Pilot rotation versus fly until you die.

Gary Grigsby's strategic level wargame covering the entire War in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945 or beyond.

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mdiehl
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Joined: Sat Oct 21, 2000 8:00 am

Post by mdiehl »

Thr problem with the "extreme range leading to pilot fatigue" defense is that it does not work for the cv engagements, all of which occurred at ranges favorable to the A6M and near the edge of F4F range. The pilots were equally well rested and the F4Fs were at the limit of their fuel. In these engagements, both sides escorted bombers.

The Guadalcanal loss ratios (which actually *favored* the Japanese through Oct (about 1.1:1), principially becaise of a single successful surprise raid in late August) might be attributable to close escort, except that the most successful Allied engagements occurred when the Japanese feigned a bomber strike, sent the bombers home about 20 km distant from Guadalcanal, and went in conducting fighter sweeps.

Clearly, all those other factors that I mentioned some time ago weigh in on the results of air combat. I placed EXP near last because I think it really belongs near last. I omitted mission type. It ought to be ahead of EXP.
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Drongo
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Post by Drongo »

Posted by mdiehl
The pilots were equally well rested and the F4Fs were at the limit of their fuel. In these engagements, both sides escorted bombers.


Were the IJN pilots well rested?

The CAP fighters had been cycling through since about dawn and then involved in heavy combat with the US strikes from Midway. The Hiryu's (?) fighters had been involved in the initial stike on Midway (wouldn't they have been in the large dogfight with land based Buffalos/Wildcats as well)?

The range may have been short but the combat was fairly full on prior to both the USN stikes and Hiryu's counter strike.
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Jeremy Pritchard
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

I do beleive that the IJNAF tended to stick with their bombers closer then USN pilots did with theirs. Boom and Zoom tactics don't work if you are closely protecting slow and lumbering bombers. When IJNAF fighters attacked a coordinated USN strike, the USN tended to have their fighters losely attached to the bombers, and primarily went after fighters over defending the bombers. More IJNAF fighters were shot down this way (as USN fighters were able to fly 'independent' of their bombers). IJNAF fighters tended to keep close to their bombers, which would give them less kills as they could not afford to go and finish off damaged enemies as their primary goal is to protect bombers.

How does PW and (probably) UV model this? It models air combat as if both sides send in fighters, then send in bombers.

First action, fighters engage other fighters.

Second action, surviving defending fighters engage bombers.

Realistically, combat was more chaotic. Japanese fighters kept with their bombers, to keep Allied fighters away, while USN fighters kept with enemy fighters, to clear the way for the bombers. IJNAF way results in fewer enemy fighter losses, higher friendly fighter losses (fighters are not at their maximum when they keep with their bobmers) bomber losses to enemy fighters is less. USN way was to keep groups working losely. Fighters worked with other fighters, and the bombers hoped that the fighters manage to keep the enemy fighters busy.

It really is not that much of a difference, as both fighters try to defend their bombers in different ways (USN to eleiminate resistance before the bombers move in, IJN to protect bombers by keeping enemy fighters away). Just because they both attacked with bombers does not mean that tactics were similar as to how they protected them.

IJNAF tactics were based on minimizing bomber losses, USN tactics were based on maximizing losses for enemy CAP. IJNAF fighters will rake up fewer fighter kills, while USN fighters will get more, based primarily on tactics used for escorting bombers.

You will never get the same casualty results as the fighting model does not take into account different escort tactics. As it stands now, the IJNAF use historic USN tactics, i.e., destroy enemy CAP then let the bombers go through. This way results for higher IJNAF fighter kills then historic, as they are more aggressive against enemy fighters and less protective of friendly bombers.

The main reason for this USN tactic was shoud the fighters closely defend the bombers, they would not be able to use their aircraft to its maxiumum. Tactics for the Thatch Weave, as well as Boom and Zoom require freedom of position and timing for fighters. Altitude and speed are important for these tactics, which do not coincide with closely protecting slow bombers.

So, the Japanese get unrealistically high fighter victories (occasionally) because they fight with their aircraft to its maximum when escorting bombers, when realistically, like the Luftwaffe, they spent more effort in keeping enemy fighters away, which increase their casualties lower enemy casualties, but lower friendly bomber losses to CAP.
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