IRL how much have Japanese got from conquered territories

[warspite1]

Not sure how you can compare Holland to Bengal in the face of all evidence but can only assume its a need to make the British look like they orchestrated the whole thing.

Not sure either what the references to members of the congress being imprisoned is meant to show. There was a war on and Ghandi was advocating action that was not in the British interest. One can argue the rights and wrongs looking back - and even the sense or otherwise - of the treatment of Congress at the time (personally I wish the British had taken a more enlightened approach). But it was hardly the most difficult thing to understand.

To suggest no other parts of India suffered from food shortage (albeit no where near as bad) confirms you fail to understand the situation. In all the factors I’ve given as contributory factors I never mentioned the inflationary pressures the British policies brought - but you never mentioned it either. The comment about policy not being decided in Tokyo is rather unfortunate, if not a little silly. But you appear happy to blame the tragedy on the intentional actions of the British government so there is nothing much else to say. Roosevelt, Bush, Churchill, its amazing just how many world leaders were desperate to commit mass murder.

[rustysi]

its amazing just how many world leaders were desperate to commit mass murder.

Oh yeah. They do it all the time.

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

The largest non-conscript army in history and the lack of volunteers for the INA says something.

I'd disagree; India always has been a populous nation, and considering the massive opportunity that armed service had for escaping poverty and social advancement, it's really no surprise. It's been a regular feature of imperial rule to offer service in the armed forces as a means to escape financial and social hardship.

The First INA recruited a significant portion of the Indian troops that had been captured in Malaya - 12,000 out of 40,000. That's effectively one in four. Doesn't exactly paint a picture of the Royal Indian Army as being the happy, motivated, all-volunteer force that you'd like it to be.

[/quote]

It does to me, given the treatment that those prisoners received. That any of them chose to remain as such, instead of joining the INA, speaks volumes about their loyalty to their unit, if not their role in empire, and the failure that was the INA.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

The largest non-conscript army in history and the lack of volunteers for the INA says something.

I'd disagree; India always has been a populous nation, and considering the massive opportunity that armed service had for escaping poverty and social advancement, it's really no surprise. It's been a regular feature of imperial rule to offer service in the armed forces as a means to escape financial and social hardship.

The First INA recruited a significant portion of the Indian troops that had been captured in Malaya - 12,000 out of 40,000. That's effectively one in four. Doesn't exactly paint a picture of the Royal Indian Army as being the happy, motivated, all-volunteer force that you'd like it to be.

It does to me, given the treatment that those prisoners received. That any of them chose to remain as such, instead of joining the INA, speaks volumes about their loyalty to their unit, if not their role in empire, and the failure that was the INA.

[/quote]

Let's also not overlook the Christmas, Cocos and Indian Navy mutinies. There was a serious undercurrent of tension within the British Indian Army that bubbled to the surface on more than one occasion.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Not sure how you can compare Holland to Bengal in the face of all evidence but can only assume its a need to make the British look like they orchestrated the whole thing.

It doesn't need to be portrayed as anything, the facts speak for themselves. The British government in Bengal removed food stockpiles and seriously impaired the ability to move food.

This was done with the intention of denying them to the Japanese.

The fact that this could result in starvation to the people of Bengal almost certainly occurred to those responsible for the decision making and was deemed an acceptable outcome if it negatively impacted the Japanese war effort.

Not sure either what the references to members of the congress being imprisoned is meant to show. There was a war on and Ghandi was advocating action that was not in the British interest. One can argue the rights and wrongs looking back - and even the sense or otherwise - of the treatment of Congress at the time (personally I wish the British had taken a more enlightened approach). But it was hardly the most difficult thing to understand.

You're pushing the notion that the war was something that every day Indians were fully in support of. It wasn't - there was a serious resistance to the war and repressive measures were taken to keep the movement in check.

To suggest no other parts of India suffered from food shortage (albeit no where near as bad) confirms you fail to understand the situation. In all the factors I’ve given as contributory factors I never mentioned the inflationary pressures the British policies brought - but you never mentioned it either. The comment about policy not being decided in Tokyo is rather unfortunate, if not a little silly. But you appear happy to blame the tragedy on the intentional actions of the British government so there is nothing much else to say. Roosevelt, Bush, Churchill, its amazing just how many world leaders were desperate to commit mass murder.

Don't take my word for any of it, here's someone smarter than me.

www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp10_21.pdf

[spence]

The problem in Bengal in 1943 was not
internecine strife, but the failure of the
imperial power to make good a harvest
shortfall that would have been manageab
le in peacetime. The famine was the
product of wartime priorities.

The above is the ending conclusion to the reference work cited as being the work of "smarter people". The conclusion appears to be that "war is bad" and that the British might have done better handling the famine in Bengal: that's a real 'no-$hitter' and incredibly enlightening to someone who is visiting this planet for the first time from some far off planet and has never heard of the Second World War.

