Carrier Ratings

[decaro]

I went into the CaW editor to look at the ship ratings for the CVs at Midway. I'm curious as to how these values were arrived at, because the ratings seem somewhat subjective.

First, what's the difference between fire control and damage control as they both are closely related, especially on a CV? Or is fire -- as in gunnery -- control really related to AA instead?

Japanese CV ratings in both of these categories are rated comperable to Allied CVs despite the fact that IJN CVs at this stage of the war were essentially floating "tinder boxes." For example, Agaki eventually became a burnt-out hulk after only one direct hit, so how can her fire and damage control ratings be comperable to either the Enterprise or Hornet?

And since it took a spead of torpedoes from ann IJN sub to finally sink Yorktown after it survied two successful aerial attacks, shouldn't this CV have an excellent damage control rating?

Re AA ratings: Again, the IJ CVs seem over rated in this area, esp. Akagi; her older 4.7"/45 cal. guns -- decreased rate of fire and elevation -- were to be upgraded after Midway, and all the IJN light AA were based on a French design licensed back in 1936.

In short, of the 146 Allied planes lost on June 4 to the IJN @ Midway, only 2 were confirmed AA kills. But it's more than just historical accuracey; when opposing fleets are this lopsided, play balance becomes very important.

(BTW, I can't think of anything more equalizing in a CV computer game than (very) random cloud cover where it counts -- over the sea that the fleets are actually in).

I assume I can successfully edit the necessary changes in these ships for the Midway scenario w/the editor, but I think these CV ratings should also be revisted before the next patch comes out.

What do you at SSG think?

[OldBoney]

Fire Control is gunnery thing (p47 Manual) There is an AA rating as well so I guess this is the main guns.

I will be interested in the answers to your questions. From my experience the Japanese carrier's damage control is nil. Often moderate damage, that an American carrier would repair and shrug off, will take them out of play. You could make them worse but they're pretty bad now.

I bought a copy of "Shattered Sword'' and am reading it now. I still wonder if the IJN TGs aren't bunched too tightly, but I don't have anything definite.

[decaro]

Yes, as an after thought I cracked open the manual and there it was, but fire control should also affect AA too, so ...

You're going to read this for yourself in SS, but for everyone else, damage control/fire fighting on a US CV was a job for everyone (save the aviators), but it was a specialty for the IJN and only handled by select crew members and engineer officers.

I would guess US damage control was better than that of the IJN at Midway, esp. after Coral Sea; after we lost the Lex, the Allies routinely drained the av fuel lines during an attack and filled them with CO2.

IJN damage control improved after Midway; apparently everyone has to learn the hard way.

Edit: Sorry, I kept confusing gunnery (fire) control w/damage control, i.e., fire fighting.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: OldBoney

... I will be interested in the answers to your questions. From my experience the Japanese carrier's damage control is nil. Often moderate damage, that an American carrier would repair and shrug off, will take them out of play. You could make them worse but they're pretty bad now ...

I realize Australia is on the other side of the world from here, but it's been several days now and nothing heard from SSG. After all, this is the World Wide Web.

[Gregor_SSG]

Yes, it is the wonderful world of the web but it was a holiday weekend in Australia, so normal service was not available. I'm going to bump this query up to Ian Trout, as he did all the ratings.

Gregor

[decaro]

Another Australian holiday? Who do you think you are? Germany!

Thanks; will we get a message from Ian, or will he simply deal with this in the next patch?

[Gregor_SSG]

Hey, the first holiday was your fault! Our beautiful city had a hideous Berlin Wall style fence erected through the middle of it, roads blocked, water cannon, snipers and the whole ugly machinery of modern security operations imposed upon it, just because President Bush was going to visit. OK, there were some other world leaders as well, but George was clearly top of the security precautions list.

We were effectively given two choices - stay at home and shut up or leave town for somewhere where sanity prevailed. Many people just got out of town.

Now this last long weekend was a proper Australian holiday. It celebrates a nominal cause, (Labour Day), that most people have completely forgotten but its in the calendar and nobody is going to take it from us. The combination of perfect early spring weather and the complete absence the relentless exaggeration of threats conducted by self important bureaucrats and security officials, not to mention the snipers, made it a perfect weekend.

