Looked at almost everything else before discovering HTTR... Great game and very interesting for historical buffs of WW2. Notice that COTA is about to be released (I really like the new supply ideas). But couldn't resist some suggestions that I haven't noticed being mentioned ... perhaps some could be considered for later version. My main feeling is that the HTTR display could be a bit more immediate - I'd like to be able to see the state of my units and what they are doing at a glance...
1. On large maps combat actions can occur without me noticing (Sometimes I scroll to an area and get to see my forces performing a Custer's last stand). How about red flashes like ripples in a pond on the minimap where actions are occuring (reckon I've seen this in some RTS game). Also when an enemy unit is spotted by one of my units could flash white in a similar way and perhaps also have a message in the scrolling log (eg "E Coy 502 spotted enemy tanks near Veghen") allowing mouse click to centre on spotted unit/s...
2. Set air strike/s to auto find target in area. Since those guys are up in the air they can probably spot units I haven't seen or don't have exact intel on. Area might be specified by mouse click & drag or map area (see later). Rather than losing unallocated strikes might default to last area specified or whatever. A map might be split into areas for instance Son, Eindhoven, Veghel, Best etc might be areas on hells highway map that could be used for airstrike/arty targeting.
3. Larger minimap. The red enemy units don't stand out very well currently (1024x768 or 1280x1024 19'' VDU).
4. Artillery seems to set up immediately it arrives at some location. Think there should be delay after arty is moved to detach from transport, setup etc. Also feel that arty comms with units are probably a bit too efficient in HTTR.
5. Set arty to counterbattery fire as first priority for the unit.
6. A more intuitive method of being able to take control of arty units and release them back to unit control. Never can remember how to do this
7. Whilst I like to have realistic order's delay on I think that in some cases a full delay should not apply. For instance when a company is being creamed a company commander should surely be able to make a decision to withdraw to nearest cover (unless it was initially ordered to hold to last man last bullet etc) which in the case of infantry and mobile units in radio/other contact might be almost instantaneous (get the hell into that wood over there!). Units such as AT might lose equipment if they retreat quickly of course (Does a routed AT unit currently lose some of its guns when retreating?).
8. Staged withdrawal doesn't seem to work very well in HTTR, but I notice that you have this as number 3 on COTA improvement list.
9. A unit's log might contain more info such as percentage left of personnel strength for a take casualties message. Could also be messages for equipment losses etc.
10. As an extension of LOS/Threats would be really useful to see complete arcs of fire of units, perhaps with different colour range bands for effective range of main unit armament.
11. I find using the function keys to switch between cohesion/fatigue/morale/ammo etc cumbersome - Really want to see that info all at the same time!?
12. Taking fire / routing etc box is a bit small and difficult to distinguish colours (specially for large proportion of males who have some red/green colour blindedness!).
13. I'd like to have semi persistent fire arrows emanating from my units. These arrows would point in the directions my units are firing in. Could be done by making the current firing graphic semi persistent i.e. fades gradually away and varying intensity according to weight of fire in that direction.
14. More gradual map zoom in and out.
15. Ability to order scenarios by historical date within theatre.
16. Record progress of scenario to allow play back afterwards and for AARs.
17. Photos of commanders, equipment etc + more biogs.
18. Deployment mode for all units. Shows outlines of where all units are deployed (and their facings etc) so that e.g. you can tell that your divisional base unit doesn't all fit in that tiny hamlet etc. and that units don't overlap too much (In a later version you could extend this so that control freaks can zoom into individual houses and adjust the number of packets of lucky strikes being allocated to each individual soldier...)
M
New Features for COTA
Moderator: Arjuna
RE: New Features for COTA
mhailes,
Thanks for your great suggestions. We've addressed quite a few in COTA already. Others will of course have to wait. I'm flat out right now, but I'll address each point in turn a bit later.
Thanks for your great suggestions. We've addressed quite a few in COTA already. Others will of course have to wait. I'm flat out right now, but I'll address each point in turn a bit later.
