A great discussion, one tiny thing I would like to interject. It was only an example Nemo gave, but I would like to point out that things like starting a thread and bemoaning how ahistorical something is could be toxic - if a developer ran with it and made changes! I suggest folks refrain from that particular sort of tactic. [8D]
And if you guys ever tire of hyperbolas then give parabolas a shot. [X(]
Tokyo Rose was a Hussy! Chez (J) vs. Canoe (A)
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
The retaking of the Kuriles would only be strategically irrelevant if Chez retook them at the cost of delaying/weakening the DEI campaign. As CR mentions the failure to retake them would be disastrous for the Japanese HI due to allied heavy bombers coming online in the following spring. Chez may allocate his available forces to try and do both, possibly using his own subterfuge to make CR think the KB is headed or present up north while really hunting allied carriers or other warships in the DEI in hopes of shifting momentum in his favor.
I don't think this will happen, but for Japan to wave off the loss of the Kuriles in 1942 would be pure folly. CR has already demonstrated his ability to crush Japanese industry from the Kuriles so their loss would be a mortal blow, not a ruse or a false threat. In Chez's current position unless he unhinges both threats in a timely basis he is lost, and the current pace of events may have doomed him regardless.
I don't think this will happen, but for Japan to wave off the loss of the Kuriles in 1942 would be pure folly. CR has already demonstrated his ability to crush Japanese industry from the Kuriles so their loss would be a mortal blow, not a ruse or a false threat. In Chez's current position unless he unhinges both threats in a timely basis he is lost, and the current pace of events may have doomed him regardless.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
There's a middle course between complaining about something which isn't real and posting a query about the survivability of patrol planes. I wouldn't advocate willfully misrepresenting the in-game situation.... but asking if Mavis were really that impervious when sitting on the water is, IMO, valid.... especially since they DO seem rather impervious compared to what one would expect. A simple strafing run should have a fairly high chance of knocking them out if they are there, from what I can see.
But your basic point is correct. You shouldn't misrepresent the game. Questioning something? Sure.
Desicat,
So, at the crucial point of decision of the logistics of the game your view is Chez placing his primary means of strategic decision in a theatre in which he doesn't have to achieve a favourable resolution for at least another 6 or 7 months is warranted. Interesting.
I think that it would be an irrelevant committment at this time since it would weaken the most strategically vital thrust. Without Palembang and in the face of a major Allied counter-thrust through the DEI/Borneo region the game will reach decision rapidly irrespective of any Allied four-engine bomber offensive from the Kuriles.
Of course each to their own. Personally I'd be delighted to see you wasting KB in a vain effort to keep my four-engined bombers away from your Northern industry while I worked on getting within range of Luzon with my counter-thrust with a view to working close enough, by land, to bring most of the southern and central mainland into bomber range from bases which are infinitely more easily supplied and more difficult for Japan to close down than bases in the Kuriles. But, as I said, each to their own. I'm certain that with a different style you can make your approach work for you.
But your basic point is correct. You shouldn't misrepresent the game. Questioning something? Sure.
Desicat,
So, at the crucial point of decision of the logistics of the game your view is Chez placing his primary means of strategic decision in a theatre in which he doesn't have to achieve a favourable resolution for at least another 6 or 7 months is warranted. Interesting.
I think that it would be an irrelevant committment at this time since it would weaken the most strategically vital thrust. Without Palembang and in the face of a major Allied counter-thrust through the DEI/Borneo region the game will reach decision rapidly irrespective of any Allied four-engine bomber offensive from the Kuriles.
Of course each to their own. Personally I'd be delighted to see you wasting KB in a vain effort to keep my four-engined bombers away from your Northern industry while I worked on getting within range of Luzon with my counter-thrust with a view to working close enough, by land, to bring most of the southern and central mainland into bomber range from bases which are infinitely more easily supplied and more difficult for Japan to close down than bases in the Kuriles. But, as I said, each to their own. I'm certain that with a different style you can make your approach work for you.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Nemo, Nowhere did I say that I thought he should send the KB north - I agree it would be foolish. What I did say is that he needed to unhinge BOTH areas, and if he could fool CR to think that the KB was headed north then all the better for him.
You stated that sending the KB on a strategically irrelevant mission to retake the Kuriles was a losing proposition and I would agree, but only in the use of the KB for this task. Chez needs to take the Kuriles without the KB, which is obviously needed elsewhere. The Kuriles are far from irrelevant and their loss in 1942 is pure folly on the part of the Japanese.
You stated that sending the KB on a strategically irrelevant mission to retake the Kuriles was a losing proposition and I would agree, but only in the use of the KB for this task. Chez needs to take the Kuriles without the KB, which is obviously needed elsewhere. The Kuriles are far from irrelevant and their loss in 1942 is pure folly on the part of the Japanese.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
I would add that I am surprised that you would confuse the allocation rationale required of available tactical assets** in the course of concurrent Operational level campaigns in obviously decisive strategic theaters of action (i.e. the loss of either campaign is ultimately fatal to Japan) as either/or propositions. At this point the Japanese need to be able to master doing two or more things at once, something you normally advocate.
