I have started running two subs in a TF along patrol routes I set and have had pretty good results. Both boats sometimes attack so it can lead to multiple attacks on a convoy.

I was thinking of doing this simply to reduce the time needed to manage subs.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn




i'm looking at an impressive list of sunk ships. Please show me how it demonstrates that merchant conyoys were escorted

By the ship type? By themn being escorts? By them being designed to combat submarines?

Or, you could read patrol reports. I have. If you want to know, go to the source material.

non sequitor the presence of sunk ships that could have been used as escorts doesn't demostrate that they were used as escorts, they had multiple roles. I am also not arguing that the Japanese never escorted convoys, i believe that military ones did get escorted.

This discussion is basically about the inability of the allies to reproduce the historic mauling of the Japanese merchant fleet. There are a number of possibilities as to why this happens, the modelling of the Japanese ASW weapon systems is one. I think that far more important is the use of convoys by Japanese players and the effective use of ASW assets (air and sea). Also other player actions such as convoy routing. I know by adjusting convoy routes i dramatically reduce sub attacks.

In the first year of the pbem game i am in i did have poor merchant routing and convoys. Very large number of attacks, several a day, i wa only really saved by the allied duds. I learned and now i aggresively search for and prosecute allied subs with air and naval units. Seems to work. Japanese didn't seem to do that IRL. Ive not reached '44 yet but mid '43 and allied subs are not a huge problem. Don't think ive got the "killer" E's yet either.

Well, you are right in this respect. As I said before. I could pull my subs today and it would only have a neglible effect on my campaign game. Losses to Japanese escorts aside, if the Japanese player trains up his escorts and air in ASW, and runs large well escorted convoys his losses will not be severe anyways. My subs will not get many chances and when they do run up on a convoy, they will usually just target the escort and miss. So there is the issue of the super deadly E type patrol ships, and a totally separate issue with targeting and other Japanese ASW efforts.

Anyhow, whatever the reasons, Allied subs are pretty much only a minor nuisance to Japan in 1944 and 45. This really has to change in my opinion.

[PresterJohn001]

Bullwinkle,

I don't think that my position being that Japan contributed to the demise of its own Merchant marine by poor planning and operations especially through lack of properly planned and escorted convoys is controversial. It may help if you state your view on the Japanese convoy system or lack therof. Including Island supply.

Thanks for the links, fascinating read...

[PresterJohn001]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

Well, you are right in this respect. As I said before. I could pull my subs today and it would only have a neglible effect on my campaign game. Losses to Japanese escorts aside, if the Japanese player trains up his escorts and air in ASW, and runs large well escorted convoys his losses will not be severe anyways. My subs will not get many chances and when they do run up on a convoy, they will usually just target the escort and miss. So there is the issue of the super deadly E type patrol ships, and a totally separate issue with targeting and other Japanese ASW efforts.

Anyhow, whatever the reasons, Allied subs are pretty much only a minor nuisance to Japan in 1944 and 45. This really has to change in my opinion.

I do agree. It is totally out of whack with what happened. but if the reason it is out is because of better use of assets by Japanese payers then it really is not so different from the formation of massive 4e bomber wings early in the war by allied players or 4e bomber anti fighter sweeps. To some extent both can also be countered by House Rules and/or an understanding with your opponent. edit add: (and for the record i'm not really that bothered by them, i play the game as is with agreed rules and its a complete blast)

Foresight plays a big role as well, a number one prioritory for Japanese players is not to get their merchant fleet sunk, right up there with don't lose your carriers and train your pilots. When you let players have as much control as they do in witpae they will use that control to stop bad war losing things happening. In some ways a degree of abstraction can help (eg a merchant transport "pool" which ships all goods and a strategic submarine pool that attacks it and causes losses based on number of subs/number merchants/year) but that approach seems totally outwith the design philosophy of witp ae.

Its interesting that more detail doesn't neccesarily lead to more a more historic game

[inqistor]

Does anyone actually made research about WHERE most of those Japan merchants were sunk? Was it around Japan, during transporting goods from DEI, invasions, or during supply operations of various remote islands?

[Chris21wen]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Chris H

I've just lost two more to the dreaded Etorofu, that makes 10 since Nov 43 (it's now Feb 13). Analysing the losses by date it ties in with the Etorofu getting radar. I did lose two to an ealier versions and had umpteen damaged but it does appear that the added radar makes the difference.

Reading some of these comments it appears its not the DC itself but the ability to find the sub that matters. This being the case then adjusting the Jap radar might fix the problem.

By the way is it possible to data mid game?