-
James Sterrett
- Posts: 1619
- Joined: Wed Jul 07, 2004 4:03 am
RE: New Features for COTA
"Set air strike/s to auto find target in area. Since those guys are up in the air they can probably spot units I haven't seen or don't have exact intel on. Area might be specified by mouse click & drag or map area (see later). Rather than losing unallocated strikes might default to last area specified or whatever. A map might be split into areas for instance Son, Eindhoven, Veghel, Best etc might be areas on hells highway map that could be used for airstrike/arty targeting. "
While fun, this doesn't square well with WW2 reality. You're essentially asking for a free-hunting function, in which the aircraft look for something moving (if it is stationary they likely won't spot it) and then attack whatever they find. Because of (well-founded) concerns over friendly fire incidents, these only operated on the far side of the bomb line from friendly units. The bomb line was typically more than 50 miles, and often more than 100 miles, from the expected forward edge of friendly units; beyond it, aircraft could attack anything they found. Closer than that line, they required guidance from a forward air control party and bombed what the FACP told them to attack. (Why was the bomb line so far away? Because pilot's navigation wasn't always perfect, so the bomb line was set far enough out that navigational errors were less likely to cause friendly fire incidents.)
Thus, the kind of free-hunting attacks you're asking for rarely took place within the proximity to friendly ground troops of an HTTR map.
Reading assignment: [;)]
Ian Gooderson, _Air Power at the Battlefront_ -- a great piece of research into the realities of close air support, 1943-1945.
While fun, this doesn't square well with WW2 reality. You're essentially asking for a free-hunting function, in which the aircraft look for something moving (if it is stationary they likely won't spot it) and then attack whatever they find. Because of (well-founded) concerns over friendly fire incidents, these only operated on the far side of the bomb line from friendly units. The bomb line was typically more than 50 miles, and often more than 100 miles, from the expected forward edge of friendly units; beyond it, aircraft could attack anything they found. Closer than that line, they required guidance from a forward air control party and bombed what the FACP told them to attack. (Why was the bomb line so far away? Because pilot's navigation wasn't always perfect, so the bomb line was set far enough out that navigational errors were less likely to cause friendly fire incidents.)
Thus, the kind of free-hunting attacks you're asking for rarely took place within the proximity to friendly ground troops of an HTTR map.
Reading assignment: [;)]
Ian Gooderson, _Air Power at the Battlefront_ -- a great piece of research into the realities of close air support, 1943-1945.
RE: New Features for COTA
James
Good point you are probably right that free hunting of unspotted units nearby should not normally be allowed especially for something like Market Garden where the air support can have no idea where the troops might be and thanks for the reference - Is interesting subject.
However, apart from unspotted units, I mainly brought this up from a desire to compensate for intel reports becoming out of date so you don't know *exactly* where the enemy unit is and also because I think It would be cool if the CAS pilot and forward observer were able to decide on strikes without the player's intervention as is done for artillery.
For instance the player might specify an area (or maybe a specific observer?!) as the current default (or see below). Then the observer (computer) might say to the next CAS in the rank something like:
"Look old chap someone spotted a bunch of Jagd Panthers on the other side of hill 419 about an hour ago. Why don't you toddle on over and take a look."
In this case the bombing might be on target even if the TDs had moved a short distance from their reported position since the plane can hopefully see it's target.
Getting a bit more sophisticated each observer on the map might stack up requests for CAS and be served on a round robin basis or according to a player set observer priority i.e. satisfy x strikes for observer A, y for B, and z for C in that order.
A further point - It might be a fun idea to make air and arty observers part of the game so that a company might have an air/arty observer capability - and might lose it or part of it if the observer is killed or the equipment destroyed or becomes faulty.
.... Actually the whole area of comms would be a very interesting one to have in the game. The game might trace comms connection in a similar way as COTA is going to treat supply. Comms problems might involve losing touch with units cos of dodgy radios also command delays would be much longer for units with poor comms connections.
