Houston, we have an (economic) problem

[bradfordkay]

Nemo, there are only three bases on the map which most members of the forum will agree should be off limit: the United States base at SLC, the Canada base at Saskatchewan, and the Karachi/Aden base. They are considered off limits because they represent far more than a single base in the game, they represent the rest of the resources for each of their nations involved.

In the case of Karachi/Aden, I am willing to allow this attack if you are using Sid's RHS mod where the Aden reinforcements would show up in Melbourne should Aden fall (if this is not the case, then I am back to declaring it off limits).

It's possible that in the CHS, Panama should be off limits if by capturing it, USN reinforcements would be blocked from ever appearing. I do not know if this is the case.

It has nothing to do with being too far away, but rather everything to do with preventing the gamey situation of the capture of a minor middle eastern base resulting in the defeat of Great Britain. It would be similar to saying that if Truk is captured, then the Southern Fleet gets no more reinforcements...

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay
It's possible that in the CHS, Panama should be off limits if by capturing it, USN reinforcements would be blocked from ever appearing. I do not know if this is the case.

In CHS, if Panama is captured, I belive the US ship reinforcements will start appearing in San Francisco. That is not realistic, unless a long delay could somehow be added to the arrival dates, but unfortunately that can't be done with the editor.

So in a way, capturing Panama in CHS is BAD for the Japanese player since naval reinforcements will then appear on the US West coast immediately. The only way to make it more attractive to attack is to give it a very large number of VPs. It has been given 100 VPs for the Alies (same as Noumea, for example), but I would be reluctant to give it more without doing a proper study on what effect it would have on the chances of either side obtaining a victory. That is a study I, at least, have never done.

I still recommend that Panama should not be off-limits for the Japanese in CHS.

Andrew

[el cid again]

Cobra and I reviewed Aden and Panama - which have LOTS of VPs for Japan in CHS - but only one for the Allies (if I remember right). We decided Andrew was right in both cases - and left the VP alone.

I will go farther: It is an RHS principle that "If it is on the map, and if it has VP assigned to it, it is fair game, in play, and proper to attack."

It is the responsibility of the Allies to defend their bases and entry points - and not to send everything they have to some losing adventure in the center of the theater. Aden, Panama, United States, the entry point in Siberia and to a lesser degree Canada are all sources of units writ large. Nothing forces you to send them all thousands of miles away - and no real strategist would denude Siberia, the US West Coast, Panama or the Mideast of defenses. A game strategist who does that is taking risks - and we have zero sympathy if they do not pay off.

I further assert it is almost impossible for a significant Japanese force - indeed even an insignificant Japanese unit - to reach ANY of these points.
If these points are captured, it is a sign of incompetant Allied play (something I will continue to believe if you capture one from me).
It is not bad game design to have entry points for units and supplies - and the vast majority of games allow you to block entry by doing that.

In spite of these beliefs, RHS deliberately attempted to "spread the wealth" and to make more entry points available with more things. We have added another in Northern Pakistan (because the Indian Air Force appears there - a city in no other mod) - and it has land links to Iran. We changed Bombay to Melbourne as an entry/exit point for British ships, and then made Melbourne a true supply source with resources, oil, supplies and fuel all appearing every day. We also made some of the Mideast oil appear at Kerachi anyway - because it comes down the Red Sea from Iraq and Iran. I do not think it is viable for Japan to cut off ALL the Allied supply sources - even if it gets one of them.

Note that RHS is log oriented - and that means Japan should find distant ops difficult. RHS ships don't have 30,000 mile ranges like CHS ships do - and they don't operate on a fraction of their real fuel requirement either.
Historians think the limit of viable major operations is about the distance of Rabaul from Tokyo - anything a lot farther afield will come at the expense of things not done that should be done (shipping and log wise) in the vital core areas of the Empire.

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Amen. But you are preaching to the choir. [Literally. I was in the US Navy Bluejacket's choir, led two detachments of it on ships, and sing to this day, in multiple languages, and sometimes in other countries.] On the subject of military performance, I know of no other US commander TWICE defeated by an inferior force, while in command of an army. Homma invaded with a force of 2.5 divisions, and Mac had more than 10. The Allied Eighth Army outclassed the People's Volunteer Army of Korea in everything except concealment, surprise and leadership.

Stillwell, if you use your Homma v. Mac example. How you would consider one of Mac's Phillipino divs to be the equivalent of one of Homma's is hard to understand. Homma's 65th bde, one of the IJAs worst combat units, would have been superior to any of them in numbers of troops, experience, morale, equipment (especially artillery) and supplies. The only troops Mac had to equal them were the Scouts and 1 rct. As far as I can tell the 4th marines never fought at Bataan.