**Current Navy doctrine states that warships are technically Operational (and in the case of super carrier's and SSBN's Strategic) assets that can be used in tactical applications.
**Current Navy doctrine states that warships are technically Operational (and in the case of super carrier's and SSBN's Strategic) assets that can be used in tactical applications.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Thanks for the interesting discussion yesterday, gents. Fascinating insight into how players think. Some lights came on for me.
Nemo's reasons for not taking Amchitka, but using it instead, are marvelous. But I won't do it for these reasons: (1) Nemo was kind enough to give sufficient detail so that I can learn from what he took the time to share, but for me to follow such a detailed recipe would almost be like stepping aside temporarily to allow another player to take over; (2) planning and implementing such a stratagem would take weeks if not months, mainly to have the force ready in CenPac or SoPac to take advantage of the deception - I don't have such a force and don't think I'll have the time to prepare it; (3) since I can't use Amchitka in such an elaborate way, there's no reason not to proceed with my little Amchitka plan.
Originally, I wanted to use Amchitka for a little maskirovka of my own. Steve had only seen Warspite and Idaho in the Kuriles. They are retiring to Dutch Island to replenish, and I then intended to use them to bombard Amchitka, suggesting to him that I had withdraw my battleships. In fact, though, Tennessee, Idaho and Maryland are in place now. But...enemy patrols caught wind of Idaho, so Steve will be on the alert for Allied battleships no matter what happens now.
I'm getting more signals that Steve is coming full bore for the Kuriles.
More shortly.
Nemo's reasons for not taking Amchitka, but using it instead, are marvelous. But I won't do it for these reasons: (1) Nemo was kind enough to give sufficient detail so that I can learn from what he took the time to share, but for me to follow such a detailed recipe would almost be like stepping aside temporarily to allow another player to take over; (2) planning and implementing such a stratagem would take weeks if not months, mainly to have the force ready in CenPac or SoPac to take advantage of the deception - I don't have such a force and don't think I'll have the time to prepare it; (3) since I can't use Amchitka in such an elaborate way, there's no reason not to proceed with my little Amchitka plan.
Originally, I wanted to use Amchitka for a little maskirovka of my own. Steve had only seen Warspite and Idaho in the Kuriles. They are retiring to Dutch Island to replenish, and I then intended to use them to bombard Amchitka, suggesting to him that I had withdraw my battleships. In fact, though, Tennessee, Idaho and Maryland are in place now. But...enemy patrols caught wind of Idaho, so Steve will be on the alert for Allied battleships no matter what happens now.
I'm getting more signals that Steve is coming full bore for the Kuriles.
More shortly.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
If he does, it is a strategic mistake of the first magnitude - your presence there is an annoyance & ultimately could prove to be a springboard for moves later in the game, but if he overreacts and sends the KB north (and additional troops) it'll give you perhaps one or two additional months to prepare your Sumatra defenses (and perhaps even switch over to the offensive at best or continue to prepare subsequent offensive operations behind your Sumatran cover at worst).
How soon before the Sabang operation hits the beach? If you can catch him in the "horns of a dilemma," he won't know which way to jump & you can get him pushing his forces back and forth, accomplishing nothing of substance.
How soon before the Sabang operation hits the beach? If you can catch him in the "horns of a dilemma," he won't know which way to jump & you can get him pushing his forces back and forth, accomplishing nothing of substance.
Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
3/30/42
NoPac: The Allies continue to land support troops (base force, engineer, CD, artillery) at Onnekotan and Paramushiro. This phase should be finished in a day or two, permitting me to withdraw the majority of my transports before enemy cavalry can arrive on the scene if I guess correctly. Lots of enemy patrol activity today, plus a raid by 37 Nells against unprotected transports at Onnekotan that didn't score a single hit (an unexpected degree of futitlity from Japanese bombers). I'm going to pull out part of 41st Division. I want to leave enough strength at Paramushiro to prevent a little counterinvasion from succeeding. However, when Steve comes he will undoubtedly bring everything possible to overwhelm the Allied force, so having a full division there won't serve any real purpose. If I'm wrong, and Steve ends up concentrating on the DEI and leaving the Kuriles for later, I can bring in reinforcements later.
China: The Chinese may have a chance of taking Kukong from a weak Japanese garrison. The threat, more apparent than real, of a sizeable Chinese force on his weak flank will worry Steve and entice him to try to cut it off. But the Chinese will be moving in and moving out quickly, looking for opportunities elsewhere.
Singapore: For the first time in nearly a week, the Japanese didn't attack. Steve may try again tomorrow, but forts are already back up to two. Singers may be able to hold another attack, and possibly he'll need to bring 52nd Div. over from Mersing before he can take it.
