Single Ship TF Dispersion of Large Vulnerable TFs in danger

[Leandros]

Warspite1 wrote: Note: All the above are readily available in September i.e. there are no units above undergoing repair or otherwise out of action.
No allowance has been made for vessels used for convoy purposes – which of course can be recalled in extremis. Finally I have referred to the Town-class as
CA (the 6-inch/8-inch distinction was blurred by then).

I had hoped to have some time to get my newly purchased WitP game up and going but your last postings here are too juicy (tempting) not to respond to….particularly
the list you obviously have copied off a contemporary Pink List. I’d be interested in knowing the date of that Pink List if it is possible.

I’d also like to ask you – if Sealion had gone ahead as planned – let’s say S-day (first landings) was Sept. 27th – this should be a reasonable date as Hitler’s
last decision date before he postponed the operation, more or less indefinitely, was Sept. 17th and there was a 10-day warning period for the involved units –
which RN destroyers from which units and bases would have opposed the invasion when? That shouldn’t be too difficult with the great variety you have listed….

Fred

[Leandros]

In the meantime I am posting a few postscripts from that period that should give a more realistic impression of the period in question than that portrayed by some members here
– here is one by Peter Fleming – Ian’s brother – taken from his book Operation Sealion – published in the fifties:

“It is often said that a democracy has its drawbacks in time of war and that the British, in peacetime, have objections against the traditional hierarchies and
command structures existing within the defence establishments. Since the upper layers of this hierarchy and the command lines were hopelessly confusing the
critical summer of 1940 it is only fitting to have a look at the system supposed to lead our nation in that difficult time. Particularly as much criticism is
bestowed upon the German which appears more monolithic but nevertheless did not work that well. It would be unjust not to show the other side of the picture.
At his apex Winston Churchill, the British leader, had the same double-role as Hitler – they were both State leaders and superior commanders of the armed forces.
Both had forcibly ensured themselves the military responsibility and even if this resulted in different practises it was the right thing to do for both.
In Whitehall the Defence Minister presided over the Chiefs of Staff and was responsible to the War Cabinet. On the level below there was a complex command
structure. In the Admiralty the Naval Staff executed a wide-ranging control over the North Atlantic (its headquarters in Gibraltar), The South Atlantic
(Freetown, Sierra Leone), the American and West Indian (Bermuda), the East Indian (Ceylon) and the Chinese (Singapore and Hong Kong) stations. The Naval Staff
was also supposed to lead the naval units in the domestic waters. These consisted of the Home Fleet – usually based at Scapa flow, the Orkneys, and the five
coastal stations – Portsmouth, Nore (Chatham), the Western Approaches (Plymouth), Rosyth and Dover. The respective heads of these commands were equal except for
Dover which was really under the Nore station but had gained an independent position, based on the actual situation, with a lower-graded admiral as CO. Areas of
responsibility and opinions varied a lot and since there was a constant need to transfer resources from one to another there was fertile ground for frictions and
disagreements. In the middle of all these, always having to take the unpopular decision was the Admiralty.

These weak points in the command system, if so it can be called, always showed themselves during exercises and it can hardly be doubted that if Sea Lion had been
executed it could have inflicted heavier loads than this cumbersome and intricate apparatus could reasonably be expected to take. But, by replacing it, or, rather
suppress it, an improvised and untried Superior Command could in a short time, with the marginal available resources, have contributed to a further degrading of
the situation. A reorganisation was never tried.

On July 25th 1940 general Alanbrooke, CO of the British invasion defences, referred in his diary from a meeting in the British headquarters:

“The navy is worried because late events have proved that the air threat is much greater than previously assumed”.

The admiralty had a dilemma. Even if the German invasion had not succeeded their naval losses could have been so great that they later might have succumbed to the
German U-boat warfare. Anyway, the winter 1941 became very tough in that respect. Already on July 21st Churchill wrote to Roosevelt:

“We give Hitler hard blows, both by repulsing the attacks and by bombing Germany. But, our losses in destroyers during air attacks can get so serious that our
defence of the supply and merchant routes over the Atlantic breaks”.

After the war he also wrote:

“The last six months of 1940 incurred great losses on us that were only dampened by the winter storms, but little results in degrading the enemy’s U-boat force.
We achieved some advantages by using a more powerful depth charge and by letting the convoys make detours. But the invasion threat demanded large concentrations
in the narrow seas and a large part of our new-building was only gradually being made ready for service. A threatening cloud was hovering over the Admiralty and
all that shared in their knowing. The week ending Sept. 22nd showed the greatest losses since the beginning of the war.

