Singapore - The British Empire

[heenanc]

WW2 15th febuary

So do you think the top brass should have kept the gloves on for longer?

A lot of troops give up there arms, the worst in the history of the British Empire. With so many surrendered do you believe that they should have stuck it out?

I understand that they didn't realized how brutal the Japanese were going to be but at the end of the day this was WAR and you can't expect pleasantries after surrender (I do have read the story's of the what the captured went through but it sounds so harsh that I couldn't imagen it)

I believe it was folly to surrender and believe it was a big mistake for no gains. Maybe the there was no hope in the TOP Brass but I believe they should have fought on. In the same situation today I'd hope they would make a stand.

Just in the interest of seeking other people views on the matter I thought I'd raise the topic as it's alway stuck in my mind!!

[borner]

When GB surrendered Japan had made a successful landing on the island iteslf, and captured the water supply among other areas, so they were not going to hold out for long. Of course, they had could not know what was going to happen after the surrender.

[Misconduct]

ORIGINAL: heenanc
I believe it was folly to surrender and believe it was a big mistake for no gains. Maybe the there was no hope in the TOP Brass but I believe they should have fought on. In the same situation today I'd hope they would make a stand.

Just in the interest of seeking other people views on the matter I thought I'd raise the topic as it's alway stuck in my mind!!

No war has ever been won by surrender. The whole idea of "Lose the battle today, to win the war tomarrow" hasn't quite won any country a war yet.

[Alfred]

Command and control of Allied troops was basically non existent by 15 February 1942.  There are plenty of stories of Allied troops voting with their feet against continuing the fight - under those circumstances they were not going to obey any officer still prepared to fight.

Even those units who were still combat capable lacked the logistics to continue more than 2-3 days.  Nothing would have been gained other than more casualties.  Nor was there any capacity to continue guerilla operations on Singapore island.

Alfred

[JeffroK]

heeanc
 
I understand that they didn't realized how brutal the Japanese were going to be but at the end of the day this was WAR and you can't expect pleasantries after surrender (I do have read the story's of the what the captured went through but it sounds so harsh that I couldn't imagen it)

You make it sound like a bit of face slapping and roughing up, not the deliberate maltreatment and outright murder of defenceless men & women. Keep reading on the lack of "pleasantries" meted out to those captured at Singapore, on Java, Sumatra, Wake Is and at Bataan!!

[John 3rd]

The Allies were so incompetently led by Percival and were truly crippled by the other British/Australian commanders that were present.  I just read my first history of that campaign and it was a first-class disaster from start to finish.  Take that terrible generalship and add a strong dose of Japanese audacity, capable leadership, and aggressive tactics and one has the recipe for a true catastrophe.

[Howard Mitchell]

Not my specialist area, but I believe British and Commonwealth armies at the time would fight tenaciously if they had trust and confidence in their leaders, but if they didn’t they could become demoralised and ineffective quite quickly. Especially true if the enemy had been dismissed beforehand as inferior but when met in battle showed themselves to be far from it.
 
Comparing Dunkirk with Singapore is interesting – one an excellent example of evacuation by sea while under enemy fire, the second a bloody shambles (good title for a book).

[Mike Scholl]

Percival and the rest of the British High Command had screwed up so badly during the previous 2 months of fighting in Malaya that the troop's morale and confidence in them had been totally shattered.  Not a good point from which to begin a "desperate struggle" to defend the "Island Fortress".  Singapore was "lost" in the Malayan fighting..., the invasion of the island itself was mearly the anti-climax to the previous campaign...

[rtrapasso]

it was later known that the IJA had extremely limited stocks of ammunition... apparently not enough for one day according to some sources... if Percival had elected to fight for even a few more days, it is quite possible (maybe even likely) that he could have pulled victory from the jaws of defeat...

[wdolson]

Not only were the Japanese low on ammunition, but they were also outnumbered and Yamashita played an excellent game of poker.  Yamashita knew his troops were scheduled for the next phase of the SRA invasions and he knew his best bet for making his time table was to bluff Percival into surrendering.

The British badly bungled the whole battle from the start.  When the Japanese landed up the peninnsula and started moving south, the British should have been fortifying the north side of the island with everything they had.  Their best bet to hold the island for a while would have been to repell crossing attempts.  When the Japanese got a foothold, it was the last nail in the coffin for Percival who's morale must have been pretty shaky by that point.

Even if discipline among the troops had been breaking down, if the British commanders had decided to fight, there would have been no place for those who wanted out to run. 

Strategically, a protracted siege in Singapore would have been horrid for the defenders (though probably better than they got as POWs), but it would have bought the rest of the Allies some valuable time.  Yamashita's troops would not have been available for the next phase of the campaign which would have given ABDA a chance to fortify and reinforce the remaining portions of the DEI.  If the Japanese had been significantly delayed in capturing Java and Sumatra, that would have been disasterous to their war economy.

Bill

[Feinder]

I'll play Devil's Advocate here (and say something on behalf of Percival).

He claimed to be very concerned about the potential civilian casualties (remember, he was essentially a pre-war military governor of Sing). At that point, the port had been attacked daily, and anything moving out of Sing was being attacked (albeit not that effectively - Japan didn't have endless torps like WitP! [;)]). Also the Japanese had crossed the isthmus, and would soon be able to bring artillery against the main city itself.

He was very aware of Japan's disregard of civilian casualties at Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan. They had also indescrimentaly bombed civilian targets in every major city in China. He expressed concern that if he did extend the fight, that the city and great many of it's civilians would be killed. Consider the (esp early war) perceptions of "open cities", to avoid wanton destruction and to preserve civilian life - Paris, Manilla, even Germany gave up Rome in 1943.