Western Sumatra: D-Day tomorrow. The enemy hasn't detected the invasion fleet and it also looks like the two bases to the south have been vacated as Steve has been concentrating his units (three small infantry that he brought in by air) on the eastern most base (he hasn't been able to take it because the Allies air transported in part of an Indian brigade). In other words, western Sumatra is lightly defended, Steve has been a bit frustrated in his efforts to eradicate opposition, and his likely plans to quickly reinforce and build up his bases here after Singapore falls are about to get a rude shock. I really like this little operation.
Eastern Sumatra: The three American engineers came ashore at Oosthaven in good shape. If Steve does elect to focus on the Kuriles, the time bought for Sumatra will be put to good use given the recent arrival of so many American engineers.
Counteroffensive: How else can the Allies take advantage of bought time and diverted enemy combat ships if Steve turns on the Kuriles? One important aspect will be to reinforce Sumatra, bring in more supply, and work on forts and airfields. Can the Allies engage in another offensive somewhere that might add to Japan's woes? I'm looking at possibilities. Malaya is one, though it will be a month or more before the Allies have the PP to buy enough units to make that possible and effective. A move in the Gilberts is another, but there's the same PP situation. A third operation that can be done pretty soon would be an invasion of Denpasar using mainly the American units about to land at Sabang. Denpasar is important to Steve - it will permit him to invade eastern Java under LBA. It's also a bit far forward from the rest of his big bases. The Allies would be able to effectively cover the operation by LBA from Java and carriers a safe distance to the west. Retaking Denpassar would likely throw a monkey wrench into Japan's plans for Java, and in the event of truly epic delays by or problems for Japan, the Allies could begin looking further east towards the heart of the DEI.
Delicate Balance/High Stakes: Generally, the window of maximum opportunity for Japan is January through August 1942. Thereafter, the Allies have received enough reinforcements to begin eying Japan as equals. In this game, Japan is disrupted at the moment, so the the window has narrowed from eight months down to five months. If the Allies can somehow wrangle a firm hold on eastern Sumatra for four or five months, Japan shouldn't ever retake it. An important part of the "firm hold" equation is maintaining a strong carrier force. Note, however, that the Allies have gone very far out on a limb - a stout limb with exceiting possibilties, but a limb nonetheless. With 3,700 AV in Sumatra now, the Allies can't afford to lose the battle in Sumatra. So buying time, reinforcing, and winning this battle is more important than ever. High stakes!
NoPac: The Allies continue to land support troops (base force, engineer, CD, artillery) at Onnekotan and Paramushiro. This phase should be finished in a day or two, permitting me to withdraw the majority of my transports before enemy cavalry can arrive on the scene if I guess correctly. Lots of enemy patrol activity today, plus a raid by 37 Nells against unprotected transports at Onnekotan that didn't score a single hit (an unexpected degree of futitlity from Japanese bombers). I'm going to pull out part of 41st Division. I want to leave enough strength at Paramushiro to prevent a little counterinvasion from succeeding. However, when Steve comes he will undoubtedly bring everything possible to overwhelm the Allied force, so having a full division there won't serve any real purpose. If I'm wrong, and Steve ends up concentrating on the DEI and leaving the Kuriles for later, I can bring in reinforcements later.
China: The Chinese may have a chance of taking Kukong from a weak Japanese garrison. The threat, more apparent than real, of a sizeable Chinese force on his weak flank will worry Steve and entice him to try to cut it off. But the Chinese will be moving in and moving out quickly, looking for opportunities elsewhere.
Singapore: For the first time in nearly a week, the Japanese didn't attack. Steve may try again tomorrow, but forts are already back up to two. Singers may be able to hold another attack, and possibly he'll need to bring 52nd Div. over from Mersing before he can take it.
Western Sumatra: D-Day tomorrow. The enemy hasn't detected the invasion fleet and it also looks like the two bases to the south have been vacated as Steve has been concentrating his units (three small infantry that he brought in by air) on the eastern most base (he hasn't been able to take it because the Allies air transported in part of an Indian brigade). In other words, western Sumatra is lightly defended, Steve has been a bit frustrated in his efforts to eradicate opposition, and his likely plans to quickly reinforce and build up his bases here after Singapore falls are about to get a rude shock. I really like this little operation.
Eastern Sumatra: The three American engineers came ashore at Oosthaven in good shape. If Steve does elect to focus on the Kuriles, the time bought for Sumatra will be put to good use given the recent arrival of so many American engineers.
