Civil War 150th

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In a place called Droop Mountain, West Virginia, Union forces were trying to clear the Confederate troops from the new state. They found about 1,200 Rebels under Brigadier General John Echols positioned on high ground, and commanding the road with artillery. However, when a reinforcing column arrived, the Federals had roughly 5,000 infantry and cavalry, and decided to attack. After spirited resistance from the Southerners, Union commander William Averell managed to turn the enemy left flank. A simultaneous charge to the center collapsed the Confederate position.

Pursued by Federal Cavalry, most of the Confederate force fled. The majority got away, but many abandoned their muskets and other equipment. Losses were 119 for the northerners and 275 for the southerners, and Echols realized his remaining troops did not have enough arms or ammunition for further battle. He retreated his force into Virginia proper, and organized Confederate resistance in West Virginia was at an end for the time being. Sadly but not surprisingly, guerrilla activity would continue.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Chattanooga, word reached the Union generals that James Longstreet and his troops were moving towards Knoxville. A warning was telegraphed to Ambrose Burnside, advising him to fall back. The threat was not so much that Burnside was outmatched, for his Army of the Ohio had more men than Longstreet's corps. The problem was that the Northern supply lines were over-stretched, and the Army of the Ohio might find itself being starved as the Army of the Cumberland had been until a few days ago.

But for the moment, Longstreet had even bigger problems than the Northerners. He had hoped to use a rail line to move his men and horses rapidly and catch Burnside spread out. But his infantry and artillery had an unpleasant surprise:

[font="Times New Roman"] They reached the station in due season, but the cars were not there. After waiting some days, the battery horses and horses of mounted officers were ordered by the wagon road. Tired of the wait, I advised the troops to march along the road and find the cars where they might have the good fortune to meet them, the officers, whose horses had been sent forward, marching with the soldiers. General Bragg heard of the delay and its cause, but began to urge the importance of more rapid movements. His effort to make his paper record at my expense was not pleasing, but I tried to endure it with patience. He knew that trains and conductors were under his exclusive control, but he wanted papers that would throw the responsibility of delay upon other shoulders.
[center]--James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]


At Rappahannock Station, Virginia, a Union column of about 2,000 men under general John Sedgwick faced a fortified bridgehead on the north bank of the river. The Yankees drew up their lines and unlimbered their artillery, but other than a vigorous bombardment showed little movement for several hours. Meanwhile, a second Union column began crossing the river at Kelly's Ford. Robert E. Lee decided to mass his troops for an attack at Kelly's Ford, but realized it was vital to hold the Rappahannock bridgehead to avoid a pincer movement from the two Northern columns. Reinforcements were sent to Rappahannock, bringing the defenders up to roughly equal strength with the Federals at that spot.

But as dusk began to fall, the previously stationary Union troops charged. Perhaps it was because of the failing light, or perhaps it was the Northern artillery bombardment, but the Rebels failed to repulse the assault. The bluecoats swarmed over the Confederate fortifications and furious hand-to-hand combat erupted. In minutes, the Southern morale broke. Some threw down their guns and surrendered, others jumped into the river and swam for it, and the rest attempted to retreat across the bridge, running a gauntlet of Federal musket fire. Few made it: the southerners lost 1670 men killed, wounded or captured, or about 80% of the defending force. Northern casualties were 419, about 20% of their engaged troops, but there were many more men coming up behind them.

It was a heartbreaking defeat for Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. They had hoped to hold the south bank of the Rappahannock for the winter, and indeed a number of soldiers had started building log huts against the cold months ahead. But the massive Army of the Potomac now had two crossings, and there were not enough Confederate soldiers to block both. They would have to abandon their positions, and fall back to the Rapidan River.

Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The American Civil War had by now reached to the other side of the world. The CSS Alabama, captained by Raphael Semmes, had been wreaking havoc on Union merchant shipping the length and breadth of the Atlantic. But the Union Navy had now expanded to such a size that a number of warships were hunting the Alabama on the open ocean, even while the coastal blockaders were still shutting down most of the ports of the Confederacy. Captain Semmes had decided a change of hunting grounds was in order, and sailed his vessel around the southern tip of Africa all the way to the Pacific.