Gregor

[goodwoodrw]

Holiday weekend? Wot far off state do you live in? Work as normal in this good ol sovereign state of Victoria

[Troutie_SSG]

I'll try to answer all of your questions, Joe.
1. Fire Control = Surface gunnery rating.
2. Damage Control = Subjective rating encompassing fire-fighting and damage repair skills and equipment.
3. The presence of arming/fueling planes on deck has a huge effect on the spread of fire and permanent damage. If you strike the Akagi when her decks are clear and ordnance stowed, I don't have any evidence that her exceptionally well trained and motivated crew would have achieved less than an American equivalent; at least not at this stage of the war. Sure, later on, when fuel was more volatile, and crews inexperienced, performance became worse. Check the ratings for Japanese carriers in subsequent scenarios; they gradually become poorer.
I am quite sure we are modeling the right factors here; what I can never be really sure of is that the balance is right. So, from time to time, I make minor changes, hoping to move closer the 'right' balance. Your observations on the delicate matter of damage control are appreciated, and won't be ignored. Indeed, the more reports I get of strange happenings, the better.
Thanks for your interest.

[decaro]

My impression of IJN doctrine was that it was so offensive-oriented that everything else – such as damage control – was only a secondary consideration.

I’m certainly not an expert on IJN CVs, but the authors of Shattered Sword are, and they claim the following from Chapter 14 (Fire and Death)

- Japan chose a CV design that reflected the worst of both the RN and USN philosophies; they refueled their aircraft in two-tiered closed hangars under unarmored flight decks. Any bomb that penetrated the deck and detonated in these closed spaces released a larger, more magnified explosion. At Midway, when the IJN CVs were hit, there were actually very few planes on deck (only some Zeros preparing for CAP); most planes were below being refueled and rearmed to attack the latest American CV sighting.

- Unlike American CVs, IJN fire mains were only divided port and starboard, which meant that a single hit could knock out half the ship's water supply.

- All IJN warships had wooden furniture, ensuring they would burn easily.

There is much more, but suffice it to say that Agaki became a burning hulk after only one direct hit; what does that say re IJN damage control?

As for AA, Sword said at this stage in the war, most IJN CVs avoided enemy air thru violent maneuvering, which undid the computerized firing solutions for it's guns. That probably explains the low AA kills I previously posted.

Kindly reconsider your CV ratings, otherwise I will have to tinker w/them at my end, and my editor sometimes proves unstable.

By the way, the authors have a website that lists naval games, including CaW:

Carriers at War, by SSG. One of my readers says, "It is inconceivable that a homepage dedicated to the IJN makes no mention in its computer games section of SSG's Carriers at War. This is possibly the most realistic computer naval wargame you will ever come across and the realism is all transparent. The game INTERFACE is extremely simple …

You can read the rest at http://www.combinedfleet.com/games.htm

[SMK-at-work]

To be picky, enclosing an explosion does not magnify it.

It means that more of the effect is contained within the enclosed space - so more damage is done to anything within that space.

the magnitude of the explosion is exactly the same, but less of it is wasted on empty space.

There's an interesting article on British vs American carrier design at http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm that discusses in some dpeth why the British system was a dead end.

[Kiwi Red One]

I have not read "Shattered Sword" but is it really on a level high enough above any other book written about Midway to allow it to be treated as the last word on the subject or is it a bit of historical revisionism?

Some books written nowadays seem to be based more on secondary rather than primary sources and they seem to rehash the same points, albeit in slightly different form, not all of which are necessarily correct. If the authors of "Shattered Sword" have gone back to researching primary sources then good for them.

The article on RN vs USN carrier design posted by SMK-at-work is eye opening, the conclusion reads:

What it does illustrate is one very important thing - carriers are unique in that their design is dictated by the aircraft they carry and how those aircraft are to be used.  It is not correct to say that the USN was right and the RN was wrong or vice versa or that one design was better than another.  The navies used their aircraft in very different ways and their carrier designs reflected that difference.  When they started to use their aircraft in the same way, their carrier designs converged.

