Tommy by Richard Holmes

[oi_you_nutter]

just started reading "Tommy - The British Soldier On The Western Front, 1914-1918" by Richard Holmes

its a history of the Bristh soldier rather than a history of the BEF

so far its a gripping read although in the introduction the author does make some interesting comments concerning the revisionist views of WW1 by different historians at different times since the war ended. regardless of what some historians think, IMHO the tactics employed by Haig were a waste of men and material, he did have alternatives, he just didnt try them.

now that my interest in WW1 has been revived and until GoA comes out, I will have to try one of the WW1 TAOW scenarios.

[TheBlackhorse]

ORIGINAL: oi_you_nutter

regardless of what some historians think, IMHO the tactics employed by Haig were a waste of men and material, he did have alternatives, he just didnt try them.

And what might those "alternatives" have been?

[oi_you_nutter]

the 64,000 dollar question is what else could they have done ?

at the tactical level the Germans were more innovative in offensive tactics and weapons, the ironty was that the Western Allies did use many of these tactics and weapons back against the originators.

the Germans invented/introduced
flamethrowers
poison gas
sub-machine gun
storm troop tactics

the Germans were on the defensive most of the time, the Entente were attacking, apart from the British invention of the tank the Germans seemed to contribute more innovation to offensive actions than those who were doing the attacking.

the onus was on the attackers to be innovative, learn lessons and adapt their offensive tactics. Million shell artillery barrages didnt cut the barbed wire and leave the enemy dazed and confused, so why did they persist in trying them again and again ? did it really take 3-4 years before offensive tactics and training had advanced enough for creeping barrages, box barrages and better small unit tactics etc ?

on the strategic level, the western front was the main theatre of war, large areas of France and Belguim were occupied so the political and military plan was to liberate those areas from defenders who were patient to sit back and defend. hence the slaughter of immense scale in a battle of attrition.

Gallipoli and Salonika were thought to be war winning side-shows that failed before they started. better planning, intelligence and execution would have helped.

other strategic alternatives could be attacking Germany itself, forcing the German fleet to fight, taking on the other members of the Central Powers, attacking the U-boat production and bases.

if the war had continued into 1919, would the Entente have enough of an numerical and equipment advantage to cause a true military defeat of Germany ?

[The Dude]

read infantry tactics of the western front in ww1.

for instance
It breaks down these million shell barrages into their actual fireplan, analyzes them and explains why certain barrages failed and why some did. Very interesting read.

The company assault groups and their layout are fundamentally the same as what we practice today ( by we i mean the cdn army and the reserve light infantry at that)

[mlees]

ORIGINAL: oi_you_nutter

the 64,000 dollar question is what else could they have done ?

at the tactical level the Germans were more innovative in offensive tactics and weapons, the ironty was that the Western Allies did use many of these tactics and weapons back against the originators.

the Germans invented/introduced
flamethrowers
poison gas
sub-machine gun
storm troop tactics

the Germans were on the defensive most of the time, the Entente were attacking, apart from the British invention of the tank the Germans seemed to contribute more innovation to offensive actions than those who were doing the attacking.

Agreed.

the onus was on the attackers to be innovative, learn lessons and adapt their offensive tactics. Million shell artillery barrages didnt cut the barbed wire and leave the enemy dazed and confused, so why did they persist in trying them again and again ?

Hindsight is 20/20. It was unclear at the time why the barrages where not working. Most of 1915 (and the first half of 1916) was spent building up ever more reserves of manpower and ammunition, as well as retooling the economies to a war footing/production. (In the beginning of 1915, an artillery battery was going through it's allotment of ammo in just 2 hours...) High trajectory mortars and such also needed to be mass produced. (Germany started with less than 100 total in their inventory in 1915.)

did it really take 3-4 years before offensive tactics and training had advanced enough for creeping barrages, box barrages and better small unit tactics etc ?

Short answer: Yup.

on the strategic level, the western front was the main theatre of war, large areas of France and Belguim were occupied so the political and military plan was to liberate those areas from defenders who were patient to sit back and defend. hence the slaughter of immense scale in a battle of attrition.

Agreed. There was political pressure for the generals of both sides to show progress towards victory. Kinda like nowadays...

Gallipoli and Salonika were thought to be war winning side-shows that failed before they started. better planning, intelligence and execution would have helped.

Never-the-less, these sideshows, which were attempts to strategically "outflank" the Central Powers, showed that some innovative thinking was taking place, just that they were poorly planned on the tactical/operational level. These side shows had to compete for rescources with the needs of the main fronts.

other strategic alternatives could be attacking Germany itself,

Not likely, considering the lack of true amphibious assault capabilities and tactics on the part of the Entente. Otherwise Gallipoli would have been done better, for example.

forcing the German fleet to fight,

The fleet can always hide behind the harbor forts, mines, subs, and torpedo boats, while the attacking fleet was much further from its own base support/rescue. It was sufficient to neutralise the enemy fleet's ability to affect the war.

taking on the other members of the Central Powers,

That was what the "sideshows" in Gallipoli, Salonika, Palestine, and Kuwait/Iraq. Unfortunately, the defenders were able to defend more successfully than the attackers hoped/expected...

attacking the U-boat production and bases.

Already addressed under "attacking Germany directly" and "forcing the High Seas fleet to fight".

if the war had continued into 1919, would the Entente have enough of an numerical and equipment advantage to cause a true military defeat of Germany ?

Absolutely. The American army and industry was still expanding rapidly by the Armistice.

Part of what caused the war to drag on so long, In My Humble Opinion, was the policy of both alliances to adopt victory conditions/demands that amounted to decisive defeat and dismemberment of the enemy. (Conditions that the enemy would not accept without being completely overrun.)

[wodin]

ORIGINAL: oi_you_nutter

just started reading "Tommy - The British Soldier On The Western Front, 1914-1918" by Richard Holmes

its a history of the Bristh soldier rather than a history of the BEF

so far its a gripping read although in the introduction the author does make some interesting comments concerning the revisionist views of WW1 by different historians at different times since the war ended. regardless of what some historians think, IMHO the tactics employed by Haig were a waste of men and material, he did have alternatives, he just didnt try them.

now that my interest in WW1 has been revived and until GoA comes out, I will have to try one of the WW1 TAOW scenarios.

Fantastic book.

Im reading The Somme by Peter Hart at the moment, another great read.