OT: Blame for the Battle of Gettysburg

[Cribtop]

As are you for starting many interesting and "community oriented" threads of late, CR. [&o]

[mdiehl]

or pound them relentlessly without much regard for casualties (Grant).

Catton and a couple of others have shown that was not Grant's strategy at all. His casualty rate per engagement was in most cases lower than the casualties that US and rebel armies suffered under the command of other general officers. About 2:1 overall which was, considering the time period, very good.

Grant's strategy was rather more one of remaining constantly engaged. So there were fewer "one big battle" events and more a constant stream of casualties. It robbed the Army of Northern Virginia of the only thing its commanders could use to good effect -- strategic initiative. Once Lee was pinned down by the Army of the Potomoc, the rest of the US armies were free to run wild.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

FDR had his Brain Trust.  I'm thinkin' AE Forumites are collectively knowledgeable about nearly anything to do with history (plus, undoubtedly, lots of other stuff to boot, though I'm not sure Chickenboy's knowledge of every exotic vacation locale in the world counts....).  In recent months you guys have helped me identify photos taken at various locations in England during World War II and helped me get my mind wrapped around Early's performance at Gettysburg.  This was not an advertised benefit of purchasing AE, but I appreciate it nonetheless.  A tip of the cap to the Forum.  You guys are great. 

Never trust a Chicken......Boy. [:D]

[Chickenboy]

All this expression of Southerly love is making me uncomfortable...

Just for those comments, Canoerebel, I'm not bringing you back any kumis the next time I go to Kazakhstan! [:'(]

ETA: I am going to San Diego this summer for a convention. We're having a party on the deck of the Midway at harbor there. No pictures for you! [:'(]

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse
But J.E.B. did leave Imboden's brigade of cavalry behind.

. . . oh, wait. You said well led. [:)]

Darn, gotta hand it to the cavalry!! But then there was Jenkins that was actually supporting Ewell, and then there was Robertson and Grumble Jones. A really good book out about that, recently. Superlative reviews from people like Col. C.C. Kingsleed (USMA, West Point), G.C. Bradley (USAMHI, Carlisle); all of whom seem to wear (or used to wear) crossed sabres on their collars. Guys who wrote the book were over 12 years old, been in the field for years and have the respect of the community. Think you might just like it. I'll send you a pm. You might find some names in the dedication section that just might sound a bit familiar [;)]

Ciao. John

[Cribtop]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

or pound them relentlessly without much regard for casualties (Grant).

Catton and a couple of others have shown that was not Grant's strategy at all. His casualty rate per engagement was in most cases lower than the casualties that US and rebel armies suffered under the command of other general officers. About 2:1 overall which was, considering the time period, very good.

Grant's strategy was rather more one of remaining constantly engaged. So there were fewer "one big battle" events and more a constant stream of casualties. It robbed the Army of Northern Virginia of the only thing its commanders could use to good effect -- strategic initiative. Once Lee was pinned down by the Army of the Potomoc, the rest of the US armies were free to run wild.

I actually agree with this point, it was what I was trying to say, but I'm sure the "without regard to casualties" comment threw me into the ditch, so to speak.

My point was that before Grant the Army of the Potomac would lose a tactical engagement and withdraw to DC or Arlington to try again in a few months. Grant would attack (a change of its own as in the past the Union advanced and the ANV would attack them), suffer higher casualties, but not necessarily proportionally higher than previous engagements and not necessarily proportionally higher than the CSA forces engaged. Then, unlike prior Union commanders, Grant stood his ground and attacked again, knowing that the attritional numbers in repeated engagements were on his side. In other words, I agree that his logic was not that of the Iranian mass wave attacks of the 80s, but rather using the sort of Lanchester's Law approach that Nemo has discussed.

This was very different from Sherman's approach, operational offensive using maneuver to avoid direct assaults on the rebs.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

... But as to calling it a matter of blame... ultimately, Lee chose to make the fight on that ground against well prepared US forces on Day 2 and Day 3. I'd say that the blame lies with him. Day 3 was especially ill advised.

The late Shelby Foote said Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having a Robert E Lee.

It was as if Lee was desparately trying to win the war with this one battle.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

All this expression of Southerly love is making me uncomfortable...

Just for those comments, Canoerebel, I'm not bringing you back any kumis the next time I go to Kazakhstan! [:'(]

ETA: I am going to San Diego this summer for a convention. We're having a party on the deck of the Midway at harbor there. No pictures for you! [:'(]

To go OT on an OT: hey, Poultry lad, this convention you make reference to, is it AVMA? I was planning on going this year. We should meet up for drinks

[USSAmerica]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

All this expression of Southerly love is making me uncomfortable...

