Operation market garden strategic goals

[madmickey]

If operation market garden was a success would it have been a quick end of the war or a disaster. On a strategic basis do you think a narrow single thrust would have lead to the destruction of the Ruhr or just a way to destroy the British 2nd Army? Some historian claim that the objectives of Operation Market Garden was to help open up the Scheldt (sic) estuary (seaborne approach to Antwerp) by cutting off the troops there. But the Canadian still had a terrible time clearing the estuary out even after Market Garden.

[Tzar007]

I do believe the strategic intention of Market Garden (to open a road to the Reich more rapidly than attacking through the Ruhr with the 3rd US Army) was sound. However, IMHO, the implementation of that strategic intention left much to be desired because of 3 elements that were not sufficiently adressed by the planners, or even worse, was ignored.

A) The Allies never cut Zangen’s Fifteenth Germany Army retreat from the coast of Holland. The 15th Army played a great role in delaying the advance of XXX Corps along the highway.
B) The concept of having XXX Corps driving along that narrow highway multiplied the chances of failure.
C) Intel information about the arrival of II Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area was bluntly ignored by the Allies.

Take these 3 factors together and then it becomes almost impossible to successfully implement Market-Garden as planned.

[madmickey]

ORIGINAL: Tzar007

I do believe the strategic intention of Market Garden (to open a road to the Reich more rapidly than attacking through the Ruhr with the 3rd US Army) was sound. However, IMHO, the implementation of that strategic intention left much to be desired because of 3 elements that were not sufficiently adressed by the planners, or even worse, was ignored.

A) The Allies never cut Zangen’s Fifteenth Germany Army retreat from the coast of Holland. The 15th Army played a great role in delaying the advance of XXX Corps along the highway.
B) The concept of having XXX Corps driving along that narrow highway multiplied the chances of failure.
C) Intel information about the arrival of II Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area was bluntly ignored by the Allies.

Take these 3 factors together and then it becomes almost impossible to successfully implement Market-Garden as planned.

My problem is that even if Market garden succeeded the 2nd army would still be easily cut-off being without flank protection and the fact that supplies could not be brought in from Antwerp. You need more than one Rhine crossing points The Remegen Bridge did collapsed shortly after being captured (about a week). But by that time the Allied had more crossing points. A General of Von Manstein ability could have turned the tide against the British

[RayWolfe]

Well, my take is that if the Germans had completely collapsed as the Brits thought they had, the narrow thrust would have worked. Unfortunately, the Germans were by no means finished and even had Market Garden been entirely successful the subsequent narrow thrust into Germany would have failed.
Had the Brits had their wits about them they would have seen that time and time again the Germans were capable of being “finished” only to rise again and fight back. They did this in almost every theatre except in their flight across France and Belgium and thus led the Allies into this false sense of security. The British had been fighting for five years, they were really tired, they wanted it over by Christmas, and they were sure going to make sure that it was.
Imagine the heady potion of success as Guards Armoured spent, what was it, six weeks swanning across France at fifty miles a day. No one wanted to listen to General Sosabowski when he was supposed to have said “But what about the Germans”
And it wasn’t just Monty, it was the whole of Allied Command, and if Market Garden had not happened, maybe Patton would have been given his head and done something equally daft.
I doubt, the Russians would have tried anything as adventurous because they had experience of just how the Germans could recover.
Ray

[madmickey]

Ray I agree with you on the Allies their first objective should have been to open up Antwerp for shipping; Monty messed up badly in that regard. You always want to reconsolidate after a big advance and not overstretch your supply lines.
Actually the narrow attack in the North is the worst place, as you would only need a single thrust to the sea to cutoff 2nd Army. In the center you would want to do a double envelopment

[The_MadMan]

The ultimate objective of Market Garden was to encircle the Ruhr but before that the objective was to drive up to the IJselmeer and cut off all the troops in Western Holland. Then in a later operation the allies had a very good starting point for their attack towards the Ruhr.

