Fortune Favors the Big Factories

[engineer]

War Plan Orange and the Big Factories

Introduction:
Marie de Sevigne quipped that “Fortune is always on the side of the big battalions,” and in the 20th Century, head to head Great Power warfare was typically decided by the weight of industry. WW1, WW2, and the Cold War support that assertion. The Russo-Japanese War is the salient counter-example that is the exception to the rule. Great Powers were often defeated in colonial warfare after WW2, but that is a topic for a different discussion. This discussion will look at War Plan Orange (WPO) through an industrial lens so to speak and see if the simulation War Plan Orange plausibly recreates the industrial consequences of a Great Power war in the 1920s between Japan and the United States.

Economic Estimates: How would a WPO Effort compare to WW2?

First, the USA had a vastly larger economy than Japan throughout the period in question. This is shown in Table 1 below.


Table 1: Comparative Economies (Constant billions of 1990 Dollars)
Source, Angus Maddison @ http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/

Interestingly, this data shows about a 6:1 disparity in relative economic size between the USA and Japan in the period in question. By 1941, this had dropped to 5:1, but US production soared during WW2 while Japanese production essentially stagnated.

In the case of Japan, the numbers tell a pretty straightforward story. In WW2, Japan operated essentially isolated from other economies. There was some technology transfer from Germany. The 1920s economy would support roughly half the output that Japan could put forth a generation later. In the WPO game Britain is a belligerent so the WW2 isolation would be recreated. Under various house rules, a questionable assumption is made that European colonial powers would continue to trade with Japan during a war with the USA, but that assumption does relieve the Japanese player of a crucial resource concern as long as he can deny the USA an offensive base in the Philippines.

During WW2, the USA invested about 30% of its war effort in the Pacific Theater. US spending on the war peaked at about 37% of the GDP for 1943-1945 with 1942 as a bridge year with 17% of the GDP going to war production. With the 30% figure for the Pacific war, that works out to 11% of GDP or about $100 billion to $200 billion per year (depending on whether you’re talking of 1942 or 1944). What that buys you in way of combat power can be seen from studying the order of battle for War in the Pacific (WitP). However, in WW2 it is clear from the historical record that serious naval rearmament started as early as 1939 so the deliveries of long-lead time items like aircraft carriers and battleships in 1943 had their origins far before the first shots were fired in 1941.

In the case of WW1, the US was continuing a naval construction program of 2 battleships per year, only prudent given the uncertain outcome in Europe, and went to war in 1917 only a matter of months after Wilson was inaugurated for his second term after campaigning on a platform of having successfully kept the USA out of WW1. Consequently, although the USA was contracting munitions production for the Allies, the US military was much closer to a “standing start” in getting to a war footing compared to the mobilization in WW2. US military spending for WW1 actually peaked in 1919. Much of the construction started in WW1 was only completed after the war. In some cases, like the USS Narwhal (also known in WPO as Submarine V5), the submarine was authorized prior to WW1 and was only commissioned in 1930. For 1919 I have contradictory numbers which indicate military expenditures of about $11 billion and total government expenditures of $11 billion, with military spending at 60% of the total US budget and a $70 billion (in 1929 dollars) US economy. Working through the algebra, that indicates a US mobilization level of 9% to 16% of the total economy compared to the 37% seen in WW2. It is a conjectural to speculate if the USA would have eventually reached its WW2 mobilization levels had the Great War endured several more years, but existing data does show that even in the peak year of 1919, there was a sharp decline in government expenditures during the 2nd half of the year as the US military demobilized. That leads me to conclude the 16% figure is a reasonably conservative floor for the ability of the USA to mobilize for a prolonged war in the 1920s.

The premise of WPO includes a breakdown in the post-World War I disarmament talks. Under those circumstances, Japan continues to build up its fleet for a conflict that is described as inevitable. The USA also continues to build capital ships and during the course of the 1920s, twelve ahistorical battleships or capital cruisers join the US Navy, evidence of continued large expenditures for naval armaments. The WPO scenarios also include the historical building programs for the “S” class submarines, Omaha class light cruisers, and various Japanese light cruisers.

In the early scenario, the Allies would have recent memory of WW1 to guide them, so one would think that the government would have been able to match the sort of mobilization found in WW1. Furthermore, given the lack of aircraft development from WW1, the overwhelming major of funds would end up being invested in naval and army expenditures. Taking the investments times the GNP, then that works out to about $100 billion dollars/year, or roughly 50% of the historical Pacific Theater investment in WW2.

In the late scenario, there is a larger pool of wealth for the American military to draw from, thanks to the economic growth in the 1920s. The aircraft industry had matured a bit so there would be more in the way of aircraft to absorb spending. I think the number here is best estimated as between the WW1 and WW2 mobilization levels but still much closer to the WW1 level. If we figure it at 20%, then that gives us $156 billion dollars per year or roughly 75% of the historical Pacific Theater investment.