Counteroffensive: How else can the Allies take advantage of bought time and diverted enemy combat ships if Steve turns on the Kuriles? One important aspect will be to reinforce Sumatra, bring in more supply, and work on forts and airfields. Can the Allies engage in another offensive somewhere that might add to Japan's woes? I'm looking at possibilities. Malaya is one, though it will be a month or more before the Allies have the PP to buy enough units to make that possible and effective. A move in the Gilberts is another, but there's the same PP situation. A third operation that can be done pretty soon would be an invasion of Denpasar using mainly the American units about to land at Sabang. Denpasar is important to Steve - it will permit him to invade eastern Java under LBA. It's also a bit far forward from the rest of his big bases. The Allies would be able to effectively cover the operation by LBA from Java and carriers a safe distance to the west. Retaking Denpassar would likely throw a monkey wrench into Japan's plans for Java, and in the event of truly epic delays by or problems for Japan, the Allies could begin looking further east towards the heart of the DEI.
Delicate Balance/High Stakes: Generally, the window of maximum opportunity for Japan is January through August 1942. Thereafter, the Allies have received enough reinforcements to begin eying Japan as equals. In this game, Japan is disrupted at the moment, so the the window has narrowed from eight months down to five months. If the Allies can somehow wrangle a firm hold on eastern Sumatra for four or five months, Japan shouldn't ever retake it. An important part of the "firm hold" equation is maintaining a strong carrier force. Note, however, that the Allies have gone very far out on a limb - a stout limb with exceiting possibilties, but a limb nonetheless. With 3,700 AV in Sumatra now, the Allies can't afford to lose the battle in Sumatra. So buying time, reinforcing, and winning this battle is more important than ever. High stakes!
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
CR I wouldn't be too sure that Chez will bring the kitchen sink to the Kuriles in an attempt to retake the islands. He has to be well aware of the following:
- way off schedule in Malaya (Singapore)
- you have heavily garrisoned southern Sumatra and Palembang
- he has yet to gain air superiority in Sumatra or Singapore
- his probes into the SE Pacific are strategically irrelevant due to pressing interests in the DEI and Kuriles
- the loss of the mini KB has left him unable to react in overwhelming CV strength in two locations simultaneously
- he has intel that you have Capital ships operating in the Kuriles and the DEI
If he sends the KB to the Kuriles the delay in the DEI will result in certain defeat. The KB going north is a win for you, in a strategic sense what would it matter that the 41st was lost in this scenario?
If the KB stays in the DEI then he has to assemble an ad hoc group to retake the Kuriles. Why make it easier for him by withdrawing the 41st Inf Div? I think you can imagine a scenario where your land based air, old battleships, and island defenses can hold vs a stout but KB-less Japanese invasion force. If anything I would reinforce and continue probing from the Kuriles in hopes of forcing him to split the KB. As you previously stated if he doesn't retake the Kuriles before the winter effects kick in he probably never will, don't make it easier for him. If the 41st contributes to either holding the Kuriles of forcing Chez to split the KB then it is a prudent strategic use of expendable assets.
- way off schedule in Malaya (Singapore)
- you have heavily garrisoned southern Sumatra and Palembang
- he has yet to gain air superiority in Sumatra or Singapore
- his probes into the SE Pacific are strategically irrelevant due to pressing interests in the DEI and Kuriles
- the loss of the mini KB has left him unable to react in overwhelming CV strength in two locations simultaneously
- he has intel that you have Capital ships operating in the Kuriles and the DEI
If he sends the KB to the Kuriles the delay in the DEI will result in certain defeat. The KB going north is a win for you, in a strategic sense what would it matter that the 41st was lost in this scenario?
If the KB stays in the DEI then he has to assemble an ad hoc group to retake the Kuriles. Why make it easier for him by withdrawing the 41st Inf Div? I think you can imagine a scenario where your land based air, old battleships, and island defenses can hold vs a stout but KB-less Japanese invasion force. If anything I would reinforce and continue probing from the Kuriles in hopes of forcing him to split the KB. As you previously stated if he doesn't retake the Kuriles before the winter effects kick in he probably never will, don't make it easier for him. If the 41st contributes to either holding the Kuriles of forcing Chez to split the KB then it is a prudent strategic use of expendable assets.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
The key to the Battle of the Kuriles is the KB, at least until Chez can build up airfields within striking range, which will take some time.
If he commits the KB and also brings what he'll conclude is necessary to recapture both islands, the Allies won't be able to hold. (But that will be fine for the reasons you noted - it will give the Allies another month or so in the DEI).
If he doesn't commit the KB, the Allies should be fine in the Kuriles for a long time to come - with five BBs in theater, I can probably fend off or make very expensive any enemy counter-invasion efforts. In fact, Steve probably won't chance it knowing I have those BBs present.
So, I don't need 41st Division any time soon. The bases won't be attacked, or they will attacked in such overwhelming numbers that 41st won't stand a chance (and I can't reinforce in material terms until I have more political points). So withdraw part of 41st Div. now...and then reinforce later if it turns out the KB remains in the DEI.
