Soviet Barbarossa

[Kull]

Pleshakov points out that the Soviets had a non-specific plan that favored offense over defense (building fortifications and airfields right on the border and shoving armies into salients is not something you do when planning to defend), but there were no details behind it, other than a requirement for the western-facing forces to be forward deployed. But several things changed in early 1941. In April Stalin signed the pact with Japan, which he felt gave the Soviets at least an 18 month window in which the far eastern arena would be quiet. Shortly thereafter (May 5th) he took on a formal role in the government as chairman of the council of ministers (the Soviet equivalent to the Prime Minister role). Until then he'd been General Secretary, which while powerful, gave him no direct responsibility for the formulation of government defense policy.

That very same day he gave a speech for the Red Army academy commencement. At the following banquet, a general congratulated him on following a "peace policy", but Stalin was quick to correct him:

"Let me introduce a correction here. A policy promoting peace did secure peace for our country. It was a good thing. For a while we emphasized the need for defense - until we rearmed our troops and gave them modern weaponry. Now, with the army restructured and possessing equipment for modern combat - now that we have become strong - it is time to go from a posture of defense to one of attack".

So that's the context in which you now see the new plan submitted to Stalin only 10 days later, which lays out the specifics of the invasion plan, and you also see how it fits with the massive mobilization of reserves and the orders directing 5 additional armies to move toward the front. Pleshakov does not cite any evidence pointing to a specific date for the offensive, but given Stalin's paranoia and his rather impulsive nature, that's not really surprising. It seems clear that he felt the time was very near, and he wanted to be able to pull the trigger whenever he felt the moment was ripe. And the gun was clearly cocked, loaded and pointed. It's just that Hitler pulled his trigger first.

[postfux]

I must admit I havent read Stalins Folly, but building defences on the border is was everyone does who plans to defend. That the Soviet deployment also had depth cant be denied.

Early 41 also saw Germany occupying the Balkan and Bulgaria joining the Axis. Reinforcing the defenses wouldnt be a surprising move.

On the other hand Germany denying the SU their area of influence in southeastern Europe and access to the Med must have led to offensive thinking in Moscow.

But an imminent invasion? Why take the risk? Why now? It is clear Britain will stay in the war and the Luftwaffe has failed. Time is working for the Soviets.

[Kull]

He wasn't "reinforcing the defenses". The Soviet army was forward deploying for an invasion. There's also something pretty close to proof that it wasn't a defensive alignment. On January 2nd 1941, there was a major war game encompassing the new border with Germany. Zhukov played the "blues" (Germany) and devastated the Reds. On the 15th, Stalin sat in to review the results, and nobody wanted to admit what had happened. Except Zhukov, who pointed out that the Reds lost because their forts were DIRECTLY on the border and the troops themselves were so close that it was impossible to prevent themselves from being "pocketed" (sound familiar WitE players?)

He had to phrase it carefully, but the gist was that the troops were not positioned properly in order to defend successfully. Which of course was entirely in keeping with the draft plans (still not fully fleshed out) for an offensive, plans of which Zhukov was unaware. To his credit, Stalin recognized that his top generals were old, incompetent, or both, and as a direct result of this meeting, Stalin fired his Chief of Staff (Meretskov) and replaced him with Zhukhov (the very next day).

So what you have is a situation where the Soviet troop dispositions were PROVEN to be a defensive failure, and the guy who knew that best of all was made Chief of Staff. And in this pre-eminent planning position, what did he do? Fix the issues identified by the war games? No. He was now part of the planning team and probably the person most responsible for turning the hazy draft into a detailed plan for an offensive that specified basically everything except the timing.

It just doesn't make sense that Zhukov would do NOTHING to fix the Soviet troop postures if the intent was to prepare for a defensive campaign.

[tomeck48]

There are inconvenient facts that can't be ignored in this matter. First the Soviet performance in the Winter War was less than promising. Second, plans are nice to have, but need competent officers and well equipped, trained men, sorely lacking in the Soviet Army in 1941. Third, the Soviets did counterattack a lot in 1941 but none of them worked until the Germans were out of supplies and freezing to death (conditions that would not have occurred on the Polish border in July). Finally, Stalin went into hiding after the Germans invaded, hardly the reaction of a confident offensive leader.

