SOVIET UNION 1941 MOBILE VARIANT AAR

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Curtis Lemay
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: SMK-at-work

There's a discussion on the mechanisation capabilities of the whermacht here that may be informative to some - http://www.ww2f.com/topic/43183-mechani ... wehrmacht/

Let's see. He says the Germans produced 116,877 trucks over the course of the war. My figure from Ellis (World War II Statistical Survey) says 345,914. He only seems to count trucks produced during the war - omitting trucks existing pre-war. (Note that the Germans sent over 300,000 trucks into Barbarossa). And he only counts trucks looted from France - not the rest of Occupied Europe. So I would question the methodology used by this amateur.

I was using figures provided by a book published by Strategy & Tactics.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: Lobster

I've come across that before. Thought it was kind of humorous. If all of the trucks carried troops the trucks and tanks would all have to wait for the horse drawn fuel to catch up to them before they could continue on. [:D]

The supply lines were already motorized. German infantry divisions already had 942 trucks each in them - but they were used in the supply lines, not towing or lifting troops/guns.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Lobster »

942 trucks seems like far too high a number. More like an average of about 520 medium to heavy trucks and an average of about 220 light (1.5 ton) trucks with maybe 20 light to medium half tracks. And to make it a logistical nightmare for some divisions the trucks were of several different nationalities. The numbers varied a bit from division to division regardless of Wave number but if you want the starting numbers for each division I have them. All from different references like Niehorster, Buchner, Nafziger, Mueller-Hillebrand, Beiersdorf, U.S. War Department. Maybe some others.

And if all of the divisional trucks were involved in supply (they weren't) then how would you use them to motorize divisions without resorting to a horse drawn logistical debacle? Not that it didn't turn into a logistical mess anyway. There were trucks devoted to carrying supplies FOR the divisions as opposed to carrying supplies TO the division. And since German divisions were responsible for moving their own supplies from corps depot to division I'm sure they used the trucks from D Supply to get supplies.

I'm not sure where you got all of the trucks and how supplies got to the motorized troops when needed. It was difficult keeping the armored spearheads supplies as it was. But motorize the whole mess
AND keep it supplied using the worst road net in Europe?

I realize it's a fabricated reality and sometimes those are the most fun and this looks like one of those fun ones. Maybe if Hitler had taken his head out of his butt and gone to a total war footing they could have come up with enough trucks to motorize more divisions.

BTW, a motorized German Infantry Division TOE had 1261 medium to heavy trucks and 780 light trucks. They were able to more or less hit that number June 22 for those divisions that were motorized. They were also supposed to have 77 light halftracks and 27 medium half tracks. Seems they had that handled fairly well too.

The motorized division had 6 infantry battalions with about 2000 light, medium and heavy trucks. An non motorized infantry division had 9 battalions with about 730 heavy, medium and light trucks. Even if you used only as many trucks as a motorized infantry division that would be an additional 1200+ trucks per division multiplied by what, a couple hundred divisions? Just sayin.

Nice what if scenario and AAR.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: Lobster

942 trucks seems like far too high a number. More like an average of about 520 medium to heavy trucks and an average of about 220 light (1.5 ton) trucks with maybe 20 light to medium half tracks. And to make it a logistical nightmare for some divisions the trucks were of several different nationalities. The numbers varied a bit from division to division regardless of Wave number but if you want the starting numbers for each division I have them. All from different references like Niehorster, Buchner, Nafziger, Mueller-Hillebrand, Beiersdorf, U.S. War Department. Maybe some others.

The figure was from the Handbook on German Military Forces. That was the TO&E figure. Perhaps they weren't at full TO&E, if you say 760. Regardless, there were additional, non-divisional, trucks in the supply lines as well. The supply lines were already motorized.
And if all of the divisional trucks were involved in supply (they weren't) then how would you use them to motorize divisions without resorting to a horse drawn logistical debacle? ...

I'm not sure where you got all of the trucks...

If you read the first post: They loot them from the occupied countries prior to Barbarossa. My source said they looted 290,000 after Barbarossa - the idea is that they have the foresight to do it before.
...and how supplies got to the motorized troops when needed. It was difficult keeping the armored spearheads supplies as it was. But motorize the whole mess
AND keep it supplied using the worst road net in Europe?