Nothing concrete yet, but little things plus my hunch suggests that Steve will come full bore for the Kuriles. Psychologically, that's understandable. I don't think he knows what to make of the Sumatra mess, but he knows it's going to be a big, bloody fight. On the other hand, the Kuriles are manageable. So, he persuades himself that he has to deal with that threat first.
More later, but D-Day for the Sabang invasion went very well. Steve's comment in his email: "Sheesh, another dilemma..."
If he commits the KB and also brings what he'll conclude is necessary to recapture both islands, the Allies won't be able to hold. (But that will be fine for the reasons you noted - it will give the Allies another month or so in the DEI).
If he doesn't commit the KB, the Allies should be fine in the Kuriles for a long time to come - with five BBs in theater, I can probably fend off or make very expensive any enemy counter-invasion efforts. In fact, Steve probably won't chance it knowing I have those BBs present.
So, I don't need 41st Division any time soon. The bases won't be attacked, or they will attacked in such overwhelming numbers that 41st won't stand a chance (and I can't reinforce in material terms until I have more political points). So withdraw part of 41st Div. now...and then reinforce later if it turns out the KB remains in the DEI.
Nothing concrete yet, but little things plus my hunch suggests that Steve will come full bore for the Kuriles. Psychologically, that's understandable. I don't think he knows what to make of the Sumatra mess, but he knows it's going to be a big, bloody fight. On the other hand, the Kuriles are manageable. So, he persuades himself that he has to deal with that threat first.
More later, but D-Day for the Sabang invasion went very well. Steve's comment in his email: "Sheesh, another dilemma..."
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Howdy, one of those long term lurkers watching on with enthusiasm.[:D]
I am continually amazed at how many dimensions this game has. For what it is worth my 2 cents- I think the psychological element is now the critical aspect of this particualar game which Nemo often discusses at length. As a long term player of the Japanese and if I was your opponent, psychologically I would be irate/ frustrated that at such an early stage of the game that I appear to be losing the initative.
Concentration of effort has not been your opponent's strong point thus far, so it will be fascinating to see how frustration may impact on his decision making- Does he lash out heavily at one objective to prove a point (I think the most likely) or fall into the old trap of trying to go for both with insufficient resources?
Psychologically I think you have him rattled as indicated by his own email and I believe the Centre of Gravity at this particular point of time is not so much Kido Butai or its projection of power, but his own mental will to agressively utilise the massive amount of combat assets he still has at his disposal.
Another sharp reversal will completely unhinged him psychologically regardless of the overall material damage. Your carriers could probably achieve that at the right juncture.
I am continually amazed at how many dimensions this game has. For what it is worth my 2 cents- I think the psychological element is now the critical aspect of this particualar game which Nemo often discusses at length. As a long term player of the Japanese and if I was your opponent, psychologically I would be irate/ frustrated that at such an early stage of the game that I appear to be losing the initative.
Concentration of effort has not been your opponent's strong point thus far, so it will be fascinating to see how frustration may impact on his decision making- Does he lash out heavily at one objective to prove a point (I think the most likely) or fall into the old trap of trying to go for both with insufficient resources?
Psychologically I think you have him rattled as indicated by his own email and I believe the Centre of Gravity at this particular point of time is not so much Kido Butai or its projection of power, but his own mental will to agressively utilise the massive amount of combat assets he still has at his disposal.
Another sharp reversal will completely unhinged him psychologically regardless of the overall material damage. Your carriers could probably achieve that at the right juncture.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Thanks, njp. That's a good idea - a carrier raid if Brad commits the KB to NoPac.
Heck, for that matter, if Brad commits the KB to NoPac, the Allies probably need to go on a limited offensive in the DEI - Denpasar (as mentioned earlier) and Koepang would make reasonable targets due to their position at the far edge of the Japanese perimeter.
Political points are strangling me. I can handle Denpassar with troops already ready to go. For Koepang, I'd almost certainly have to buy troops. An invasion of Malaya is a possibility, though I'm still weighing that. And it would be effective now to inavade the Gilberts, but I definately can't spare the PP there. I think the Gilberts would take a lower priority than the DEI, but I need to mull that over for awhile.
I am about 99.99% sure that I can dismiss India as even a remotely possible target at this point. That means I have enough AV there at this point to handle her defense (roughly 2,500). That, in turn, means I can buy 27th USA Div. when it arrives in Capetown in a couple of days and use it in the DEI. Also, the Brit reinforcements due to arrive at Aden in coming weeks can be used similarly.
Heck, for that matter, if Brad commits the KB to NoPac, the Allies probably need to go on a limited offensive in the DEI - Denpasar (as mentioned earlier) and Koepang would make reasonable targets due to their position at the far edge of the Japanese perimeter.
Political points are strangling me. I can handle Denpassar with troops already ready to go. For Koepang, I'd almost certainly have to buy troops. An invasion of Malaya is a possibility, though I'm still weighing that. And it would be effective now to inavade the Gilberts, but I definately can't spare the PP there. I think the Gilberts would take a lower priority than the DEI, but I need to mull that over for awhile.