Sept. 22nd was only five days before the last possible S-day – invasion day. This should show that they were fully aware of the problem regarding the loss of
shipping, whether Sea Lion succeeded or not.

The well-known German historians Rohwer and Hümmelchen have detailed all parties’ missions during the war in their book “Chronik des Seekrieges” – on September
1940:

“There is a strong preponderance of German operations in the Channel and the south-western part of the North Sea at this time. Mainly in connection with initial
mine-laying for Sea Lion. According to Roskill the Kriegsmarine leadership was highly surprised on the lack of initiative shown by the British navy, be it along
the English and Norwegian coasts or the continent”.

That the German diversions were taken seriously by the British leadership is shown in a broadcast by Churchill on Sept. 11th:

“…finally, preparations are being made for ships that shall transfer an invasion force from ports in Norway".

Implying that preparations for a landing on the east coast of England was in progress. The German preparations were, in reality, Operation Herbstreise - the
gigantic trickery to hold back parts of the Royal Navy in the North Sea. This one is rather descriptive, too:

When Commander, later Captain, Basil Jones, arrived back from his service in the Mediterranean he was given the 10th destroyer flotilla to command. This was in
March 1944 and his flotilla, consisting of the large Tribal ships, was to protect the western flank of the upcoming invasion in Normandy. He writes in his book
And so on to Battle:

“Before the formation of the 10th flotilla, the rather mixed forces for Channel operations had been somewhat unfortunate. The movement of enemy supply ships along
the Britanny coast between Brest and the Channel Islands had offered a target against which C.-in-C., Plymouth rarely possessed sufficiently powerful forces to
counter their normal covering force of a division of Elbings (or larger destroyers), though many gallant exploits were carried out by the smaller Hunt class
destroyers which were available from time to time from the Portsmouth and Plymouth Commands”.

During the great invasion scare between 6th and 7th of September the Admiralty put the Home fleet in Scapa Flow on one hours notice and collected several fighting
groups which should sweep up the Channel. The night after the 1st destroyer flotilla was already at sea with Atherstone, Beagle, Bulldog and Saladin. These were
ordered to divert towards Calais and destroy eventual concentrations found there. However, they never got that far as dawn was coming and they had orders to be
well west of Dungeness before daylight. Atherstone reported that they were shadowed by German aircraft all the way back to Portsmouth as soon as dawn broke.
So, nothing more could be done until the next night. As the enemy movements continued during the day after it was decided to establish two offensive groups each
consisting of a cruiser with three destroyers as escort. None of them met with any success, according to the RN – due to weather. It is a little typical that the
cruiser Galatea hit a mine and was out of the game for a month. Peter C. Smith writes in his book Hold the Narrow Waters:

“….the hard fact is that while these powerful British forces were at sea looking for German invasion crafts, German torpedo boats were laying minefields at the
British side of the Channel. They did so under the very noses of the British, not once, but time and time again, as they had done in 1939. Even after a year these
audacious German surface forces were operating with impunity”.


Fred

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Warspite1 wrote: Note: All the above are readily available in September i.e. there are no units above undergoing repair or otherwise out of action.
No allowance has been made for vessels used for convoy purposes – which of course can be recalled in extremis. Finally I have referred to the Town-class as
CA (the 6-inch/8-inch distinction was blurred by then).

I had hoped to have some time to get my newly purchased WitP game up and going but your last postings here are too juicy (tempting) not to respond to….particularly
the list you obviously have copied off a contemporary Pink List. I’d be interested in knowing the date of that Pink List if it is possible.

I’d also like to ask you – if Sealion had gone ahead as planned – let’s say S-day (first landings) was Sept. 27th – this should be a reasonable date as Hitler’s
last decision date before he postponed the operation, more or less indefinitely, was Sept. 17th and there was a 10-day warning period for the involved units –
which RN destroyers from which units and bases would have opposed the invasion when? That shouldn’t be too difficult with the great variety you have listed….

Fred

warspite1

Hee hee.. no, no, no! [:)]. When you turned up on the forum and explained that you had researched this subject and had written a book on this I invited you to comment on why you felt Sealion was possible and what your research had dug up that made you believe this.

I would ask that again - and in so doing answer the following absolutely key questions and queries:

- You are confident your research shows that few (none?) of the plethora of RN ships, whether they be destroyers, torpedo boats, MTB or whatever could be called into action against the invasion fleet. This despite the fact that the journey time was in the order of 30 hours (assuming the weather was kind, no foul-ups, lines coming adrift etc etc).