Just for those comments, Canoerebel, I'm not bringing you back any kumis the next time I go to Kazakhstan! [:'(]

ETA: I am going to San Diego this summer for a convention. We're having a party on the deck of the Midway at harbor there. No pictures for you! [:'(]

To go OT on an OT: hey, Poultry lad, this convention you make reference to, is it AVMA? I was planning on going this year. We should meet up for drinks

Wow, I had better steer my wife away from that conference! [:'(]

[geofflambert]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

The summer of 1863 was the point of decision for the Confederacy.  They had just prevailed at Chancellorsville in Virginia.  The Union Army was in a bit of disarray and was feeling some pressure.  But in the west, things were a mess for the Confederacy.  Grant was besieging Vicksburg and Rosecrans had taken Middle Tennessee and was threatening northern Alabama and eastern Tennessee.  This was a dire situation and called for prompt and decisive action.

Longstreet urged Lee to send him west with two divisions (those two divisions hadn't been engaged at Chancellorsville, so were fresh and ready to go).  Longstreet wanted to join Bragg near Tullahoma, Tennessee, have that combined force then joined by Johnson coming up from Jackson, Mississsippi, and then this large army would move into Kentucky and threaten Cincinatti.  Longstreet felt this was the best way to offer succor to Vicksburg.

Lee disagreed, in part because he hated to ship off an important part of his army.  Instead, Lee wanted to invade north.  He felt that doing so mgiht force the Union to draw Grant back from Vicksburg.  He was probably wrong.  Even had things gone badly for the Union in Pennsylvania, it's doubtful that the Union would have recalled a force as distant as Grant's, especially considering its position and closeness to victory.

So Lee was probably wrong, but he had to try to win the war somehow.  Taking the offensive in the wake of Chancellorsville made sense.  He surely knew it was a longshot, but it offered him something proactive and probably better than just remaining on the defensive and slowly getting bludgeoned to death (the course of action that Johnston adopted to some extent in Georgia the next year).

Lee was not a perfect man, but he is probably one of the truly great men that America has produced.  He merits the accolades he receives.

Perhaps. He did create the Port of St. Louis, bet many of you were unaware of that.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

or pound them relentlessly without much regard for casualties (Grant).

Catton and a couple of others have shown that was not Grant's strategy at all. His casualty rate per engagement was in most cases lower than the casualties that US and rebel armies suffered under the command of other general officers. About 2:1 overall which was, considering the time period, very good.

Grant's strategy was rather more one of remaining constantly engaged. So there were fewer "one big battle" events and more a constant stream of casualties. It robbed the Army of Northern Virginia of the only thing its commanders could use to good effect -- strategic initiative. Once Lee was pinned down by the Army of the Potomoc, the rest of the US armies were free to run wild.

Once again, I am a Southern boy at heart, but the best general of the conflict was Sam Grant. Many good generals won great battles during the conflict. However, Grant destroyed armies. I can't really think of any other general officer who did that. Not like Grant did.

"I can't spare this man--he fights." Lincoln

[ilovestrategy]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

You won't get too many southerners admitting this but the simple fact is that no Confederate general, and this most definitely includes Lee, had any idea how to win the war for the south.

I was born and raised in Louisiana and I have to agree with this.

[ilovestrategy]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

All this expression of Southerly love is making me uncomfortable...

Just for those comments, Canoerebel, I'm not bringing you back any kumis the next time I go to Kazakhstan! [:'(]

ETA: I am going to San Diego this summer for a convention. We're having a party on the deck of the Midway at harbor there. No pictures for you! [:'(]

I live in San Diego. I'd love to have lunch with you if you have the time.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Alfred
You won't get too many southerners admitting this but the simple fact is that no Confederate general, and this most definitely includes Lee, had any idea how to win the war for the south.

I do agree with ilovestrategy. I think almost all Southrons would admit that, pal (except the Texicans, of course [8D]). The parallels between the War of Northern Aggression and the Pacific War are many and varied, and the US Civil War often comes up in the context of strategic analysis of the Pacific conflict. Because ilovestrategy is a righteous dude and seems to love strategy, this is dedicated to him.

Generals, as a rule, don’t have the responsibility of defining a war winning strategy. That’s at the political/policy board level, at which generals have input but don’t control (unless they also run the govt like Fredrick or Nappo). It’s quite illuminating to consider that both Japan and the CSA were run by soldiers, or ex-soldiers, who thought of themselves as generals. Note; I am NOT equating Davis to Tojo, just remarking on the similar philosophical composition of each nation’s policy board level.

In the CSA, every general had to obtain approval of their campaign plans from the President, which were invariably altered by Davis.

In Japan, every IJN plan had to get approval from IJGHQ (effectively the govt, under Tojo), and which were invariably altered by the IJA: and vice versa.

Neither the CSA, nor Japan had any hope (or even contemplation) of winning the war by a resounding strategic victory over opposing forces. Their only hope was to achieve significant defensive victories that would sap the morale and will-to-continue of the opponent. They were both classical attritional situations (strategically, not necessarily tactically).