The "Beheading Contest" featured in the Tokyo newspapers after the fall of Nanking is hardly "the product of wartime priorities". The Japanese worked 90000 Thais to death building their railroad from Bangkok to Rangoon. Four million Indonesians died while under Japanese beneficence although hardly any of them died because of Allied bombing or getting caught in the middle of a battle. Filipinos roundly rejected the "Greater East Asia (Japanese) Prosperity Sphere". And frankly there is no defense whatsoever for the official Japanese behavior towards prisoners of war.

There was just never any chance that the Japanese could behave in a way that would have benefited the various other Asian populations. Those who thought otherwise (INA comes to mind) were pure and simply the dupes of Japanese wartime propaganda

[Dili]

Bengal famine did not surprise me in context of British policies post war in England: engineered rationing... by 1970's per capita income in West Germany was already above England.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

ORIGINAL: mind_messing



I'd disagree; India always has been a populous nation, and considering the massive opportunity that armed service had for escaping poverty and social advancement, it's really no surprise. It's been a regular feature of imperial rule to offer service in the armed forces as a means to escape financial and social hardship.

The First INA recruited a significant portion of the Indian troops that had been captured in Malaya - 12,000 out of 40,000. That's effectively one in four. Doesn't exactly paint a picture of the Royal Indian Army as being the happy, motivated, all-volunteer force that you'd like it to be.

It does to me, given the treatment that those prisoners received. That any of them chose to remain as such, instead of joining the INA, speaks volumes about their loyalty to their unit, if not their role in empire, and the failure that was the INA.

Let's also not overlook the Christmas, Cocos and Indian Navy mutinies. There was a serious undercurrent of tension within the British Indian Army that bubbled to the surface on more than one occasion.

warspite1

Invergordon mutiny, Salerno mutiny.... it happens in Britain too.......

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

You're pushing the notion that the war was something that every day Indians were fully in support of. It wasn't - there was a serious resistance to the war and repressive measures were taken to keep the movement in check.

warspite1

I must confess I had to re-read that comment a few times as I couldn’t understand where it came from - I assumed I was missing something.

I have pushed no such notion. This is just another example of you simplifying everything - well life ain’t that simple. The fact you refer to ‘everyday Indians’ is unfathomable. India was a deeply divided country. If it hadn’t been - and ‘everyday Indians’ had worked together, there is little possibility that British rule could have lasted as long as it did. It was Muslim/Hindu antipathy that greatly helped to sustain the Raj - and the British knew it.

“There was serious resistance to the war” - no **** sherlock! But that resistance - serious to those involved in it - was thankfully limited (although serious enough on a few occasions). Had it been more widespread the raising of the largest non-conscript army in history would simply not have been possible. But read about India and try and understand. The volunteers for the armed forces were not spread equally across the sub-continent. Life isn’t black and white. There were regions, religions, ethnic groups loyal to Britain, and those who couldn’t wait to see the back of us. The majority - as is often the case - were shades of grey that just got on with things as best they could until events took over one way or another.

“Repressive measures were taken to keep the movement in check” Ya think? I have said this - hence my comment that British policy in India, in terms of governance (particularly in the 30’s), could have been more enlightened to the benefit of all. But as said, it was wartime, the British could not afford India to go into open revolt and measures were taken to try and put Congress back in its box by imprisoning the leaders. Why is that so difficult to understand? What did the British do with Mosley in this country during the war? Yes, he was imprisoned and his party banned.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Don't take my word for any of it, here's someone smarter than me.

www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp10_21.pdf

warspite1

Firstly thanks for the link - that was an interesting read and always good to read different perspectives. You say someone smarter than you? Well he’s studied the Bengal Famine so I guess in terms of that subject he is smarter (on that topic) than both of us. But he also presents one view. He is also selective in the cabinet quotes and the action taken by the war cabinet. Quelle surprise. What the work also identifies - and I have mentioned this previously, is the role in this tragic unfolding mess played by local government - and we are talking about Indians themselves. What were they in on the great conspiracy to murder 3 million of their fellow Indians too? Having read that article do you still think the problems in Bengal - where communication with various districts could take weeks - were easier than Holland?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

Bengal famine did not surprise me in context of British policies post war in England: engineered rationing... by 1970's per capita income in West Germany was already above England.

warspite1

?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

The fact that this could result in starvation to the people of Bengal almost certainly occurred to those responsible for the decision making and was deemed an acceptable outcome if it negatively impacted the Japanese war effort.

warspite1

Interesting statement. “Almost certainly occurred”? So where is the evidence that supports that comment? Only “almost”? Careful. Okay let’s park that one and move on. Please confirm who deemed starvation of the Bengali people acceptable? Under what circumstances? After invasion? Without an invasion? How many deaths in the event the Japanese didn’t invade was deemed acceptable? Please confirm who deemed starvation acceptable?