- Please explain how these barges are going to get troops ashore. The procedure they are required to undertake having reached the beaches, how the units are to communicate with each other while manoeuvring, and how the barges are to make it back to their ports of embarkation for follow-up waves.

- Most important of all please confirm what you believe (in your expected scenario) to be happening between the start of the invasion at the successful landings of the German army on the shores of southern England.
In other words, what do you believe will be the response of both the RN and the RAF.


By the way, yes that was from a pink list from early September I believe.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

In the meantime I am posting a few postscripts from that period that should give a more realistic impression of the period in question than that portrayed by some members here
– here is one by Peter Fleming – Ian’s brother – taken from his book Operation Sealion – published in the fifties:

“It is often said that a democracy has its drawbacks in time of war and that the British, in peacetime, have objections against the traditional hierarchies and
command structures existing within the defence establishments. Since the upper layers of this hierarchy and the command lines were hopelessly confusing the
critical summer of 1940 it is only fitting to have a look at the system supposed to lead our nation in that difficult time. Particularly as much criticism is
bestowed upon the German which appears more monolithic but nevertheless did not work that well. It would be unjust not to show the other side of the picture.
At his apex Winston Churchill, the British leader, had the same double-role as Hitler – they were both State leaders and superior commanders of the armed forces.
Both had forcibly ensured themselves the military responsibility and even if this resulted in different practises it was the right thing to do for both.
In Whitehall the Defence Minister presided over the Chiefs of Staff and was responsible to the War Cabinet. On the level below there was a complex command
structure. In the Admiralty the Naval Staff executed a wide-ranging control over the North Atlantic (its headquarters in Gibraltar), The South Atlantic
(Freetown, Sierra Leone), the American and West Indian (Bermuda), the East Indian (Ceylon) and the Chinese (Singapore and Hong Kong) stations. The Naval Staff
was also supposed to lead the naval units in the domestic waters. These consisted of the Home Fleet – usually based at Scapa flow, the Orkneys, and the five
coastal stations – Portsmouth, Nore (Chatham), the Western Approaches (Plymouth), Rosyth and Dover. The respective heads of these commands were equal except for
Dover which was really under the Nore station but had gained an independent position, based on the actual situation, with a lower-graded admiral as CO. Areas of
responsibility and opinions varied a lot and since there was a constant need to transfer resources from one to another there was fertile ground for frictions and
disagreements. In the middle of all these, always having to take the unpopular decision was the Admiralty.

These weak points in the command system, if so it can be called, always showed themselves during exercises and it can hardly be doubted that if Sea Lion had been
executed it could have inflicted heavier loads than this cumbersome and intricate apparatus could reasonably be expected to take. But, by replacing it, or, rather
suppress it, an improvised and untried Superior Command could in a short time, with the marginal available resources, have contributed to a further degrading of
the situation. A reorganisation was never tried.

On July 25th 1940 general Alanbrooke, CO of the British invasion defences, referred in his diary from a meeting in the British headquarters:

“The navy is worried because late events have proved that the air threat is much greater than previously assumed”.

The admiralty had a dilemma. Even if the German invasion had not succeeded their naval losses could have been so great that they later might have succumbed to the
German U-boat warfare. Anyway, the winter 1941 became very tough in that respect. Already on July 21st Churchill wrote to Roosevelt:

“We give Hitler hard blows, both by repulsing the attacks and by bombing Germany. But, our losses in destroyers during air attacks can get so serious that our
defence of the supply and merchant routes over the Atlantic breaks”.

After the war he also wrote:

“The last six months of 1940 incurred great losses on us that were only dampened by the winter storms, but little results in degrading the enemy’s U-boat force.
We achieved some advantages by using a more powerful depth charge and by letting the convoys make detours. But the invasion threat demanded large concentrations
in the narrow seas and a large part of our new-building was only gradually being made ready for service. A threatening cloud was hovering over the Admiralty and
all that shared in their knowing. The week ending Sept. 22nd showed the greatest losses since the beginning of the war.

Sept. 22nd was only five days before the last possible S-day – invasion day. This should show that they were fully aware of the problem regarding the loss of
shipping, whether Sea Lion succeeded or not.

The well-known German historians Rohwer and Hümmelchen have detailed all parties’ missions during the war in their book “Chronik des Seekrieges” – on September
1940:

“There is a strong preponderance of German operations in the Channel and the south-western part of the North Sea at this time. Mainly in connection with initial
mine-laying for Sea Lion. According to Roskill the Kriegsmarine leadership was highly surprised on the lack of initiative shown by the British navy, be it along
the English and Norwegian coasts or the continent”.

