New Construction US DD

[engineer]

In a 4-5 year potential war, the USA has enough time to design and build lots of new destroyers from scratch. In WW2, Fletcher class destroyers were being built in 12 to 18 months on a routine basis. In WPO, there are no new construction US destroyers in the OOB. Especially for the late scenario, I don't think this is tenable.

Hypothetical Destroyer Acquisition timeline

early 1920's: Washington Treaties break up with no agreement
1922: US cuts defense budget anyway, 147 destroyers laid up
1924: Worsening diplomatic situation in the Pacific. Debate in Congress on mobilizing DD's versus new construction
1925: Roaring 20's provide enough revenue (along with Congressmen wanting to bring home the bacon) that a small 8 destroyer build is authorized (1925 DD "Phelps" class). Delivery is planned for 1927
1926: Building on the 1925 precedent, an improved destroyer is authorized (1926 DD "Hammann" class). Once war is declared some additional units are authorized but the emphasis is on mobilizing the reserve destroyers. The mobilized destroyers will arrive in 1927. The new 1926 destroyers will deliver in 1928
1927: Now that the war has been going on for some time, the naval designers are freed to build a destroyer relatively unconstrained with respect to cost. This leads to a large (2000-2500 ton) well-armed destroyer, the 1927 DD "Fletcher" class). These destroyers will be a 1929 delivery and could extend easily through 1930.

One good thing about integrating this is that it opens the door to eliminate the Royal Navy turning San Diego in "Scapa Flow West." This makes for potentially longer "house rules" games between the USA and Japan (1 to 1). A extra US battleships should also be salted in for 1928, 1929, and 1930, relecting ships authorized in 1924, 1925, and 1926, respectively.

Scrubbing the Japanese OOB for wartime construction is also called for, but that's beyond the scope of this thread.

Phelps-class discussion: This is a modified Clemson. The main armament is upgraded to 5" from 4". The hull is lengthened a bit so the torpedo tubes can be consoldiated with two centerline mounts. The extra displacement is used for more fuel so the range and cruise speed is bumped up a bit.

Note on naming: I went to Navsource and went through their destroyer page. They have a sequential list by hull numbers of US destroyers with a DANFS link at the bottom of each photo page to the history of that particular ship. I basically checked for destroyers that did not use a previous USN ship name and used those names for new destroyers. The full list is in the "Western Citadel" scenario that I'm working on, Phelps, Hammann, and Fletcher just happened to the be the first names where my admittedly arbitrary but I think reasonable assumptions outlined above, provided a break between classes.

[engineer]

The 1926 DD "Hammann" class is bigger departure.  The main guns are in turrets instead of exposed mounts.  Two superimposed turrets are present fore and aft. Three quad torpedo mounts are arranged amidships.  This looks much more like the historical US destroyers from the early to mid-1930s.

[engineer]

The Fletcher class is a big destroyer for the period.  This would certainly displace in the 2000 to 2500 ton range.  A torpedo mount is discarded in favor of a 5th 5 inch gun.  The guns are turreted.  The three inch AA gun is discarded for more 1 pounder and 0.50 caliber MG AA armament. It's also recognized as redundant with dual-purpose main guns.  Extra fuel capacity gives longer range and higher cruising speed. 

[engineer]

The Phelps class gets a late game upgrade.  Since all of the destroyers are deployed in a "hot war" situation, depth charges and Y racks are already provided.  In the case of the Phelps, her two centerline guns are replaced with turrets for greater protection of the gun crews and her AA armament is beefed up. 

[engineer]

Since the early scenario starts in 1922, the year when the US was historically demobilizing a huge portion of its destroyer strength, there is no plausible way to imagine a pipeline of ongoing destroyer construction.  1922 and 1923 would be spent remobilizing the destroyers, but certainly the designers would be in position to start working on something that would look like a Phelps and get it authorized by the end of 1922.  That would suggest they should start joining the fleet during the second half of 1924 and 1925.  An improved destroyer would then be designed in 1923 that could be commissioned in late 1925 and 1926.  Turrets might be omitted on the 1923 destroyer in favor of the open mounts used on US destroyers up to that date. 
 
So one could imagine 20 - 25 Phelps class destroyers being added mid-game and 30 - 35 Hammann class destroyers added in the late game of the early scenario.

[Terminus]

There was a general feeling, however, that it would be more cost-effective to re-instate older destroyers than build new ones. Besides, you'd need the extra crewmen for all the fancy-schmanzy battlewagons and aircraft carriers coming on line.

[engineer]

All true, but the US war effort is a big tent.  See my "Fortune Favors the Big Factories" thread.  A late scenario war effort would plausibly result in an output about 50% to 75% as big as the historical WW2 Pacific war effort.  Given the low cost and early status of aircraft, this would be disproportionately reflected in surface warships.  The only category that comes close in this respect is BB/BC with the new dreadnoughts and capital cruisers.  The US mobilized manpower in both WW1 and WW2, it follows they could mobilize manpower over several years in the hypothetic WPO Pacific War. The Clemsons only had a crew of about 150 officers and men so even 100 destroyers is only one division's worth of manpower.  Likewise, the new construction destroyers would have larger crews, but seventy or so new construction warships would only require about a division's worth of troops. 
 
