Did Neville Chamberlain do the right thing?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

The Soviets still might have come to the aid of the Czechs, somehow.

The conference could have been called by the Western Allies when they saw the repercussions of the Treaty of Versaille and the other treaties. If Germany, Austria, Hungary and others would not come, that would mean that they would get nothing. Remember, the Depression had already started by 1930 and part of the unrest in the Sudetenland was because the Sudetenland ethic Germans had produced a lot of export goods which were now not being exported, hence not produced and therefore a lot of jobs were lost. Think of a version of the "Common Market" being formed in the 1930s . . .

Appeasement is giving the bully your lunch money so he would beat you up. Righting a wrong is correcting a bad contract. There is a difference.

warspite1

Why not set a scene and give whoever wants to explore this something to work with?

So what is the year? Who suggests this and why exactly i.e. what is the catalyst? What is it going to encompass? Territorial amendments or financial settlements too? How would decisions be made and by whom?

I think this would be helpful because at the moment I am struggling to think of a scenario. Countries don't just give up their positions without there being a good reason, but in proposing this, the Western Powers need to be ready to come with their cheque books out because only one side of the fence is going to be doing the Father Christmas impression.

And if they are doing that then what are they actually getting out of it? What is their fall-back position?

[RangerJoe]

Considering the government at the time with a going senile (in 1933 anyways) James Ramsay MacDonald who had done the London Conference in 1924; MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain could have started the process. With the advice that for the Parliament of "If we don't get an agreement, we will have to re-arm."

Computer/browser problems so I can't get into too many research sites for detailed work.

[RangerJoe]

Some things were being tried:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dawes_Plan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Plan

[philabos]

As pointed out in the video, the UK had no agreement with Czechoslovakia, only France was committed based on the 1924 Agreement.

Chamberlain's mistake may have been leaving London in the first place.

[Crossroads]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Crossroads

ORIGINAL: warspite1


warspite1

Please see post 50 for my thoughts. We know Hitler would have ordered Case Green - what every country (and the plotters amongst the German General Staff) does after that? Who knows? As said would the Czechs beat off the Germans? Would they quickly succumb? or what? And without knowing that its all just so much guess work.

To continue this off-tangent, I did read your posts, also I did watch the video first. Which was excellent and quite interesting while at it. Again, the original quesion is a most intriguing one: Did Chamberlain do the right thing? I went back and worth on my own though process, not between "yes" or "no", but "yes" and "I don't know". Hindsight not allowed, I could not conclude he did the wrong thing, per se. Sudetenland and 1938 was not "it", imho.

I do agree with the panelist that 1935 and Abessinia was a missed opportunity. The Navy could have so easily kept Mussolini at bay, showing a strong deterrence, and indeed, showing the UK politicians "are not eunuchs". That in mind, in 1940-1941 the Italian embargo did play a strong role in Mussolini choosing Hitler. That, and of course the fact Hitler's Germany had humiliated everyone and appeared all-powerful and non-stoppable.

As for the Munich Agreement, with no hindsight, and keeping in mind it was about 3 million Germans joining Germany proper, i don't see how the public would have agreed to go to war against Germany on those premises. Nor was Anscluss, either. It is such a devilish dilemma with 20/20 hindsight though, as those two annexations left Germany so much stronger.

Which brings me back to my question, or rather pointing my finger at Czechoslovakia instead. Reverting to old bacon-and-eggs joke, and how the chicken participated in preparing breakfast, the pig committed. Yes, Chamberlain participated (strongly) in Munich negotiations, but Czechoslovakia committed to it. If indeed the Sudetenland had her best defences there, the question in black and white was: does she give them up, or does she keep them? Czechoslovakia went with it, with a terrible price, while Hitler received quite an inventory of war material and factories for his use.