That the German diversions were taken seriously by the British leadership is shown in a broadcast by Churchill on Sept. 11th:

“…finally, preparations are being made for ships that shall transfer an invasion force from ports in Norway".

Implying that preparations for a landing on the east coast of England was in progress. The German preparations were, in reality, Operation Herbstreise - the
gigantic trickery to hold back parts of the Royal Navy in the North Sea. This one is rather descriptive, too:

When Commander, later Captain, Basil Jones, arrived back from his service in the Mediterranean he was given the 10th destroyer flotilla to command. This was in
March 1944 and his flotilla, consisting of the large Tribal ships, was to protect the western flank of the upcoming invasion in Normandy. He writes in his book
And so on to Battle:

“Before the formation of the 10th flotilla, the rather mixed forces for Channel operations had been somewhat unfortunate. The movement of enemy supply ships along
the Britanny coast between Brest and the Channel Islands had offered a target against which C.-in-C., Plymouth rarely possessed sufficiently powerful forces to
counter their normal covering force of a division of Elbings (or larger destroyers), though many gallant exploits were carried out by the smaller Hunt class
destroyers which were available from time to time from the Portsmouth and Plymouth Commands”.

During the great invasion scare between 6th and 7th of September the Admiralty put the Home fleet in Scapa Flow on one hours notice and collected several fighting
groups which should sweep up the Channel. The night after the 1st destroyer flotilla was already at sea with Atherstone, Beagle, Bulldog and Saladin. These were
ordered to divert towards Calais and destroy eventual concentrations found there. However, they never got that far as dawn was coming and they had orders to be
well west of Dungeness before daylight. Atherstone reported that they were shadowed by German aircraft all the way back to Portsmouth as soon as dawn broke.
So, nothing more could be done until the next night. As the enemy movements continued during the day after it was decided to establish two offensive groups each
consisting of a cruiser with three destroyers as escort. None of them met with any success, according to the RN – due to weather. It is a little typical that the
cruiser Galatea hit a mine and was out of the game for a month. Peter C. Smith writes in his book Hold the Narrow Waters:

“….the hard fact is that while these powerful British forces were at sea looking for German invasion crafts, German torpedo boats were laying minefields at the
British side of the Channel. They did so under the very noses of the British, not once, but time and time again, as they had done in 1939. Even after a year these
audacious German surface forces were operating with impunity”.


Fred

warspite1

Just skimmed through this and will respond - it's simply too tempting not too [:)]

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing





You'd be surprised!

fb.asp?m=3773387

Let me quote the part, and make it nice and clear before I am accused of a misquote or not reading what you've typed.



Last time I checked, "minuscule chance" is something that is not "impossible".

That was the crux of the other thread. Good to see you've changed your tune.

warspite1

Read post 58. You are splitting hairs again. I have maintained that Sealion was impossible unless EVERYTHING goes right for the Germans and wrong for the British over an extended period of time. For all intents and purposes that is an impossibility.

You have not commented upon the Charge of the Light Brigade manoeuvre in this last post so can I assume you have now understood what I have said at least in that regard??

warspite1

No response. I will take that as a yes...at last!

England and Scotland - two nations divided by a common language [:D]

Unlike you I have commitments outside this forum.

As for hair splitting, be so good as to find the post that I suggested the Home Fleet would run away to Canada at the first sign of Sealion. Quote it, just so there's no confusion.

It is at least good to see that you see the military value of the Home Fleet keeping units in reserve.

Y'know Warspite, you have this real strange mind-set: it's like you think the Royal Navy could operate as if the German armed forces couldn't harm them. The truth, as was learned at Norway, was that this simply wasn't the case.

Let's leave nationalism out of this, as I doubt you'll like my views on that as you do my views on this.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Yes and the incident off Crete is another. The Germans had air supremacy but the RN got in amongst a convoy at night and suffice to say, things
did not turn out well for the Axis.....

I trust it worked out well for the Royal Navy units participating in that operation...[;)]

Fred

[Leandros]

I had hoped to have some time to get my newly purchased WitP game up and going but your last postings here are too juicy (tempting) not to respond to….particularly
the list you obviously have copied off a contemporary Pink List. I’d be interested in knowing the date of that Pink List if it is possible.

I’d also like to ask you – if Sealion had gone ahead as planned – let’s say S-day (first landings) was Sept. 27th – this should be a reasonable date as Hitler’s
last decision date before he postponed the operation, more or less indefinitely, was Sept. 17th and there was a 10-day warning period for the involved units –
which RN destroyers from which units and bases would have opposed the invasion when? That shouldn’t be too difficult with the great variety you have listed….