M
P.S. I seem to recall that the 1st Airborne div lost their air support comms equipment. Although lack of air support is a major criticism for Market I understand that they did get some minimal support late on in the campaign. In this case the pilots presumably had to find their own targets and presumably honoured the bomb line in the breach rather than the observance?
Good point you are probably right that free hunting of unspotted units nearby should not normally be allowed especially for something like Market Garden where the air support can have no idea where the troops might be and thanks for the reference - Is interesting subject.
However, apart from unspotted units, I mainly brought this up from a desire to compensate for intel reports becoming out of date so you don't know *exactly* where the enemy unit is and also because I think It would be cool if the CAS pilot and forward observer were able to decide on strikes without the player's intervention as is done for artillery.
For instance the player might specify an area (or maybe a specific observer?!) as the current default (or see below). Then the observer (computer) might say to the next CAS in the rank something like:
"Look old chap someone spotted a bunch of Jagd Panthers on the other side of hill 419 about an hour ago. Why don't you toddle on over and take a look."
In this case the bombing might be on target even if the TDs had moved a short distance from their reported position since the plane can hopefully see it's target.
Getting a bit more sophisticated each observer on the map might stack up requests for CAS and be served on a round robin basis or according to a player set observer priority i.e. satisfy x strikes for observer A, y for B, and z for C in that order.
A further point - It might be a fun idea to make air and arty observers part of the game so that a company might have an air/arty observer capability - and might lose it or part of it if the observer is killed or the equipment destroyed or becomes faulty.
.... Actually the whole area of comms would be a very interesting one to have in the game. The game might trace comms connection in a similar way as COTA is going to treat supply. Comms problems might involve losing touch with units cos of dodgy radios also command delays would be much longer for units with poor comms connections.
M
P.S. I seem to recall that the 1st Airborne div lost their air support comms equipment. Although lack of air support is a major criticism for Market I understand that they did get some minimal support late on in the campaign. In this case the pilots presumably had to find their own targets and presumably honoured the bomb line in the breach rather than the observance?
M
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James Sterrett
- Posts: 1619
- Joined: Wed Jul 07, 2004 4:03 am
RE: New Features for COTA
A different way to approach part of the effect you're looking for:
I'd be happy to assign CAS Priority to a given headquarters; while CAS Priority was assigned, it would automatically take any CAS that showed up and direct it as it saw fit (most threatening target). It would wait to commit the strike for 5 minutes, so that if you wanted to override the priority, you could use the usual method to direct the strike. After that, it's a race between you and the HQ to assign the strike (who will click faster - you, or the AI? [;)] ) Setting up a priority passing function such as you suggest also works for me.
The problem with hunting a unit you think moved a small distance is that you wind up in a bind - either the pilots do some hunting (dangerous) or you direct them to hit a specific area - which means you'd click that onto the map in the current manner.
If you have a computer that's up to it, grab a copy of IL-2 Sturmovik or Falcon 4: Allied Force and try hunting vehicles on a large map. Even though it is *easy* in the sim (compared to real life), it's very hard to tell the good guys from the bad guys, especially when they get close; and terrain features that loom large in the eyes of the chaps on the ground barely register to you up in the air. I've bombed friendlies in both of these despite using every crosscheck I could think of. [:(]
"I seem to recall that the 1st Airborne div lost their air support comms equipment. Although lack of air support is a major criticism for Market I understand that they did get some minimal support late on in the campaign. In this case the pilots presumably had to find their own targets and presumably honoured the bomb line in the breach rather than the observance?"
You know more than me about the specific case - but it sounds like Britannia waived the rules, probably partly from having a good enough description of the static perimeter, and partly from knowing things couldn't get much worse if the pilots screwed up.
I'd be happy to assign CAS Priority to a given headquarters; while CAS Priority was assigned, it would automatically take any CAS that showed up and direct it as it saw fit (most threatening target). It would wait to commit the strike for 5 minutes, so that if you wanted to override the priority, you could use the usual method to direct the strike. After that, it's a race between you and the HQ to assign the strike (who will click faster - you, or the AI? [;)] ) Setting up a priority passing function such as you suggest also works for me.