If you are going to make the case for a deliberate and wilful act of mass murder then you really ought to back that up with facts.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: spence

The problem in Bengal in 1943 was not
internecine strife, but the failure of the
imperial power to make good a harvest
shortfall that would have been manageab
le in peacetime. The famine was the
product of wartime priorities.

The above is the ending conclusion to the reference work cited as being the work of "smarter people". The conclusion appears to be that "war is bad" and that the British might have done better handling the famine in Bengal: that's a real 'no-$hitter' and incredibly enlightening to someone who is visiting this planet for the first time from some far off planet and has never heard of the Second World War.

The "Beheading Contest" featured in the Tokyo newspapers after the fall of Nanking is hardly "the product of wartime priorities". The Japanese worked 90000 Thais to death building their railroad from Bangkok to Rangoon. Four million Indonesians died while under Japanese beneficence although hardly any of them died because of Allied bombing or getting caught in the middle of a battle. Filipinos roundly rejected the "Greater East Asia (Japanese) Prosperity Sphere". And frankly there is no defense whatsoever for the official Japanese behavior towards prisoners of war.

There was just never any chance that the Japanese could behave in a way that would have benefited the various other Asian populations. Those who thought otherwise (INA comes to mind) were pure and simply the dupes of Japanese wartime propaganda

warspite1

The author concludes succinctly. The Imperial Power was ‘in charge’ and so it happened on their watch. He rightly says war time priorities was the reason. He doesn’t enlarge upon that - which is a shame - but his selected quotations and ‘half a story’ are instructive in concluding where, specifically, he believes the blame lies......

However the article does not make the case for MM’s accusation that the famine was a deliberate act by the British to murder 3 million Indians and so further his argument that the actions of the Japanese in WWII can be compared to the actions of Britain as an Imperial power at around the same time.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Don't take my word for any of it, here's someone smarter than me.

www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp10_21.pdf

warspite1

Firstly thanks for the link - that was an interesting read and always good to read different perspectives. You say someone smarter than you? Well he’s studied the Bengal Famine so I guess in terms of that subject he is smarter (on that topic) than both of us. But he also presents one view. He is also selective in the cabinet quotes and the action taken by the war cabinet. Quelle surprise. What the work also identifies - and I have mentioned this previously, is the role in this tragic unfolding mess played by local government - and we are talking about Indians themselves. What were they in on the great conspiracy to murder 3 million of their fellow Indians too? Having read that article do you still think the problems in Bengal - where communication with various districts could take weeks - were easier than Holland?

Feel free to find another article of your choice. I doubt you'll find anything that takes the tone you'd like from Indian historians.

The cabinet quotes aren't cherry picked. Amery himself noted that Churchill was akin to George III in regards to India.

The British government of the time damned the local government as the cause, citing "hoarding and speculation". Looking at the evidence, that's not the case.

There was nothing stopping the British from mounting a relief effort akin to Operation Manna and Operation Chowhound. The transports were even in theatre - based at Ledo and flying to China.

Interesting statement. “Almost certainly occurred”? So where is the evidence that supports that comment? Only “almost”? Careful. Okay let’s park that one and move on. Please confirm who deemed starvation of the Bengali people acceptable? Under what circumstances? After invasion? Without an invasion? How many deaths in the event the Japanese didn’t invade was deemed acceptable? Please confirm who deemed starvation acceptable?

If you are going to make the case for a deliberate and wilful act of mass murder then you really ought to back that up with facts.

The decision was made to remove surplus stocks of food from a region with marginal excess food production. Either the ramifications were discussed and found acceptable, or they weren't. In the first case, the government deemed the possible starvation of Bengals acceptable. In the second case, the govenrment was criminally indifferent to the potential outcomes.

The author concludes succinctly. The Imperial Power was ‘in charge’ and so it happened on their watch. He rightly says war time priorities was the reason. He doesn’t enlarge upon that - which is a shame - but his selected quotations and ‘half a story’ are instructive in concluding where, specifically, he believes the blame lies......

However the article does not make the case for MM’s accusation that the famine was a deliberate act by the British to murder 3 million Indians and so further his argument that the actions of the Japanese in WWII can be compared to the actions of Britain as an Imperial power at around the same time.

You missed the paragraph above the conclusion. It's much more relevant:

" Here I have argued that the lack of political will to divert foodstuffs from the war effort rather than speculation in the sense outlined was mainly responsible for the
famine. Those in authority at the time knew that there was a shortfall. The war cabinet in London chose not to act on it. Churchill’s lack of empathy for India
and ‘all to do with it’ mattered; his immediate reaction to Amery’s last-ditch plea for more shipping on November 10th was ‘a preliminary flourish on Indians
breeding like rabbits and being paid a million a day by us for doing nothing about the war’."


The British government precipitated the famine by their wartime measures, then downplayed the issue as far as possible, then failed to mount any effective relief efforts.