On this date, the Alabama intercepted the Northern clipper ship Contest, which was sailing off the Gaspar Strait in the East Indies. The Contest was a pure sailing ship, but for a time she bid fair to escape the Confederate raider. Unluckily for the Yankee ship, a mid-day calm allowed the steam-powered Alabama to get within gun range, and the merchantman surrendered. Captain Semmes did not have enough spare crew to take over the Contest, so, after removing the crew as prisoners, he reluctantly had the Union vessel burned. As always, Alabama had not lost a single crewman.

[Missouri_Rebel]

Great commitment to a phenomenal thread.

Thanks

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

General James Longstreet had finally gotten the last of his brigades to Sweetwater, Tennessee, the half-way point between Chattanooga and his objective of Knoxville. Beyond this point, his men would have to march instead of move by rail, so he had been promised there would be supplies there for his army. However:

[font="Times New Roman"]We were again disappointed at Sweetwater. We were started from Chattanooga on short rations, but comforted by the assurance that produce was abundant at that point, and so it proved to be; but General Stevenson, commanding the outpost, reported his orders from the commanding general were to ship all of his supplies to his army, and to retire with his own command and join him upon our arrival. In this connection it should be borne in mind that we were recently from Virginia,—coming at the heated season,—where we left most of our clothing and blankets and all of our wagon transportation; and by this time, too, it was understood through the command that the Richmond authorities were holding thunder-clouds over the head of the commander, and that General Bragg was disposed to make them more portentous by his pressing calls for urgency. Thus we found ourselves in a strange country, not as much as a day’s rations on hand, with hardly enough land transportation for ordinary camp equipage, the enemy in front to be captured, and our friends in rear putting in their paper bullets. This sounds more like romance* than war, but I appeal to the records for the facts...
[center]--James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]

To make matters still worse, there was a river that needed to be crossed to get to Knoxville, so the Confederates would have to bring materials for bridge construction. A number of pontoons were delivered to Sweetwater -- but no wagons to move them any further.

However, Longstreet and his men were equal to the challenge. From the Tidewater campaign, there were accomplished foragers in the ranks, and the area had a number of farms not yet overrun by hungry soldiers. Longstreet sent out the foraging parties and arranged for the pontoons to be carried by hand. Losing no time, he had his advance men march out from Sweetwater even as the last of his force was arriving.


*Note in the 1860's, "romance" meant fiction (generally unrealistic), rather than the boy-meets-girl genre it usually refers to today.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Sherman finally made his rendezvous in Chattanooga:

[font="Times New Roman"]...on reaching Kelly's Ferry found orderlies, with one of General Grant's private horses, on which I rode into Chattanooga, November 14th. Of course, I was heartily welcomed by Generals Grant, Thomas, and all, who realized the extraordinary efforts we had made to come to their relief.
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center] [/font]

Grant now had plenty of military talent at his disposal. In addition to himself, there was Sherman, George "the rock of Chickamauga" Thomas, and an up-and-coming general named Philip Sheridan. Along with W. F. "Baldy" Smith, there were several other skilled engineering officers as well. With James Longstreet and his corps now absent from the besieging lines, Grant's forces significantly outnumbered Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee. But Grant wanted all of Sherman's men up before he moved out. He believed that the Union Army of the Cumberland had lost heart after the defeat of Chckamauga, and would not fight well until other Federal soldiers set them an example. (The events of eleven days later would indicate otherwise.)


Speaking of Longstreet's force, it continued to make slow progress. A little more than two days had been taken up building bridges, since nearly all the material had to be carried by hand. It didn't help when a force of Yankee infantry attacked the picket guards on the far side of one bridge on this date, and made signs of attempting to assault the bridgehead. It was a bluff: Union commander Ambrose Burnside had decided to fall back before the Confederate advance, and make his stand in Knoxville.