Fred[/quote]

Hee hee.. no, no, no! [:)]. .

I suspected as much. It's the same every time.

By the way, yes that was from a pink list from early September I Believe...

September 16th?

Fred

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: warspite1

warspite1

Read post 58. You are splitting hairs again. I have maintained that Sealion was impossible unless EVERYTHING goes right for the Germans and wrong for the British over an extended period of time. For all intents and purposes that is an impossibility.

You have not commented upon the Charge of the Light Brigade manoeuvre in this last post so can I assume you have now understood what I have said at least in that regard??

warspite1

No response. I will take that as a yes...at last!

England and Scotland - two nations divided by a common language [:D]

Unlike you I have commitments outside this forum.

As for hair splitting, be so good as to find the post that I suggested the Home Fleet would run away to Canada at the first sign of Sealion. Quote it, just so there's no confusion.

It is at least good to see that you see the military value of the Home Fleet keeping units in reserve.

Y'know Warspite, you have this real strange mind-set: it's like you think the Royal Navy could operate as if the German armed forces couldn't harm them. The truth, as was learned at Norway, was that this simply wasn't the case.

Let's leave nationalism out of this, as I doubt you'll like my views on that as you do my views on this.

warspite1

Okay mind_messing, as I thought this is pointless as you are either a) too stupid to understand, or b) refusing to understand because you want to turn this into something more.

I do not for one moment think you are stupid – we disagree on everything, but that is absolutely fine and differences of opinion can be handled like grown ups – but you are clearly looking for something else. As an example we have the “Let's leave nationalism out of this” comment. What the….?? I used a play on the famous quote by Shaw/Churchill/Wilde/Whoever about the US and the British to highlight that we do not seem to understand each other. There was nothing sinister about that – and I certainly wasn’t bringing “nationalism” into the conversation. You want to know about my views on Scotland? Try reading the thread in the GD forum at the time of the referendum. So don’t try and inject that nonsense into the discussion and make out (yet again) I have said something I have not. It is not of the slightest interest to me what your views on nationalism are.

Then the “Unlike you I have commitments outside this forum”. Where did that come from? Why the need for that sneering comment? You know nothing about my life outside the forum. But then, you have form for this sort of thing don’t you:

I shall remind you:

1. It was you turned the last friendly debate sour with the intended put down “You've evidently watched the Battle of Britain just too many times……” comment. Clearly from what was subsequently written there was only one of us that could be accused of that. All you came up with during the conversation was the same lazy, tired, worn out comment about the RAF on its last knees…. Then there was you – a WITP-AE player!! no less – suggesting that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen could have been combat ready for Sealion, not to mention all the RN capital ships sunk off Crete…..
2. Then of course there was the delightful “embarrassing for you” when once again all I did was to make a comment to highlight that the RN were not going to cower in port because the enemy had aircraft – and I backed that up with actual examples. But you chose to miss the point as usual and again tried to make out I was writing some pseudo propaganda piece.
Finally I see you continue – even now – to simply ignore what I have written. As said above there are only two reasons for that and, as also said I do not think you are being stupid so……

“It is at least good to see that you see the military value of the Home Fleet keeping units in reserve”.

Of course. Different ships different purposes. The Home Fleet as I have said a billion times would not have been used straight off and, when Sealion proves to be a total failure, they will remain where they are.

“Y'know Warspite, you have this real strange mind-set: it's like you think the Royal Navy could operate as if the German armed forces couldn't harm them. The truth, as was learned at Norway, was that this simply wasn't the case”.

There you go again. How many times, over how many threads - do I have to say this is not the case? How about you show me where I have said that – a quote would be good. You have plenty to choose from in which I have said the exact opposite.
The running to Canada exaggeration was in frustrated response to the fact that whatever I write, however I express it, you keep saying I envisage a Charge of the Light Brigade, all guns blazing approach to the invasion from the Home Fleet. I have not said that, I said the exact opposite on about half a dozen occasions over the two threads.

But then you appear to be confused otherwise why this?

“Air superiority is the key element regarding Sealion. With it, the Germans stand a good chance, otherwise they don't”.
You then went onto say:
quote:

ORIGINAL: Orm "Could you give me a percentage figure on what "unlikely" is to you so I better understand what number we argue about".

Mind_messing answered: 5% mark. Without air superiority, you're probably hovering around at the 1%.

So 5% is a good chance of success yes?

