What were they thinking?

[Cap Mandrake]

Question for the knowledgeable. Did the Japanese military REALLY think they could take the DEI, SE Asia, Singapore, the PI and bomb the snot out of PH and then just make nice with everybody? Surely someone had to pencil out the industrial capacity and huge manpower of the US. It seems one of history's most catastrophic miscalculations. At least Barbarossa had a chance of capturing Moscow. Even if two carriers were sunk at Pearl and Midway was taken and PM and Queensland and Samoa etc etc...they STILL would have lost. Maybe FDR would have been booted, but someone would have taken his place. Does Bushido require a disconnect of the analytical mind? It just seems such a waste.

[SunDevil_MatrixForum]

Having lived and studied previously in the United States, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of the Imperial Japanese Navy was not eager to enter into war with that county. Ordered into combat by his country, Yamamoto was the most reluctant of warriors who seemed to know that it was his destiny to fight and die for his Emperor in a lost cause.

"In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success."
Admiral Yamamoto in an interview with Shigeharu Matsumoto, a member of the Japanese Cabinet, 1940

[SunDevil_MatrixForum]

Born: 4 Apr 1884 at Japan

Died: 18 Apr 1943 at Bougainville, Solomon Islands, New Guinea

Overview: Commander of Japanese Combined Fleet for first part of World War II. Shot down and killed by American Air Forces fighters in 1943.

Biography: Admiral Yamamoto was a sophisticated man, well-traveled, educated in Economics at Harvard, and fluent in English. He loved to play poker.

He served under Admiral Tojo in the Russo-Japanese War, and was present at the battle of Tsushima in 1905.

Between the wars, he struggled against the battleship admiral to get the carriers he knew the Japanese Navy needed. He became Minister of The Japanese Navy in 1938.

Yamamoto's personal preference was to avoid war with the United States. He respected American industrial capacity, and doubted that Japanese industrial resources could handle a protracted conflict with the United States. Once the decision for war was made, he dilligently pursued victory.

He planned the air raid on Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto then organized the invasion of the Soloman Islands and New Guinea. He then raided British colonies such as Ceylon.
He also planned the major campaign to capture Midway, which resulted in a disastrous defeat for Japan.

Yamamoto was killed on April 18, 1943, when the transport he was riding was downed near Bougainville by USAAF P-38's from Guadalcanal. The mission was specially designed to strike a blow against the war-fighting ability and morale of the enemy, and was made possible by "Magic", the code-breaking effort against the Japanese naval codes.

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: SunDevil

Having lived and studied previously in the United States, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of the Imperial Japanese Navy was not eager to enter into war with that county. Ordered into combat by his country, Yamamoto was the most reluctant of warriors who seemed to know that it was his destiny to fight and die for his Emperor in a lost cause.

"In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success."
Admiral Yamamoto in an interview with Shigeharu Matsumoto, a member of the Japanese Cabinet, 1940

"In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success."

This is exactly my point. He was almost right about the 6-12 month time frame (Midway can hardly be termed "running wild")....but what business does he have puting the conditional conjunction "if" in his second sentence?

[SunDevil_MatrixForum]

Because he can not see into the future. He figured if he destroyed the pacific fleet, which by the way he almost did in Midway (pure luck for the americans, if anyone watched command decisions on History channel last week) he figured that the Americans would have no way to prevent him from expansion and hence a two front war would sue for peace to focus on Germany.

[brisd]

One reason Yamamoto was so eager to defeat the US Navy in a decisive battle (in this case, Midway), was he wanted a very strong negotiating position so that Japan could then try to negotiate, make concessions and try to end the war prior to US strength destroying Japan. One thing we must remember is that in Dec 41 Germany seemed on the verge of conquering the USSR and thus dominating Europe. Japan felt that if USA was faced with two major enemies, Japan could negotiate a peace where she got to keep most of her conquests. US and Japan relations were bad mostly due to her aggression in China and then her allying with the Axis. Both sides felt they couldn't back down and Japan struck back when the oil embargo took effect. Ask this question: if Germany had defeated USSR and made Britain sue for peace, Japan had conquered or made puppet states of India and Australia, would USA have insisted on unconditional surrender?
It was an insane move on Japan's part, dominated by an military-industrial interests that had taken over their government. Hmmm, sounds like current USA to me. I'd go on about that but that is another topic altogether.