So in my mind, it was not Chamberlain, it was the Czechoslovakian government who made the most terrible decision on appeasement. With 20/20 hindsight of course, but it was their call, ultimately. A war against Germany was of course a terrible option, but when the price at the table is your survival as an independent state, it comes ultimately to making a choice there. One of the panelists suggested the war might have been over in a matter of days, but that is of course what was the expected outcome of invasion of Finland by USSR as well. Who knows? Very difficult to speculate, and of course a terrible option for Czechoslovakia as well. I have no doubt Hitler would have done anything butt attacked, and I don't believe there would have been a coup in Germany either. Everyone was terrified of Hitler, there was no coup when Germany attacked France, either, while most of the German Generals were really scared of the potential outcome of Fall Gelb.

-- Edit: and how it played out in history, from this point of view, was how it logically should have played out, too? Annexation of Czechoslovakia finally opened up everyone's eyes to the fact there was no role for diplomacy anymore. From now, it was the arms who'd do the talking. Also, Stalin would have never done anything else given the options. Decadent European powers bleeding each others to death, leaving Europe ripe for pickings, how would he say no. So we are where we are. --

While the past is easier to forecast then future, it is not simple either. I don't know but the overall situation with Czechoslovakia in 1938. Can anyone recommennd a book going in detail about this?

warspite1

Interesting post re the Czechoslovakian take.

I suppose on the one hand one could say Benes did the only sensible thing by the Czech people - it was made clear he would be taking his country to war without the possibility of help coming their way so there would be hundreds of thousands of deaths - many civilian - for little purpose.

On the other hand, as you say, no one knows what would have happened so why not stand firm and see what happens - maybe help will be forthcoming (particularly if they put up a good defence) and worst case the Czechs will be remembered for making a stand against evil. Maybe the reality was that mobilisation would be too badly affected by the loss of the Sudeten Czechs?

But even if help doesn't arrive and they go under, is life for your average Czech really going to be any worse than what life was likely to be like under the Nazis? Or did they too believe that Hitler wouldn't seek any more after the Sudetenland?

I've never really read a critique of Benes and Co's actions. Would be interesting to read.

I am not blaming Benes as such, just curious to learn more as how and why the decisions in Czechoslovakia were made, at the time. As you wrote, the options were terrible. They just did not have any good options, just bad, and worse, with hindsight required to see how this decision played out.

Again, the safe assumptions Benes could have made were that yes, Hitler would attack, and that outside help was questionable at best, after Munich Agreement. I would not have USSR being available to "help" at this stage a feasible option at all. No one would trust their "help" (hence the parenthesis), and also, they were not much in a shape to help anyone, with the officer purges etc.

And, crucially, there was no prequisite as what it truly means to have appeasement with Hitler, or Stalin for that matter. Czechoslovakia decided to trust the agreement, to their demise. Baltic countries decided to trust their agreements, to their demises. And of course, we have not much touched the subject of how to work with a a pot of nationalities such as Czechoslovakia after the Great War. There are sound reasons why Czechs and Slovaks wanted their independent states after the Cold War. And at the time it was more complex, even.

So, anyone with a good book to recommend on the topic of pre-WW2 Czechoslovakia? [:)]

[RangerJoe]

But the Czechs and the Slovaks are somewhat related to each other but not to the Germans except through intermarriage - which did take place. Also, there were no lines on any map which sharply delineated ethnic groups.

[philabos]

Crossroads, see post 42.
Watt gained access to the German Diplomatic files while serving with the British Army in 1947.
It does cover Europe as a whole and not just Czechoslovakia, over 600 pages covering 1938-1939.
Used copies $6 on Amazon.

[Crossroads]

ORIGINAL: philabos

Crossroads, see post 42.
Watt gained access to the German Diplomatic files while serving with the British Army in 1947.
It does cover Europe as a whole and not just Czechoslovakia, over 600 pages covering 1938-1939.
Used copies $6 on Amazon.

Thanks, I noticed your post at the time, but was not aware how inexpensive some hard cover used copies were. Bought one!

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Crossroads

ORIGINAL: philabos

Crossroads, see post 42.
Watt gained access to the German Diplomatic files while serving with the British Army in 1947.
It does cover Europe as a whole and not just Czechoslovakia, over 600 pages covering 1938-1939.
Used copies $6 on Amazon.