The problem with hunting a unit you think moved a small distance is that you wind up in a bind - either the pilots do some hunting (dangerous) or you direct them to hit a specific area - which means you'd click that onto the map in the current manner.
If you have a computer that's up to it, grab a copy of IL-2 Sturmovik or Falcon 4: Allied Force and try hunting vehicles on a large map. Even though it is *easy* in the sim (compared to real life), it's very hard to tell the good guys from the bad guys, especially when they get close; and terrain features that loom large in the eyes of the chaps on the ground barely register to you up in the air. I've bombed friendlies in both of these despite using every crosscheck I could think of. [:(]
"I seem to recall that the 1st Airborne div lost their air support comms equipment. Although lack of air support is a major criticism for Market I understand that they did get some minimal support late on in the campaign. In this case the pilots presumably had to find their own targets and presumably honoured the bomb line in the breach rather than the observance?"
You know more than me about the specific case - but it sounds like Britannia waived the rules, probably partly from having a good enough description of the static perimeter, and partly from knowing things couldn't get much worse if the pilots screwed up.
RE: New Features for COTA
Am not quite sure of your main intention - Surely in reality friendly fire *did* occur (whatever system was adopted) and so friendly fire would be a *good* addition (at some stage when the developers have time to develop the air model further) and would increase the realism of the simulation somewhat. I would suggest that in HTTR both bombing and arty are perhaps more accurate than they were historically.
Although I'm no expert I feel that, at time of Market Garden, air support must have worked somewhat in the way I suggested in my last post - It's difficult to believe that a pilot would blindly bomb some map reference given by a ground controller when he could see that nothing was there or that he would ignore targets slightly off of his given position... (Also you might expect a pilot who could not find a target to return to the rank for another mission if he had sufficient fuel - you wouldn't want to go home without shooting off those rockets). A low flying Typhoon (for instance), rather than engaging in blanket bombing of a map reference would usually need to identify the targets for it's rockets individually. I find it hard to believe that ground controllers, who wouldn't in any case be able to see the individual targets, would leave nothing to the discretion of the pilots ...
Also, thinking about it, your 50-100 mile bomb lines (in your first post) seem a bit odd for interdiction missions. For instance, In Falaise Gap, just before Market Garden, many planes were involved interdicting the enemy retreat all over the front. These Jabos would operate well within 50 miles of both Brit and American troops?! Surely almost all interdiction missions would be closer than 50 miles even those directed at enemy supply lines?? if you extend this to 100 miles you're probably going to be in a different war...
Recently I've been reading "An Army At Dawn" by Rick Atkinson (really excellent ***** I think) which is about the Torch landings and the subsequent campaign in Tunisia. Apparently, in the early stages, bombing the wrong side was so bad that the American soldiers would try to shoot down any plane regardless of marking... You'd expect friendly fire to be quite bad in the Aegean campaigns too.
>> IL-2 Sturmovik or Falcon 4: Allied Force
I thought modern planes used electronic identification signals coordinated with the ground units (but am again on somewhat shaky ground knowledge wise)? I realise that this doesn't always work in practice viz first gulf war when Brits lost more casualties to friendly fire than to enemy action... you'd think it might work in a sim though.
M
Although I'm no expert I feel that, at time of Market Garden, air support must have worked somewhat in the way I suggested in my last post - It's difficult to believe that a pilot would blindly bomb some map reference given by a ground controller when he could see that nothing was there or that he would ignore targets slightly off of his given position... (Also you might expect a pilot who could not find a target to return to the rank for another mission if he had sufficient fuel - you wouldn't want to go home without shooting off those rockets). A low flying Typhoon (for instance), rather than engaging in blanket bombing of a map reference would usually need to identify the targets for it's rockets individually. I find it hard to believe that ground controllers, who wouldn't in any case be able to see the individual targets, would leave nothing to the discretion of the pilots ...