I am about 99.99% sure that I can dismiss India as even a remotely possible target at this point. That means I have enough AV there at this point to handle her defense (roughly 2,500). That, in turn, means I can buy 27th USA Div. when it arrives in Capetown in a couple of days and use it in the DEI. Also, the Brit reinforcements due to arrive at Aden in coming weeks can be used similarly.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
desicat,
Ah I misread. I had conflated discussion of the commission of KB to the Kuriles and your post in error. I think we are, generally, in agreement. Retaking the Kuriles in a phased manner while taking or rendering irrelevant Southern Sumatra would be a near-optimal strategy at this point. Why phased rather than concomitant? Well, simply I don't think Chez has the moxy to take Southern Sumatra at this stage even if he fully commits so I think he definitely doesn't have the moxy to take it if he tries to run concomitant operations.
With that said I don't think that even if he tried to phase things he'd succeed. He hasn't shown an ability to use his interior lines to advantage - interior lines combined with the long-range of their aerial forces is one of the most potent force multipliers the Japanese have allowing phased favourable concentration of forces at various portions of the front. Really they can just Bagration the Allies repeatedly.
Why not concurrency? I think that that would lead to inappropriate allocation of forces as I don't think Chez has sufficient recon to properly apportion his forces.... So, concurrency is great but without the ability to run those concurrent ops with slightly less force per op it can be disastrous. I think that for Chez it would be disastrous even though theoretically superior.
One caveat to concurrence is that while simultaneity is a force multiplier one way to really derange Boyd loops is to unleash a significant surprise in order to derange the loop a little but then drip-feed more surprised ( phased operations ) in over the next little while in order to disrupt the opposing commander's attempts to re-orient appropriately. In essence you derange and then challenge the efforts at re-orientation by continuing to temporally feed in dislocations over a short period of time.
Re: Navy doctrine: Aye, they're right too.
As to our later assessment re: Chez's options... Good assessment but I think the key at this stage is that Chez may no longer be sufficiently temporally oriented to the objective realities of the situation to make that sort of, correct, assessment. What he could/should do is clear. What HE can actually see as possible right now is less so, IMO.
Canoe,
Do you have any HR against marching a few thousand AV down from India into Burma?
Ah I misread. I had conflated discussion of the commission of KB to the Kuriles and your post in error. I think we are, generally, in agreement. Retaking the Kuriles in a phased manner while taking or rendering irrelevant Southern Sumatra would be a near-optimal strategy at this point. Why phased rather than concomitant? Well, simply I don't think Chez has the moxy to take Southern Sumatra at this stage even if he fully commits so I think he definitely doesn't have the moxy to take it if he tries to run concomitant operations.
With that said I don't think that even if he tried to phase things he'd succeed. He hasn't shown an ability to use his interior lines to advantage - interior lines combined with the long-range of their aerial forces is one of the most potent force multipliers the Japanese have allowing phased favourable concentration of forces at various portions of the front. Really they can just Bagration the Allies repeatedly.
Why not concurrency? I think that that would lead to inappropriate allocation of forces as I don't think Chez has sufficient recon to properly apportion his forces.... So, concurrency is great but without the ability to run those concurrent ops with slightly less force per op it can be disastrous. I think that for Chez it would be disastrous even though theoretically superior.
One caveat to concurrence is that while simultaneity is a force multiplier one way to really derange Boyd loops is to unleash a significant surprise in order to derange the loop a little but then drip-feed more surprised ( phased operations ) in over the next little while in order to disrupt the opposing commander's attempts to re-orient appropriately. In essence you derange and then challenge the efforts at re-orientation by continuing to temporally feed in dislocations over a short period of time.
Re: Navy doctrine: Aye, they're right too.
As to our later assessment re: Chez's options... Good assessment but I think the key at this stage is that Chez may no longer be sufficiently temporally oriented to the objective realities of the situation to make that sort of, correct, assessment. What he could/should do is clear. What HE can actually see as possible right now is less so, IMO.
Canoe,
Do you have any HR against marching a few thousand AV down from India into Burma?
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
3/31/42
Sabang: The Allies land about 100 AV. The cursor shows two enemy units (2,000 men) present, but the landing didn't trigger an auto-bombardment counter-attack, so the two are probably a base force plus some infantry that Steve is transporting in by air. A two-BB bombardment TF will hit the base tonight. Tomorrow, the invasion force, which is continuing to come ashore and should thus be stronger, will deliberate attack. A refugee Sumatran unit entered the hex to the east and found it vacant, so it too should fall tomorrow.
Singapore: The Japanese only bombarded, so Singers holds into April. Allied AV has recovered to about 340 with two forts. B-17s from Palembang to target enemy ground troops here tomorrow.