The idea was to pull Longstreet's men far enough away from the main Confederate army that they could not rejoin before the critical battle, or maybe not at all. In this Burnside would be successful, but at the time both Grant and the administration in Washington became very nervous that Burnside was apparently being driven back in defeat. And indeed the Northern force was still spread out by the retreat, and vulnerable.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Having arrived in Chattanooga a few days ahead of his army, Sherman took a tour of the area:

[font="Times New Roman"]The next morning we walked out to Fort Wood, a prominent salient of the defenses of the place, and from its parapet we had a magnificent view of the panorama. Lookout Mountain, with its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly, and an occasional shot fired toward Wauhatchee or Moccasin Point gave life to the scene. These shots could barely reach Chattanooga, and I was told that one or more shot had struck a hospital inside the lines. All along Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebel beleaguering force; the lines of trench from Lookout up toward the Chickamauga were plainly visible; and rebel sentinels, in a continuous chain, were walking their posts in plain view, not a thousand yards off. "Why," said I, "General Grant, you are besieged;" and he said, "It is too true." Up to that moment I had no idea that things were so bad.


He also explained the situation of affairs generally; that the mules and horses of Thomas's army were so starved that they could not haul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions, were so scarce that the men in hunger stole the few grains of corn that were given to favorite horses; that the men of Thomas's army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive; that Bragg had detached Longstreet with a considerable force up into East Tennessee, to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least to force him to recall Longstreet.
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center] [/font]

The Union generals still had a problem: Sherman's force was coming from the west, and the Longstreet vs. Burnside fight was taking place miles to the east of Chattanooga. To gain the best possible advantage against the Confederates, the reinforcing Federal soldiers would have to be marched around Chattanooga, which meant crossing the river at least twice, and at least four more days of delay. They could only hope that Longstreet would not inflict a major defeat on Burnside in the meantime. Grant could at least be confident that Sherman was the man to call on if prompt movements were needed:

[font="Times New Roman"]Having seen enough, we returned to Chattanooga; and in order to hurry up my command, on which so much depended, I started back to Kelly's in hopes to catch the steamboat that same evening; but on my arrival the boat had gone. I applied to the commanding officer, got a rough boat manned by four soldiers, and started down the river by night. I occasionally took a turn at the oars to relieve some tired man, and about midnight we reached Shell Mound, where General Whittaker, of Kentucky, furnished us a new and good crew, with which we reached Bridgeport by daylight.
[center]--Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman[/center] [/font]

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In eastern Tennessee, Longstreet's Confederates had successfully bridged their main river obstacle, and were pursuing the retreating Northerners under Burnside. The key to the race was a crossroads at Campbell's Station, less than a day's march away from Knoxville. If the Rebels could seize the crossroads, they would cut off a major portion of the Union forces -- but the Yankees beat them to it by about a quarter of an hour.

Longstreet attempted a double envelopment, assaulting both Union flanks at the same time. The Northern right was hit hard, but just managed to keep together. The attack on the Union left, however, was ineffective. Seeing that there would be no collapse, the Confederates pulled back for a time, which Burnside used to retreat his force to high ground about three-quarters of a mile (1.2 km) to the rear. This allowed the Federal cannons to unlimber and open fire. The Southerners did likewise, but even though they had Edward Porter Alexander, the man who had achieved artillery mastery at Chancellorsville, this time they had little effect:

[font="Times New Roman"]As soon as the line was organized, the batteries opened practice in deliberate, well-timed combat, but General Alexander had the sympathy of his audience. His shells often exploded before they reached the game, and at times as they passed from the muzzles of his guns, and no remedy could be applied that improved their fire.
[center]--James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of The Civil War in America[/center][/font]

After sunset, the Northerners were able to make an orderly retreat into Knoxville. They had lost about 400 men in killed, wounded, and missing, while the Southerners are believed to have sustained around 520 casualties all told. (Once again, the Confederate records are incomplete.)

[Capt. Harlock]

November 17, 1863:

This date marks the more or less official beginning of the siege of Knoxville. As in the siege of Chattanooga, the Confederates never truly managed to surround the Northerners and cut the supply lines. Unlike Chattanooga, they did not get as much help from weather and geography. True, Burnside and his men had a long and tenuous road back to their main supply base, but they were better able to use the river that ran by the city, and the population in eastern Tennessee was more pro-Union and willing to help.

