Is reading a "fact" in the Osprey volume about UK WW2 Battlecruisers receivable too? Because it doesn't strenghten your position neither, sorry to say so...Extreme BS answer,do you actually beign there to know that or you read that "fact" on combinedfleet.com
here is the official RN report about the loss of the Hood - extracts can be seen there: http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... to144.html
Conclusions
We conclude
(1) That the sinking of Hood was due to a hit from Bismarck's 15-inch shell in or adjacent to Hood's 4-inch or 15-inch magazines, causing them all to explode and wreck the after part of the ship. The probability is that the 4-inch magazines exploded first.
(2) There is no conclusive evidence that one or two torpedo warheads detonated or exploded simultaneously with the magazines, or at any other time, but the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. We consider that if they had done so their effect would not have been so disastrous as to cause the immediate destruction of the ship, and on the whole, we are of the opinion that they did not.
(3) That the fire that was seen on Hood's Boat Deck, and in which UP and/or 4-inch ammunition was certainly involved, was not the cause of her loss.
Note nowadays conclusions are a little different, here an exemple of counter-expertise
http://www.warship.org/no21987.htm
Are these new "FACTS" from this "source" objective enough this time about the lucky shoot thesis? The Hood was a BC, its deck armor was this of a BC, and therefore ok, let's say there is no lucky shoot thing, you're right: it was a BC, and died like any BC would die in front of a BB: he blew up after a diving salvo in the face, and maybe a little earlier than other because he was unlucky enough to get hit at the wrong place. That surely doesn't make the Bismarck able to tear the Iowa or the Yamato apart with three salvoes by the way [:D]Probable Cause:
The exact origin of the explosion is now, and shall probably always remain, somewhat in doubt. An examination of the actual testimony of witnesses shows that although a preponderance felt that the explosion came from forward of Hood's mainmast, this opinion was by no means universal. Statistically, about 42% saw the explosion as originating forward of the mainmast, 16% saw it originating at the mainmast, and 21% either saw it originating aft of the mainmast or someplace else entirely. Some witnesses associated the explosion with a fall of shot from Bismarck, but, as we have seen, a very significant proportion did not.
Given the conflicting and confusing evidence that has been presented, is there nonetheless a "most probable" explanation for the loss of Hood that reconciles the observations of witnesses with the geometry of the ship, and with the course of the action? I believe there is. The first significant bit of evidence is that to most witnesses the blast was essentially noiseless, or at least lacking a noticeable "bang." The "bang" of an explosion is caused by the creation of a supersonic shockwave, and is necessarily absent when burning occurs, even very rapid burning indeed. The noiselessness of the explosion constitutes strong circumstantial evidence that the fatal blast was caused not by the detonation of Hood's shells or torpedoes but by the more or less rapid combustion of her propellants. It is probably no coincidence that a very similar noiselessness was associated with the explosion of USS Arizona's propellant magazines at Pearl Harbor. This conclusion is in accordance with the findings of the original boards. Assuming that a shell or shells from Bismarck precipitated the disaster, this also explains the short delay that witnesses noted between the arrival of Bismarck's fatal salvo and the first evidence of the blast, and may in fact explain why many did not causally connect the two events. The burning rate of typical gun propellant is closely related to the surrounding pressure and temperature, and except in a very tightly enclosed space - such as the breech of a gun - take a considerable time to "build up steam." In fact, if venting is adequate, most gun propellants are surprisingly hard to ignite and unspectacular in their combustion.
In the absence of any other possible energy source, like the boards, I have concluded that it is most probable that Hood was relatively slowly rent apart over a period of perhaps a second by the uncontrolled burning of the propellants in her after magazines. Although the actual position of the hit and the subsequent path of the projectile through the ship are problematical, it is clear that there are several routes by which one of Bismarck's 380mm shells might have reached the after magazines. Again, like the boards, I have also concluded that the most probable cause of the final blast was a hit from a single 380mm projectile from Bismarck.
The general consensus of witnesses was that the explosion seemed to originate in the vicinity of the mainmast, some distance forward of the after magazines. The orthographic diagram shows that there is one place where a shell falling slightly short could have passed through the after engine room and detonated in or near the magazines located immediately adjacent to its after bulkhead at station 280. Yet another possibility is that it passed through the 178mm belt before detonating in essentially the same place. If this occurred, and ignition of the propellant in the magazines followed from it, then a large part of the rapidly expanding gas bubble would have taken the path of least resistance and vented into the engineering spaces immediately forward of this area. For a time the sheer inertia of Hood's structure would have slowed expansion in any other direction. Once the expanding gasses had reached the engine rooms, the quickest exits to the outside would have been the series of massive exhaust vents located on the centerline immediately forward and aft of the mainmast. These huge ducts, changing in size and shape as they rose through the ship ended in roughly square vents 1.8 meters on a side on the boat deck. It was as spectacular, near-vertical columns of flame from these vents near the mainmast, foreshortened to observers on surrounding ships, that the explosion first became visible. Shortly thereafter, the entire stern of the ship exploded.90
At the time of the blast, the Boards of inquiry calculated the "X" 15-in magazine contained about 49 tons of cordite, "Y" magazine contained 45 tons, and the 4-in magazines contained about 18.5 tons. The uncontrolled burning of this quantity of propellant in the after magazines might have slowed briefly as the volume of the engineering spaces served as a space into which the gasses could expand, and as the vents directed much of the combustion products outboard. But although this expansion and venting could temporarily relieve the pressure, it could never be enough to prevent an explosion from eventually tearing the ship apart.91 Ironically, the chemical energy stored in the battlecruiser's after magazines - enough to lift her enemy over a kilometer in the air had it been employed to do so - had instead destroyed the Hood herself.