Thanks, I noticed your post at the time, but was not aware how inexpensive some hard cover used copies were. Bought one!

warspite1

I'm trying to get through Gorbachev as quickly as possible so that I can get to this puppy! At least How War Came has given me the impetus I need to get the book on the ex-Soviet leader finished asap!!

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: Crossroads
...

So, anyone with a good book to recommend on the topic of pre-WW2 Czechoslovakia? [:)]

For some insight into the Czech-Slovak issue you read Hasek's 'Good Soldier Svejk'. Its a deeply black comedy set at the start of WW1 but on the way throws a lot of light on the differences of language and culture.

There is a good biography of him by Cecil Parrott (though long out of print) that goes into these issues in more detail.

Mary Heimann's 'the state that failed' has some good reviews and seems to be a comprehensive study from 1918 to 1992.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: loki100

ORIGINAL: Crossroads
...

So, anyone with a good book to recommend on the topic of pre-WW2 Czechoslovakia? [:)]

Mary Heimann's 'the state that failed' has some good reviews and seems to be a comprehensive study from 1918 to 1992.

warspite1

This has a very mixed reception on Amazon. 13 reviews average 3/5. I may dip my toe in after How War Came....

[loki100]

aye, bit hard to interpret as the negatives all seem to come from a very specific take on events. Since I don't claim to be able to interpret the views expressed, I felt it maybe had value as at least trying to cover the internal dynamics up to 1938?

[Crossroads]

Meanwhile, I thought to check Max Jakobson's The Diplomacy of the Winter War, which, despite of its name, covers the years of 1938-1940, and also discusses in quite some detail how the great power politics were aligning at the time.

One interesting tidbit related to topic of this thread is the discussions between the US Moscow Ambassador Davies and the Foreign Minister of USSR Litvinov in March 1938, where Litvinov says he's personally certain that Czechoslovakia will face a most difficult situation in next summer (1939). He also declares that in his opinion they will agree to Hitler's demand because there's no reason they should trust the French to be able to offer any assistance to them. He was also certain that USSR does not need to follow their agreement to aid Czechoslovakia, because France will never do so (as mentioned earlier in this thread, USSR had agreed to aid Czechoslovakia only once France ha already done so). Also: "France does not trust Soviet Union, Soviet Union does not trust France, League of Nations is dead", and "Soon, in Hitler occupied Europe, only the UK in the West and Soviet Union in the East shall survive".

Another interesting anecdote from early 1938 is Komintern's secretary Dimitrov publisihing an article stating "Hitler's Roadmap" of "attacking Austria in Spring 1938, Czechoslovakia in Autumn 1938, Hungary in Spring 1939, Poland in Autumn 1939, Yugosloavia in Spring 1940, Romania and Bulgaria in Autumn 1940, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland in Spring 1941, and USSR in 1941." Not a bad estimate.

With this type of diplomatic discussions taking place at the time, Chamberlain's attempt to prevent the war seem again not that out of place as what could have been achieved diplomatically. The other options would have been to do nothing, or to try to achieve a military solution. And with this, I am now in the camp that Chamberlain indeed did the right thing with the Munich Agreement. Meaning, with the voting in the video per the Opening post, I moved from Don't Know to For.

Let us see if "How War Came" changes my take on things.

[Zovs]

Maybe he was in the wrong environment?

Just read this article from a completely different kind of world but thought I’d share for food for thought.


I've been in London this week, at a conference, and thinking about ducks.

In the story of the ugly duckling, a young duck compares themselves to the rest of their family and notices how different and ugly they are. This goes on for some time, the duck believing that they are simply a very ugly duckling. Then the duck travels, and ultimately meets some swans, and realizes that they weren't an ungly duckling all along, but instead a beautiful swan.

This story is often used to help us when we feel different, or inferior to our peers, to understand that we're all unique, and at some point we'll find our inner beauty and realize that we were wonderful and amazing all along.

This is a good moral to this story. But there's one aspect of this story that is usually overlooked by those who hear it.