The famine happened as a result of calculated choices on the part of the British colonial regime. Famine releif was denied as a result of deliberate choices on the part of the British colonial regime.

Interesting statement. “Almost certainly occurred”? So where is the evidence that supports that comment? Only “almost”? Careful. Okay let’s park that one and move on. Please confirm who deemed starvation of the Bengali people acceptable? Under what circumstances? After invasion? Without an invasion? How many deaths in the event the Japanese didn’t invade was deemed acceptable? Please confirm who deemed starvation acceptable?

If you are going to make the case for a deliberate and wilful act of mass murder then you really ought to back that up with facts.

There are two possibilities here.

A: The colonial government evaluated the outcomes of moving food stocks and shipping out of a region with a marginal food surplus.
B: The colonial government did not evaluate the outcomes of moving food stocks and shipping out of a region with a marginal food surplus.

In case A, the government is willing to risk starvation of the population in order to deny the food to the Japanese.

In case B, the government is just criminally indifferent.

ORIGINAL: spence

The problem in Bengal in 1943 was not
internecine strife, but the failure of the
imperial power to make good a harvest
shortfall that would have been manageab
le in peacetime. The famine was the
product of wartime priorities.

The above is the ending conclusion to the reference work cited as being the work of "smarter people". The conclusion appears to be that "war is bad" and that the British might have done better handling the famine in Bengal: that's a real 'no-$hitter' and incredibly enlightening to someone who is visiting this planet for the first time from some far off planet and has never heard of the Second World War.

The "Beheading Contest" featured in the Tokyo newspapers after the fall of Nanking is hardly "the product of wartime priorities". The Japanese worked 90000 Thais to death building their railroad from Bangkok to Rangoon. Four million Indonesians died while under Japanese beneficence although hardly any of them died because of Allied bombing or getting caught in the middle of a battle. Filipinos roundly rejected the "Greater East Asia (Japanese) Prosperity Sphere". And frankly there is no defense whatsoever for the official Japanese behavior towards prisoners of war.

There was just never any chance that the Japanese could behave in a way that would have benefited the various other Asian populations. Those who thought otherwise (INA comes to mind) were pure and simply the dupes of Japanese wartime propaganda

I raised the issue of the Bengal famine to make the point that none of the colonial powers were remotely close to being beacons of moral righteousness. There's been a great deal written about how colonial structures are always determinantal for all involved.

[warspite1]

I raised the issue of the Bengal famine to make the point that none of the colonial powers were remotely close to being beacons of moral righteousness.

And who ever claimed they were? As said, by the standards of today they are wrong. But, in less enlightened times it’s what countries did - whether Monarchies, Republics or whatever – Belgium, Britain, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Mongols, Netherlands, The Ottomans, Portugal, Russia, The Romans, Spain, Sweden, United States etc etc etc. So no, making straw man arguments does not help your cause as it’s a pretty obvious tactic and totally without merit.

There's been a great deal written about how colonial structures are always determinantal for all involved.

And of course the first part of that sentence – a great deal written - is true (and rightly so), while the second part merely confirms your own bias. Always detrimental? No, but generally detrimental? Yes. I think that is a given as a colony that drains resources away from the mother country is all rather pointless.

But always? That is once again, a simplistic, throw-away line that detracts from any sensible debate about empires. Empires came in all forms and let’s be honest, even the least benign were hardly guilt free – sometimes even by the standards at the time. Amritsar? Pretty disgusting episode wasn’t it? But then so was Peterloo. Working conditions for those under colonial rule were for a great many pretty hideous – poverty in India in the 19th century was huge. But have you ever been to the Science and Industry Museum in Manchester? Seen the cotton machines that only children could clean?...while moving…. Life was pretty grim back then for the majority wherever one was and whoever ruled by. Of course having a rubbish life AND being conquered by a foreign foe was just salt in the wound….


So you have laid out your credentials for disliking empires – although, by the standards of today, so does just about every right thinking person – so no gold stars there. But you believe the actions of the British are no better than the Japanese. You’ve said:

There's plenty of precedent within WW2 for nations gulfing the vast distance between respectable conduct and outright brutality. With the focus of AE in mind, the Bengal Famine springs immediately to mind.

You’ve provided a paper by one person and presented this like it is the last word on the subject of the Bengal Famine. Sorry but because it contains conclusions that you agree with, that does not necessarily mean it’s the last word and does not even come close to being the last word. To understand this episode – and no I don’t just mean picking out a few ‘smoking gun’ quotes – I mean to really understand this episode takes a proper analysis, a detailed timeline, crop returns, imports of food to India in response (and no I don’t just mean vague references using sentences like ‘relatively small amount’ from Wiki), causes of death (famine or disease), weather reports, the military situation, the domestic situation in the rest of India, what action actually ended the famine?; in short it takes someone without a serious weed up their behind and an agenda to look dispassionately and objectively into the tragedy properly. That is what I am interested in. You said:

Feel free to find another article of your choice. I doubt you'll find anything that takes the tone you'd like from Indian historians.