In addition, the fortifications around Knoxville were good, and getting stronger still. (In addition to the Federals troops, there were 700 black inhabitants of the town highly motivated to work on the entrenchments.) When Longstreet and his men arrived, they immediately concluded that a straight-on assault was a bad idea. What the plan actually was is less than clear. Whether they decided to try to starve the Yankees out, or whether they were waiting while scouts probed for a weak point, the Confederates set up their camps and cut the telegraph wires leading north.

But this was enough to set Washington into something not far from panic. The Lincoln administration was still not convinced that Grant and his reinforcements would save Chattanooga, and the idea of losing two armies instead of just one was a nightmare. A series of telegrams began to flow to Grant, urging him to rescue Burnside and his force. In actuality, Burnside was doing the Union cause good service where he was. The effect of the siege was to remove over a quarter of Braxton Bragg's army, plus his best corps commander, from the lines in front of Chattanooga.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Abraham Lincoln, along with William Seward and members of Congress, diplomats, a military guard, and a Marine band boarded a special train for Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The trip took four hours, and there is a story that Lincoln used the time to write his speech on the back of an envelope. However, his private secretary John Nicolay insisted that he spent the time relaxing and swapping humorous stories with his fellow travelers.

As anticipated, the hotels in Gettysburg were already full to overflowing, so Lincoln stayed the night at the home of David Wills, the event organizer. So did the event's featured speaker Edward Everett and the Governor of Pennsylvania, indicating how difficult it was to find space that night. Lincoln spent some time after supper working on his speech, and did not go to bed until about midnight. He would still be making a few revisions at breakfast the next morning.

[british exil]

The hotels did not not or could not vacate a room for the president?
How times have changed. I think if the president were to travel to a city today, a whole floor would be made free for him and his entourage.

Capt. Harlock still enjoying the thread, just did not realize how long the war lasted after Gettysburg. Keep the posts coming.

Your faithful and humble reader. (sounds a bit like back then)

Mat

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

The crowd at the ceremony for the dedication of the Gettysburg cemetery is estimated at nine thousand people, including nine governors and three cabinet members. Edward Everett stood up to speak, and began, "Standing beneath this serene sky, overlooking these broad fields now reposing from the labors of the waning year, the mighty Alleghenies dimly towering before us, the graves of our brethren beneath our feet, it is with hesitation that I raise my poor voice to break the eloquent silence of God and nature."

His hesitation quickly vanished, and he went on for over two hours, recounting the events of the battle and alluding to the battles of Marathon and Waterloo. Those who are curious can find the text of the speech at:
http://www.civilwarhome.com/everettgettysburg.htm

To be fair, this was a time when the majority of people had longer attention spans than are common today. (Each of the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates ran three hours, with each man given 90 minutes total to speak.) When Everett went back toward his seat, Lincoln shook his hand to congratulate him, advanced to the speaker's stand, put on his steel-rimmed glasses, and read:

[font="Verdana"]Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate, we can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.[/font]


Apparently the audience had not been expecting such a short speech. When the President had finished, they seemed to be caught off-guard, and there was silence for several seconds, until Lincoln moved back toward his seat. Then there came applause, but Lincoln interpreted the reaction as disapproval. "It is a flat failure, and the people are disappointed," he remarked to a friend. Edward Everett was much more impressed -- but it is unlikely that even he realized he had just heard the most famous speech in American history.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

Unbiased reporting of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address was definitely not the order of the day. Depending on the political sympathies of their owners, the newspapers praised it or heaped scorn upon it. The New York Times reported that Lincoln had been showered with applause at several points during his delivery, which was untrue. On the other hand, the Chicago Times commented, "The cheek of every American must tingle with shame as he reads the silly, flat and dishwatery utterances of the man who has to be pointed out to intelligent foreigners as the President of the United States." But talent recognized genius: Edward Everett wrote to Lincoln, "I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes."

At Chattanooga, weather was interfering with Sherman's efforts to get his troops up as soon as possible:

[font="Times New Roman"]On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was.
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

What was going on was, amazingly, a further diversion of Confederate troops to help Longstreet at Knoxville. Confronted by fortifications and a Union army nearly equal to his own and other Federals not very far away, Longstreet had not surprisingly asked for more men. There was some justice to his request, for the reinforcements he had been promised from Virginia had not arrived, and he had from the beginning stated that he needed a certain number to make sure of taking Knoxville quickly. But now the "besieging" Rebel army at Chattanooga would number only half that of the Yankees once Sherman's force was in position -- and it would be there in three days.