I don't seem to remember where Mac lost to the KPA. He wasn't in command of the ROK forces that were destroyed out north of the Han. The decision to commit US forces didn't happen until a week after the invasion (invasion was on 6/25/50). United Nations Command, Mac's actual command, wasn't created until 2 weeks into the campaign. The Eighth Army wasn't even formed until 3 weeks had gone by and the retreat well established. The perimeter around Pusan was formed two weeks after that. The only major US units that were committed prior to that were the 24th ID which landed in the first week of July and part of the 25th ID. Effectively crushed north of the perimeter, they were outclassed by the KPA in everything, including concealment, surprise and leadership. Some of the units in the KPA had fought in the Chinese civil war and could be considered veteran divisions. By the time they hit US formations they had already wiped out several ROK divisions. The US units initially fed into delay/get steamrollered by the NK had the combat effectiveness and experience of garrison troops. When the KPA finally assualted the perimeter, they were outnumbered and, after several close calls, defeated. The forces in the perimeter eventually surpassed the KPA after massive reinforcements were landed, but by that time he was already planning Inchon. The KPA lost that one too.

BOT: I'm really interested to see if this economic model works. The research at least, seems light years ahead of stock. Hopefully, it plays that way.

[Mike Scholl]

"We also made some of the Mideast oil appear at Kerachi anyway - because it comes down the Red Sea from Iraq and Iran."

CID Pretty sure you meant to say the Persian Gulf, not the Red Sea. Before someone "jumps" you about it.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay
It's possible that in the CHS, Panama should be off limits if by capturing it, USN reinforcements would be blocked from ever appearing. I do not know if this is the case.

In CHS, if Panama is captured, I belive the US ship reinforcements will start appearing in San Francisco. That is not realistic, unless a long delay could somehow be added to the arrival dates, but unfortunately that can't be done with the editor.

So in a way, capturing Panama in CHS is BAD for the Japanese player since naval reinforcements will then appear on the US West coast immediately. The only way to make it more attractive to attack is to give it a very large number of VPs. It has been given 100 VPs for the Alies (same as Noumea, for example), but I would be reluctant to give it more without doing a proper study on what effect it would have on the chances of either side obtaining a victory. That is a study I, at least, have never done.

I still recommend that Panama should not be off-limits for the Japanese in CHS.

Andrew

There is one problem with this in that if Panama was threatened the US would then be operating on interior lines and would not hesitate in shipping large quantites of materials, troops, and planes. The idea of "Euorpe" first would go right out the window, and resources committed to Europe would go immediately to Panama. Since there is no way in the current game engine that this can be simulated I would argue that Panama should be off limits.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Since Yamashita had been to Europe and North America, he may indeed have had a better sense of the direction of things. By 1945 it may be also that few Japanese soldiers harbored many illusions (though clearly some did). But I believe the decision to defend Baguio City and the hills behind it was sound strategy - even in 1941 - to the extent MacArthur - supposed expert on the Philippines - should have adopted it. Denial of major mineral deposits, and an operational area that does not guarantee every last soldier get Malaria plus Dengue Fever (which happened to all the men on Bataan - though not those on Corregidore), and an area that produces a natural food surpluss sufficient for twice the army Mac had, not to mention very nice ridge lines and swift rivers at the base of each,
make the area the obvious choice. The first time I crested the highest ridge - and saw the horrible approach along a ridge edge the road makes to Baguio - I understood the problems an offensive up that road must entail. The other route into the area - Balinta Pass - was so defensible Mac staffers like Ike believed a single battalion could hold any reasonable opposing force. Years later - after it was disclosed by the officers of Fort Drum - I also learned that one does not have to hold Bataan to close Manila bay - provided one put food on Fort Drum itself - it would have to be slowly ground to concrete dust. [26 feed of grinding was not enough to take out even a single secondary system]. Even War Plan Orange might work - if the Army were not going to become too weak to be effective due to starvation and disease - and it had the vast area of Northern Luzon to retreat into - ridge line by ridge line. Wether one intends to hold out for years - or not - it is a much better place to fight than the malarial plains and hillls to the South.

One wonders where all the money and resources were to be found for this enhanced Phillipine defence. Certainly not during the early 30's during the depression.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Mike: We pretty much agree - but I know Northern Luzon pretty well - and it is not well understood this is a rich place. It holds the largest copper mine in Asia - and that is not the richest of the minerals. It also produces rice in quantity and is not malarial - has mountains to make it defensible - and airfields. T
FYI

Question: How do you handle the civilian population, and especially the refugees, the very people you are sworn to defend?

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Retired:

There is a wonderful book US Army Ships and Watercraft of the Second World War (or World War II). It lists the 12,000 named ships - and describes the 80,000 watercraft - of the US Army in that conflict - numbers which dwarfed the USN (but which are also given in the introduction).

Do you by chance own a copy of this. It seems like everytime I look for at the Loussac Library it cannot be found? I have trying to get my hands on a copy.

[bradfordkay]

"One wonders where all the money and resources were to be found for this enhanced Phillipine defence. Certainly not during the early 30's during the depression."

I wonder... IIRC (! - what this means is that I'm too lazy to dig for the references [;)]) the big hydroelectric projects of the west were depression era projects. If they had the money to build the Hoover Dam they could have come up with some more for PI defense, had anyone the foresight and political will.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

"One wonders where all the money and resources were to be found for this enhanced Phillipine defence. Certainly not during the early 30's during the depression."