Congressional pork-lust and corruption is long-standing, e.g. the 1920s produced Teapot Dome.  While remobilization is more cost effective, then there is far less money coming home for shipworkers and yard owners. This scenario is based on a Navy brass that favors new ships over old ships, politicians who favor higher expenditures over more cost-effective solutions, and a state department that sees the utility in using new construction to send a political message to the Japanese that aggression won't be tolerated.  It's a political question rather than a profit and loss question. 
 
The other point is that within the Western Citadel assumptions is a US government that has already invested tens of millions to fortify Guam as a Pacific Gibraltar to deter Japanese aggression. While there is certainly an argument that this would crowd out ship construction funds, the other side of that is "in for a penny, in for a pound" so that incremental investment would be justified to prevent the fall of that very expensive asset in the Mariana's.  The other point of Western Citadel is that it represents a "worst case" from the Japanese perspective of a USA that responded to the Japanese challenge with higher naval expenditures across a balanced fleet over a period time during the mid-1920s instead of only investing in some high profile battlewagons while keeping the balance of the military at pretty much the historical post-treaty budget levels. 
 
To be fair, I haven't researched all of the destroyers that actually start the game in the Pacific or come in as reinforcements to sort out how many are remobilized and how many remained on active duty.  I do know that of the 110 or so destroyers that have the 9999 entry delay, about 100 are demobilized and the balance are active duty Atlantic Fleet.  The destroyers that were remobilized for Coast Guard duty only required 6-8 weeks of peacetime yard time before being commissioned into the Coast Guard so taking years and years to get the reserves remobilized doesn't follow. 
 
The overall US schedule destroyer additions in Western Citadel (as of now)
- 50 remobilized DD late 1926 through late 1927
- 8 Phelps DD late 1927 to early 1928
- 12 Hamman DD mid to late 1928
- 50 Fletcher DD late 1928 to late 1929
120 DD total / 70 new construction DD
 
Half the San Diego RN destroyers have been removed completely and the balance have been relocated to Columbo along with the RN battlewagons.
 
Between 1939 and 1944, the USA commissioned about 400 total new destroyers, the majority of which were deployed in the Pacific.  So 70 new construction destroyers is clearly at the low end of my 50% to 75% estimate. 
 
One could certainly have a less provocative, more austere US military posture leading up to the outbreak of war which presumes no ongoing destroyer construction.  However, that would result in something that would look more like my early scenario estimate where you would drop the Fletcher, and split 50 or so new destroyers between the Phelps and Hammann classes in 1928 to 1930 deliveries. 

[Terminus]

Didn't mean to suggest that you shouldn't charge ahead with your project. Go for it, definitely!

[engineer]

Oh, I will.  But WPO has a steep learning curve and certainly I'm aware that opportunities for errors abound.  So this is a place to share (certainly someone else could use my notional classes and save themselves some work) and also maybe do some proofing. (I think 8 mg's in 8 turrets means 8 single mg's and that sort of thing), and the drydock question led me to discover that ships have to have a non-zero speed or they won't show up in the reinforcement queue.
 
Another point is whether too much evolution is present between classes.  My Fletcher is pretty close to the historical Fletcher, but it's advanced 15 years in time.  I've shortened the range a bit, dropped a knot off the speed, and excluded the heavy wartime AA armament.  That being said, is this Fletcher a too fanciful v-weapon (drop a turret or a torpedo mount) or does it represent a plausible if aggressive design compared to other contemporary destroyers.   
 
A final point is that if I've made a stupendous flaw in my reasoning, I really don't mind having it pointed out, learning from mistakes and all that.  It's especially useful for veterans like yourself to comment since I don't know much at all about the considerations that went into the stock OOB beyond some of the scenario background and FAQ data that's here on the site.  There's obviously a risk of nattering over silly details (like whether raspberry is better flavor than blueberry, matters of taste and hypotheticals), but another if I overcommit the historical shipbuilding capacity of a country by 3x. I've been scrubbing things on the Allied side first because that's were the research is easiest.  Eventually, I'm going to be studying the Japanese side, too. 

[Terminus]

ORIGINAL: engineer

(I think 8 mg's in 8 turrets means 8 single mg's and that sort of thing)

That is not correct. The heading "turrets" should be read "barrels per mount". In the example of your destroyers, you've created an octuple .50-cal mount. The correct tally is 8 to 1, which results in eight single .50-cal mounts.

[engineer]

Doh!  Thanks!  I'll get that fixed and proof the rest of my modified classes to make sure I didn't repeat that mistake elsewhere. 
 
So a pair of quad torpedo mounts would be 2 mounts x 4 torpedoes per mount?  My 8x2 that I have for the Phelps is actually 8 mounts with 2 torpedos per mount. 

[Terminus]

Correct. It should read "8" in the "num" column, and "4" in the "turrets" column. That makes it two quad mounts.

I made that mistake myself far more times than I care to count whilst modding WitP and WPO...

[Tankerace]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Correct. It should read "8" in the "num" column, and "4" in the "turrets" column. That makes it two quad mounts.

I made that mistake myself far more times than I care to count whilst modding WitP and WPO...

Well, I made that error more than a few times in creating WPO, so no worries! [:D]
Unfortunately no super-uber-mega-death-dreadnoughts made it into the final product. [8D]

[Terminus]

Tut, tut... Underachiever...[:'(]