Incidentally, the forward units of Sherman's Army of the Tennessee were already linking up with troops from the Army of the Potomac. There was a considerable amount of "chaffing" from unit to unit, as it was noted that the men from the West were less orderly, and wore broad-brimmed hats instead of the classic military-style caps. But they were in rather better physical condition than the Easterners, having gone through the Vicksburg campaign.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

At Chattanooga, the original "Cracker Line" bridge had broken. (Some credit it to the strain of crossing Sherman's troops and artillery, some to high water levels from rain, and some to rafts that the Confederates had pushed into the river for just that purpose.) But Sherman had finally brought his force into position. Grant decided it was time to move:

[font="Times New Roman"]Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

The Northerners put together a force of about 14,000 men in front of their lines. For a time it looked like a parade-ground assembly, so much so that the Confederates held their fire.

[font="Times New Roman"]At two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way.
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

Losses on either side added up to about 1,000 men in total, though the Yankees had more killed and wounded and the Rebels lost more in prisoners. Southern commander Braxton Bragg finally began to realize how much of a threat Grant's movements were. He called back some of the troops he had dispatched to aid James Longstreet at Knoxville, including the best division in his army under Patrick Cleburne. And he also ordered his main lines on Missionary Ridge to be fortified, something that should have been done weeks beforehand.

However, while the fortifications or "works" were finally being created, two peculiar decisions were made. First, the defending troops were split in two, with one half occupying a line of rifle-pits along the base of the ridge, and the other half on the heights. Second, the line of defense at the top was placed on the physical crest, the line of highest geographical points. It would have been wiser to place the men and guns along the "military crest", the shoulder of the ridge that would have allowed the clearest field of fire down the slopes.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

After the success of Orchard Knob the day before, the next part of Grant's plan called for moves against the right and left flanks of the Confederate army. Sherman's force of three divisions was assigned to the Confederate right, and had to cross the Tennessee river to get there. The first part of this move went well enough. Sherman's men had marched behind hills, so that the Rebels were unaware of his move until their outlying picket guards were attacked in the dark.

By this time the Yankees were seasoned bridge-builders, as Sherman testified later in his report to the War Department: "...by daylight of November 24th two divisions of about eight thousand men were on the east bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectable rifle-trench as a tete du pont*. As soon as the day dawned, some of the boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon-bridge was begun, under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, the whole planned and supervised by General William F. Smith in person. A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over Chickamanga Creek, near its mouth, giving communication with the two regiments which had been left on the north side, and fulfilling a most important purpose at a later stage of the drama. I will here bear my willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent (viz., thirteen hundred and fifty feet) laid so noiselessly and well, in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F. Smith."

Now with light to see by, the advance force of Northerners charged, and overran the first set of Confederate lines. But then it was discovered that what the Yankees had taken was an isolated hill, rather than the end of Missionary Ridge. The true objective was strongly fortified, an unpleasant surprise since preliminary reports had indicated the Rebels had not bothered to entrench there. More, the defenses were manned by a crack division, which Bragg had recalled just the day before. The attack would have to wait until the next day.

On the Confederate left, the Northern troops under Joseph Hooker were already across the river. Grant had intended a move on Lookout Mountain to be a diversion, but "Fighting Joe" had 10,000 men and was not in the mood for a mere feint. He was at least smart enough not assault the mountain head-on, for it was all but unclimbable from the west, but ordered his advance to sweep around the north end and go up the still difficult but accessible terrain there.

Thick clouds and fog rolled in to the area during the afternoon, preventing Grant and the main body of the Union army from seeing what was going on. Hooker was little help, sending messages that alternately boasted of success and pleaded for reinforcements. Finally, the "Battle Above the Clouds" wound down and the Yankees had achieved a decisive positional advantage. Hooker sent that "in all probability the enemy will evacuate tonight", and this time he was quite right. With the aid of a total lunar eclipse, the Rebels got most of their men off Lookout Mountain, but left behind 1,251 dead, wounded, and prisoners. The fight had cost the Yankees 408 casualties in all.