They get there the same way they got to the armored spearheads historically - using the exact same logistical net. And that's what I modeled. And, yes, they do end up at the end of their supply tether eventually. Remember that while they add about 170,000 trucks they deduct about 20,000 horse teams. The weight of the fodder for those teams is, incredibly, about comparable to the petrol for those trucks. It doesn't really require much additional tonnage, if any.
BTW, a motorized German Infantry Division TOE had 1261 medium to heavy trucks and 780 light trucks. They were able to more or less hit that number June 22 for those divisions that were motorized. They were also supposed to have 77 light halftracks and 27 medium half tracks. Seems they had that handled fairly well too.

The motorized division had 6 infantry battalions with about 2000 light, medium and heavy trucks. An non motorized infantry division had 9 battalions with about 730 heavy, medium and light trucks. Even if you used only as many trucks as a motorized infantry division that would be an additional 1200+ trucks per division multiplied by what, a couple hundred divisions? Just sayin.

About 132 infantry (or otherwise non-motorized) divisions, if I recall. 1200 x 132 = 158,400, plus some non-divisional stuff must have come to about 170,000. That was the figure my source listed. They also listed that there were 320,000 trucks in the invasion historically, so that figure is about a 50% increase in total trucks.

Note that I left a few corps unmotorized, though - to deal with badlands.
Nice what if scenario and AAR.

Thanks. We can quibble about whether it was doable or not, but just answering the question of what the effect would have been is interesting. I was surprised by what a difference a few trucks made.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by SMK-at-work »

the US Strategic bombing survey has an interesting page on vehicle production too - see http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html
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RE: Conclusions

Post by golden delicious »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

If you read the first post: They loot them from the occupied countries prior to Barbarossa. My source said they looted 290,000 after Barbarossa - the idea is that they have the foresight to do it before.

This explains why the Germans were able to motorise 132 divisions after Barbarossa.

I'd look at what the Germans were actually able to achieve with those 290,000 trucks and apply that to the scenario. I would guess it would amount to better supply away from the railhead and maybe a dozen additional motorised divisions- not 132.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by governato »

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

If you read the first post: They loot them from the occupied countries prior to Barbarossa. My source said they looted 290,000 after Barbarossa - the idea is that they have the foresight to do it before.

This explains why the Germans were able to motorise 132 divisions after Barbarossa.

I'd look at what the Germans were actually able to achieve with those 290,000 trucks and apply that to the scenario. I would guess it would amount to better supply away from the railhead and maybe a dozen additional motorised divisions- not 132.


My main worries are that

- Trucks broke down really fast for the Axis (even if in this scenario they were all German trucks, roads would still be horrible) in TOAW trucks never break down. It does not matter if combat is more deadly for trucks than it should as their number is an abstract quantity (as compared to say tanks, where one TOAW tank = 1 real tank). In reality Axisunits lost 50+% of their trucks in non combat related events *by September*. Just giving OKH a large number of trucks is not a realistic modeling of the campaign as it will result in inflated MPs after just a a handful of turns.
[edit: I understand this is *partially* taken into account by the supply radius values, but I do not think it is enough]

- One real truck is *not* equivalent to one TOAW truck (I know Bob knows this, but just for the audience), it is just an abstract quantity that relates to a unit MPs. The 'right' amount of trucks is the one that gives you the `right' MPs. So even if Germany got 290,000 extra trucks, how many should be added to the units to represent a realistic number of MPs?

I think Bob's is an interesting 'what if', but perhaps he could also try just increasing supply for infantry formations *or the supply radius* as a comparison and see how the two versions work.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: SMK-at-work

the US Strategic bombing survey has an interesting page on vehicle production too - see http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html

Now that's a lot better info than your first link. I note that it totals 316,033 trucks produced over 40-43, with 227,466 going to the military. Ellis has 236,663 military trucks over that period - pretty good agreement.

And this has pre-war values: 412,216 trucks produced in the six years prior to the war by Germany alone. If you can assume that the rest of Europe is doing something proportionately similar, then Europe is full of trucks for looting. The looting my source referenced now seems doable.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

If you read the first post: They loot them from the occupied countries prior to Barbarossa. My source said they looted 290,000 after Barbarossa - the idea is that they have the foresight to do it before.