Eastern Sumatra: Aussie heavy AA to land at Oosthaven tomorrow. Indian artillery unit comes ashore at Benkolen. Allies set to strip India of coastal defense guns as they are much more likely to be put to use in Sumatra. The first, recently moved from Surat, will board transports at Bombay and make for Oosthaven. The next one goes to Benkolen and should depart Bombay in three days.
China: After a probing bombardment tomorrow, we'll know whether the Chinese force is strong enough to take Kienko. The big IJA stack at Changsha (37 units) hasn't budged. The Chinese reinforcements that made the long, long, long journey from Sian are now arriving at various posts on the Changsha to Liuchow front.
Kuriles: Allied recon probed Shikuka. Two DDs are patrolling the waters - one in the Shikuka area, the other in the Pacific well south of Paramushiro. Allied sub encountered a CM and ACM in the Sea of Japan - seems possible that would be a defensive force heading into NoPac to mine ports that Steve deems vulnerable. Since Shikuka is lightly garrisoned (one unit), everything suggests that Steve is worried about the Allies coming further. That's good. Bettys and Nells sortied again at extreme range, once again missing. Unloading at Onne and Para continues. After one more day, the transports will depart even if not fully unloaded.
Pacific: Two unrestricted US RCTs arrive in the next week. This would help the Allies form a Gilberts invasion force if that move is given PP priority, though I think it still has to take second fiddle to the DEI.
DEI Counteroffensives: While still waiting to see if Steve throws the KB at the Kuriles, as hoped, the Allies are evaluating options for offensive action in the DEI. Denpasar is a likely target as is Koepang. 27th USA Div. arrives at Capetown in five days with AV of 297 (the unit begins the war with high disablement). I have 1,000 political points in hand and should have 1,250 in five days. The division should cost about that much. That's probably the highest priority PP need right now since that unit can be used in one of these invasion, in an invasion of Malaya, or to reinforce Sumatra.
Sabang: The Allies land about 100 AV. The cursor shows two enemy units (2,000 men) present, but the landing didn't trigger an auto-bombardment counter-attack, so the two are probably a base force plus some infantry that Steve is transporting in by air. A two-BB bombardment TF will hit the base tonight. Tomorrow, the invasion force, which is continuing to come ashore and should thus be stronger, will deliberate attack. A refugee Sumatran unit entered the hex to the east and found it vacant, so it too should fall tomorrow.
Singapore: The Japanese only bombarded, so Singers holds into April. Allied AV has recovered to about 340 with two forts. B-17s from Palembang to target enemy ground troops here tomorrow.
Eastern Sumatra: Aussie heavy AA to land at Oosthaven tomorrow. Indian artillery unit comes ashore at Benkolen. Allies set to strip India of coastal defense guns as they are much more likely to be put to use in Sumatra. The first, recently moved from Surat, will board transports at Bombay and make for Oosthaven. The next one goes to Benkolen and should depart Bombay in three days.
China: After a probing bombardment tomorrow, we'll know whether the Chinese force is strong enough to take Kienko. The big IJA stack at Changsha (37 units) hasn't budged. The Chinese reinforcements that made the long, long, long journey from Sian are now arriving at various posts on the Changsha to Liuchow front.
Kuriles: Allied recon probed Shikuka. Two DDs are patrolling the waters - one in the Shikuka area, the other in the Pacific well south of Paramushiro. Allied sub encountered a CM and ACM in the Sea of Japan - seems possible that would be a defensive force heading into NoPac to mine ports that Steve deems vulnerable. Since Shikuka is lightly garrisoned (one unit), everything suggests that Steve is worried about the Allies coming further. That's good. Bettys and Nells sortied again at extreme range, once again missing. Unloading at Onne and Para continues. After one more day, the transports will depart even if not fully unloaded.
Pacific: Two unrestricted US RCTs arrive in the next week. This would help the Allies form a Gilberts invasion force if that move is given PP priority, though I think it still has to take second fiddle to the DEI.
DEI Counteroffensives: While still waiting to see if Steve throws the KB at the Kuriles, as hoped, the Allies are evaluating options for offensive action in the DEI. Denpasar is a likely target as is Koepang. 27th USA Div. arrives at Capetown in five days with AV of 297 (the unit begins the war with high disablement). I have 1,000 political points in hand and should have 1,250 in five days. The division should cost about that much. That's probably the highest priority PP need right now since that unit can be used in one of these invasion, in an invasion of Malaya, or to reinforce Sumatra.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Nemo, yes, we have to pay PP to move across national boundaries. 
Darn, or I'd have the entire 2,500 AV currently in India in Burma.
Darn, or I'd have the entire 2,500 AV currently in India in Burma. "Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
Nemo, yes, we have to pay PP to move across national boundaries.