Also, thinking about it, your 50-100 mile bomb lines (in your first post) seem a bit odd for interdiction missions. For instance, In Falaise Gap, just before Market Garden, many planes were involved interdicting the enemy retreat all over the front. These Jabos would operate well within 50 miles of both Brit and American troops?! Surely almost all interdiction missions would be closer than 50 miles even those directed at enemy supply lines?? if you extend this to 100 miles you're probably going to be in a different war...
Recently I've been reading "An Army At Dawn" by Rick Atkinson (really excellent ***** I think) which is about the Torch landings and the subsequent campaign in Tunisia. Apparently, in the early stages, bombing the wrong side was so bad that the American soldiers would try to shoot down any plane regardless of marking... You'd expect friendly fire to be quite bad in the Aegean campaigns too.
>> IL-2 Sturmovik or Falcon 4: Allied Force
I thought modern planes used electronic identification signals coordinated with the ground units (but am again on somewhat shaky ground knowledge wise)? I realise that this doesn't always work in practice viz first gulf war when Brits lost more casualties to friendly fire than to enemy action... you'd think it might work in a sim though.
M
M
RE: New Features for COTA
Friendly fire was very much a thing of reality in WW2.
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James Sterrett
- Posts: 1619
- Joined: Wed Jul 07, 2004 4:03 am
RE: New Features for COTA
Having gotten home and dug out Gooderson to firm up my position, it's time to issue some retractions. Oops!
Yep, but friendly fire is already in HTTR - some strikes near friendly troops may go awry and hit your troops instead of the enemy. I do agree the arty is too responsive (though it's hard to complain when it's mine! [;)] ) and the air too flexible and accurate as well - with the same disclaimer. [:)]
My main intent - if it's CAS, then it should be hitting known targets - but I'm happy to unload the micromanagement of the target selection process onto the AI by assigning priority of support to headquarters units; in theory, this is like assigning the forward air control party to that unit.
Well, you won't be in a different war, but (this is the big retraction) the bomb line tended to be ~10 miles out, not 50-100. Oops! [:(]
Gooderson has a significant section on Market-Garden; among the things to pull out on why CAS wasn't available, in summary:
- Airborne forces did not keep up with developments in CAS control, *and* they lost most of their signals gear;
- Fighter-bombers were kept from flying when their presence might conflict with airdrops, including supply drops, to prevent them from tangling with the fighters protecting the cargo aircraft;
- Fighter-bombers were not sent in to conduct CAS in the later stages because "it is unlikely that the Typhoons could have identified their targets adequately enough to have intervened in the fighting" not least to to the signals shortfall. (Gooderson, pp. 97-98)
Even the March 1945 drops had awkward to abysmal ground-air coordination.
Falaise is a good question. My skimming through Gooderson isn't providing answers on the coordination; I'd guess that the free-hunting air attacks had strictly defined boundaries - although those still included the major movement routes! [:)]
Much of the most effective interdiction was deep, because the prime target was railroads. The Western Allies pounded the rail network in France before D-Day, apparently with good results in hurting the German's ability to move troops and supplies in the quantities they needed. (Rail interdiction was something the Soviets never got nailed down, despite pre-war doctrine, probably because until summer-autumn 1944, the partisans could stand in for the air force in that role).
Agreed - well worth reading.
Coordination in DS1 worked through rear HQs trying to check known friendly unit positions against the positions of reported targets. It didn't always work out....
I'm not aware of an IFF system for ground units. Even the one for air units isn't foolproof...!
The main point was that those sims provide an easy and fun means of getting a sense of the difficulty of the problem, even though it's distinctly easier in the sim than in real life.
ORIGINAL: mhailes
Am not quite sure of your main intention - Surely in reality friendly fire *did* occur (whatever system was adopted) and so friendly fire would be a *good* addition (at some stage when the developers have time to develop the air model further) and would increase the realism of the simulation somewhat. I would suggest that in HTTR both bombing and arty are perhaps more accurate than they were historically.