This explains why the Germans were able to motorise 132 divisions after Barbarossa.

I'd look at what the Germans were actually able to achieve with those 290,000 trucks and apply that to the scenario. I would guess it would amount to better supply away from the railhead and maybe a dozen additional motorised divisions- not 132.

My source says it takes 170,000 to fully motorize, and (see the calculations) that seems to agree with the figures Lobster proposed. He figured about 1200 trucks to raise an infantry division to the same motorization as a motor division. 132 x 1200 = 158,400.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Remember that while they add about 170,000 trucks they deduct about 20,000 horse teams. The weight of the fodder for those teams is, incredibly, about comparable to the petrol for those trucks. It doesn't really require much additional tonnage, if any.

I want to re-evaluate this. I was assuming that the horse teams in the supply chain remained in the divisions. So, only horse teams that are towing things would be deducted. But if we add 1200 trucks to raise the division to full motor-division status, then all horse teams should be deducted. That's 1133 x 132 = 149,556 horse teams, not 20,000. That many teams would have required much more fodder tonnage than the trucks required tonnage of petrol. So tonnage needs would have actually dropped a bunch.

Most of those were in the supply lines - which would then have been replaced by trucks. The additional trucks in the supply columns means that the supply net is actually much better than historical. So, we get a better net and a reduced tonnage demand.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: governato

My main worries are that

- Trucks broke down really fast for the Axis (even if in this scenario they were all German trucks, roads would still be horrible) in TOAW trucks never break down. It does not matter if combat is more deadly for trucks than it should as their number is an abstract quantity (as compared to say tanks, where one TOAW tank = 1 real tank). In reality Axisunits lost 50+% of their trucks in non combat related events *by September*. Just giving OKH a large number of trucks is not a realistic modeling of the campaign as it will result in inflated MPs after just a a handful of turns.
[edit: I understand this is *partially* taken into account by the supply radius values, but I do not think it is enough]

- One real truck is *not* equivalent to one TOAW truck (I know Bob knows this, but just for the audience), it is just an abstract quantity that relates to a unit MPs. The 'right' amount of trucks is the one that gives you the `right' MPs. So even if Germany got 290,000 extra trucks, how many should be added to the units to represent a realistic number of MPs?

I think Bob's is an interesting 'what if', but perhaps he could also try just increasing supply for infantry formations *or the supply radius* as a comparison and see how the two versions work.

I didn't actually add 290,000 trucks to the scenario. I think the total added was in the 90,000 area. So, only trucks required for combat elements were physically added to the TO&E - enough to lift the squads and tow the guns, etc.

Just forget TOAW for the moment. Could the Germans fully motorize with an extra 290,000 trucks? The figures seem to say they could.

I still don't get the breakdown issue. The difference is only one of quantity. If the historical version works well without modeling truck breakdowns (and it does) then the up-motored one should too.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Lobster »

ORIGINAL: Lobster

The motorized division had 6 infantry battalions with about 2000 light, medium and heavy trucks. An non motorized infantry division had 9 battalions with about 730 heavy, medium and light trucks. Even if you used only as many trucks as a motorized infantry division that would be an additional 1200+ trucks per division multiplied by what, a couple hundred divisions? Just sayin.

Please note that you would have to motorize 9 battalions per infantry division, not 6 as in a motorized infantry division. Three regiments, not two. But that would not be an increase of 50% because many of the trucks belong to divisional assets, not battalion or regimental assets.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: Lobster

ORIGINAL: Lobster

The motorized division had 6 infantry battalions with about 2000 light, medium and heavy trucks. An non motorized infantry division had 9 battalions with about 730 heavy, medium and light trucks. Even if you used only as many trucks as a motorized infantry division that would be an additional 1200+ trucks per division multiplied by what, a couple hundred divisions? Just sayin.

Please note that you would have to motorize 9 battalions per infantry division, not 6 as in a motorized infantry division. Three regiments, not two. But that would not be an increase of 50% because many of the trucks belong to divisional assets, not battalion or regimental assets.