Regardless of your ten, I would disgree that radar makes the difference. IJN escorts have found my subs and attacked from the first day of the war. A DC attack does not use radar, it uses sonar. Radar is used only for initial localization, and only that on a night surface attack. E-class escorts getting radar in an upgrade cycle is not the determining factor in their effectivness, it's weapon device counts and layouts. JWE's points about how the algorithms call and use the platform data, which I re-posted yesterday, are the determining factor IMO.

The devs have said over and over that there will not be significant code changes at all in the game. Changing detection and sensor routines are major code changes. What can be done must be done in data. JWE's comments regarding altering the Range (but not the Accuracy) variable in the DC devices to me offers a very good way to proceed.

A strange coincidence then? The only difference between the Etorofu before Nov 43 and after is the addition of the radar.

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn

If Japanese players ran their merchant fleet like the Japanese did IRL would near historical results be achieved?

I don't think it's anything to do with tactics, unless IRL the super-E never left port. It looks like the super-E is like Ivan Drago - "Whatever it hits, it destroys".

but if the reason it is out is because of better use of assets by Japanese payers

What do you think the E's were doing IRL which is so different?

The Allied navy just seems to be f***ing useless to me - an Allied ship is probably worth half a Japanese ship, in my experience - it's a bit sad to see that submarines are going to be just as useless as the rest of it. [8|] Especially when it's in total defiance of history.

[EUBanana]

Out of curiosity I hit up Wikipedia, as you do ([:'(]) to find out what the super Es were up to IRL. There's a pretty good list of a subset of them here and you can read their fates.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukuru_class_escort_ship

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No.1_class_escort_ship

A skim through that reveals a lot of "Sunk by submarine" (which is not going to happen in AE it seems, and implies that IRL they were being used in the same way they are used in game, ie sailing around lokoing for submarines) and a lot more "Sunk by mine" (which the Allies in AE barely have any of).


And if you look the successes they made - and this is all late war, 1944 onwards, when the Japanese were taking ASW seriously - they didn't even manage a 1:1 kill ratio versus Allied submarines. Something is seriously, seriously out of whack here, and the Allied submarine campaign was one of the most important naval contests in the Pacific. So something is seriously out of whack with something extremely important to the theatre.

It is, in my mind, akin to Long Lance torpedoes simply not working. Pretty damn important!

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn

Bullwinkle,

I don't think that my position being that Japan contributed to the demise of its own Merchant marine by poor planning and operations especially through lack of properly planned and escorted convoys is controversial. It may help if you state your view on the Japanese convoy system or lack therof. Including Island supply.

Thanks for the links, fascinating read...

I've been in several of these threads over AE's life, and I find that often the difference comes down to definitions, especially of "convoy." Many of the opponents to my views tend to have an ETO-centric view of what a convoy must consist of in order to merit the definition. IOW, very large gaggles of merchants escorted by coordinated numbers of ASW-equipped escorts, mostly moving from large sources of logistics to either consumers of those products or industrial centers for further processing.

That description does not fit well with the PTO. The Japanese did not have a few (NYC, Halifax, Hampton Roads, etc.) shipping points, and only a few (Portsmouth, Murmansk, etc.) destinations. They also had both production-oriented shipping (SRA to HI for example) and a myriad of forward bases needing end product re-supply, a feature not present in the land-oriented ETO. As such, their shipping was more dispersed, in smaller formations, and covered a much greater body of water, making naval operations systematically different on both offense and defense. In that theater, a formation of 3-5 merchants and 2-3 escorts of varying quality constituted a "convoy." The flip-side of that was not an 80-ship, Atlantic-type monster, but 1-2 merchants traveling without escort. When commentators speak of "no convoys" here it is important to define whether they mean "no escorts", in which case Allied submarine ops should have been as easy as falling off a log, or that they mean "no ETO-style mega-formations" which pretty much didn't exist, or need to exist, in the PTO.

I do not and have never claimed that there were not lone-ship merchant movements in the PTO. Clearly there were. USS Pollack's 1st patrol report at yesterday's link showed this to be the case, at least early and at least deep in home waters. But I do claim that most merchant ships moving during the war years in the PTO had SOME level of escort. I also acknowledge, without having deep factual support, that this level of escorting probably varied by location. A convoy moving from Saigon to the HI in mid-1942 did not rate the escorts that a re-supply convoy bound for the Marshalls would rate. There were fewer patrols into the resource areas in the early months of the war than later when forward basing and advanced submarine support was achieved. But I would be very surprised if it were the case that MOST resource center movements of oil and ore and other raw material moved with no escorts, even early.