Can anyone say Tannenburg?

[Kull]

After an event happens, it's easy to go through the list of actual occurrences and point to the important facts. But before Barbarossa, Stalin was looking at a lot of others, and in his mind these were the important ones:

- The Red Army had clobbered the Japanese in Manchuria just a few years earlier, and suffered few casualties in so doing.
- The War in Finland wasn't a great success at first, but the Soviets "muddled through" and won in the end. At no time were they seriously threatened with an actual loss.
- The conquest of Poland, and the subsequent occupations of the Baltics and Bessarabia were all cake walks.

As for the German Army, Stalin felt that it's results were magnified by the incompetence of it's opponents, and in particular that none other than France were remotely comparable in size and weaponry. But on that count, the Soviets clearly outclassed the Germans:

Tanks: 14,000 to 3300
Aircraft: 9000 to 2000
Manpower: 3M Soviet troops in the Baltic-to-Black Sea theatre alone, a number that Germany couldn't remotely approach

Now those are just raw numbers and don't account for differences in quality and tactics, but even there the Soviets had encountered German weaponry in Spain only a few years earlier - and had visited German factories - and they weren't that impressed. Even the outmoded T-26 had proven superior to the German Mark I and II, and if German equipment "won out" in Spain, the Soviets felt it was only due to superiority in numbers, something that would not be true in a mano-a-mano encounter.

I think we can all agree that Stalin was drawing the wrong conclusions and vastly over rated the ability of his forces, but that's really the whole point. Stalin believed what he wanted to believe and there were just enough facts readily available to convince him that he was right.

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Kull
I think we can all agree that Stalin was drawing the wrong conclusions and vastly over rated the ability of his forces, but that's really the whole point. Stalin believed what he wanted to believe and there were just enough facts readily available to convince him that he was right.

This does reflect my own impressions. We can see that even after the invasion Stalin repeatedly ordered counter attacks that reflected what he thought they were capable of but which they were not. And why most military "facts" do not really say either way whether or not Stalin was going to attack Germany.

The other calculation that Stalin would have been making is whether to delay any conflict so that Germany's war in the west would weaken it further first, or whether they needed to attack sooner to avoid Germany becoming too strong. Hence why deployments could have been about giving options rather than reflecting decisions. I do think his foreign policy, while aggressive, also displayed caution. The quick fall of France was a shock. There is no doubt they assumed there would be a conflict at some point, the caution was only at choosing when would be the best time and who would start it. If Stalin was being cycnical, a not unreasonable assumption, he would rather Germany and the West wore each other out first.

[Capitaine]

ORIGINAL: Ridgeway

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

..... denier?

You might want to be careful throwing that word around.

No. I won't. What do you think of that?

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

ORIGINAL: Ridgeway

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

..... denier?

You might want to be careful throwing that word around.

No. I won't. What do you think of that?

Very uncool to call me names. [:)]

[Capitaine]

I don't know the answer, but has anyone looked to see what kind of plans and orders existed for the Winter War and Bessarabia on the Soviet side? Suggesting that the Soviets were using some standard military protocol in their offensive operations isn't convincing to me unless it can be shown this was how they normally behaved. I.e., "their normal course of business".

[Capitaine]

ORIGINAL: Telemecus

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

ORIGINAL: Ridgeway




You might want to be careful throwing that word around.

No. I won't. What do you think of that?

Very uncool to call me names. [:)]

Since when is that "a name". Explain.

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

ORIGINAL: Telemecus

ORIGINAL: Capitaine



No. I won't. What do you think of that?

Very uncool to call me names. [:)]

Since when is that "a name". Explain.

Since the post you made with that reference to me and not to what I said.

I think the best thing to say is it was a mistake, a misunderstanding online and we can forget about it. Then we can get back to talking about an interesting topic and not me.

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

I don't know the answer, but has anyone looked to see what kind of plans and orders existed for the Winter War and Bessarabia on the Soviet side? Suggesting that the Soviets were using some standard military protocol in their offensive operations isn't convincing to me unless it can be shown this was how they normally behaved. I.e., "their normal course of business".