Another important factor in the desicion of Eisenhower to go ahead with Market Garden were the V2 rocket attacks on London. Eisenhower was under a lot of pressure of the Brits to make an end to it and by cutting of the western part of Holland the attacks would stop. Because of Market Garden there were no launches for a number of weeks but after the operation failed the launches started again.

It remains to be seen if XXXcorps had enough troops left for the attack from Arnhem to the IJselmeer (another 50+ km) but this we'll never know...

[Arjuna]

Great discussion guys. Keep it up.

I'll throw in a few comments just to stir things up. First off I have to agree Antwerp was strategically vital. IMO the single biggest strategic mistake made by the Allies in 1944 was their failure to get Antwerp operational asap. Responsibility for this rests primarily with Eisonhower. While he had a million and one things on his mind, he took his eye off this one. IMO getting Antwerp up and running should have been the number on priority for Allied forces after the Normandy breakout. The logistic tail wags the operational dog of mechanised forces. That's a fact of life. Sure Eisonhower had tasked Monty's forces to do it and they had failed to seize the opportunity originally presented. But given its significance Eisonhower should have been paying close attention to this objective. Like Monty during Market Garden he failed to do so.

Re the Single thrust debate. For all of Monty's shortcomings ( and he had many ) he was in no way deluded about the need for more than one road to supply his armies. The original plan envisaged three corps advancing together, with 12th on the left and 8th on the right protecting the flanks of 30th Corps. The flank Corps never made the same progress primarily because of lack of supplies. Had these been forthcoming, by reigning in Bradley's army group then I believe it would have been sucessful and there would have been sufficient force to force the Rhine and encircle the Ruhr from the north. What then should have happened would be for the 2nd Army Group to pause and priority of supplies given to Bradley so he could complete the encirclement from the South.

Put simply there was not enough supplies ( without Antwerp ) to keep more than one Army Group going flat chat at a time. The trick then is to keep the Germans off balance by shifting emphasis from one sector to another. In other words use a series of rolling punches. This is what the Soviets did to great effect in the East. More ground is made that way than equal pressure across the whole front.

[The_MadMan]

The most important reason why 8th corps on the right could not protect the right flank was because Patton refused to stop his attack. Thus 8th corps could focus it's actions on XXXcorps but had to do two tasks at once (protect Pattons left flank and advance along with XXXcorps).

[madmickey]

ORIGINAL: The_MadMan

The most important reason why 8th corps on the right could not protect the right flank was because Patton refused to stop his attack. Thus 8th corps could focus it's actions on XXXcorps but had to do two tasks at once (protect Pattons left flank and advance along with XXXcorps).

The First US Army was on the 3 army left and the 3 army was far to the south.

First I am a Canadian so I am used to the British empire lore. I have heard enough about the falise gap. The Canadian were supposed to reached Falise they did not do not blame the Americans for that.

[madmickey]

ORIGINAL: Arjuna

Great discussion guys. Keep it up.

I'll throw in a few comments just to stir things up. First off I have to agree Antwerp was strategically vital. IMO the single biggest strategic mistake made by the Allies in 1944 was their failure to get Antwerp operational asap. Responsibility for this rests primarily with Eisonhower. While he had a million and one things on his mind, he took his eye off this one. IMO getting Antwerp up and running should have been the number on priority for Allied forces after the Normandy breakout. The logistic tail wags the operational dog of mechanised forces. That's a fact of life. Sure Eisonhower had tasked Monty's forces to do it and they had failed to seize the opportunity originally presented. But given its significance Eisonhower should have been paying close attention to this objective. Like Monty during Market Garden he failed to do so.

Re the Single thrust debate. For all of Monty's shortcomings ( and he had many ) he was in no way deluded about the need for more than one road to supply his armies. The original plan envisaged three corps advancing together, with 12th on the left and 8th on the right protecting the flanks of 30th Corps. The flank Corps never made the same progress primarily because of lack of supplies. Had these been forthcoming, by reigning in Bradley's army group then I believe it would have been sucessful and there would have been sufficient force to force the Rhine and encircle the Ruhr from the north. What then should have happened would be for the 2nd Army Group to pause and priority of supplies given to Bradley so he could complete the encirclement from the South.