I wonder... IIRC (! - what this means is that I'm too lazy to dig for the references [;)]) the big hydroelectric projects of the west were depression era projects. If they had the money to build the Hoover Dam they could have come up with some more for PI defense, had anyone the foresight and political will.

Oh yeah, I can just see it.. okay to all you Americans in the bread line, instead of seeing you all employed building up the United States infractructure, we the politicians have decided to instead spend a large sum of money making sure the Phillipines do not get attacked by the Japanese, hope you enjoy your soup... yup, lack of political will..

[bradfordkay]

Many of those Americans in the CCC might have been shipped to the PI to perform their work. IT's not that different from shipping them to Montana and Wyoming (or the Canal Zone, for that matter).

The thing is, we on this forum are all Pacific War nuts and feel that this could all have been foreseen by some astute leaders. None of it is bloody likely, but I think that the money would have been available if someone could have sold it politically.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

"One wonders where all the money and resources were to be found for this enhanced Phillipine defence. Certainly not during the early 30's during the depression."

I wonder... IIRC (! - what this means is that I'm too lazy to dig for the references [;)]) the big hydroelectric projects of the west were depression era projects. If they had the money to build the Hoover Dam they could have come up with some more for PI defense, had anyone the foresight and political will.

The Washington Naval Treate specifically prohibited any improvements to Ameriocan Fortifications west of Hawaii...., this was a sop to the Japanese for not getting a 70% tonnage ratio like they wanted.

[bradfordkay]

Gee, Mike, why do you have to bring reality into a perfectly good argument?!

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior
There is one problem with this in that if Panama was threatened the US would then be operating on interior lines and would not hesitate in shipping large quantites of materials, troops, and planes. The idea of "Euorpe" first would go right out the window, and resources committed to Europe would go immediately to Panama. Since there is no way in the current game engine that this can be simulated I would argue that Panama should be off limits.

Although I have never tested it, a Japanese landing on Panama should trigger the acceleration of US LCUs in the same way as a landing on the US West coast, so there is a built-in US reaction (and I think an appropriate one) to such an event.

If I get time I will test this to see whether it is actually the case.

Andrew

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior
There is one problem with this in that if Panama was threatened the US would then be operating on interior lines and would not hesitate in shipping large quantites of materials, troops, and planes. The idea of "Euorpe" first would go right out the window, and resources committed to Europe would go immediately to Panama. Since there is no way in the current game engine that this can be simulated I would argue that Panama should be off limits.

Although I have never tested it, a Japanese landing on Panama should trigger the acceleration of US LCUs in the same way as a landing on the US West coast, so there is a built-in US reaction (and I think an appropriate one) to such an event.

If I get time I will test this to see whether it is actually the case.

Andrew

oh really..that would be interesting.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

"One wonders where all the money and resources were to be found for this enhanced Phillipine defence. Certainly not during the early 30's during the depression."

I wonder... IIRC (! - what this means is that I'm too lazy to dig for the references [;)]) the big hydroelectric projects of the west were depression era projects. If they had the money to build the Hoover Dam they could have come up with some more for PI defense, had anyone the foresight and political will.

The Washington Naval Treate specifically prohibited any improvements to Ameriocan Fortifications west of Hawaii...., this was a sop to the Japanese for not getting a 70% tonnage ratio like they wanted.

The key word here is Fortifications. However, in reading several good period writings you do have a point. There was too strong of an isolationist policy in Congress to get much by them till late 30's. The treaty said nothing about increasing land forces though. As in Article XIX: "The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace."

[el cid again]

Anarchy:

1) I did not say that a Philippine Army division was equal to an IJA division. But Mac had created the Philippine Army personally - over many years - and been paid millions of dollars to do so. Whatever its condition, it is not someone elses fault. Further, HE said - and I think believed - it COULD meet the IJA on equal terms at the beaches. Doesn't matter if they were not as good - he had a lot of troops - and lots of other assets - which were poorly employed in quite defensible terrain. I bet they had a fighting chance to stay in the field until relieved. And in the process deny the rich ores of Northern Luzon to the enemy.

2) You are confused about which defeat I refer to in Korea. The People's Volunteer Army of Korea was NOT Korean!!!! It was Chinese. It attacked on Thanksgiving Eve 1950 along the banks of the Conng Chong River - and Mac was fully in command - having ordered 8th Army to jump off on attacks along the same river the following morning (having no clue the real situation).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

"We also made some of the Mideast oil appear at Kerachi anyway - because it comes down the Red Sea from Iraq and Iran."

CID Pretty sure you meant to say the Persian Gulf, not the Red Sea. Before someone "jumps" you about it.

Yep. Typed too fast on my lunch hour. You are right.

[el cid again]

IF Panama were made "off limits" the troops and ships and planes that defend it should ALSO be "out of the game" -

RHS lets PLAYERS decide the risks of sending how much forward - and does not saddle them with possibly irrelevent historical decisions. Take your pick - but we pick "power to the players." Of course, as always, a player can leave as much in Panama as he thinks is "historical" - even if not needed in his opinion. Still "power to the players." We DO say "if you don't think real commanders would do it, don't do it" - so that would fall in that category.