My reading over the years of scores of patrol reports tells me that, except for the first months' patrols, most approaches and attacks by USN subs encountered some kind of escorts. How efective they were is another story, but even a badly managed escort could get lucky and kill you. At minimum they could disrupt the attack and allow the merchants to take evasive actions. The JAANAC summaries point to a large numebr of escort-type combatants sunk by subs. Most, from patrol reports, were sunk in the course of attacks on convoys, not in single-ship actions against independent ASW operations. Some were, but the majority were not.

I appreciate you taking the time to read the links. Similar reports aren't readily available for large, surface fleet actions. The nature of submarines' size and independent operation makes their reports, to me, much more personal and real. The CO fought his ship very directly, through fewer levels of command, and also wrote the report himself, usually on the transit home. As such, they contain a fascinating account not ony of the dry facts, but what he was thinking or balancing in his mind during the battle.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Chris H

A strange coincidence then? The only difference between the Etorofu before Nov 43 and after is the addition of the radar.

True, but the difference in weapons and ammo between 3/43 and 8/43 are massive. Maybe you got lucky and didn't run into any between July and November?

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn

ORIGINAL: crsutton

Well, you are right in this respect. As I said before. I could pull my subs today and it would only have a neglible effect on my campaign game. Losses to Japanese escorts aside, if the Japanese player trains up his escorts and air in ASW, and runs large well escorted convoys his losses will not be severe anyways. My subs will not get many chances and when they do run up on a convoy, they will usually just target the escort and miss. So there is the issue of the super deadly E type patrol ships, and a totally separate issue with targeting and other Japanese ASW efforts.

Anyhow, whatever the reasons, Allied subs are pretty much only a minor nuisance to Japan in 1944 and 45. This really has to change in my opinion.

I do agree. It is totally out of whack with what happened. but if the reason it is out is because of better use of assets by Japanese payers then it really is not so different from the formation of massive 4e bomber wings early in the war by allied players or 4e bomber anti fighter sweeps. To some extent both can also be countered by House Rules and/or an understanding with your opponent. edit add: (and for the record i'm not really that bothered by them, i play the game as is with agreed rules and its a complete blast)

Foresight plays a big role as well, a number one prioritory for Japanese players is not to get their merchant fleet sunk, right up there with don't lose your carriers and train your pilots. When you let players have as much control as they do in witpae they will use that control to stop bad war losing things happening. In some ways a degree of abstraction can help (eg a merchant transport "pool" which ships all goods and a strategic submarine pool that attacks it and causes losses based on number of subs/number merchants/year) but that approach seems totally outwith the design philosophy of witp ae.

Its interesting that more detail doesn't neccesarily lead to more a more historic game

Well, two issues here as I see it. Better tactics and planning should allow the Japanese player to moderately affect the outcome of the sub war.

However, the other issue is that Japan was saddled with poor technology in both of their aircraft and ships which greatly hindered AWS ability beyond a certain point. Japanese escorts were equipped with poor to non exsistant radar in both their escorts and aircraft-not to mention a basic lack of technical expertise due to limitations in their seconday and university schools. Japanese radar was so bad that American subs unlike subs in any theater still carried out night time surface attack until the end of the war. The super E type escort and the abilty of non-radar equipped air in the game are not a reflection of better training and tactics but in fact a reflection of technology that never actually exsisted.

Allies subs had excellent air search and surface radar. The advantages that this gave the Allied sub fleet over Japanese ASW forces that were poorly equipped to counter it is the major reason Japan took such a beating. This technological gap between the two forces did not decrease as time went by but increased.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

And if you look the successes they made - and this is all late war, 1944 onwards, when the Japanese were taking ASW seriously - they didn't even manage a 1:1 kill ratio versus Allied submarines. Something is seriously, seriously out of whack here, and the Allied submarine campaign was one of the most important naval contests in the Pacific. So something is seriously out of whack with something extremely important to the theatre.

JWE has outlined what's out of whack. Look in the editor at the Etorufu upgrades between March 1943 and November 1943. The device upgrades, while maybe historic, play into the exec code's lack of subtlety in such areas a sensor performance, crew training and coordination, material upkeep, etc. What's left is calling the attack routines as long as weapon devices are left unfired, and the sub gets greased.

There are ways to tone this down in the editor, but no way to do so without a restart. I'm going to try on my next start to do this, but for now I think it's just a case of play on, adjust as best I can with other assets, and see how it goes.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

Well, two issues here as I see it. Better tactics and planning should allow the Japanese player to moderately affect the outcome of the sub war.

Absolutely!