That is considering the effect of the environment. The ugly duckling only thought they were ugly when they were in the wrong environment. Once the environment was fixed, they suddenly saw themselves in the right light. The truth came out because of WHERE they were.

Winston Churchill should never have become Prime Minister. He was a wild cat. He was an alarmist at a time when nobody wanted that. They wanted to be told everything was alright. He wasn't a politician who came from "the system". He was an outsider. In just about ANY other age, he would never have found success. His achievements did not come just because he had that "never quit" attitude, like some Hollywood story about the athlete who never gives up and eventually finds success.

He only achieved what he did because he was suddenly the right person when the environment changed. As the inevitability of war became apparent, the environment was suddenly right for him. But not before that. He needed the right environment to flourish. Just like the ugly duckling.

Winston Churchill was not a conformist. He was unabashedly himself. But his success didn't come until the environment became right. His predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, was a man most would probably admire. He was dedicated to doing everything he could to preserve peace. Unfortunately, the environment wasn't right for him. But it was for Winston Churchill.

Now I'm not trying to denigrate perseverance, something we all probably need more of. But we also need to be in the best environment for us.

I've had a couple jobs as a programmer that I just sucked at. I got fired from one job, and nearly fired from the other. They were simply the wrong environment. When I found the right environment, I flourished.

So what about you? Are you in the right environment to succeed? Are you in "the right seat on the right bus"? Are you trying to make things work in the wrong environment? Trying to make yourself into a "pretty duckling" by doing what all the other ducks are doing?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Crossroads

Let us see if "How War Came" changes my take on things.

warspite1

I'm just itching to get to this but I know if I pick it up before Gorbachev is finished, I won't finish the latter.....

I am particularly interested in understanding more about Franco-Belgian discussions, and hope that there is something about this in the book.

[Crossroads]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I am particularly interested in understanding more about Franco-Belgian discussions, and hope that there is something about this in the book.

Indeed! Max Jakobson, understandably due to topic of his book, provided more detail about Soviet diplomats and what they had talked before the war. He repeats a good few times how Soviets were certain they'd not need to follow up on their promise of protecting Czechoslovakia, for they were certain France would not follow up on their promise, first.

[philabos]

Litvinov was one of the more enlightened members of the Soviet leadership, low bar as that may be. He actually had some talent dealing with the west and had good relations with the western media as well. He was certainly right about the French, and that contributed to his replacement by Molotov. Apparently the Soviet leadership came around to Litvinov's point of view by fall of 1939.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: philabos

Litvinov was one of the more enlightened members of the Soviet leadership, low bar as that may be. He actually had some talent dealing with the west and had good relations with the western media as well. He was certainly right about the French, and that contributed to his replacement by Molotov. Apparently the Soviet leadership came around to Litvinov's point of view by fall of 1939.

warspite1

I was always under the impression that Litvinov's 'problem' was that he was seen as being behind the collective security failure earlier in the decade. He was also Jewish and anti-Nazi, so when the landscape changed and Stalin was approached about getting into bed with Hitler, Litvinov was not the man for the job and exited stage left.

I would have thought the autumn of 1939 was when Stalin was patting himself on the back that Molotov had done a grand job and was delighted with Litvinov's removal. The NS Pact was proving its worth, Eastern Poland gobbled up and more to come....

[philabos]

Right on all counts.
The only nuance was Litvonov had concluded France would not fight. One does not deliver bad news to Josef. He was out.
Molotov did the NS pact, which admittedly Litvinov would never do.
Not sure how happy Stalin was in 1941 with the accomplishment, but Molotov did hold onto his head.
That itself was an achievement.
The point is the NS pact was doable because an alliance with the European land power was not.
Litvonov got the second part right.

[warspite1]

How War Came

Okay so up to chapter 4 and so far so.... okay.

The authors writing style isn't my favourite - although not the worst I've ever come across. More to the point, the story seems to have whistle-stopped through much of the appeasement story which seems a bit of a shame.

So 1939 it is....