The USN and IJN correctly concluded that the power of the carrier lay in the offensive capability of its airgroup and ended up with designs that maximised the number of planes that could be carried while the RN went down a more defensive road, so the armoured box carriers of the Illustrious and subsiquent classes were limited in the size of their air groups even with outriggers and deckparks. Given all the limitations that the RN and FAA operated carriers under I believe that they a magnificent job.
 
As far as carrier ratings go the beauty of CAW is that the editor allows you to simply change the values of vertually any factor in the game should you desire to do so. The designers have assigned ratings as they see fit. If anyone does not think that those ratings are correct merely change them. Given that most wargames that do not let you tinker with unit values etc CAW is a real breath of fresh air, so feel free to customise things as you see fit.

SSG should be applauded for retaining the ability to edit so freely in the latest release of CAW and congradulated on producing an outstanding game...a Kiwi praising our Aussie neighbours...it must be good!! [:)]

Cheers
KRO

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: SMK-at-work

To be picky, enclosing an explosion does not magnify it.

It means that more of the effect is contained within the enclosed space - so more damage is done to anything within that space.

the magnitude of the explosion is exactly the same, but less of it is wasted on empty space ...

I think you're (technically) correct; the authors of Sword also compared it to a firecracker exploding within a sealed tin.

Add to that mix all the munitions on the planes and ammo carts below deck, not to mention the av gas fumes freed from damaged fuel lines that are gathering in an enclosed hangar whose forced ventilation system has just failed. In short, "boom."

Several fireballs from Kaga strongly suggest that was just what happened after it was hit; IJN damage control couldn't contain the fire raging below its deck.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

My impression of IJN doctrine was that it was so offensive-oriented that everything else – such as damage control – was only a secondary consideration.

I’m certainly not an expert on IJN CVs, but the authors of Shattered Sword are, and they claim the following from Chapter 14 (Fire and Death)

I'm not sure about that one ... They were interested in details about the IJN since they were kids, and they did their homework, no doubt, plus they got a good reputation.

But I can't stop thinking that they were "just" very good at collecting facts and informations which were already known in Japan (for quite a few years), so they kind of "transfered" or "forwarded" infos/facts to the western hemisphere, where - contrary to the japanese POV - the focus used to be on the USN, on what the USN did right, or - regularly picked up by writers from the western hemisphere - on what amount of luck had been involved on the US side.
Many of the numbers/facts they collected were submitted by japanese experts, researchers or historians, they did not get to see/verify original documents nor did they go to Japan to interview eye witnesses (afaik). It is a kind of "remote work", imho.

I think "Sword" doesn't factor in one vital fact: Besides "Sword" not covering USN decisions/POVs to draw the big picture (although some decisions/actions on the USN side might have had a bigger impact than the authors may think - or bigger than they would accept, whatever), the book doesn't factor in that the USN commanders could not gather/develop tactics, type of approaches etc. from real battles/conflicts where carriers were envolved, nor did the respective USN commanders have air combat experience. The book draws a picture where the IJN was a a doomed force right from the start (due to design flaws, bad doctrine, etc.), without taking into account that the USN did accept risks to a level where they fielded all available CVs (Midway), although there was a chance that they would have been confronted with a superior enemy carrier force. Many of the USN commanders were aggressive and acted as if they would have had combat experience, although they received the vital knowledge on academies only.

Let me quote from a dissertation authored in 2005 (someone posted the link in another thread):

ORIGINAL : DOUGLAS VAUGHN SMITH - Carrier Battles:Command decisions in harm's way, Florida State University

Most of all, however, since war is an interactive endeavor, the outcomes of the
five Pacific carrier battles can be attributed to the relative merit of decisions taken by the
opposing commanders. But the success of U.S. commanders in making appropriate and
timely decisions at sea in World War II is also a function of the correct or erroneous
decisions and actions taken and executed by their Japanese counterparts........

I don't think that good/bad decisions were the only factors that triggered the outcomes, and it seems that the author didn't know vital details about the IJN side (logistics, doctrine, carrier design, etc.) presented in "Sword", but the decisions were important cornerstones during these battles.