Again, a very telling comment and a crass one. “The tone you’d like” – a bit pathetic. If there is evidence of genocide, of the wilful murder of up to 3m people I want to know about it. And an “Indian historian”? What do you mean? You won’t accept any report written by anyone British? What are you saying, any such report on the famine can only be considered true if it’s written by an Indian? As I said I was very interested to read the paper you provided the link for by Grada from University College Dublin. No, I don’t think it in any way shape or form answers the questions I want to see answered (fancy map telling me the % of 20+ Bengalis that were literate in 1941 isn’t hugely helpful), it also falls into the selective quotations and evidence trap, but it raises some good points and asks questions that need to be addressed as part of a proper look at what happened.

The cabinet quotes aren't cherry picked.

What are the quotes the only thing WSC or anyone else in the cabinet had to say on the whole tragedy? Wow....

I must say though that this one gave me a chuckle. It’s like the thread about Churchill and Anthrax from some years back. Desperate to believe Churchill came close to authorising it’s use, you posted the oft quoted speech about Iraqis and Mustard Gas. As was shown, WSC’s comment didn’t exactly put him up for humanitarian of the year (but then how many of his contemporaries (from all countries) would have felt the same?) but as a tool for proving his willingness to use Anthrax it meant absolutely nothing. It was, in effect, a bit of mud-slinging and no more.

The quotes Amery noted are not great – but equally no proof of any deliberate mishandling of the Bengal Famine by WSC. They also lack context in terms of the pressures Churchill was under and the problems faced in India at the time (not that that would make deliberate mass starvation acceptable). If evidence was not cherry picked and this was a balanced article seeking to get to the truth then why not mention the steps HMG did take? But that would take a bit of effort and wouldn’t fit the narrative would it?

The British government of the time damned the local government as the cause, citing "hoarding and speculation".

This is why a proper timeline needs to be drawn and understood. The inference from the bits and pieces of ‘evidence’ provided is that 1 The British remove the surplus food and fishing boats. 2 Famine – HMG says do nothing. 3 Major problem starvation followed by disease.

There is of course a problem with that – a very big problem. Despite some people liking to make everything black and white and simple, life is not like that. What almost certainly happened is that the problems didn’t quickly happen over a short space of time. They took time to identify, the scale of the problem even more so. People appeared to be reacting to events rather than controlling them. Why? Where exactly did the blame for that lie?

There was a British policy to deny surplus food to the Japanese. That had an effect on a situation created already by the Japanese occupation of Burma. You seem to suggest at this stage someone in HMG decided that this may lead to starvation. The considered opinion was “yeah that’s acceptable”. You have no evidence as to who took that decision, what debates were had and where ultimate sanction came from but state it all the same. One of the things we know from exploring conspiracy theories is that some people just can’t seem to understand that ALL the information on something isn’t available to ALL the people ALL the time. What you say suggests that all agencies were aware of this policy, were concentrating on this policy and were contributing what they knew to this policy. Then with all facts known the decision was “Do it”.

But regardless, with hindsight the policy was wrong anyway because it made a bad situation that was soon to develop (for whatever reason(s)) worse, and, again with hindsight, it was wrong on a second count; namely that given Japanese MO, regardless of whether the surplus had been removed or not, the Japanese would have taken what they needed and to hell with the population. Knowing what we do about the Japanese supply lines into Burma, the Bengali population would have been in major trouble had an invasion happened and even if the policy of denial was not taken.

There is no doubting that there was a cyclone in late 1942, but what happened next, in what order, exactly where, what instructions were given by whom to whom, has not been set out. What appears to have happened from the articles I’ve read and tried to piece together is the age old tale of people being overwhelmed by what was happening – distances and poor communication (this was not Holland), didn’t help, but nor did the myriad of other contributory factors I’ve mentioned in previous posts. The issue developed over time. The requests of HMG increased overtime suggesting that no one was getting a handle on the situation. Hording, HMG policy-induced Inflation, corrupt and inept local Indian and British officials, tension between Muslim and Hindu populations, all added to the mix.

Then of course there was the small matter of the Quit India Movement and its effect on British and local government resource and attention. When did that start? Well just 5 months after the denial policies started to be put into effect. The local uprisings and protests that took place were not quashed until March 1943. Why is that important? Well for one thing in August 1942 the war was going pretty much down the toilet for the Allies, the British and Russians in particular. The eastern Indian Ocean had been wrested from RN control and an invasion of India was feared. While all this was going on 57 battalions of infantry – about 6 divisions worth - were required to quash an uprising. That’s a lot of diversion of resources at a really bad time.

There was nothing stopping the British from mounting a relief effort akin to Operation Manna and Operation Chowhound. The transports were even in theatre - based at Ledo and flying to China.