Oh and also the quite bizarre reference to the French navy:

“Now, I'm not saying the RN wouldn't have opposed Sealion, merely that I don't think they wouldn't have been been sending anything that was armed and could float against the Germans. Think less of the Yamato sailing to it'd fate, and more of the Marine National following the Fall of France”.

Why what could they have done – sailed the Dunkerque and Strasbourg up the Seine? The defence of France and the UK/Japan are a tad different – two are islands and one isn’t….

It's a real shame we are arguing like this but as I say, if you refuse to read what is written - and instead focus on what you want someone to have said then its all really rather a waste of space....

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I had hoped to have some time to get my newly purchased WitP game up and going but your last postings here are too juicy (tempting) not to respond to….particularly
the list you obviously have copied off a contemporary Pink List. I’d be interested in knowing the date of that Pink List if it is possible.

I’d also like to ask you – if Sealion had gone ahead as planned – let’s say S-day (first landings) was Sept. 27th – this should be a reasonable date as Hitler’s
last decision date before he postponed the operation, more or less indefinitely, was Sept. 17th and there was a 10-day warning period for the involved units –
which RN destroyers from which units and bases would have opposed the invasion when? That shouldn’t be too difficult with the great variety you have listed….

Fred

Hee hee.. no, no, no! [:)]. .

I suspected as much. It's the same every time.

Fred

warspite1

Well anyone can come up with that? So how about you answer the questions?

I would have thought, given the time and effort you have put into this you would welcome the chance. But no, you are happy to quote random passages from things wot famous people have said in order to divert attention from the fundamental problems that any such operation would be faced with.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Yes and the incident off Crete is another. The Germans had air supremacy but the RN got in amongst a convoy at night and suffice to say, things
did not turn out well for the Axis.....

I trust it worked out well for the Royal Navy units participating in that operation...[;)]

Fred

warspite1

There you are at it again. One quote out of context and a "witty" response to go with it???

Genuinely Leandros, please tell me what that response was written for and what you thought you were responding too i.e. in what context was my comment taken?

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Yes and the incident off Crete is another. The Germans had air supremacy but the RN got in amongst a convoy at night and suffice to say, things
did not turn out well for the Axis.....

I trust it worked out well for the Royal Navy units participating in that operation...[;)]

Fred

warspite1

There you are at it again. One quote out of context and a "witty" response to go with it???

Genuinely Leandros, please tell me what that response was written for and what you thought you were responding too i.e. in what context was my comment taken?

What about you answering my question? Did it work out well? I should think that is of some importance as you obviously meant your original posting had - importance.
And you must necessarily have meant it had some relevance to the Sealion discussion - or? Or why did you post it? Does what happened to the RN vessels in that
context not have any importance or does it not fit in with your argumentation? What was the purpose of your posting?

Was it the September 16th Pink List?

Fred

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Leandros



I trust it worked out well for the Royal Navy units participating in that operation...[;)]

Fred

warspite1

There you are at it again. One quote out of context and a "witty" response to go with it???

Genuinely Leandros, please tell me what that response was written for and what you thought you were responding too i.e. in what context was my comment taken?

What about you answering my question? Did it work out well? I should think that is of some importance as you obviously meant your original posting had - importance.
And you must necessarily have meant it had some relevance to the Sealion discussion - or? Or why did you post it? Does what happened to the RN vessels in that
context not have any importance or does it not fit in with your argumentation? What was the purpose of your posting?

Was it the September 16th Pink List?

Fred

warspite1

Well that is very, very disappointing. So you responded to my post without even bothering to understand why it was posted, in what context and what it was meant to answer.

The "debate" has gone rapidly downhill....

[Leandros]

warspite1

Well that is very, very disappointing. So you responded to my post without even bothering to understand why it was posted, in what context and what it was meant to answer.

The "debate" has gone rapidly downhill....

Oh, dear, so sorry. On the contrary, I bother a lot. That is why I responded. But, as you are so reluctant to explain it to all of us here I suppose it probably
didn't go very well for the RN after their fierce battle with the requisitioned Greek fishing boats and the lone Italian light destroyer.

I trust it was all worth it....Crete wasn't lost after all..[;)]....?

Was it the September 16 Pink List?

Fred

[Chickenboy]

Gentlemen,

Parsimonious bickering over the infinitesimally small chance of success (no chance versus very very very small chance of success) isn't going to convince anyone of the merits of your case(s). I think we can all agree that the operation likely would not have succeeded, but for a near-miraculous turn of events for the Germans.

The operation would have been conducted on a 'shoestring', at least as measured by future amphibious landings' preparations and OOBs. It would have been met with stiff resistance on the water, over the water and on the beaches. Follow-on forces would have been hard pressed to achieve even their most optimistic goals, if they got ashore at all.