However, the other issue is that Japan was saddled with poor technology in both of their aircraft and ships which greatly hindered AWS ability beyond a certain point. Japanese escorts were equipped with poor to non exsistant radar in both their escorts and aircraft-not to mention a basic lack of technical expertise due to limitations in their seconday and university schools. Japanese radar was so bad that American subs unlike subs in any theater still carried out night time surface attack until the end of the war. The super E type escort and the abilty of non-radar equipped air in the game are not a reflection of better training and tactics but in fact a reflection of technology that never actually exsisted.

Allies subs had excellent air search and surface radar. The advantages that this gave the Allied sub fleet over Japanese ASW forces that were poorly equipped to counter it is the major reason Japan took such a beating. This technological gap between the two forces did not decrease as time went by but increased.

This is spot on - the player should be able to change whatever tactics and strategy they want. The only limit should be the limit that the technology (or the technology/doctrine combination) imposes (in that I include your comments about the education level of the troops).

I think that air ASW is thrown out of whack by the air skill model. I posted that else where a few times nad won't repeat it here. See this thread, post #3, if you want to.

As far as surface ASW, I'm sure JWE has the cause in his sights.

[PresterJohn001]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana


What do you think the E's were doing IRL which is so different?

Dedicated ASW units backed by Airbourne (army supplied at that) Naval Search and ASW Flights is what i have. Pretty sure thats a level of sophistication that the Japanese didn't have especially mid '43. That drives off the allied subs. Large escorted convoys for resource and supply movement reduces attack opportunities. Ive not got the "Super" E's yet and don't think that my naval anti sub assets do much to allied subs. I'd swap an escort for a squadron of Thunderbolts anyday[:D]

I think its pretty evident that the historic sub war doesn't happen. I also think that it is because of the level of control that players have in witpae. I mean i can reroute a convoy around spotted subs daily, every convoy if i can really be bothered.

[bradfordkay]

"I mean i can reroute a convoy around spotted subs daily, every convoy if i can really be bothered."

Aye... but with patrol zones the subs are moving as well so that turns out to be a wash. There's always a chance that you might move the convoy into the subs path.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
There are ways to tone this down in the editor, but no way to do so without a restart. I'm going to try on my next start to do this, but for now I think it's just a case of play on, adjust as best I can with other assets, and see how it goes.

Would it be helpful if either I or John 3rd posted the ASW changelog in the ScenDev forum?

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn
Dedicated ASW units backed by Airbourne (army supplied at that) Naval Search and ASW Flights is what i have. Pretty sure thats a level of sophistication that the Japanese didn't have especially mid '43. That drives off the allied subs.

I would expect better results from actually attending to ASW, seems like IRL the Japanese pretty much ignored submarines.

However, I think that is a different kettle of fish from a super-E destroying any sub whose hex it wanders in to. I wsould kinda expect a super-E to act like a super-E IRL - ie moderately effective but no more than that. And if you want /more/, have more aggressive patrols, ASW aircraft /as well/, etcetera. It seems though that even if you had a few hunter-killer TFs of super-Es, which is entirely historical, the Es would practically effortlessly wipe the floor with the USN, which is total fantasy I think.

I don't think player intervention can really do much in this regard. It is a tactical, not a strategic, issue. All you can do as a player is get an E into the same hex as an Allied submarine as often as possible. That is the sole influence on the super-E versus Gato that a player can have on the matter.

Judging by the IRL number of sinkings, it looks like IRL if a super-E shared a hex with an Allied submarine, on average it would be the E being sunk, not the sub. Even if you nudge this kill ratio up a bit, allowing for more ASW aircraft than reality, it in no way should come near to the results observed.

I don't think if a SAG meets another SAG of roughly equal strength and blows it away that the player can pat himself on the back and say that happened because of his strategic mastery. That's just the roll of the dice. When Jap cruisers annihilate Allied cruisers thats just due to the stats. It's not about player tactics at this point. Player tactics merely lets the cruisers get in gun range in the first place. In just the same way, when the E is dropping depth charges the outcome of that has nothing to do with the player and the strategy employed. The only thing the player can do is ensure that subs meet more Es than AKs.

And we're talking about, or I'm talking about, what happens when E meets SS. This seems to be completely player neutral, IMHO.

I'd swap an escort for a squadron of Thunderbolts anyday[:D]

While the t-bolts do certainly kick a lot of ass, I don't think thats really relevant for the submarine war. I don't deny the Allies have toys which do work, but given the first wargame I ever bought was Silent Service, I have a soft spot for subs. [;)]

I'd like the t-bolts to behave like t-bolts did, and subs to behave like subs did, and the Es too.

I think its pretty evident that the historic sub war doesn't happen. I also think that it is because of the level of control that players have in witpae. I mean i can reroute a convoy around spotted subs daily, every convoy if i can really be bothered.