You make it all sound so simple. But maybe you are right. So tell me what aircraft were based there – we are talking late 1942 and then into 1944 - and what were they doing at the time? Presumably numbers in 1942 would have been significantly less than later as the Allies built up resources in north eastern India. Presumably they were not sitting around waiting for something to happen. I suspect they were being worked hard to keep China in the war and building up defences on the Indian/Burmese border? I’d be very interested to know what makes you say there was ‘nothing stopping’ a relief effort. But again even if there was capacity there, that in itself is pointless if the people in charge – HMG, the Viceroy, the local government officials, the military – don’t know what the solution is and this is where the detail outlined above is needed.

The famine happened as a result of calculated choices on the part of the British colonial regime. Famine releif was denied as a result of deliberate choices on the part of the British colonial regime.

So you keep saying, and as I have said, the British were in charge – and this happened on their watch. But it’s a big accusation you are making, please provide some actual evidence. Remember your accusation is that the British behaviour here (outright brutality) is no better than the Japanese treatment of conquered peoples. Like with the rather limited people that believe Roosevelt knew about Pearl Harbor, to say HMG (Churchill) knew what was going on and was happy to allow 1.2-3m Bengalis to starve or die of disease is really easy to say – some proof however would be nice before you lay this at his door.

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili

Bengal famine did not surprise me in context of British policies post war in England: engineered rationing... by 1970's per capita income in West Germany was already above England.

warspite1

?

Check when Britain stopped rationing compared to other European countries much more affected by war. It was completely unjustified and at same time destroying food like milk and derivates like what cheese could be fabricated...So they had rationing and at same time destroying food and deciding what cheese to make by a Government bureaucrat. Rationing was btw one of the reasons that Churchill could return to power promising to end it. I can only imagine what would have happened in less developed country.

Another one that falls more in US side, how in Germany as German economy representative in Occupation Ludwig Erhard went out against Allies, freeing prices to get growth and products into the market. He succeeded.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

EDIT FOR BREVITY

OK, how's this warspite. I've provided a published paper about the famine. You don't like the conclusions it draws. Fair enough.

The ball is in your court now. Why don't you go find a paper that you like. While you look, I'll throw another couple your way.

https://sci-hub.tw/10.1080/00856408908723118

I'll even say that you might be interested in Mark Tauger's views.

Again, a very telling comment and a crass one. “The tone you’d like” – a bit pathetic. If there is evidence of genocide, of the wilful murder of up to 3m people I want to know about it. And an “Indian historian”? What do you mean? You won’t accept any report written by anyone British? What are you saying, any such report on the famine can only be considered true if it’s written by an Indian? As I said I was very interested to read the paper you provided the link for by Grada from University College Dublin. No, I don’t think it in any way shape or form answers the questions I want to see answered (fancy map telling me the % of 20+ Bengalis that were literate in 1941 isn’t hugely helpful), it also falls into the selective quotations and evidence trap, but it raises some good points and asks questions that need to be addressed as part of a proper look at what happened.

Sorry, that wasn't clear. I was suggesting that you avoid the Indian historiography on the issue as they tend to be exceptionally critical of the British role.

What are the quotes the only thing WSC or anyone else in the cabinet had to say on the whole tragedy? Wow....

I must say though that this one gave me a chuckle. It’s like the thread about Churchill and Anthrax from some years back. Desperate to believe Churchill came close to authorising it’s use, you posted the oft quoted speech about Iraqis and Mustard Gas. As was shown, WSC’s comment didn’t exactly put him up for humanitarian of the year (but then how many of his contemporaries (from all countries) would have felt the same?) but as a tool for proving his willingness to use Anthrax it meant absolutely nothing. It was, in effect, a bit of mud-slinging and no more.

The quotes Amery noted are not great – but equally no proof of any deliberate mishandling of the Bengal Famine by WSC. They also lack context in terms of the pressures Churchill was under and the problems faced in India at the time (not that that would make deliberate mass starvation acceptable). If evidence was not cherry picked and this was a balanced article seeking to get to the truth then why not mention the steps HMG did take? But that would take a bit of effort and wouldn’t fit the narrative would it?

It's not mud-slinging. Churchill was one of those rare people that came out on the right side of history despite a very troubled journey through it.

The quotes provided give an insight into the mindset of the highest levels of British leadership at the time. It doesn't convey much sympathy with the people of Bengal, or much urgency to resolve the problem. That is compounded by the offical report, which was more or less a whitewash.

You make it all sound so simple. But maybe you are right. So tell me what aircraft were based there – we are talking late 1942 and then into 1944 - and what were they doing at the time? Presumably numbers in 1942 would have been significantly less than later as the Allies built up resources in north eastern India. Presumably they were not sitting around waiting for something to happen. I suspect they were being worked hard to keep China in the war and building up defences on the Indian/Burmese border? I’d be very interested to know what makes you say there was ‘nothing stopping’ a relief effort. But again even if there was capacity there, that in itself is pointless if the people in charge – HMG, the Viceroy, the local government officials, the military – don’t know what the solution is and this is where the detail outlined above is needed.