In my mind, the most damning evidence against this operation's success lies in the fact that the Germans called the bloody thing off. Fresh from their blitzkrieg victories over the low countries ,Poland and France, they must have really really not liked their chances. Many other less sanguine high commands (historically speaking) put into that situation would have thrown their lot behind the operation and likely gone down to ruinous failure. That the Germans did not do so is a testimony to their rational approach to a hopelessly flawed operational plan.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Gentlemen,

Parsimonious bickering over the infinitesimally small chance of success (no chance versus very very very small chance of success) isn't going to convince anyone of the merits of your case(s). I think we can all agree that the operation likely would not have succeeded, but for a near-miraculous turn of events for the Germans.

The operation would have been conducted on a 'shoestring', at least as measured by future amphibious landings' preparations and OOBs. It would have been met with stiff resistance on the water, over the water and on the beaches. Follow-on forces would have been hard pressed to achieve even their most optimistic goals, if they got ashore at all.

In my mind, the most damning evidence against this operation's success lies in the fact that the Germans called the bloody thing off. Fresh from their blitzkrieg victories over the low countries ,Poland and France, they must have really really not liked their chances. Many other less sanguine high commands (historically speaking) put into that situation would have thrown their lot behind the operation and likely gone down to ruinous failure. That the Germans did not do so is a testimony to their rational approach to a hopelessly flawed operational plan.

Do you know the plan(s)?

Fred

[warspite1]

The passage from Peter Fleming. Okay, but what does this prove one way or the other? He is trying to say that the command system was not perfect. And….?

So how does this compare to the German command structure and the Hitler, Raeder, Goring combo? You know the Raeder that does not believe in the operation he is being told to launch, the Goring who believes in it even less and has just made a total Horlicks of the Battle of Britain and whose Luftwaffe, as a result, is a damn sight smaller than it was at the start of the battle – unlike the RAF – and whose pilots are every bit as tired and exhausted as their enemy counterparts and whose morale is er… not exactly great right now. Oh and above all this we have the Fuhrer who probably believes in the project less than his two subordinates, knows nothing about the navy, and who has eyes on only one thing …Lebensraum.

The quote from Alanbrooke. Right, one quote that, in isolation means little and proves even less. The Admiralty – like every other naval service realised at the start of WWII that air power would prove to be a greater danger than envisaged. Not exactly a shocking revelation is it? And what are you proving by this? At the risk of being slaughtered by mind_messing for some embarrassing peudo propaganda spiel, the lack of air cover - either partial, or in some cases total, didn't stop the RN doing what it needed to do.

The Churchill letter to Roosevelt. Churchill is desperate for assistance – he knows the intervention by the US is the only way this war is going to get won. Do you express surprise that the letter did not say “listen me ol’ Yank chum, no need to worry here, everything is fine. If you can spare some destroyers then great, but if not then no problem”? The losses to air attacks were serious in so far as overall losses to precious units were concerned – but no more so than losses to mines, subs or surface units. The point is the losses were serious in relation to the war situation.

Yes the Admiralty has a dilemma but your scenario ignores one, really rather vital point. If the UK is invaded and beaten then initially it really does not matter if there is one ship or 100 ships left. The UK has, at that point, lost the war. So first things first – if the invasion is beaten off, then you worry about how to protect the convoys. If the UK is beaten – guess what??? There are no convoys…….

The diversion? Yes it was taken seriously, a landing on the East Coast was considered a possibility, and as I have said, the Home Fleet would have been used to counter any breakout by the German ahem…. “Heavies”. But please please please enlighten me as to exactly what this diversion is going to achieve once its make-up has been realised? EVEN if the British had not thought that landings in the south were the real thing - a 30-hour voyage by almost 4,000 vessels would have been a bit of a clue do yathink?

The biggest problem with all this – and the quotes in the last part of your post – is what happens during the prelude to an invasion and what happens during an invasion. You could make exactly the same case against the RAF. They effectively stopped fighting over the Channel in the build-up to the BoB. By your reasoning there is only one reason for that, the RAF were beaten and were withdrawing for their own safety. Well actually the RAF leadership were sensible enough to realise that the Battle of Britain (the air war) was not going to be won over the Channel. They were sensibly husbanding forces for what was to come.

In the same way that the BoB was “what was to come” – and which the RAF were winning (and getting stronger) at the point that Sealion would have to be launched or postponed – the actual invasion would be the key point for the defence of the UK and the role of the RN.