Put simply there was not enough supplies ( without Antwerp ) to keep more than one Army Group going flat chat at a time. The trick then is to keep the Germans off balance by shifting emphasis from one sector to another. In other words use a series of rolling punches. This is what the Soviets did to great effect in the East. More ground is made that way than equal pressure across the whole front.

Eisenhower was a political general. Politics meaning he got along with people. He was not a strategic thinker. He and Bradley dropped the ball badly in not protecting the Ardennes and not allowing a cutoff of German forces at the base of the Bulge. Monty could have easy cutoff German approach to the Scheldt estuary when he approached Antwerp. Reasonable goals for end of fall of 1944 was to clear Antwerp have continuos line approaching the Rhine from the center and south clear the Siegfried line. Holland is terrible tank country and the 2nd Army gave over control of Holland to 1 Canadian Army.

Even with a couple roads a single envelopment is just too easy to stop or worse cutoff and encircle itself especially when you can use the sea in a single envelopment. The area covering the original Army group in the east had as many troops as the whole of the Western front. The Russian also knew you needed a double encirclement to cutoff German troops (e.g. Stalingrad it helps when weak Axis country protects your flank, Bagdration and Korsun). The Russian also lacked sufficient truck transport for all fronts to move together.

To approach fron the south the Americans would have to clear the Siegfried and approach the rhine. That took several month to happen.

[Tzar007]

ORIGINAL: madmickey

Eisenhower was a political general. Politics meaning he got along with people. He was not a strategic thinker.

Don't want to get our debate pushed on a different track, but let me just say how much this is true. Eisenhower is much too often evaluated from a military perspective rather than from a political one. His position as Supreme Allied Commander was 90% politics, 10% military. And don't make a mistake about it, politics are as important as military affairs at this level.

He had to hold the Coalition together and make sure all the different national armys could work together in a satisfactory fashion, and I think he did a wonderful job at that. Just think about how difficult it must have been dealing with overstretched egos such as Monty or De Gaulle...

[madmickey]

ORIGINAL: Tzar007

ORIGINAL: madmickey

Eisenhower was a political general. Politics meaning he got along with people. He was not a strategic thinker.

Don't want to get our debate pushed on a different track, but let me just say how much this is true. Eisenhower is much too often evaluated from a military perspective rather than from a political one. His position as Supreme Allied Commander was 90% politics, 10% military. And don't make a mistake about it, politics are as important as military affairs at this level.

He had to hold the Coalition together and make sure all the different national armys could work together in a satisfactory fashion, and I think he did a wonderful job at that. Just think about how difficult it must have been dealing with overstretched egos such as Monty or De Gaulle...

I agree with you that Ike was a good choice as Supreme commander.
I was just replying in the last post to blaming Ike instead of Monty about not clearing Antwerp sea approach.
By the way I was a Montreal who moved to Calgary 30 years ago,

[Tzar007]

ORIGINAL: madmickey

I agree with you that Ike was a good choice as Supreme commander.
I was just replying in the last post to blaming Ike instead of Monty about not clearing Antwerp sea approach.
By the way I was a Montreal who moved to Calgary 30 years ago,

You don't miss Montreal too much ? [:)]

By the way, Calgary is doing good so far in the playoffs. Actually, I've bet on them against Vancouver. With Bertuzzi gone, and now Cloutier gone, the Canucks will have a lot of trouble getting through Calgary.

OK, close the parenthesis here. Coming back to Market Garden strategic goals, it seems also that a false sense of invincibility was permeating all the planning of this operation. The Allied Supreme Command basically thought Germany was finished - or rather wanted to believe that Germany was finished - after their almost complete collapse in August in France and Belgium. Retrospectively, it seems foolish to assume that, considering the failure of Market-Garden and the Ardennes offensive of Germany in December 44, but the will to conclude the war by Xmas 44 was strong. This is probably why Allies overlooked the worrying intel reports about concentration of SS troops in Arnhem. Also, it seems there was pressure to use the First Allied Airborne Army in one way or another.