All those aircraft flying the Hump...?

So you keep saying, and as I have said, the British were in charge – and this happened on their watch. But it’s a big accusation you are making, please provide some actual evidence. Remember your accusation is that the British behaviour here (outright brutality) is no better than the Japanese treatment of conquered peoples. Like with the rather limited people that believe Roosevelt knew about Pearl Harbor, to say HMG (Churchill) knew what was going on and was happy to allow 1.2-3m Bengalis to starve or die of disease is really easy to say – some proof however would be nice before you lay this at his door.

The British response was brutally indifferent. It remains so. The inital reaction ("It's the fault of the locals and a mismanagement issue") then developed into brutal indifference ("We don't have the ships or we can't risk it", "The Greeks need it more").

Churchill knew about the famine. Mukerjee is rightly exceptionally critical. The food was there, as was the shipping. It just wasn't going to India.

[BBfanboy]

I have not studied the situation in India/Bengal/Burma but it sounds like facts are being brought forward without the total context of what was happening everywhere Britain was supposed to deal with.

About the food destruction in Britain - I have never heard this but it could have happened. Convoys were bringing in massive amounts of everything and stockpiling to feed the millions of troops being sent to Britain and to send along with the invasion forces that were to launch from there. I would expect the US had something to say about using the food it was stockpiling for its own troops. It is easy to see how perishable foods could easily become unusable before they could be sent anywhere. British cheese producers presumably had limited capacity to handle milk. And most milk sent overseas was powdered anyway and may not have been suitable for cheese production. I expect even powdered milk has an expiry date.

About getting the food to India - I am not aware of any ships sitting idle during the war, except when they were gathering into a convoy in a major port like Halifax. So if they all had a mission, diverting some to India would mean denying another mission their shipping. In 1943 Britain was supporting the North Africa campaign and then the Sicily and Italian campaigns. On top of that were convoys to Russia and the height of the Battle of the Atlantic. If there was a shortage for India, that is not surprising.

As for India itself, it is a large country which would normally feed its own people without much being imported from abroad. No doubt the crop failure was a surprise and required a rapid response, but the rail and road infrastructure going to Bengal was not robust (it still isn't - lots of rickety bridges, steep climbs and very narrow roads). It would take months to make arrangements to handle a civilian requirement that the military was not prepared for. The best thing, IMO, would have been to let the people in the affected area migrate south where the food was - but factional conflicts probably made that unpalatable. So who, in the end could have prevented the catastrophe?

Sometimes even the rich and powerful are helpless in the face of all that is expected of them. [:(]

[warspite1]

I've provided a published paper about the famine. You don't like the conclusions it draws. Fair enough.

I didn’t say I didn’t like the conclusions. I said it was an interesting read with some interesting arguments. What it was not, was the last word on the tragedy and in no way shape or form made the case that you are arguing.

Why don't you go find a paper that you like.

I’ve told you before, but you choose to ignore, I am not interested in a ‘paper I like’. You keep using the word like to suggest I only want one version of the truth. But no, I am not like you. I am interested only in a proper understanding. The paper that I want to see does not appear to be available. Yes I could have posted Tauger or Herman or others in support of an alternative view to yours. But, while as interesting as those you’ve posted, they don’t answer some of the fundamental questions I have (questions that you should have if you really want to be able to support your accusation).

….. I was suggesting that you avoid the Indian historiography on the issue as they tend to be exceptionally critical of the British role.

Another boring unwarranted remark given all I’ve said previously.

It's not mud-slinging. Churchill was one of those rare people that came out on the right side of history despite a very troubled journey through it.

Yes it was mud-slinging. The Anthrax article was shown to be complete rubbish – even the trendy lefty author admitted he should not have said all that he did….

As for Churchill’s record, yes he was a complex individual. You know, the sort of individual that increasingly the modern day generation can’t appear to cope with. He was not squeaky clean, there were errors of judgement – and, in this day and age some of his ideas and policies don’t look great (in other words he was human and a man of his time). But if we judge everyone in history strictly by today’s standards then – and just think about this for a moment – who will be left that we can actually be ‘allowed’ to admire or say anything publically in their defence? But that is another subject completely.

All those aircraft flying the Hump...?

So in support of your statement that there was ‘nothing stopping’ a relief effort you provide this – “all those aircraft”… Really? Great detail…. So this plethora of spare aircraft were milling around doing nothing? When Churchill wrote to FDR asking for assistance with shipping to aid the situation in Bengal Roosevelt replied that while Churchill had his “utmost sympathy,” his Joint Chiefs had said they were “unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping….Needless to say, I regret exceedingly the necessity of giving you this unfavourable reply”.

