Coastal Defense Guns

[el cid again]

Only CD units should really be able to engage ships. Plain Field Artillery units should only be effective in firing at actual landings (troops on the beach). This is represented poorly in the game.

Good post - with which I have only one quibble: The game does seem to actually FORBID army artillery to engage anything but landings. The key seems to be in the device classification - if it is a "naval gun" it is treated differently than if it is an "army weapon." And since SOME field guns (in existing databases - not mine) are "naval guns" - maybe you are talking about them? However, the only cases I know of are US field guns for some reason classified as "naval guns." The Japanese don't have such field guns. Aside from the fact the "modeled poorly" evaluation seems to be a bum rap, I am not sure I agree field guns cannot be effective. Do you think it was ONLY the Russians who used "pattern shots" from field guns vs ships? [A pattern shot is a pattern designed to put the target in a potential hit situation regardless of its maneuver. If you know its course and speed, you can estimate its maneuvering space. This is done on precalculated tables. It was universally taught in Cold War era communist nations - but I have not seen such a thing in US or Japanese literature.] By the time I was sailing, field guns were regarded as deadly in CD work.

[el cid again]

Thanks Nik. Just so. The routine is intended to allow a commander to elect not to send unarmored ships in - not because they should not be beat up if they go in - but because they SHOULD BE!

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

How am I incorrect? The entire thing was instigated because one either had to send in armored ships without escorts (to keep the escorts from being slaughtered)




A statement which does not mean the same thing as:

quote:


This is a sure sign that the designers felt the guns were overpowered and a toggle can fix it


Wrong. The feature was added not because the designers felt the guns were overpowered but because the routine was not flexible enough to allow bombardment TF's to have a proper escort and not subject the unarmored warships to punishment from coastal defenses

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Only CD units should really be able to engage ships. Plain Field Artillery units should only be effective in firing at actual landings (troops on the beach). This is represented poorly in the game.

Good post - with which I have only one quibble: The game does seem to actually FORBID army artillery to engage anything but landings. The key seems to be in the device classification - if it is a "naval gun" it is treated differently than if it is an "army weapon." And since SOME field guns (in existing databases - not mine) are "naval guns" - maybe you are talking about them? However, the only cases I know of are US field guns for some reason classified as "naval guns." The Japanese don't have such field guns. Aside from the fact the "modeled poorly" evaluation seems to be a bum rap, I am not sure I agree field guns cannot be effective. Do you think it was ONLY the Russians who used "pattern shots" from field guns vs ships? [A pattern shot is a pattern designed to put the target in a potential hit situation regardless of its maneuver. If you know its course and speed, you can estimate its maneuvering space. This is done on precalculated tables. It was universally taught in Cold War era communist nations - but I have not seen such a thing in US or Japanese literature.] By the time I was sailing, field guns were regarded as deadly in CD work.

CID. I have no idea what the "database" of WITP says on the subject. I looked at it closely when I first got the game and saw so many numbers that made no sense compared to each other that I gave up even looking at it until or unless 2by3 provided a "key" to what they meant and how they interacted. I'll have to go back and look to see if it has 2 entries for a US M1A1 155mm gun (Long Tom). If they have a normal and a CD version, maybe they did better than I think. I noticed at that time they didn't seem to have the US model 1919 240mm Howitzer in the database at all. If someone put them in, I hope they were as "naval" or CD weapons. It's the only way they were used in the Pacific that I know of.

As to a Field Gun being "effective", I'm sure they would do some damage if they hit. But unless the target was close (direct fire range) the fire control wouldn't allow them to "hold" a moving target with any degree of success. They might fire preplanned "patterns" into a specific area (like a narrow strait) with some effect, but in general their fire control systems just weren't built to handle the continuous shifts in relative position of a naval-type Fire Control System. They had no normal need for such capability. When the US made use of some "Field-type" guns in a CD role, they were put on pre-surveyed and plotted special mountings and tied into Naval Fire Control systems.