I'd have been interested to see this. Are there any AARs where someone has done an early Burma invasion while working with the supply movement restrictions ? 2500 AV might be very hard to keep supplied through the jungle now.
The AE-Wiki, help fill it out
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ny59giants
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Singapore: The Japanese only bombarded, so Singers holds into April. Allied AV has recovered to about 340 with two forts. B-17s from Palembang to target enemy ground troops here tomorrow.
If your AV is down to just this amount, why not air transport in more troops?? Deny him this base would help any future plans to re-capture Malaya IMO.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
I would love to reinforce Singapore. Doing so might well just end the game.
Here's the problem. The garrison is obviously very weak and could fall on the next attack. Any troops going in will have no prep. And Steve has at least one more division already present at Mersing and undoubtedly on the way. So air transporting in AV isn't going to help. And bringing them in by ship will take too long - at least six to eight days and by then the campaign will be over. There's also the problem of massive enemy LBA concentrations at Mersing, Kuantan, Singkawang and vicinity. The troops I would be using to reinforce would be coming from Sumatra, so I'd be risking wasting critical troops on a mission that wouldn't succeed. Finally, when I was considering all this, the KB was believed to be in theater and likely to show up around Singers at any moment.
For all those reasons I decided about a week or ten days ago that reinforcing Singers was too risky. I would have done so had I known the garrison would hold out for at least two weeks and that would have been a fun move.
Here's the problem. The garrison is obviously very weak and could fall on the next attack. Any troops going in will have no prep. And Steve has at least one more division already present at Mersing and undoubtedly on the way. So air transporting in AV isn't going to help. And bringing them in by ship will take too long - at least six to eight days and by then the campaign will be over. There's also the problem of massive enemy LBA concentrations at Mersing, Kuantan, Singkawang and vicinity. The troops I would be using to reinforce would be coming from Sumatra, so I'd be risking wasting critical troops on a mission that wouldn't succeed. Finally, when I was considering all this, the KB was believed to be in theater and likely to show up around Singers at any moment.
For all those reasons I decided about a week or ten days ago that reinforcing Singers was too risky. I would have done so had I known the garrison would hold out for at least two weeks and that would have been a fun move.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Sorry Canoe. Chez has pulled off the Maskirovka operation to end all Maskirovka operations. The West Coast invasion force arrives next turn and you can't stop it now.
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Canoerebel
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
witpqs: That would be good theater if everything that had happened to date was by design.
I got a most puzzling email from Chez this afternoon. Read this:
"...The Kuriles are a entirely different matter. You caught me totally flat-footed there. With the majority of troops in the Home Islands being permanently restricted, I am finding it is not an easy task to move troops to where they are needed.
"I think what is needed is an algorythm similar to the one that triggers kamikazes. Only restrict it to any invasion between Okinawa and the Kuriles. It should trigger some changes in the restricted status of the troops. Or something along the lines of emergency reinforcements that arrive with an invasion of the west coast or Australia. As it is, it is impossible to reinforce the Kuriles without redirecting significant numbers of troops from the PI or Malayan operations."
Is it possible that Chez didn't see the massive number of Depot Division troops he received as a result of the Allied invasion of the Kuriles? Is it possible he isn't even aware that such an invasion is an auto trigger? His comments regarding Australia suggest that somehow he has missed out on his auto reinforcements. How can this be?
Secondly, the reinforcements are part of a restricted command, but it's up to a player to recognize that he'll need a reserve of PPs for emergencies such as this. Readers may recall that the Allies took into consideration that Japan had just bought 52nd Div. for transport to Malaya, so that PP's might be short.
This email could be an attempt at deception, but it seems more to me like an enemy HQ in utter disarray.
I got a most puzzling email from Chez this afternoon. Read this:
"...The Kuriles are a entirely different matter. You caught me totally flat-footed there. With the majority of troops in the Home Islands being permanently restricted, I am finding it is not an easy task to move troops to where they are needed.
"I think what is needed is an algorythm similar to the one that triggers kamikazes. Only restrict it to any invasion between Okinawa and the Kuriles. It should trigger some changes in the restricted status of the troops. Or something along the lines of emergency reinforcements that arrive with an invasion of the west coast or Australia. As it is, it is impossible to reinforce the Kuriles without redirecting significant numbers of troops from the PI or Malayan operations."
Is it possible that Chez didn't see the massive number of Depot Division troops he received as a result of the Allied invasion of the Kuriles? Is it possible he isn't even aware that such an invasion is an auto trigger? His comments regarding Australia suggest that somehow he has missed out on his auto reinforcements. How can this be?
Secondly, the reinforcements are part of a restricted command, but it's up to a player to recognize that he'll need a reserve of PPs for emergencies such as this. Readers may recall that the Allies took into consideration that Japan had just bought 52nd Div. for transport to Malaya, so that PP's might be short.
This email could be an attempt at deception, but it seems more to me like an enemy HQ in utter disarray.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.