So in summary, we should expect to see a US effort in the early scenario that is roughly half of the historical WW2 effort. In the late scenario, where the US would have a larger economy to exploit, three quarters of the historical WW2 effort. Since the aircraft in the 1920s are more primitive and less expensive than their WW2 counterparts, that means the investment will show up in warship construction and ground forces.

More to follow . . .

[engineer]

WPO New Construction Reinforcements

So what reinforcements join the principal navies during the course of WPO that are not simply ship shuffling forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific?


Table 2, New Construction in WPO for Early and Late Scenarios & WW2

*    US carrier construction included 17 fleet carriers, 9 light carriers, and the balance in escort carriers.  Numerous fleet carriers and cruisers were still under construction in 1945.  Had the war continued through the end of 1946, at least an additional 10 carriers (Including 3 big Midway-class ships) and 10 cruisers would have likely joined the USN, pushing the WW2 builds toward ~60 equivalent battleships.

In reaching an equivalent battleship figure, I’m estimating battleships and battle cruisers are parity, cruisers at ¼ of a battleship, fleet carriers at ½ of a battleship, light carriers at ¼ of a battleship, and escort carriers at 10% of a battleship. 

So what does this tell us?  Japan is heavily investing and managing to roughly match the USA in construction rate.  The USA is building about 2 major capital ships per year, a rate they had demonstrated that they could sustain dating from the start of their dreadnought program almost twenty years before.  Furthermore, the US effort is operating at less than 20% the historical WW2 rate.  The Japanese effort is actually matching their historical WW2 rate.  In WW2, for both powers, the weight of ship construction shifted to cruisers and carriers over battleships.  While dreadnoughts unquestionably remained the capital ship in the 1920s, the WPO new construction schedules seem disproportionately battleship heavy.   

However, there is also a case that this is a deliberate weakening of the Allies for the sake of play-balance.  US war planners estimated that it would take about 60 days for four dreadnoughts in the Atlantic Fleet to clear for deployment and sail to the Hawaiian Islands.  However, casual inspection of the reinforcement schedules show that it takes over 1000 days in either scenario for the US to decide that the Japanese Fleet is unlikely to sail up the Potomac and put the Capitol under their guns.  In the absence of a plausible “historical” explanation for the US reinforcement schedule, one clear possibility is design intent to prevent a quick concentration of superior naval power by the part of the US player.

If you’re looking for a game, especially head to head.  I would suggest that the OOBs with respect to the major surface combatants are fine and the refinements are to be found elsewhere.   If you’re looking for a historically valid “what-if” simulation, then the Allied OOB is very short on reinforcements.  From the earlier discussion, a plausible US war effort is on the order of 50% to 75% of the historical effort.  Boosting the US construction to match the admittedly conjectural effort levels would radically change the game balance and nearly guarantee US victory.  The Japanese player would see a situation where they would have a brief period of ascendancy, and then the US reinforcements would be potentially overwhelming.  A human player might counter the Allied AI, but the question would generally come down to the price of US victory. 

For the “historical” simulation, the question is, what else to add?  My focus in historical research so far has been in the later scenario so I’ll emphasize that in my discussion for now.

Battleships:  Add two more for 1928, two more in 1929, and three more in 1930.  The 1923 BB in the ship class files is a good starting point.  I would recommend adding lots more AA machine guns.  The logic of senior NCO’s persuading their officers to allow them to bolt a .30 or 0.50 caliber machine gun to every spare bit of deck space during wartime is overwhelming. 

Carriers:  Acceleration of a keel-up carrier design is plausible, but it seems unlikely that such a ship would arrive before the 2nd half of 1929.  Such a ship would not have the advantage of US experience in operating the historical USS Lexington and USS Saratoga, so the hypothetical carrier would be less effective than the historical USS Ranger, but such a carrier might easily carry 60 aircraft.  I’d add two carriers, USS Hornet and USS Wasp in late 1929. 

Heavy Cruisers:  The USS Pensacola was authorized in December, 1924.  Under peacetime conditions, her keel was laid in October, 1926 and she was commissioned in 1930.   During WW2, the Baltimore class cruisers typically took just over 700 days from laying the keel to commissioning.  In a naval arms race, it’s very plausible that authorization would be accelerated and construction would proceed much faster.  Once war broke out it is inconceivable that additional units would not be procured and serial production would allow construction times to shorten toward the WW2 typicals.  Furthermore, without the Washington Treaty limiting displacement to 10,000 tons, the US cruisers would have been better protected instead of naval designers finding themselves constrained to hit the treaty displacement limit. I’d recommend tweaking up durability/armor and tweaking down top speed compared to the historical US treaty cruisers.  That would lead to a reasonable construction schedule of 2 cruisers in 1927, 4 more in 1928, 6 in 1929, and 8 in 1930 (20 total). 