Yep, but friendly fire is already in HTTR - some strikes near friendly troops may go awry and hit your troops instead of the enemy. I do agree the arty is too responsive (though it's hard to complain when it's mine! [;)] ) and the air too flexible and accurate as well - with the same disclaimer. [:)]
My main intent - if it's CAS, then it should be hitting known targets - but I'm happy to unload the micromanagement of the target selection process onto the AI by assigning priority of support to headquarters units; in theory, this is like assigning the forward air control party to that unit.
Also, thinking about it, your 50-100 mile bomb lines (in your first post) seem a bit odd for interdiction missions. For instance, In Falaise Gap, just before Market Garden, many planes were involved interdicting the enemy retreat all over the front. These Jabos would operate well within 50 miles of both Brit and American troops?! Surely almost all interdiction missions would be closer than 50 miles even those directed at enemy supply lines?? if you extend this to 100 miles you're probably going to be in a different war...
Well, you won't be in a different war, but (this is the big retraction) the bomb line tended to be ~10 miles out, not 50-100. Oops! [:(]
Gooderson has a significant section on Market-Garden; among the things to pull out on why CAS wasn't available, in summary:
- Airborne forces did not keep up with developments in CAS control, *and* they lost most of their signals gear;
- Fighter-bombers were kept from flying when their presence might conflict with airdrops, including supply drops, to prevent them from tangling with the fighters protecting the cargo aircraft;
- Fighter-bombers were not sent in to conduct CAS in the later stages because "it is unlikely that the Typhoons could have identified their targets adequately enough to have intervened in the fighting" not least to to the signals shortfall. (Gooderson, pp. 97-98)
Even the March 1945 drops had awkward to abysmal ground-air coordination.
Falaise is a good question. My skimming through Gooderson isn't providing answers on the coordination; I'd guess that the free-hunting air attacks had strictly defined boundaries - although those still included the major movement routes! [:)]
Much of the most effective interdiction was deep, because the prime target was railroads. The Western Allies pounded the rail network in France before D-Day, apparently with good results in hurting the German's ability to move troops and supplies in the quantities they needed. (Rail interdiction was something the Soviets never got nailed down, despite pre-war doctrine, probably because until summer-autumn 1944, the partisans could stand in for the air force in that role).
Recently I've been reading "An Army At Dawn" by Rick Atkinson (really excellent ***** I think)
Agreed - well worth reading.
>> IL-2 Sturmovik or Falcon 4: Allied Force
I thought modern planes used electronic identification signals coordinated with the ground units (but am again on somewhat shaky ground knowledge wise)? I realise that this doesn't always work in practice viz first gulf war when Brits lost more casualties to friendly fire than to enemy action... you'd think it might work in a sim though.
Coordination in DS1 worked through rear HQs trying to check known friendly unit positions against the positions of reported targets. It didn't always work out....
I'm not aware of an IFF system for ground units. Even the one for air units isn't foolproof...!
The main point was that those sims provide an easy and fun means of getting a sense of the difficulty of the problem, even though it's distinctly easier in the sim than in real life.
RE: New Features for COTA
Hi Wodin
Well no one is going to argue with that. I think though you would need to read the posts in a little more detail if you wanted to make a more penetrating contribution to the discussion...
M
Friendly fire was very much a thing of reality in WW2.
Well no one is going to argue with that. I think though you would need to read the posts in a little more detail if you wanted to make a more penetrating contribution to the discussion...
M
M
RE: New Features for COTA
ORIGINAL: mhailes
I think though you would need to read the posts in a little more detail if you wanted to make a more penetrating contribution to the discussion...
One of the really great things about this board is the friendly way everyone treats other posters no matter how robust the discussions.
Shall we keep it that way? [:)]
Ray
RE: New Features for COTA
Yes sorry. rereading, my post does have more needle than was intended[:-].Shall we keep it that way?