[Dereck]

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

If Morrison write about destroyers attacking from short range heavy defended and well prepared to defence base, like Truk or Rabaul - he is definetly wrong. Nothing of that ever happened.

This is from History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 6, page 420:

Five destroyers of Captain Simpson's Squadron 12 threw the first ship bombardment into Rabaul on the night of 17-18 February. Under heavy cloud-wrack and through frequent rain squals the destroyers, guided by SG radar (that great gift of God and the double-domes to mariners), entered St. George Channel before midnight, steamed around Duke of York Island in search of shipping, and fired 3868 rounds of 5-inch on Rabaul town, installations and supply areas during the midwatch of 18 February, while steaming 20 knots under a smoke screen. They also launched 15 torpedoes against shipping in Blanche Bay. Shore batteries opened up on the destroyers about five minutes after the bombardment commenced, but made no hits. After this exhibition of courage and good seamanship, Simpson retired at 30 knots.

According to the book between 17 and 29 February 1944, Destroyer Squadrons 12, 22, 23 and 45 bombarded both Kavieng and Rabaul on three occasions. The only damage suffered by US destroyers were made by Jap shore batteries at Kavieng where they made hits on the Buchanan and Farenholt.

From History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 6, page 421-22:

FInally Captain Earle's Squadron 45, thoroughly fed up with the "milk run" duty in the III Amphibious Force, was let in the bombardment game. The full squadron left Purvis Bay 23 February, fueled at Stirling Harbor and entered St. George Channel at 2330 on the 24th. East of Cape Gazelle the senior division continued in a westerly direction along the south coast of New Ireland, while COmmander E.B. Taylor's division (Anthony, flag) headed straight in for Rabaul. Between 0030 and 0100 February 25, Taylor made three runs across the front of Vunapope area, where military stores were stacked high and deep. Coastal batteries replied, but made no hits.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Thanks Nik. Just so. The routine is intended to allow a commander to elect not to send unarmored ships in - not because they should not be beat up if they go in - but because they SHOULD BE!

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

How am I incorrect? The entire thing was instigated because one either had to send in armored ships without escorts (to keep the escorts from being slaughtered)




A statement which does not mean the same thing as:

quote:


This is a sure sign that the designers felt the guns were overpowered and a toggle can fix it


Wrong. The feature was added not because the designers felt the guns were overpowered but because the routine was not flexible enough to allow bombardment TF's to have a proper escort and not subject the unarmored warships to punishment from coastal defenses

Thanks Nik. Just so. The routine is intended to allow a commander to elect not to send unarmored ships in - not because they should not be beat up if they go in - but because they SHOULD BE!

Not against non dedicated non CD units! For the love of gawd!

[treespider]

Just picked up John Wukovits - Pacific Alamo - The Battle for Wake Island.

Interesting account of the 1st Japanese attempt to invade on December 11, 1941.


In summary -

USMC had three(3) two gun 5 inch batteries on Wake for a total of six 5 inch guns.

The Japanese had bombed Wake for three days with aircraft.

Major Devereux ordered the batteries to hold fire until his order.

Rear-Admiral Kajioka pulled his TF within 8,000 yards without receiving American fire.

Japanese commence shelling at 8,000 yards.

Close distance to 6,000 yards and continue shelling.

Kajioka orders distance closed to 4500 yards.

At this point Devereux issues orders to fire at will.

Battery A hits Yubari four times damaging the cruiser. A destroyer intercedes and lays smoke and is also hit by Battery A.

Battery L hits Destroyer Hayate with 3rd salvo (without a range finder which was destroyed during Japanese bombardment) and scores a magazine explosion sinking the ship. Before the Japanese are able to pull out of range Battery L scores hits on a second destroyer, one transport and one cruiser.

Battery B scored hits on two of three Japanese destroyers.

By the end of December 11 the atoll's three 5-inch batteries and 4 Wildcats of VMF-211 sank two surface ships and one submarine, as well as damaging seven other ships.