Both the CSA and Japan depended on foreign intervention. Japan depended on Germany beating Russia, or at least keeping her occupied and keeping the Westerns busy, thereby supporting the ‘weariness’ strategy. What they missed was the ‘outrage effect’ that just put the economic powerhouse in a higher gear, so it really didn’t matter squat what happened in Russia, Japan was toast sooner or later.

The CSA’s dependence was a bit more prosaic. They wanted (nay, required) active intervention. They first tried ‘cotton is king’, but all that did was push development of long staple Egyptian. Then they tried ‘we are your historical brothers, and here’s your chance to humiliate the hated Yankee and gain an economic foothold’. This was getting some traction so long as Southern arms demonstrated an ability to maintain the integrity of the State, but then along came the Emancipation Proclamation.

Once the conflict was cast in those terms, there was no way that GB would ever come in. Even a 10-year-old, remembering her actions in the 1812 conflict, would realize that GB would never, ever, allow herself to be tarnished with any association with slavery, whatsoever. A not sufficiently realized practical and political effect that Lincoln understood ohh, so well.

Ok. That’s an extremely brief background of the context within which a General must operate. Anybody out there have any suggestions about how any General, on either side, could have figure it out and done it different.

Btw, Scott’s Anaconda plan, which was what got eventuated, bears a remarkable similarity to Nimitz’ operational concepts in the Central Pacific (ok, and MacArthur’s in SWPac). Just conceptually internalize Guadalcanal as Donelson; then Shiloh and Vicksburg as the Gilberts and Marshalls. Sherman’s strike through the heartland might, perhaps, evoke New Guinea/Philippines, while the Marianas/Okinawa suggest the final campaign to the Petersburg line and ‘the end’.

[ed] ok, so that's an over gloss of my professional opinion. On a personal level, I believe the parallels can be extended further. Both the Southern States and Imperial Japan, were sucked into precipitous and premature conflicts by the actions of a pack of sabre-rattling, self-absorbed, self-centered, utterly brainless "politicians".

Time, and attention to the economics of things, and attention as to how to make those things work for ya, rather than being a millstone, would have had some significantly different consequences. The Southern States shoulda, coulda, and our national landscape might have been very different. Japan shoulda, coulda, and the post war landscape would have been very different indeed.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: JWE

... Btw, Scott’s Anaconda plan, which was what got eventuated, bears a remarkable similarity to Nimitz’ operational concepts in the Central Pacific (ok, and MacArthur’s in SWPac). Just conceptually internalize Guadalcanal as Donelson; then Shiloh and Vicksburg as the Gilberts and Marshalls. Sherman’s strike through the heartland might, perhaps, evoke New Guinea/Philippines, while the Marianas/Okinawa suggest the final campaign to the Petersburg line and ‘the end’.

I thought the Pacific war was more a "high road, low road" approach with Nimitz taking the more direct route, giving MacArthur more men and amphibious photo ops.

Then, somewhere along the way someone realized we could bypass and isolate enemy-held islands.

[Feinder]

I just blame the dog.

-F-

[crsutton]

"As we say out West, if a man can’t skin, he must hold a leg while somebody else does.” Lincoln commenting on Grants overall plan.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

I thought the Pacific war was more a "high road, low road" approach with Nimitz taking the more direct route, giving MacArthur more men and amphibious photo ops.

Then, somewhere along the way someone realized we could bypass and isolate enemy-held islands.

More like "My road: no, MY road!" When the JCS couldn't decide in favor of either King of MacArthur they let them both proceed.

Both Mac and Nimitz and the staffs under them originally envisioned a slow advance base by base. The most famous being Mac's plan to take back Rabaul. Depending on which Bio you read, it was either Mac or one of his intel subordinates (Fellers) who came up with the bypassing idea. Halsey learned the benefits of this after the near disaster at the start of Cartwheel.

Like the "North" vs. "South" however....the US ultimately had the resource muscle to pull off a two pronged major offensive which served to help split and distract Japanese defensive efforts

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

I thought the Pacific war was more a "high road, low road" approach with Nimitz taking the more direct route, giving MacArthur more men and amphibious photo ops.

Then, somewhere along the way someone realized we could bypass and isolate enemy-held islands.

More like "My road: no, MY road!" When the JCS couldn't decide in favor of either King of MacArthur they let them both proceed.

Both Mac and Nimitz and the staffs under them originally envisioned a slow advance base by base. The most famous being Mac's plan to take back Rabaul. Depending on which Bio you read, it was either Mac or one of his intel subordinates (Fellers) who came up with the bypassing idea. Halsey learned the benefits of this after the near disaster at the start of Cartwheel.

Like the "North" vs. "South" however....the US ultimately had the resource muscle to pull off a two pronged major offensive which served to help split and distract Japanese defensive efforts

Yep, I don't think it was in the end a bad way to go.

[LoBaron]

Guys, as for someone who only has vague knowledge on the Civil War (that it took place from 1861-65 resides in memory
because I happened spend countless hours playing North&South [;)] ) I highly apprechiate your analysis of Gettysburg.

Very interesting read. Thank you!