M
M
RE: New Features for COTA
- Airborne forces did not keep up with developments in CAS control, *and* they lost most of their signals gear;
- Fighter-bombers were kept from flying when their presence might conflict with airdrops, including supply drops, to prevent them from tangling with the fighters protecting the cargo aircraft;
- Fighter-bombers were not sent in to conduct CAS in the later stages because "it is unlikely that the Typhoons could have identified their targets adequately enough to have intervened in the fighting" not least to to the signals shortfall. (Gooderson, pp. 97-98)
This throws some more light on why air support was so poor for Market Garden (at least after the initial support of XXX corps up the road from Joe's Bridge to Valkenswaard) and suggests another instance of poor air planning (other than dropping the airborne divisions all over Holland except around the bridges, only one drop on first day etc). Its hard to find a single reason for the failure of Market Garden (viz the scene in the film: A Bridge Too Far, where they all have a different reason), but the air planning staff get my vote for greatest negative contribution...
I think that what the discussion has lead to is that air support is going to be very dependent on the situation - In particular how strong the coordination is between the ground and the air forces (comms, identification etc). For instance the support given to XXX corps up the highway on the first day of garden has more of the complexion of a set piece - XXX corps had good mobile ground control and was using yellow smoke markers and fluorescent orange panels on the back of vehicles for ID. Further all rules of engagement could be agreed before the operation started at the planning stage. In these circumstances the air support could be carried out with minimal damage quite close to friendly forces. However, heres a quote from Tim Saunders, Hells Highway:
"As the dust thrown up by rocket and shell began to subside a sharp eyed pilot identified and attacked several 88mm guns lying in wait, covering the road in the area of Hoek. However, a Typhoon was also responsible for the destruction of two Shermans, who now moving, could not rely on yellow smoke to identify them"
M
P.S. feel rather guilty of cluttering up COTA "new feature thread" with all this stuff. Maybe should move this discussion to another thread if that is possible.
M
RE: New Features for COTA
ORIGINAL: mhailes
P.S. feel rather guilty of cluttering up COTA "new feature thread" with all this stuff. Maybe should move this discussion to another thread if that is possible.
I don't think that's needed - a good discussion on possible new features is not really OT in a "new feature thread"
Keep it coming
Greetz,
Eddy Sterckx
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James Sterrett
- Posts: 1619
- Joined: Wed Jul 07, 2004 4:03 am
RE: New Features for COTA
"I think that what the discussion has lead to is that air support is going to be very dependent on the situation - In particular how strong the coordination is between the ground and the air forces (comms, identification etc)."
Yep. As your example shows, it all comes down to coordination, and coordinating when the situation is fluid is very dependent on training and good C2 - even today! In that regard, I think we're in violent agreement. [:)]
The bit I failed to put into the prior post, also from skimming Gooderson last night, is the late-war use of airborne FCPs by the US (and maybe the British); so in later 1944 and 1945, there's some chance that they ought to have the ability to "put out a spotter" for planned periods during good weather & daylight to orbit an area and look for bad guys - though I'd still argue that these would be relatively poor at spotting any troops that were not moving (or, for artillery/mortars, firing).
Yep. As your example shows, it all comes down to coordination, and coordinating when the situation is fluid is very dependent on training and good C2 - even today! In that regard, I think we're in violent agreement. [:)]
The bit I failed to put into the prior post, also from skimming Gooderson last night, is the late-war use of airborne FCPs by the US (and maybe the British); so in later 1944 and 1945, there's some chance that they ought to have the ability to "put out a spotter" for planned periods during good weather & daylight to orbit an area and look for bad guys - though I'd still argue that these would be relatively poor at spotting any troops that were not moving (or, for artillery/mortars, firing).
RE: New Features for COTA
is the late-war use of airborne FCPs by the US (and maybe the British);
My father flew air artillery spotting missions, but in Korea and later, since he had unfortunately been captured by the Germans in 1940. However, I understand that the British spotting squadrons were used as early as the Torch landings (651 air OP squadron was formed in August 1941 and landed in Algiers in Nov 42) and many squadrons were added throughout the subsequent campaigns in Italy and Europe. There seems to have been a connection between the army air corps spotting for artillery and the RAF in that the Auster aircraft sometimes carried RAF observers.