[spence]

Suppressive fire seems to be ignored in the routines. When the Nips came back on 22 Dec they brought along 4 CAs along with what they had before. The Marine shore batteries accomplished little in response to the heavy fire laid down by the reinforced invasion forces.
As mentioned in another thread (re nuclear naval bombardments or some such) the USN bombardment forces in later invasions all but completely suppressed the CD units on the invaded islands...and did pretty useful work suppressing the Japanese field artillery as well.

[treespider]

Spence said:

Suppressive fire seems to be ignored in the routines. When the Nips came back on 22 Dec they brought along 4 CAs along with what they had before. The Marine shore batteries accomplished little in response to the heavy fire laid down by the reinforced invasion forces.

In skimming through the account of the second attack it appears that the japanese did not use Shore bombardment but landed under cover of darkness and kept their surface units out of range of the 5 inch guns. I could not find an account of Japanese shore bombardment in the second attack other than two cruisers being ordered to fire a diversionary bombardment on Peale island who lost there bearings and actually fired the bombardment into the ocean sevral miles away.

As mentioned in another thread (re nuclear naval bombardments or some such) the USN bombardment forces in later invasions all but completely suppressed the CD units on the invaded islands...and did pretty useful work suppressing the Japanese field artillery as well.

One thing I failed to mention was the fact the Americans were amazed that the Japanese came in so close at Wake on Dec 11th. In an interview after the war Devereux said that the Japanese "should've wiped us out with ease."

One of the themes in this section of the book seems to be that the Japanese ship guns from the December 11th force could easily out range the US 5" CD guns.

I don't recall but the routine in the game whereby the player can decide whether escorts bombard or not applies to what ships...CL and smaller or Destroyer and smaller?

Perhaps the routine should have be based on range instead of ship class if we really wanted to micro-manage. Afterall we are able to set AC altitude in 1000' increments.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: treespider

Spence said:

Suppressive fire seems to be ignored in the routines. When the Nips came back on 22 Dec they brought along 4 CAs along with what they had before. The Marine shore batteries accomplished little in response to the heavy fire laid down by the reinforced invasion forces.

In skimming through the account of the second attack it appears that the japanese did not use Shore bombardment but landed under cover of darkness and kept their surface units out of range of the 5 inch guns. I could not find an account of Japanese shore bombardment in the second attack other than two cruisers being ordered to fire a diversionary bombardment on Peale island who lost there bearings and actually fired the bombardment into the ocean sevral miles away.

As mentioned in another thread (re nuclear naval bombardments or some such) the USN bombardment forces in later invasions all but completely suppressed the CD units on the invaded islands...and did pretty useful work suppressing the Japanese field artillery as well.

One thing I failed to mention was the fact the Americans were amazed that the Japanese came in so close at Wake on Dec 11th. In an interview after the war Devereux said that the Japanese "should've wiped us out with ease."

One of the themes in this section of the book seems to be that the Japanese ship guns from the December 11th force could easily out range the US 5" CD guns.

I don't recall but the routine in the game whereby the player can decide whether escorts bombard or not applies to what ships...CL and smaller or Destroyer and smaller?

Perhaps the routine should have be based on range instead of ship class if we really wanted to micro-manage. Afterall we are able to set AC altitude in 1000' increments.

Interesting possibility..., just make sure your accuracy falls off as rapidly as your own description indicates " two cruisers being ordered to fire a diversionary bombardment on Peale island who lost there bearings and actually fired the bombardment into the ocean sevral miles away". As the bombardment routine makes virtually all bombardments into high speed night "shoot and scoots", we should have a LOT of "badly bruised ocean" out there.

That's the dichotomy..., get close enough to spot the target and risk being shot at, or stand out at maximum range and drop shells indiscriminately over the area. US preparatory bombardments were generally done slowly in daylight with air spotting and support---which the game makes a somewhat difficult operation to duplicate.

[jwilkerson]

CL and smaller or Destroyer and smaller?

CLs are lumped in with the Big Boys ... not the Escorts ...