I am not 100% certain but I suspect most (probably all?) transport aircraft were US. But according to you, the aircraft weren’t doing much important (other than keeping China in the war and building up defences against invasion/preparing for an offensive in the Arakan) and could have been spared – whereas the ships couldn’t?

The inital reaction ("It's the fault of the locals and a mismanagement issue") then developed into brutal indifference ("We don't have the ships or we can't risk it", "The Greeks need it more").

Like all good conspiracy theories there is an awful lot of malevolent moustache twirling taking place on the grassy knoll, but not much else. We are talking about a complex situation that evolved over a period of time. Read the various articles available – these writers who have studied this can’t even agree on whether there was a crop failure, or the extent of the crop failure….there is no agreed position on the extent to which denial caused/made the problem worse. As has been said by some of these writers, the problem would have been manageable in peacetime (assuming of course that this specific issue would have happened in peacetime, but we can’t know for certain because the ‘experts’ can’t agree on the actual cause), But there were a large number of factors that came together to magnify this problem – the nature of which would have taxed anyone as there was simply no precedent; the small matter of the war (and its effect on rice imports from Burma), the war time inflation, the need to keep war production going and troops provisioned etc etc.

Brutal indifference? As has been clear from the various articles, there were steps taken by local government and the Government of India. But, these failed. Putting policies in place is not brutal indifference – that is action being taken. But the policy failure does evidence human beings in unfamiliar (and later desperate) circumstances being unable to always find the right answer. If every politician had the right answer to every problem then the world wouldn’t be in the mess it’s in now right?

Churchill knew about the famine. Mukerjee is rightly exceptionally critical. The food was there, as was the shipping. It just wasn't going to India.

I would ask you to support that comment but I’d just get the same bland response as with the aircraft. We know there were ships available to the Allies. And Mukerjee claims they were going here there and everywhere but India. Mukerjee has said that in January 1943 60% of shipping in the Indian Ocean was ordered to the Atlantic. This order was made at around the time that requests were being made of HMG for more food. But as I’ve said there are interesting questions raised. One such comes from Auriol Law-Smith’s paper you linked previously. If, as Wiki states, Linlithgow was requesting more food from HMG, why did he simply not use the powers available to him under the 1935 India Act and the Defence of India rules?

Set against the decision to remove shipping to the Atlantic it has to be remembered that losses of merchant ships had almost tripled in 1942 compared to the previous year. If that continued then the build-up of war material and food in Britain would be imperilled. You see, there were always competing needs – but with hindsight everything is so easy. And without wishing to state the bleedin’ obvious, with Britain starved out of the war or unable to reinforce i.e. loss of the Atlantic lifeline, then India was in even bigger trouble.

I know that people like Mukerjee believe that the war situation is not worthy of mention but there was quite a bit for HMG to be focussed on at the time. I mean we are talking summer 1942 and hindsight is NOT allowed:

- The exact effect of the winter offensive on the Wehrmacht is not appreciated in the west and Operation Blue sees the Soviets pushed back to a city on the Volga while German forces push into the Caucasus and the oil there. So the British and the US are trying to keep the Soviets in the war through lend-lease which means shipping is required in three oceans – Arctic, Indian and Pacific
- The Germans are about to make a final drive for Cairo having pushed the British back to a railway halt on the coast of Egypt…. The Mediterranean remains closed with all that means for merchant shipping needed to supply North Africa having to go around the cape.
- A huge operation to try and keep Malta in the war is required
- In the Indian Ocean the Royal Navy has been pushed back to Africa and is stripped to allow the operation above.
- The losses in the Battle of the Atlantic have tripled from the year before as the Allies battle to keep the Atlantic sea lanes open to supply and reinforce the UK
- In the Far East the British Army have been pushed back in poor order to the Burmese border and are still re-building so that they can launch a limited campaign at the end of the year
- The Allies are trying to keep supply to China open
- While all the above is going on there is a revolt in India that is taking up manpower and resource that is needed elsewhere.

But then there were reports of starvation in eastern India and requests for assistance from HMG. What none of the reports and papers I’ve read seem to be able to do is piece together is what exactly what was requested and when? What was then delivered? What ended the famine - was it imports that eventually got there or food from within other parts of India that were available all along? If from internal sources then why was this not done sooner – why did Linlithgow not use the powers he had? Articles like that in Wiki suggest the imports were negligible – if so then how was the famine ended? When did local government officials realise the problem and how was this escalated? Parts of Bengal were badly affected while others were relatively unaffected – what impact did this have on local officials thinking in terms of the scale of the problem, its causes (and thus what was required to sort it out)? As said, questions to be answered to get a proper understanding of how the tragedy unfolded and what was done/not done and why.

It’s a big accusation you’ve made but the evidence against HMG acting deliberately to withhold food when confronted with a major humanitarian crises has not been made. If someone ever makes it – and provides evidence – then I for one will have no issue accepting it.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Edit for brevity

http://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.10 ... 8908723118