That being said. Percival was clearly far below par.

-F-

[Alfred]

Further to Feinder's post, Percival was a better general than he is credited.  His two greatest deficiencies were:
 
(1)  a lack of troops.  His first task was to protect the airfields which too often were too close to potential landing sites.  He just didn't have the troops to do that and rush/fortify the north as has been suggested
 
(2)  he was too nice a person, allowing too much latitude to incompetent subordinates and not being ruthless in seeing his orders were carried out.
 
In addition to the above, he laboured under a flawed military/civilian command structure.  Too much authority was diffused with the Governor.
 
Sure the Japanese were short on logistics but don't forget that the British logistic position was really no better.  No point in having ammo stockpiled in warehouses if there is no longer an effective distribution network.  Once the Allies were across the causeway, the only realistic chance they had of prolonging the fight was if they could defeat and completely repel the Japanese crossing within the first 24-48 hours.  The failure to achieve that outcome was more properly due to Bennet than Percival.
 
Given all the factors, it is unlikely that a better general than Percival could have performed that much better to have significantly affected the outcome.
 
Alfred 

[rtrapasso]

(1) a lack of troops.

In order to say you "lack troops", you have to compare it to your opposition. At the beginning of the campaign, Percival outnumbered the Japanese 10 to 1!! [X(] Yamashita limited his offensive to 2 divisions (he didn't think he could support more logistically, and he was proved right).

Percival managed to fritter this 10: 1 advantage away, however... by defending everything, he defended nothing... he allowed momentum to slip away to Yamashita from the start (failing to seize the Thai landing sites)... refused to let the troops fortify positions ("it might harm morale")... Heck, the British High Command even refused to let basic manuals for fighting the Japanese be distributed to the troops (for similar reasons.) [X(] [&:]

As for the "desertion/poor morale": The British 18th Division landed in Singapore just a few days before the surrender... hard to credit that there was no fight left in them when they hadn't been committed to the struggle.

[drw61]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

The British 18th Division landed in Singapore just a few days before the surrender... hard to credit that there was no fight left in them when they hadn't been committed to the struggle.

I have never understood this. Why did they not sent the 18th Division to Java or Rangoon if they were just about to surrender?

[Feinder]

I do believe that Percival and the rest had indicated to India that their situation was rapidly deteriorating.  I don't know that that it was ever said that "surrender is immenent" at that point.  But saying that your situation is grave, may have expedited/confirmed the destination of the 18th Division.  Also consider that Sing was the largest jewel of the Empire, outside of India (and considered far more stategically important than it actually was).  You end up with a recipe for a mass surrender.
 
-F-

[Feinder]

Cool.

I found it. My old link was dead.

The "Wavell Report" - the official debrief of the Malay/Sing campaign written in May 1942. Very interesting reading. Granted, it's not as "even handed" as the more contemporary histories, but it certainly gives insight into the questions you're asking.

-F-

The Wavell Report

[Feinder]

Here is part of the accounts of of a UK Medic, who sailed with the 18th Div to Sing (he didn't stay).

-F-

Albert's War, Chapter 5 - The Road to Singapore

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Feinder

I do believe that Percival and the rest had indicated to India that their situation was rapidly deteriorating.  I don't know that that it was ever said that "surrender is immenent" at that point.  But saying that your situation is grave, may have expedited/confirmed the destination of the 18th Division.  Also consider that Sing was the largest jewel of the Empire, outside of India (and considered far more stategically important than it actually was).  You end up with a recipe for a mass surrender.

-F-

Percival was under direct orders from Churchill not to surrender the city and to conduct house to house fighting... he chose to ignore this and surrender... Yamashita pulled a huge bluff by stating he would annihilate the Brits if they didn't surrender, and it worked... no telling what would have happened if Percival hadn't surrendered, but it probably would not have been good for the Japanese...

It wouldn't have been good for the civilians, either, but after the fall of Singapore, the Japanese conducted a "bit" of ethnic cleansing as well as blackmailing large amount of money from the remaining population... by allowing the city to fall intact (more or less) to the Japanese, this vastly aided the war effort of the enemy, and didn't spare the population much, i think.

[Feinder]

Well, Sing was a bit of the New York of East - very much a melting pot.  There were about 1/4 Chinese, 1/4 Malays, 1/4 Western, and 1/4 Indians.

The Chinese did NOT fair well.  Many were executed or disappeared.
The Indians were initially stockaded, and were later given the choice to join the INA, or remain in captivity.
The western (civilians) were largely the merchants and polito of Sing - many were used to attempt to run the local economy (altho it Sing was never nearly as productive as it was pre-war).
The Malays were mostly the labor, and they too were largely put back to work.

Make no mistake, life in Sing was NOT pleasent.  But Japan did recognize it as a major source of commerce, and tried to pursue it as such.  But if there are not ships from Euuope trading, there is littel commerce (duh).  Life under the imperial rule was definatlely difficult, but Japan did want to pursue the "Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere" and thus demponstrate their superior-ness.  It didn't work.  But life in Sing was certainly not as harsh as it was in other occupied inustrial cities like Manilla.

-F-

[rtrapasso]

But life in Sing was certainly not as harsh as it was in other occupied inustrial cities like Manilla.

Unless, of course, you were one of the Chinese or European/Eurasian... none of these faired at all well... and as you point out, this was HALF the population...

Yes, if you were in the OTHER half things were better than in (say) Manilla.