There are enough Allied submarines to completely surround the Home Islands, I think...

[PresterJohn001]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn
Dedicated ASW units backed by Airbourne (army supplied at that) Naval Search and ASW Flights is what i have. Pretty sure thats a level of sophistication that the Japanese didn't have especially mid '43. That drives off the allied subs.

I would expect better results from actually attending to ASW, seems like IRL the Japanese pretty much ignored submarines.

However, I think that is a different kettle of fish from a super-E destroying any sub whose hex it wanders in to. I wsould kinda expect a super-E to act like a super-E IRL - ie moderately effective but no more than that. And if you want /more/, have more aggressive patrols, ASW aircraft /as well/, etcetera. It seems though that even if you had a few hunter-killer TFs of super-Es, which is entirely historical, the Es would practically effortlessly wipe the floor with the USN, which is total fantasy I think.

I don't think player intervention can really do much in this regard. It is a tactical, not a strategic, issue. All you can do as a player is get an E into the same hex as an Allied submarine as often as possible. That is the sole influence on the super-E versus Gato that a player can have on the matter.

Judging by the IRL number of sinkings, it looks like IRL if a super-E shared a hex with an Allied submarine, on average it would be the E being sunk, not the sub. Even if you nudge this kill ratio up a bit, allowing for more ASW aircraft than reality, it in no way should come near to the results observed.

I don't think if a SAG meets another SAG of roughly equal strength and blows it away that the player can pat himself on the back and say that happened because of his strategic mastery. That's just the roll of the dice. When Jap cruisers annihilate Allied cruisers thats just due to the stats. It's not about player tactics at this point. Player tactics merely lets the cruisers get in gun range in the first place. In just the same way, when the E is dropping depth charges the outcome of that has nothing to do with the player and the strategy employed. The only thing the player can do is ensure that subs meet more Es than AKs.

And we're talking about, or I'm talking about, what happens when E meets SS. This seems to be completely player neutral, IMHO.

I'd swap an escort for a squadron of Thunderbolts anyday[:D]

While the t-bolts do certainly kick a lot of ass, I don't think thats really relevant for the submarine war. I don't deny the Allies have toys which do work, but given the first wargame I ever bought was Silent Service, I have a soft spot for subs. [;)]

I'd like the t-bolts to behave like t-bolts did, and subs to behave like subs did, and the Es too.

I think its pretty evident that the historic sub war doesn't happen. I also think that it is because of the level of control that players have in witpae. I mean i can reroute a convoy around spotted subs daily, every convoy if i can really be bothered.

There are enough Allied submarines to completely surround the Home Islands, I think...

yeah but from what ive seen so far as the Japanese player - the presence of air units as spotters and asw units makes the biggest diference. If they are there the sub attacks are reduced and attacks on subs are increased (both by air and naval assets). Means ive got less units bombing the chinese (or whoever) but thats my choice. I'm pretty sure the presence of anti sub air units was important in the Atlantic Campaign. I don't see why if the Japanese had dedicated sufficient air assets to protecting its convoys the course of war would have been changed. Any source material on this area ?

allied naval asw seems pretty effective mid '43. most attacks damage or sink Japanese subs.

Again, i say its is a result of tactical level interactiveness in a strategic level game

[witpqs]

The only objection I have is when those assets perform better than they were technically capable of performing, which gets down primarily to attacks hitting and/or sinking subs. IMO the IJ player should be able to put 100% of his aircraft on ASW if he so desires. I fully expect my IJ opponents to do better than history in the merchant marine vs sub department.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: PresterJohn

ORIGINAL: EUBanana


What do you think the E's were doing IRL which is so different?

I think its pretty evident that the historic sub war doesn't happen. I also think that it is because of the level of control that players have in witpae. I mean i can reroute a convoy around spotted subs daily, every convoy if i can really be bothered.

No, I can't argue with rerouting convoys as that is only wise. However, "spotted subs" is an issue as the Japanese were severely handicapped in all respects there. In areas of heavy Japanese air patrols, Allies subs simply waited under the surface during the day and then surfaced to feed on Japanese shipping at night when limitations on Japanese air search (and lack of radar) made them relatively blind. It was the real benefit of 21 centimeter radar in that it gave American subs eyes at night- something that German and Japanse subs lacked. Combine that with the excellent flow of information on convoy routing directed to American subs by Sigint and Ultra that made even rerouting questionable at times..

I would say in game the frequency of spotting and detection levels on spotted Allied subs is way too high. Simply put, if it worked the way it should, you would not be seeing very many of the Allied submarines. As it is now, if they are anywhere where they should be, you can pretty much see them all the time.