*"Tete du pont" translates to "bridgehead".

[Zap]

My, how the quality of speech of politicians have fallen. The gentlemen you quoted was so eloquent

Edward Everett stood up to speak, and began, "Standing beneath this serene sky, overlooking these broad fields now reposing from the labors of the waning year, the mighty Alleghenies dimly towering before us, the graves of our brethren beneath our feet, it is with hesitation that I raise my poor voice to break the eloquent silence of God and nature."

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

It could be argued that the successes of the previous two days meant that it was only a matter of time before Braxton Bragg and his Army of Tennessee had to fall back from Chattanooga. But Grant was never happy to wait it out, and Washington was still nearly frantic over the situation of Ambrose Burnside and his force:

[font="Times New Roman"]The next day the President replied: "Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck also telegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center][/font]

Both Grant and Bragg believed that the Southern position along Missionary Ridge was impregnable to direct assault. Therefore, Grant's plan was to roll up both flanks, with Sherman's corps going to the Confederate right, and Hooker's troops from the Army of the Potomac hitting the left. The Army of the Cumberland, commanded by George Thomas, would make a careful attack on the center to prevent reinforcements from being sent to the flanks, but would not press its assault.

The attack on the Confederate right quickly ran into trouble. There was another slope crowned by defensive entrenchments to be overcome. And this one was defended by a division commanded by Patrick Cleburne, very likely the best division in Bragg's army. Sherman's men tried several assaults, but were driven back with heavy losses. And here the Army of the Cumberland's part in the center failed, for reinforcements were pulled from Missionary Ridge to hold the Yankees back. Especially, the Rebels wheeled up artillery and began pounding the Federal infantry.

Meanwhile, Hooker and his force were encountering slow going, not from Confederate resistance, but from natural obstacles. The line of advance had to cross Chattanooga Creek, and the one bridge usable for an army had been burned. The Yankee engineers improvised a replacement, but found it would take too long to reinforce it to the point where it could bear the weight of cannons. Hooker decided to advance with just infantry:

[font="Times New Roman"] Hooker . . . was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer.
[...]
I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once. I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest...
[center]--The Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant[/center] [/font]

Grant had not intended that the advance go all the way to the top of Missionary Ridge. In fact, he asked Thomas sharply who had given the orders. "I don't know," Thomas replied, "I did not." But Grant decided not to issue a recall. The soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland had chafed under having to be rescued from a siege, and being assigned a secondary role in the battle. Now, they were determined to wipe out their previous defeat, and cries of "Chickamauga! Chickamauga!" rang out as they went up the slopes.

And now the problem of the geographic crest versus the "military" crest become very real and practical. From their unwisely placed entrenchments, the Rebels could not bring their full firepower against the Federals heading towards them. In minutes a stream of Northern soldiers poured over the top of the ridge, and the outnumbered Confederates broke and ran. The entire center of Bragg's army gave way, and about then Hooker's attack on their left flank began in earnest as well.

From this position, the only alternative to destruction was retreat, and the Southerners knew they would have to fall back for miles before they could make a stand. (Eventually they would go 30 miles or 48 km.) That meant abandoning both their headquarters and their main supply depot. The orders went out to burn the depot, and those orders meant the end of Braxton Bragg's command of the army.

[font="Times New Roman"]When we arrived at Chickamauga Station, our brigade and General Lucius E. Polk's brigade, of Cleburne's division, were left to set fire to the town and to burn up and destroy all those immense piles of army stores and provisions which had been accumulated there to starve the Yankees out of Chattanooga. Great piles of corn in sacks, and bacon, and crackers, and molasses, and sugar, and coffee, and rice, and potatoes, and onions, and peas, and flour by the hundreds of barrels, all now to be given to the flames, while for months the Rebel soldiers had been stinted and starved for the want of these same provisions. It was enough to make the bravest and most patriotic soul that ever fired a gun in defense of any cause on earth, think of rebelling against the authorities as they then were. Every private soldier knew these stores were there, and for the want of them we lost our cause. Reader, I ask you who you think was to blame? Most of our army had already passed through hungry and disheartened, and here were all these stores that had to be destroyed. Before setting fire to the town, every soldier in Maney's and Polk's brigades loaded himself down with rations. It was a laughable looking rear guard of a routed and retreating army. Every one of us had cut open the end of a corn sack, emptied out the corn, and filled it with hard-tack, and, besides, every one of us had a side of bacon hung to our bayonets on our guns. Our canteens, and clothes, and faces, and hair were all gummed up with molasses. Such is the picture of our rear guard.
[center]--Sam R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch" Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment[/center] [/font]