The Japanese naval leadership had considerable combat experience even before the decision was taken to attack the U. S. at Pearl Harbor. Japan’s aircraft carrier commanders - and particularly Admiral Chuichi Nagumo who commanded all major carrier operations, including the six-carrier attack on Pearl Harbor, prior to U.S. Fleet opposition which started with the Battle of the Coral Sea -- had considerably more operational experience in a combat environment than any Admiral the United States could muster to oppose them. In fact, the first carrier commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to see action, and the senior commander in the first three of the five Pacific carrier battles, Radm. Frank Jack Fletcher, was not even an aviator and thus lacked conceptual insight into air battle, out of sight of the carrier that launched the attack and in an extra dimension as compared to battle on the ocean’s surface. Nor had he seen any opposing surface naval action while in command of a Navy fighting vessel, though he had won the Medal of Honor for service as a Lieutenant during the United States’ occupation of Vera Cruz and the Navy Cross for service in European Waters in 1918........

....The American Admirals had merely pondered in the classroom and on the gaming board situations that their Japanese adversaries had experienced in real life. ......

One of the dissertation's goals:

.... through evaluation of the decision processes of the commanders concerned, it will attempt to identify the inter-War educational system -- and particularly Sound Military Decision -- as the cornerstone of success in those battles.

That's where the dissertation shines, it also shares my idea of USN commanders who were willing to take risks, with many of them acting aggressively or quickly.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.
- All IJN warships had wooden furniture, ensuring they would burn easily.

I tend to think that the designs of many carriers' structures + battle stations were flawed and more of a risk/threat than any furniture could be, and maybe these designs even played into the hands of the USN: battleships or CA's which were converted to CVs/CVLs, either during the construction/planning phase or even after completion, and all the carriers with wooden superstructures, where some of the changes made in the dockyards were applied hastily, while others took years, due to lack of resources or problems during production.
Wooden Interior/furniture might have been no more than the "sugar" on top.

There is much more, but suffice it to say that Agaki became a burning hulk after only one direct hit; what does that say re IJN damage control?

It does say a lot about the flawed design, about the (the lack of) awareness regarding potential high damage caused by direct hits or fire. It does say a lot about the general offensive posture/doctrine, where the IJN was supposed to strike first (and deadly), so the focus wasn't on safety/damage control, obviously.

As for AA, Sword said at this stage in the war, most IJN CVs avoided enemy air thru violent maneuvering, which undid the computerized firing solutions for it's guns. That probably explains the low AA kills I previously posted.

Not sure if they really did these manouevres during dive bomber attacks, I doubt that they could reduce the chance of being damaged that way.
Check this: http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/imag ... 057576.jpg
I'm sure that chances were high to minimize damage when that kind of manoeuvre had been used, if being attacked by level bombers.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Kiwi Red One

I have not read "Shattered Sword" but is it really on a level high enough above any other book written about Midway to allow it to be treated as the last word on the subject or is it a bit of historical revisionism?

Some books written nowadays seem to be based more on secondary rather than primary sources and they seem to rehash the same points, albeit in slightly different form, not all of which are necessarily correct. If the authors of "Shattered Sword" have gone back to researching primary sources then good for them ...

No, good for those of us who want our history real and not from Hollywood. And for the record, I like my PC games as real as humanly possible, even if I have to do it myself.

(For the record, I had a similar gameplay issue w/AGEOD's BoA in that the Colonials could never win their revolution, so America was never going to be "born"; AGEOD eventually reintroduced severe supply rules that hamstrung large Brit armies and made the game more realistic, so history was again able to repeat itself).

In fact Sword did go directly to the (recently?) translated IJN flight operation logs as well as the ship's log of the Akagi; this has dispellled much of the myth of Midway, esp. after the erroneous published "eye witness" accounts of Fuchida, whose twisted retelling of this tale has hidden from the West what really happened at Midway for almost half a century.

I hope Sword will not be the last word on Midway, judging by the responses to my posts.

As for me, I still have trouble w/my CaW editor, and the manual is not that helpful; but I thought the rest of us who bought this game would like to know why playing the Midway scenario from the Allied side is so hard when the actual battle seemed so easy.