The key here, the most important element, is the ramshackle naval units the Germans can club together for this operation. When you prove to me how this force, travelling at 2-3 knots can get across the channel unscathed – or sufficiently unscathed to enable the troops to land in good order, at the same time and thus be in a position to fight as a cohesive force, for sufficient naval vessels to get back across the Channel to pick up additional waves and supplies, to then go back (repeat as many times as necessary) then I will change my view.

Forbes we know didn’t believe it was possible, Goering and Raeder we know, didn’t believe it was possible, Hitler surely would have launched it if he thought it was possible. But you know what? He didn’t… I wonder why?

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Gentlemen,

Parsimonious bickering over the infinitesimally small chance of success (no chance versus very very very small chance of success) isn't going to convince anyone of the merits of your case(s). I think we can all agree that the operation likely would not have succeeded, but for a near-miraculous turn of events for the Germans.

The operation would have been conducted on a 'shoestring', at least as measured by future amphibious landings' preparations and OOBs. It would have been met with stiff resistance on the water, over the water and on the beaches. Follow-on forces would have been hard pressed to achieve even their most optimistic goals, if they got ashore at all.

In my mind, the most damning evidence against this operation's success lies in the fact that the Germans called the bloody thing off. Fresh from their blitzkrieg victories over the low countries ,Poland and France, they must have really really not liked their chances. Many other less sanguine high commands (historically speaking) put into that situation would have thrown their lot behind the operation and likely gone down to ruinous failure. That the Germans did not do so is a testimony to their rational approach to a hopelessly flawed operational plan.

Do you know the plan(s)?

Fred

Not half as well as the Germans did.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

warspite1

Well that is very, very disappointing. So you responded to my post without even bothering to understand why it was posted, in what context and what it was meant to answer.

The "debate" has gone rapidly downhill....

Oh, dear, so sorry. On the contrary, I bother a lot. That is why I responded. But, as you are so reluctant to explain it to all of us here I suppose it probably
didn't go very well for the RN after their fierce battle with the requisitioned Greek fishing boats and the lone Italian light destroyer.

I trust it was all worth it....Crete wasn't lost after all..[;)]....?

Was it the September 16 Pink List?

Fred

warspite1

Thank-you for proving my point. "Crete wasn't lost after all".

Crete being won or lost had NOTHING to do with my post or the point of my post.

I think I have the measure of your way of debating. Let's just pick up on random comments from somewhere/anywhere and then use that to prove a point.

Okay fair enough. Oh and btw it wasn't a destroyer [8|]

[WriterNotViking]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

Do you know the plan(s)?

Fred

He doesn't need to know them to make the point that he did.

Ultimately, is it really so unreasonable to say that the British would have opposed an invasion of their homeland with a determined and sustained effort involving all branches of their armed forces? I don't think it is, and after that, arguing over which forces would have been committed and which would have been held back to serve as leverage in negotiations becomes fairly pointless. The commanders in charge would have made those decisions, and we are not them, nor do we share their responsibilities.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

warspite1

Well that is very, very disappointing. So you responded to my post without even bothering to understand why it was posted, in what context and what it was meant to answer.

The "debate" has gone rapidly downhill....

Oh, dear, so sorry. On the contrary, I bother a lot. That is why I responded. But, as you are so reluctant to explain it to all of us here I suppose it probably
didn't go very well for the RN after their fierce battle with the requisitioned Greek fishing boats and the lone Italian light destroyer.

I trust it was all worth it....Crete wasn't lost after all..[;)]....?

Was it the September 16 Pink List?

Fred

warspite1

On reflection, and having re-read your comment, I will actually answer your rather unfortunate post.

Cap Mandrake made the point about what happens when light forces get in amongst poorly defended "assault" craft. He quoted the Slapton Sands disaster. I furthered that comment with the example of the action off Crete.

Why is that relevant? Well let me first calmly point out to you (despite your silly comments designed to deflect from the point) this has nothing to do with whether Crete was saved, this has nothing to do with - what was it? how "fierce" the battle was, and it had nothing to do with whether the action was "worth it???".

The point being made was that, even if you believe the nonsense about the RAF (who I repeat were winning the BoB at that time) taking no action against the invasion fleet or the beaches as you state, all it would require was a reasonable sized naval force to get in amongst the head of the invasion flotilla to cause total and utter carnage. Remember we are talking about attacking vulnerable, slow moving, low in the water, barges and tugs.

This would be at night so your vaunted Luftwaffe and the cowardly and quite useless RAF are not factors. In both cases - Slapton Sands and Crete, the enemy had air supremacy by the way, and in both cases the attacking units fought some distance from where they were based.