http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTy8yHXt7Q0

Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
The British would had put their entire navy to prevent a D-day scenario. Even with complete air superiority, the Germans would have had a very hard time trying to sink so many battleships and cruisers. The Lufftwaffe didn't design torpedo bomber and their torpedoes were faulty in 1940, but more important, they did not train for naval operations. So, they had nothing close to the performance of hard core veteran Japanese Betty bombers.
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
I didn't know it was their strategy to wait a bit....
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
Well I am thinking there was also this tremedous fear of level bombers as anti-shipping weapons, and this was proven wrong only by mid 1942. So it is also possible that the British were overstimating the risks to their fleet.
In the scenario of Great Britain's survival at the stake, I bet they would just keep their damaged ships fighting until the end.
ORIGINAL: HexHead
Churchill's government (a 'national' gov't under British procedures - there was no election, recall, Churchill succeeded to the PM's post) had made it about as clear as one can make it that there were to be no negotiations with the Hitlerite cabal.
Something about Naziism being eradicated from the face of the earth, IIRC. The RN was, if necessary, to remove to the western hemisphere to keep a fleet-in-being intact.
ORIGINAL: HexHead
He wasn't 'threatening' anyone. Reminding a would be ally of possible consequences, due to circumstances that would have long passed out of your control, is not a threat. It is what we in the business call 'a frank assessment.'