Also, see my posts on Nagumo having too many Zeros -- probably just too many planes, period -- and cloud cover over CaW's Midway scenario.

[decaro]

Goodguy: yes, the Japanese people knew for some time that Cdr. Fuchida's Midway account just didn't make sense; but that fact never made it over here, hence Shattered Sword.

The winner of a carrier battle is like the winner of a chess game; it's the player that makes the next to last mistake. Midway was no exception, and USN execution was haphazard and sloppy as compared to IJN offensive efficiency. But the Kido Butai had played fast and loose w/their defensive defficiencies during the previous 6 months of unending victories, and they finally paid for it in full at Midway.

In the words of Cdr. Chihaya, ".. we should have met the same fate somewhere else in the Pacific .. because it was visited on the Japanese navy to penalize its absurd self-conceit."

There is no perfect CV design; the Brits went w/more protection, which meant smaller air wings; the USN went w/(air) power projection and emphasized damage control to reduce the risks associated w/wooden flight decks.

There are actually photos of IJN CVs at Midway using sharp manuevers -- circling and figure "S" -- to avoid air attack. They are in Sword, and probably online as well.

My posts here aren't meant to be an exhaustive review of WW II CV doctrine; I'm trying to get SSG to take a hard look at their CV ratings in CaW, and since I have no expertise on these matters, I'm quoting the latest source.

However, for the record, I do have a (US) Navy Unit Commendation, although I was never in the USN.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Gregor_SSG

Hey, the first holiday was your fault! Our beautiful city had a hideous Berlin Wall style fence erected through the middle of it, roads blocked, water cannon, snipers and the whole ugly machinery of modern security operations imposed upon it, just because President Bush was going to visit. OK, there were some other world leaders as well, but George was clearly top of the security precautions list.

We were effectively given two choices - stay at home and shut up or leave town for somewhere where sanity prevailed. Many people just got out of town ...

Gregor

I was an editor w/the school newspaper when Bill Clinton visited Housatonic Community College, along w/his personal entourage that included an anti-assasination sniper squad --who immediately took up position on all the nearby rooftops -- and other secret service bodyguards. No Berlin wall, but the SS had cordoned-off all the hallways and turned my school into a maze.

The visit was during the Monica Lewinski scandal and the President wasn't answering any questions from the press; I wasn't able to go home, either.

[Troutie_SSG]

Perhaps I should have mentioned the other factor used in establishing how readily fires spread or are brought under control. Each ship class has a vulnerability value, subjectively expressing design and stability. Japanese carriers in all scenarios are more vulnerable than their Allied counterparts. On the scale of 0-7 used, every point has a profound effect.
I have to say that all my original research was done before the latest tomes on Midway were published.
In the past three months or so, I have played out the battle a very large number of times. In almost every case, who gets there first decides the outcome!
To give you some idea where Midway stands now, I have just put the finishing touches on 65 Mystery Variants which will be appearing in the next patch, just as soon as I'm satisfied there are no AI glitches in them.
P.S I have ordered a copy of 'Shattered Sword'. Guess I better read it!
Thanks again for all the interest.

[Gregor_SSG]

Regarding damage control, I remember reading somewhere that although the US carriers had undergone a hazard reduction program, this had been done in a pre-war fashion i.e. not very seriously, and it wasn't until after a couple of serious fires that this measure was undertaken with the zeal required to really reduce the fire risk or furniture, bedding, fittings, paint and so on.

Gregor

[BlindOldUmp]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

<SNIP>
Add to that mix all the munitions on the planes and ammo carts below deck, not to mention the av gas fumes freed from damaged fuel lines that are gathering in an enclosed hangar whose forced ventilation system has just failed. In short, "boom."
Several fireballs from Kaga strongly suggest that was just what happened after it was hit; IJN damage control couldn't contain the fire raging below its deck.

I haven't read anything to change my mind that gasoline fumes are what destroyed Lexington & Taiho as well. Somebody thought ventilating was needed, opened up some vents (instead of shutting off the gas at the source or pumping overboard or ..... not that HAZMAT disposal is easy ) and that spread the fumes into a larger box which caused a larger explosion on what was a salvagable ship.
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-u ... -l/cv2.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/Taiho.htm