Both the officers and men under Bragg had resented his authoritarian style, but had been willing to follow his orders as long as he seemed to know what he was doing. As the word spread of the tremendous waste, that opinion changed. The Army of Tennessee would never again believe in the competence of Braxton Bragg.

Over the three days of fighting, the Union had sustained 5,824 casualties (753 killed, 4,722 wounded, 349 missing), while the Confederates lost 6,667 (361 killed, 2,160 wounded, 4,146 prisoners or missing). Though the losses indicate only a minor advantage for the North, strategically the battles were a decisive victory. The rail and river lines to Chattanooga were now clear to build a stockpile of supplies and a mass of troops, and the gateway to Georgia was open. First, however, there was the matter of Burnside's force at Knoxville.


Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

South of Chattanooga, both sides were regrouping after the stunning breakthrough of Missionary Ridge. The Confederate units had retreated in disorder, except for the force under Patrick Cleburne which had held off Sherman on the right wing, and then acted as rear-guard for the entire army. On this date, men were falling back into line as the units moved southward into Georgia. They had left much of the artillery behind, however, and were a long way from ready for another all-out battle.

Ulysses S. Grant guessed as much. He was a man who believed strongly in pursuing a defeated foe and inflicting as much additional damage as possible. But he had also pledged to the War Department and the President that he would relieve Burnside and his force at Knoxville at the earliest possible moment. He therefore split his forces, ordering a substantial column of George Thomas' Army of the Cumberland under General Gordon Granger to set out for Knoxville. Meanwhile, troops from the Army of the Potomac under Joe Hooker and from the Army of the Tennessee under William T. Sherman were to pursue the retreating Confederates under Braxton Bragg. But in the fighting of the past three days, units from the various armies had gotten mixed up as reinforcements were rushed to places in need from whatever troops were closest. Sending the troops back to their correct commanders took some time. In addition, Sherman's force had crossed the Tennessee River with only two days' rations, and now needed to forage. Happily, they came upon the main Confederate depot, which was still afire here and there, but had some useful cornmeal and fodder for the horses remaining.


In Virginia, George Meade and the Army of the Potomac were not yet ready to accept the end of campaigning season. Meade decided to turn Robert E. Lee's strategy of going around his right flank back upon his Southern foe. On this date, his troops began crossing the Rapidan River at three fords, hoping to either force the Army of Northern Virginia to shift from its entrenchments, or better still, get between it and Richmond.

But there was a reason that late Autumn was not considered good campaigning weather. Rains had fallen for three days before, and once again roads had turned to mud. On this date, they began to dry, but the Northerners could still only travel about half the distance they had hoped to. Nor did they have the advantage of surprise: alert Confederate scouts and cavalry had spotted the movements, and immediately reported them to Lee. Not surprisingly, the ever-aggressive Southern commander ordered a counter-attack.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In northern Georgia, the Union pursuit under Joseph Hooker found the Rebels, but soon wished they hadn't. Again, the division under Patrick Cleburne had been selected to act as rear-guard, and Cleburne had chosen his position well at a place called Ringgold Gap. The Southerners waited until the advance Federal troops were only 50 yards (46 m) from their lines, then let loose a volley that completely disrupted their foes.

Hooker tried to use his superior numbers by attacks on the sides, but the valley was too naroow to permit much maneuvering. After five hours of pitched battle, the Confederates withdrew in good order, burning the bridge on the other side of the gap. The Northerners had lost 509 men in total, while the Confederates had sustained only 221 casualties. When Ulysses S. Grant came up, he decided against any further pursuit, for he still had the problem of James Longstreet's force besieging Knoxville.