Air OP squadrons would be a great feature to be able to include in scenarios, since they increase the spotting range and would make for interesting artillery battles. Also you'd have to hide stuff to avoid it being spotted from the air.
M
M
RE: New Features for COTA
Another neat feature would be to record the source and time (and perhaps range) of a spotting/intelligence report so that when you look at an enemy unit it might say in the details:
"spotted 10:51 by E Coy 502 PIR, range 100 metres"
"spotted 12:24 by 651 air OP, range 1 km"
different spotting methods and ranges of spotting might give you different reliability for certain attributes such as number of enemy troops, fatigue, cohesion etc.
M
"spotted 10:51 by E Coy 502 PIR, range 100 metres"
"spotted 12:24 by 651 air OP, range 1 km"
different spotting methods and ranges of spotting might give you different reliability for certain attributes such as number of enemy troops, fatigue, cohesion etc.
M
M
RE: New Features for COTA
They already do. Agree that more info on the spotter would be nice.
TT2778 - UI - Intel Reports - More info on spotter - see comments by MHailes
TT2778 - UI - Intel Reports - More info on spotter - see comments by MHailes
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James Sterrett
- Posts: 1619
- Joined: Wed Jul 07, 2004 4:03 am
RE: New Features for COTA
"There seems to have been a connection between the army air corps spotting for artillery and the RAF in that the Auster aircraft sometimes carried RAF observers."
Interesting on the aircraft-sharing. [:)]
Interesting on the aircraft-sharing. [:)]
RE: New Features for COTA
They already do
What I mean is that if an enemy is spotted by say air OP (or just standard artillery OP on high ground) you might have a good idea of numbers and location but not much indication of fatigue, morale, unit designation etc. However, If the enemy is spotted by a ground unit that is actively sending out patrols (notice the stealth feature request here) it might for instance capture enemy soldiers and you could get a good idea of fatigue, morale etc. , but maybe less idea of disposition. So each attribute might have a separate spotting reliability in the display (for instance having a two color bar for fatigue instead of the current single color one would give you a max/min estimated fatigue). in HTTR the reliability is a single box, mostly "poor" or "vague" in my experience (is poor worse than vague[&:]), which doesn't tell you very much.
Hope I'm not annoying you with all these minor feature requests[&o] - You'll just have to release COTA in order to shut me up for a bit. I think the single [8D] feature that would most interest me (a matter of great concern to you I'm sure[:)]), after the logistics improvements in COTA, is a complete simulation of inter unit/arty/air comms (radio/flags/runners etc) with full fog of war for both sides i.e. as a commander you only know as much about your own and the enemy's dispositions as you can find out over your comms links with a knock on effect on supplies (you can't supply units if you don't know where they are) and also effects on order delay (you can't relay orders to units until you can contact them or rather you can issue the orders but they may take some time or never arrive). Also suggested feature in first para would apply to both friends and enemies. I suspect though from some previous comments in the forum that you have something like this in mind (at least friendly FOW) for some time in the future?
M
M
RE: New Features for COTA
ORIGINAL: mhailes
I think the single [8D] feature that would most interest me (a matter of great concern to you I'm sure[:)]), after the logistics improvements in COTA, is a complete simulation of inter unit/arty/air comms (radio/flags/runners etc) with full fog of war for both sides i.e. as a commander you only know as much about your own and the enemy's dispositions as you can find out over your comms links with a knock on effect on supplies (you can't supply units if you don't know where they are) and also effects on order delay (you can't relay orders to units until you can contact them or rather you can issue the orders but they may take some time or never arrive).
It sure goes the way to more realism. And in this case, more realism also means more frustration for the commander. I already have enough difficulties with my units even if I perfectly know their status. I also think that current ennemy intel is too innacurate. If such insane stuff (gaming-wise, not simulation-wise) is to be implemented, I officially demand that it can be parametrized (like the orders delay), with one option to disable it.
Take care,
JeF.
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