Light Cruisers:  The question here is whether additional Omaha class cruisers would be ordered, the Brooklyn’s would be accelerated, or something else altogether would be attempted.  Accelerating the Brooklyn’s by so many years is implausible to me.  The Lighter-Than-Air community was aggressive in pushing their case for airships to supplant light cruisers in the scouting role.  The wide open spaces of the Pacific were the textbook case for airship scouting.  A crisis with Japan might have provided the opening for the LTA community to accelerate their development plans and dirigibles have a play-balance advantage of being very expensive relative to their combat power within the most logical implementation in the WPO engine as an ultra-longrange patrol plane.  Basically, they soak up budget with little return in combat power so letting the proposed airship activity absorb the light cruiser budget seems a reasonable game/alternate historical trade-off. 

Destroyers:  The US had a plentitude of destroyers from WW1.  The Farragut class was the first modern class of destroyers in the 1930s.  In the early scenario any additional construction would be Clemson/Wickes class.  In the late scenario, something like the historical Farragut is more plausible.  A different, and more likely, approach would be an up-gunned Clemson, with 5in DP guns.

Submarines:  The current WPO includes the historical Barracuda (V1) and Narwhal (V5) class submarines that were first commissioned in the mid-to-late game periods.  The Barracudas would be introduced in 1924 (historical commissioning date) and serial production would take place (more long-range subs) until the Narwhal was introduced in 1929.  Serial production of the improved sub would continue through the end of the game.  Instead of 6 fleet submarines, the US force should include a few dozen additional fleet boats.   

If this was worked into the reinforcement schedule, the result would increase the total US builds in battleship equivalent from 9 to something around 29, or about 60% of a historical WW2 effort. Most of that is with late game battleships and accelerating the new US heavy cruisers. That is still somewhat short, but it does suggest that by 1928/1929, the US player will have a new battle fleet to fight the Japanese if he’s lost the first two (the initial US forces in the Pacific and the Atlantic Fleet reinforcements).  

I think it's arguable that the WW2 new construction was probably triple or more the combat power of the 1941 US Pacific Fleet so new construction that matches or significantly the combat power of the pre-war US fleets is appropriate for the early/late, respectively, scenarios under the alternate historical economic assumptions above. 

More to follow . . .

[engineer]

The Russo-Japanese War Counter-example:

In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese successively destroyed the Russian Far East Fleet and the Russian Baltic Fleet.  This left Russia without a way to effectively get at Japan given the limits of the Trans-Siberian Railway to support a land campaign and the absence of a navy to directly threaten the Japanese Home Islands.  With unrest at home, the Russians couldn’t afford to remain at war for years more in order to build a third fleet to hazard in battle. 

his experience encapsulates the Japanese hopes for WW2 and the implicit hopes that they would entertain upon starting a war with the USA in the 1920s.  Getting beyond American paranoia about a Japanese invasion of California, the Japanese would hope that by destroying the enemy navy, they would rob their opponents of the means to threaten the Home Islands and induce them to sue for peace on favorable terms.  The opening months of WW2, with Pearl Harbor, the fall of Malaya, and the conquest of the East Indies represented very nearly an ideal realization of that objective, but the USA didn’t give up, carriers were the new capital ship, and, in a long war, the USA rebuilt their fleet and successfully put the Home Islands under a siege that would have starved millions if the use of atomic weapons hadn’t brought the war to an early close in 1945. 

That suggests a very different additional victory condition for WPO.  If the Japanese Empire achieves a 3:1 or 4:1 ratio of battleships and battle cruisers compared to the USA, then the USA might be compelled, like Russia, to sue for peace.  It would be game over, finis!  Given that the Japanese won’t out-build the USA, the only way to make this happen is aggressive action to sink the US ships.  At the same time, this would make the US player more cautious in risking his capital ships (like Nimitz was in 1942).

One could see a “goalie force” as that minimum number of battleships necessary to prevent instant victory, being kept in reserve.  That would also allow historically realistic intervals for the transfer of the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific so they could be counted toward the “goalie force”.   Operations would then have to be planned and executed with what was left over after keeping that minimum reserve necessary for the fight out of harm’s way.  If the US player “pulled the goalie”, they could add those ships to an offensive operation, but the obvious risk there would be decisive Japanese victory possibly ending the war.  Time would allow production, giving the US more and more forces for operations, but taking that time would leave the Japanese free to reave with their own capital units and possibly build up a pretty substantial point total for the Allies to overcome.  In one sense, the Japanese could “run out the clock” on an overly cautious Allied player.  So the problem for the Allied remains knowing when to switch from defense to offense in order to begin the long slog back to Tokyo.   

Sorry for all the sports metaphors. 

[Helpless]

Good reading! Keep it coming.. [&o]