[dtravel]

I think it is a little unfair to claim that bushido required a "disconnect" of the rational mind. But to answer your question, "yes".

The Japanese grand strategic plan was to "shock and awe" the Allies into quitting. They thought that losing the vast amount of territory they planned to take during the first six months combined with the losses they believed they would be able to inflict on the initial counter-attacks would be enough to demoralize their enemies into negotiating a peace settlement that would be favorable to them. The part of the attack on Pearl in this plan was to disable the US Navy, delaying their ability to interfere for the critical first few months as well as part of the demoralizing.

The fatal flaw in all of this was an assumption that has been made by MANY combatants throughout history. That an enemy can be made to give up much more easily than is true in real life. They (IMHO) really were not prepared in any way for the wrath of the American people because they saw the "softness" and "laziness" of the common American in peace. With their own long tradition of a warrior caste with well understood "rules of war", they really couldn't understand the truely terrifying force that is the "Citizen Soldier". The professional Japanese soldiers saw the Pacific War as just one more conflict in a long, ongoing series. The American response was more like that of a farming community suddenly faced with a pack of rabid wolves. "Kill every last one of them so our wives and children will be safe and we can go back to our fields." The "Japanese will only be spoken in Hell" sentiment was not exactly uncommon or unpopular. To a large extent I'm sure many saw it as just simple common sense. Eliminate the threat. Forever.

[von Murrin]

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

"In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success."

This is exactly my point. He was almost right about the 6-12 month time frame (Midway can hardly be termed "running wild")....but what business does he have puting the conditional conjunction "if" in his second sentence?

Actually what makes it so stunning as a prediction are Midway and Guadalcanal. Midway was fought almost precisely six months after PH and the first real considerations for withdrawal from Guadalcanal came within weeks of the first aniversary of the PH raid.

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: SunDevil

Because he can not see into the future. He figured if he destroyed the pacific fleet, which by the way he almost did in Midway (pure luck for the americans, if anyone watched command decisions on History channel last week) he figured that the Americans would have no way to prevent him from expansion and hence a two front war would sue for peace to focus on Germany.

And I am saying he was full of it. Let's say he did sink 5 old BB's and got REALLY lucky and sunk 2 carriers. He would indeed mop up in the South Pacific and the PI would fall and Singapore etc etc...but then what? The idea that after suffering so much pain, an American President or Congress or even the citizenry would put up with a humiliating peace treaty is hogwash. Once he was in the fight...I dont blame him for being aggressive at Midway, but the idea that the US was going to slink away is where the "military genius" part loses some credibility.

[SunDevil_MatrixForum]

Well misunderstanding your opponents culture is something that has happened throughout history, can anyone say Iraq?

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: von Murrin

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

"In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success."

This is exactly my point. He was almost right about the 6-12 month time frame (Midway can hardly be termed "running wild")....but what business does he have puting the conditional conjunction "if" in his second sentence?

Actually what makes it so stunning as a prediction are Midway and Guadalcanal. Midway was fought almost precisely six months after PH and the first real considerations for withdrawal from Guadalcanal came within weeks of the first aniversary of the PH raid.

To an extent you are right..he missed his prediction by only one day (Midway was one day short of 6 months after PH) and Midway might have gone the other way, but I dont think he thought he was going to get his butt kicked in 6 months.

[SunDevil_MatrixForum]

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success

You make this last comment after you quoted what he said....

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: SunDevil

Well misunderstanding your opponents culture is something that has happened throughout history, can anyone say Iraq?

Now, now...dont get us closed down [;)]

[Kitakami]

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

ORIGINAL: SunDevil

Because he can not see into the future. He figured if he destroyed the pacific fleet, which by the way he almost did in Midway (pure luck for the americans, if anyone watched command decisions on History channel last week) he figured that the Americans would have no way to prevent him from expansion and hence a two front war would sue for peace to focus on Germany.

And I am saying he was full of it. Let's say he did sink 5 old BB's and got REALLY lucky and sunk 2 carriers. He would indeed mop up in the South Pacific and the PI would fall and Singapore etc etc...but then what? The idea that after suffering so much pain, an American President or Congress or even the citizenry would put up with a humiliating peace treaty is hogwash. Once he was in the fight...I dont blame him for being aggressive at Midway, but the idea that the US was going to slink away is where the "military genius" part loses some credibility.