I am guessing what you are saying is that countries did not normally make plans to invade each other. My evidence would be that up to the 1930s they actually did and this is how they normally behaved to one another. You can read all the published war plans the USA had for going to war with Britain in the 1930s and vice versa for instance. The period from the 1950s onwards when every country did not have at least some plans for going to war with its neighbours is the anomaly. No one that I know of thinks that a war was a serious prospect between Britain and the USA in the 1930s. So the conclusion has to be war plans do not imply a commitment to go to war.

You could argue that Soviet Union was different from other countries in that regard - but then have to justify why?

[Stelteck]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TyANHGWbUHA

[No idea]

ORIGINAL: Telemecus

ORIGINAL: Capitaine

I don't know the answer, but has anyone looked to see what kind of plans and orders existed for the Winter War and Bessarabia on the Soviet side? Suggesting that the Soviets were using some standard military protocol in their offensive operations isn't convincing to me unless it can be shown this was how they normally behaved. I.e., "their normal course of business".

I am guessing what you are saying is that countries did not normally make plans to invade each other. My evidence would be that up to the 1930s they actually did and this is how they normally behaved to one another. You can read all the published war plans the USA had for going to war with Britain in the 1930s and vice versa for instance. The period from the 1950s onwards when every country did not have at least some plans for going to war with its neighbours is the anomaly. No one that I know of thinks that a war was a serious prospect between Britain and the USA in the 1930s. So the conclusion has to be war plans do not imply a commitment to go to war.

You could argue that Soviet Union was different from other countries in that regard - but then have to justify why?

The USA certainly had war plans against all their possible (and almost impossible) rivals. Those included Japan (war plan orange) Britain (war plan red iirc), war plan black against Germany and even a war plan Emerald against Ireland (¡¡¡)

I would bet 10 to 1 that all other powers had similar plans. I know for sure that pre 1914 the major european powers had plans against each other. In fact, and contrary to what is sometimes thought, Germany had war plans against Russia only, but it wasnt updated since 1910, iirc. It would have been instresting to see what might have happened (and how the world would be today) had they updated their war plan against Russia only.

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Stelteck
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TyANHGWbUHA

Excellent video - and spot on about thinking critically. I think he does make the same mistake of making assertions from facts that do not follow - such as military plans implying political intentions. But I guess he would be the first to agree when he realises that. Ultimately you can only put theories out and not expect them to have to be right, but just see if they survive the critical tests by others.

[Aufklaerungs]

You may just want to issue a denial, mon Capitaine[8|]

[Kull]

I'll spare others from losing 45 minutes of their lives - the video is a straw man that basically debunks Suvorov's use of quotes from Keitel to support Suvorov's own extreme position - specifically a book arguing that the Soviets started WW2. But the video makes it's own extreme argument, by poking holes in Keitel's statements (hardly difficult) and using THAT as evidence that the Soviets were NOT planning to attack in the West.

Just because you can prove that one side really did have serious aggressive intent (and who here is arguing that Germany did not?), it doesn't mean the other side wasn't making similar plans. It IS possible for both Bob and Tom to wear a blue shirt.

[Aufklaerungs]

Completely agree. Why drag Keitel memoirs and Suvorov/Rezun theories in to muddy up the waters? They're both usual suspects, not reliable sources.

[whalus]

ORIGINAL: Kull
Just because you can prove that one side really did have serious aggressive intent (and who here is arguing that Germany did not?), it doesn't mean the other side wasn't making similar plans. It IS possible for both Bob and Tom to wear a blue shirt.

I think most have indicated they agree that offensive plans were being made by both sides here. As far as actually being serious about conducting an offensive campaign in 1941 the evidence seems to point more to Hitler than it does Stalin. And I do find it hard to believe that the possibility of Stalin launching an attack first played much, if any, role in Hitler's decision to invade Russia when he did.

[Capitaine]

@whalus - Do you have authority for your comments or is that just your "feelings"? Hitler is one of the most lied about men in history.