[EricGuitarJames]

Looking at the intel regarding the military situation in September 1944 you can forgive the Western Allies for thinking the war was virtually over. The Germans had suffered catastrophic defeats in the East and the West losing vast numbers of men and quantities of equipment. The strategic bomber offensive was believed to be seriously degrading German factory's capacity for making military ware as well as weakening 'home front' morale. As my old university history tutor used to say 'it's not surprising Germany lost the war so much that they lasted out for so long'.

[Arjuna]

Eric,

Good points.

I agree that politics are inextricably intertwined with military aspects at the Supreme Commander level. No doubt about it. True the number one priority was keeping the coalition alive. But there was no doubt of it unravelling after the destruction of the German forces at Normandy. None of the western allies were going to jump ship now that they all believed they were on a definite winner. So Ike could have and should have been a little more robust in that area and focused more on the military objectives. As I said before the number one military objective following the breakout should have been Antwerp.

It's interesting that you always hear talk of having to placate Monty's huge ego. While this was true, it was equally true that there were huge egos amongst the American commanders which needed placating as well ( and not just Patton's ). In fact and not surprising, Ike favoured these egos and the natural bias for the pusuit of "national glory" despite the compelling military arguments for giving supply priority to the armies aimed at the most important objective. This in my view was where Ike fell short ( albeit not by much ). You need a Supreme Commander who can be objective enough and strong enough to make some tough decisions. I don't think this aspect had been thought through well enough before the sector allocations prior to D Day. In hind sight maybe a better option would have been to have had at least one American Army per Army Group. This may have avoided any bias from manifesting. It certainly could have made it easier for Ike to have favoured a push towards Antwerp. It may have also contributed to better inter-Ally cooperation and the pursuit of a common purpose. The hard part would have been to find an American Army commander prepared to work under Montgommery. The interesting thing is that this too could have been avoided if Alexander had been given the nod for NW European sector over Monty.

Very interesting, hey?!![:)]

[The_MadMan]

ORIGINAL: madmickey

The First US Army was on the 3 army left and the 3 army was far to the south.

First I am a Canadian so I am used to the British empire lore. I have heard enough about the falise gap. The Canadian were supposed to reached Falise they did not do not blame the Americans for that.

What does this have to do with it? [&:]

[RayWolfe]

ORIGINAL: Arjuna
In hind sight maybe a better option would have been to have had at least one American Army per Army Group. This may have avoided any bias from manifesting.

I’ve never heard that suggested elsewhere or considered it even though they did a lot of mixing in Italy. It’s got a touch of brilliance to it, so simple yet cunning (even though you’ve had thirty years to think of it). Baldrick would be proud of you.
Next time you can have a go as supreme commander. [:'(]
Ray

[Golf33]

To Haig, while holding about a square foot of turf:

"Here's the ground we've captured in the last big push, sir."

"Excellent! What scale is it?"

"It's one to one sir; this is the actual piece of ground we captured!"

[X(]

[CriticalMass]

Careful with that irony...it's sharp

ORIGINAL: Golf33

To Haig, while holding about a square foot of turf:

"Here's the ground we've captured in the last big push, sir."

"Excellent! What scale is it?"

"It's one to one sir; this is the actual piece of ground we captured!"

[X(]

[RayWolfe]

ORIGINAL: Golf33
To Haig, while holding about a square foot of turf:
"Here's the ground we've captured in the last big push, sir."
"Excellent! What scale is it?"
"It's one to one sir; this is the actual piece of ground we captured!"
[X(]

I think you’ll find it may have been General Melchet and Captain Darling in Black Adder Goes Fourth [8|]
But, of course, that series was so wonderfully bittersweet. [:(]
Ray