Well...

You are speaking about a Japanese military man that was born in the 19th century. To put it in your own terms, he was not "full of it" by the standards of his time. Otherwise, the US would not have considered it important to kill him with the P-38s. Please understand our current thinking has little to do with how most Americans thought in the forties, and much less with what Japanese thought back then. There were things like the America First commitee, the Monroe Doctrine, and other such phylosophies that we find strange today, and yet back then they were considered important elements of American culture. As for the Japanese, the concept of face, although still strong today, was of the utmost importance for Japanese military men of the early twentieth century.

Just my 2 cents

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: SunDevil

In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success

You make this last comment after you quoted what he said....

Quite clearly he percieved Japan could not win a protracted struggle, but what prevented him from making his point more forcefully? Did he not have allies within the military? Was everybody a "yes man"? My point is that somebody must surely have done a tally of shipbuilding capacity, and steelmaking capacity and oil self-sufficiency and machine tools and available capital etc etc etc of the US. What was needed was a really clean Powerpoint presentation with a graph of US industrial production going through the roof in 6 months.

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: Kitakami

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

ORIGINAL: SunDevil

Because he can not see into the future. He figured if he destroyed the pacific fleet, which by the way he almost did in Midway (pure luck for the americans, if anyone watched command decisions on History channel last week) he figured that the Americans would have no way to prevent him from expansion and hence a two front war would sue for peace to focus on Germany.

And I am saying he was full of it. Let's say he did sink 5 old BB's and got REALLY lucky and sunk 2 carriers. He would indeed mop up in the South Pacific and the PI would fall and Singapore etc etc...but then what? The idea that after suffering so much pain, an American President or Congress or even the citizenry would put up with a humiliating peace treaty is hogwash. Once he was in the fight...I dont blame him for being aggressive at Midway, but the idea that the US was going to slink away is where the "military genius" part loses some credibility.

Well...

You are speaking about a Japanese military man that was born in the 19th century. To put it in your own terms, he was not "full of it" by the standards of his time. Otherwise, the US would not have considered it important to kill him with the P-38s. Please understand our current thinking has little to do with how most Americans thought in the forties, and much less with what Japanese thought back then. There were things like the America First commitee, the Monroe Doctrine, and other such phylosophies that we find strange today, and yet back then they were considered important elements of American culture. As for the Japanese, the concept of face, although still strong today, was of the utmost importance for Japanese military men of the early twentieth century.

Just my 2 cents

Oh..I think you hit it on the head. Once the thing started there was no turning back, but to make that decision requires the suspension of rational decision-making.

BTW..the analogy to the Monroe Doctrine seems somewhat strained. There may have been jingoistic bluster but nobody was advocating a bombardment of Portsmouth or Le Havre or Kiel.

[Bodhi]

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake
What was needed was a really clean Powerpoint presentation with a graph of US industrial production going through the roof in 6 months.

Don't think Powerpoint presentations were part of the concensus building process in Japan at that time. [:D]

[brisd]

Yamamoto faced great opposition to his views of America and prospects of success vs her. He stated the only way to defeat USA was to dictate peace at the White House and he did his best. His life had been threatened by Army hotheads and other ultranationalists to the point that his appointment to command the Combined Fleet saved his life from assassins!
He was a man of his times, he fought for his country despite not much hope for success. Many patriots have done the same for their nations.

[Cap Mandrake]

ORIGINAL: Bodhi

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake
What was needed was a really clean Powerpoint presentation with a graph of US industrial production going through the roof in 6 months.

Don't think Powerpoint presentations were part of the concensus building process in Japan at that time. [:D]

Oh...were Microsoft products on the embargo list too?

[dtravel]

ORIGINAL: Bodhi

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake
What was needed was a really clean Powerpoint presentation with a graph of US industrial production going through the roof in 6 months.

Don't think Powerpoint presentations were part of the concensus building process in Japan at that time. [:D]

Be thankful for that. (I saw not too long ago the results of someone making a Powerpoint presentation out of the Gettysburg Address. )