Ok, I missed that. So, perhaps the plan was not to up-motorize the supply columns as well. We'll leave in the horse teams that were in the supply columns, and just deduct the ones that towed divisional equipment. The supply net remains identical to the original. That was how I designed the scenario anyway.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I still don't get the breakdown issue. The difference is only one of quantity. If the historical version works well without modeling truck breakdowns (and it does) then the up-motored one should too.

Historically, did the motorized divisions have to convert to foot divisions? I don't think so. Truck losses would have been accommodated via other TO&E losses to those divisions (they had been in combat for months), and via degradation of the supply net. Indeed, in the scenario, those divisions are well down in assigned vs. authorized after a few months, and, as I've stated, the supply net degrades over time via the Supply Radius.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by governato »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I still don't get the breakdown issue. The difference is only one of quantity. If the historical version works well without modeling truck breakdowns (and it does) then the up-motored one should too.

Historically, did the motorized divisions have to convert to foot divisions? I don't think so. Truck losses would have been accommodated via other TO&E losses to those divisions (they had been in combat for months), and via degradation of the supply net. Indeed, in the scenario, those divisions are well down in assigned vs. authorized after a few months, and, as I've stated, the supply net degrades over time via the Supply Radius.

If you do not have it, I recommend reading 'Kiev' and `Typhoon' by Stahel. They give a detailed description of how attritional losses due to breakdowns affected the mobility and recon capabilities of the Wehermacht starting in midsummer.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by golden delicious »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

My source says it takes 170,000 to fully motorize, and (see the calculations) that seems to agree with the figures Lobster proposed. He figured about 1200 trucks to raise an infantry division to the same motorization as a motor division. 132 x 1200 = 158,400.

This doesn't address the problem. You're not stating that the Germans get more trucks, they just get them earlier.

Whatever the Germans were able to do with these trucks in 1942 (or whenever) - that's what was possible.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by governato »

One thing that worries me is that 1 TOAW truck does NOT represent one real truck, this can be guessed by the change in MPs vs trucks associated to a given unit. Rather than worrying on the absolute number of trucks I would like to see tests that focused directly on the Axis movement capabilities.

Mind me, I like the current experiment, but what I would do is adding XX trucks to boost MPs by given fraction to each unit and provide enough replacements to sustain that. That would provide a clean test and free the scenario from the plausibility arguments that have been brought up.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

My source says it takes 170,000 to fully motorize, and (see the calculations) that seems to agree with the figures Lobster proposed. He figured about 1200 trucks to raise an infantry division to the same motorization as a motor division. 132 x 1200 = 158,400.

This doesn't address the problem. You're not stating that the Germans get more trucks, they just get them earlier.

Whatever the Germans were able to do with these trucks in 1942 (or whenever) - that's what was possible.

They get them earlier by making the decision to loot them earlier. That's the basis of the scenario.
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RE: Conclusions

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: governato

One thing that worries me is that 1 TOAW truck does NOT represent one real truck, this can be guessed by the change in MPs vs trucks associated to a given unit. Rather than worrying on the absolute number of trucks I would like to see tests that focused directly on the Axis movement capabilities.

Mind me, I like the current experiment, but what I would do is adding XX trucks to boost MPs by given fraction to each unit and provide enough replacements to sustain that. That would provide a clean test and free the scenario from the plausibility arguments that have been brought up.

Whatever their condition was, I don't see why the normal TOAW features of readiness, supply, and losses aren't sufficient to address it. It seemed to work pretty well for the original scenario.
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governato
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RE: Conclusions

Post by governato »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: governato

One thing that worries me is that 1 TOAW truck does NOT represent one real truck, this can be guessed by the change in MPs vs trucks associated to a given unit. Rather than worrying on the absolute number of trucks I would like to see tests that focused directly on the Axis movement capabilities.

Mind me, I like the current experiment, but what I would do is adding XX trucks to boost MPs by given fraction to each unit and provide enough replacements to sustain that. That would provide a clean test and free the scenario from the plausibility arguments that have been brought up.

Whatever their condition was, I don't see why the normal TOAW features of readiness, supply, and losses aren't sufficient to address it. It seemed to work pretty well for the original scenario.

I will say it again: TOAW does not explicitly include attrition/breakdown losses. I think it is a problem that forces designers to partially compensate in other ways, but we may just agree to disagree here!
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