In Virginia, the Battle of Mine Run began as advancing Union troops encountered the Confederates. Here a Southern General began to show the ability that would win him a semi-independent command similar to what Stonewall Jackson had enjoyed:

[font="Times New Roman"]I had received information that a body of the enemy's cavalry had crossed in front of Fitz. Lee at Morton's Ford, and had been cautioned by General Fitz. Lee to look out for my left flank against molestation of the enemy's cavalry, and supposing the party firing on Johnson's train might be a body of cavalry that had crossed at some of the fords below Morton's, I sent word to General Johnson that such was my opinion and directed him to attack and drive off the cavalry. He at once formed his division and moved forward to the attack, soon encountering, instead of a cavalry force, a very heavy force of infantry advancing towards the Bartlett's Mill road.

A very heavy engagement with both artillery and infantry ensued, in which Johnson's division encountered the enemy's 3rd corps under French, supported by the 6th corps under Sedgwick, and, after a very obstinate fight lasting until after dark, Johnson effectually checked the enemy's advance, driving his troops back, and maintaining full occupation of the road. His brigades behaved with great gallantry, encountering many times their own numbers, and by the check thus given to the enemy in this quarter saved the whole corps from a very serious disaster, for if the enemy had got possession of this road, he would have been able to come up in rear of the other division, while they were confronting the large force at Locust Grove.

[ . . .]

This affair satisfied me that the enemy's whole army was in the immediate neighborhood, and as Ewell's corps, under my command, was then in a most unfavorable position, I determined to fall back across Mine Run about two miles in our rear, where I had observed a good position as I passed on.
[center]--Jubal Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States[/center]
[/font]

Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan and several of his officers had been confined in the Ohio State Penitentiary after their capture. On this date Morgan and six other men pulled off a remarkable escape, digging a tunnel out of one of their cells, and then climbing the prison wall with a rope made out of their bed furnishings. They managed to board a train in nearby Columbus, eluding the pursuit. Morgan would eventually make his way through Kentucky back into the South. But there he would unhappily learn that his wife had given birth to their daughter the very day of his escape, but the baby girl had died within a few days.

[Capt. Harlock]

150 Years Ago Today:

In Virginia, both Robert E. Lee and George Meade had cause for unhappiness. Meade had managed to bring his entire Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan River, and outnumbered the Army of Northern Virginia by about 70,000 to 44,000. It was too late for an attack where much of the Northern army would be caught on the other side of the river. On the other hand, the Confederates had spent much of the previous night digging rifle-pits and putting down sharpened wooden stakes and other obstacles. It was also too late for an easy attack by Meade: as Jubal Early put it, the Southerners had "full confidence that we would be able to punish him severely for disturbance of us at this inclement season." And it was inclement weather, for the rains were falling again, and that night the temperature would drop below freezing.

In eastern Tennessee, it was getting cold as well. Both Yankees and Rebels had troops not clothed for late Autumn: Sherman's men had marched from Mississippi, and Longstreet's men had not received new equipment since their move from Virginia in September. But word of a major battle at Chattanooga had reached the Confederates besieging Knoxville, although for a few more days it was not clear what the results had been. On this date, Major-General McClaws asked Longstreet to delay an assault on Knoxville until the situation was more clear, going so far as to make the request in writing. Longstreet fired back that "I am entirely convinced that our only safety is in making the assault upon the enemy's position to-morrow at daylight, and it is the more important that I should have the entire support and co-operation of the officers in this connection."

Time also seemed to be running out for the Northerners. Grant had been given a message from Burnside, implying that he only had food enough to last until about December 3rd. Partly for this reason, Grant had called off the pursuit of Braxton Bragg's army, and ordered a relief column to Knoxville. But on this date, when it was supposed to depart, there was no move. General Granger, who was supposed to be commanding the force, beleived it was a bad idea, and General Thomas backed him up.

In truth, the Federal situation at Knoxville was not nearly so bad. Burnside was making some amends for his poor performance as head of the Army of the Potomac, and ingenious ways had been found to get more food into the town.